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Dassain Nonia And Another v. Ramdeo Prasad Patwa And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rai, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff instituted a title and possession suit (originally on 27 March 1945) against defendants 1 and 2 (Dasain Nonia and his son Chaturbhuj Nonia) for declaration of his title to certain lands and for confirmation/recovery of possession. The plaintiff's case was that the land belonged to the patti of Khan Saheb Mir Mehdi Hussain (Mutawalli of a waqf estate) and that the plaintiff took a permanent settlement by a registered kabuliat dated 8 December 1937 at an annual rental; he received rent receipts from the landlord and was put into possession with boundary pillars. After taking possession the plaintiff improved the land (filled part, built a tatti house, reared fish) and sublet the house to one Saudagar Nonia.
In 1944 defendant No. 1 sued Saudagar in a Small Causes Court (Suit No. 378 of 1944) for arrears of rent of the hut; that suit was decreed on 19 December 1944. The plaintiff then brought the present suit. The plaint was later amended to implead defendants 3–5, alleging that on 23 July 1946 defendants 1 and 2 executed a registered sale deed in favour of purchasers who forcibly constructed a hut on part of the suit land. The relief portion was amended to seek recovery of possession if dispossessed during pendency of the suit.
The learned Munsif dismissed the suit on the ground that the kabuliat conferred no valid title (held to be for building purposes) and because the plaintiff had been settlee from only one of several co-sharers; additionally the Munsif found defendants had failed to prove title but dismissed because plaintiff had acquired no valid title. The plaintiff appealed. The First Additional Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur, allowed the appeal, held that the settlement conferred title (or at least the settlee could remain in possession when the lessor was in exclusive possession) and decreed the suit. Defendants 1 and 2 then appealed in second appeal to this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the registered kabuliat (Exhibit 2) and attendant rent receipts conferred a valid proprietary title on the plaintiff, or whether the settlement was for non-agricultural purposes such that section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply to invalidate a transfer.
- Whether a settlement made by one co-sharer proprietor can confer on a settlee an occupancy right enforceable against others (i.e., whether a settlee induced by one co-sharer can obtain exclusive possession against other co-sharers or must be limited to joint possession or require partition).
- Whether, on the facts, the plaintiff was entitled to recovery of khas possession (exclusive possession) from the defendants who were found by the lower courts to have failed to prove any title.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defendants 1 & 2) Arguments — as presented through Mr. Prem Lall
- The settlement in favour of the plaintiff was for non-agricultural purposes (building a house) and therefore the registered kabuliat did not confer title; reliance was placed on the provisions of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- A settlement by one co-sharer cannot confer occupancy rights enforceable against other co-sharers; reliance was placed on Bibi Kaniz Fatma v. Hussainuddin Ahmad (ILR 22 Pat 382 : AIR 1943 Pat 194, Full Bench).
- Relying on Abdul Kabir v. Mt. Jamila Khatoon (AIR 1951 Pat 315), the plaintiff could at best obtain a decree for joint possession with the defendants rather than exclusive possession.
Plaintiff's Case and Factual Position (as alleged in the plaint and evidence)
- Plaintiff alleged settlement by Mir Mehdi Hussain (Mutawalli) by a registered kabuliat dated 8 December 1937 at an annual rent; received rent receipts in forms conforming to the Bihar Tenancy Act and was put in possession by boundary pillars.
- After settlement the plaintiff cultivated, filled part of the land, constructed a tatti house, reared fish and sublet the house to Saudagar Nonia.
- Plaintiff alleged dispossession by purchasers who had obtained a sale deed from defendants 1 and 2 and had constructed a hut on part of the suit land; sought declaration of title and recovery of possession (including a prayer for recovery if dispossessed during pendency).
The opinion does not set out extended adversarial argument by the plaintiff's counsel in the High Court proceedings; the record records the plaintiff's factual assertions and some of his deposition (quoted) which was relied upon by the court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramkeshwar v. Haricharan, AIR 1947 Pat. 444 | Cited to support the proposition that a plaintiff may be entitled to recover possession from defendants who have no title even if a registered kabuliat had not conferred a valid title under section 107. | The subordinate judge relied on this authority to hold that the plaintiff could get back possession from defendants who had no title even if Exhibit 2 did not confer valid title. The High Court considered the subordinate judge's reliance alongside its own finding that the kabuliat did confer title. |
| Bibi Kaniz Fatma v. Hussainuddin Ahmad, ILR 22 Pat 382 : AIR 1943 Pat 194 (Full Bench) | Held that a person inducted by one co-sharer without consent of all co-sharers is not a raiyat of the entire land and cannot acquire right of occupancy against other co-sharers by long possession. | The court considered this Full Bench decision but distinguished it: here other co-sharers had not objected and the lessor was in exclusive possession; hence the decision did not bar the plaintiff from the relief sought against the defendants who had no title. |
| Abdul Kabir v. Mt. Jamila Khatoon, AIR 1951 Pat 315 | Authority for the proposition that a buyer/claimant who acquires only part interest co-owned may be entitled only to joint possession rather than exclusive possession in certain fact patterns. | The court discussed this decision, set out its facts and distinguished them from the present case (where the entire area was settled with plaintiff by Mir Mehdi Hussain who was in exclusive possession), and held the plaintiff was entitled to khas possession here. |
| Huldhur Sein v. Gooroo Das Roy, 20 W.R. 126 | Authority cited in support of the principle that a co-sharer cannot obtain ejectment of trespassers from entire land but can obtain joint possession to the extent of his share (as applied in other cited cases). | Quoted in the Abdul Kabir discussion as one of the cases illustrating limits on a co-sharer's remedy; the court treated the authorities as fact-dependent and distinguished them from the present facts. |
| Radha Proshad v. Esuf, ILR 7 Cal. 414 : 9 Cal LR 76 | Authority illustrating that where co-sharers support trespassers, plaintiffs may be limited to joint possession. | Referred to in the context of distinguishing earlier authorities relied upon by counsel; the court observed that in those cases co-sharers supported the trespassers, unlike the present case. |
| Naresh Chandra v. Haydar Sheikh Khan, 49 Cal LJ 83 : AIR 1929 Cal 28 | Illustrates that a purchaser of only some co-sharers' rights may be limited to joint possession when other co-owners remain in possession. | Referred to among authorities distinguishing the circumstances where only joint possession is granted; the court held the present facts were different and supported khas possession to the plaintiff. |
| Currimbhoy and Co. Ltd. v. L.A. Creet, AIR 1930 Cal 113 (Divn. Bench) | Holds that one of several co-owners is entitled to maintain an ejectment action against a trespasser without joining the other co-owners. | The court cited this decision (and Sambhu Gossain v. Piyari Mian) as governing the present case and as support for permitting the lessor/lessee to sue ejectment without joining other co-owners when seeking to remove trespassers. |
| Sambhu Gossain v. Piyari Mian, AIR 1941 Pat. 351 | Authority holding that one co-owner may maintain an action in ejectment against a trespasser without joining other co-owners. | The court relied on this decision in holding that the plaintiff (settlee/lessee under Mir Mehdi Hussain in exclusive possession) could maintain ejectment and recover possession against the defendants who had no title. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by reviewing the factual findings of the trial court (Munsif) and the first appellate court (1st Additional Subordinate Judge) and then considered the legal contentions advanced by the appellants. The analysis set out by the court may be summarized in the following steps, as stated in the opinion:
- Evaluation of the nature of the kabuliat: The court examined Exhibit 2 (the registered kabuliat) and the rent receipts (Exhibit 3 series). It quoted the English rendering of a portion of the kabuliat: "It is requisite that I, the executant, shall properly cultivate the said lands and appropriate the produce thereof." From this wording, and the fact that the receipts were printed in accordance with the Bihar Tenancy Act, the court concluded that the settlement was for agricultural purposes. Consequently the contention that the kabuliat was for non-agricultural building purposes (invoking section 107 Transfer of Property Act) was rejected.
- Assessment of plaintiff's deposition: The court noted the plaintiff's deposition phrase "I took this land on settlement for constructing house thereon" but concluded that the deposition might indicate an intention to build in the future; it did not outweigh the clear terms of the kabuliat and the tenancy-form receipts indicating an agricultural settlement.
- On the co-sharer issue: The court considered the argument that a settlement by one co-sharer could not bind other co-sharers. It relied on the factual finding of the subordinate judge that the lessor (Mir Mehdi Hussain) was in exclusive possession of the area settled and that no other co-sharers had objected. The court distinguished the Full Bench decision in Bibi Kaniz Fatma on its facts: that case barred acquisition of occupancy by a person inducted by one co-sharer without consent, but here other co-sharers were not opposing and the lessor had exclusive possession.
- On competing authorities about remedies available to co-sharers: The court examined authorities (including Abdul Kabir and other cited decisions) that in some circumstances restrict a co-sharer's remedy to joint possession. The court emphasized that those decisions were fact-dependent—often where other co-sharers supported the trespassers or where the claimant had only succeeded to part interest. On the present facts (settlement by one co-sharer who had exclusive possession and absence of objection by other co-sharers), the court concluded the plaintiff was entitled to khas (exclusive) possession.
- Reliance on precedents permitting a single co-owner to sue ejectment: The court cited Currimbhoy & Co. Ltd. v. L.A. Creet and Sambhu Gossain v. Piyari Mian for the proposition that one co-owner can maintain an action in ejectment against a trespasser without joining other co-owners, and applied that principle here.
- Title and possession findings: The court agreed with the subordinate judge that the defendants had failed to prove title to the lands in suit and that the plaintiff had proved title and prior possession (including dispossession by the defendants after the Small Causes decree). On these facts and the court's interpretation of the kabuliat, the plaintiff was entitled to relief.
The court's reasoning remained close to the factual record and the precedents it cited; the court repeatedly differentiated earlier authorities on the basis of differing facts (especially the presence or absence of objection by other co-sharers and whether the claimant had only a part interest).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal by defendants 1 and 2 is DISMISSED (the result stated in the opinion: "the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs").
Implications / Consequences:
- Direct effect on the parties: The decree in favour of the plaintiff (as granted by the 1st Additional Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur) is sustained by this Court. The plaintiff's settlement (kabuliat) was held to confer a valid title (on the basis that it was agricultural in nature) and the plaintiff was entitled to possession; the defendants were found to have failed to prove any title to the lands in suit.
- Remedial consequence: The plaintiff is entitled to khas (exclusive) possession as against the defendants who have no title, subject to any rights that co-sharers who have not objected might later assert (the court noted that if other co-sharers do object, partition remedies may be pertinent, but in absence of objection there was no need for partition proceedings).
- On precedent-setting: The opinion applies and distinguishes existing authorities; it does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying established case law to the specific facts. The court expressly relied on prior decisions (cited above) and distinguished them on their facts when necessary.
Order entry: Choudhary, J. agreed. Final line of the opinion: "Appeal dismissed."
Rai, J.:— This appeal by defendants 1 and 2 is directed against the judgment and decree of the 1st Additional Subordinate Judge. Muzaffarpur reversing those of the 4th Additional Munsif of the same place.
2. The plaintiff instituted the present suit originally against defendants 1 and 2, namely, Dasain Nonia and his son Chaturbhuj Nonia for declaration of his title to the lands in suit and for confirmation of possession of the same. The case of the plaintiff was that the land in suit an Dertained to the patti of Khan Saheb Mir Mehdi Hussain. Mutawalli of Waaf Estate, and the plaintiff took permanent settlement of the same at an annual rental of Rs. 5-10-0 under a registered kabuliat dated the 8th December, 1937. According to him, the landlord granted him a rent receipt as proof of the above settlement. After the settlement the plaintiff was put in possession of the same by the Malik by fixing four boundary stone pillars.
3. After coming in possession of the area settled, the plaintiff filled up a portion of it and constructed a tatti house on it and reared fish in the remaining area settled with him. He sublet the tatti house to one Saudagar Nonia. In the year 1944 defendant No. 1, Dasain Nonia, filed Small Cause Court suit No. 378 of 1944 against Saudagar for arrears of rant of the hut which had been originally constructed by the plaintiff on the allegation that the hut belonged to him, and that he had let out the same to Saudagar on a monthly rental. On the 19th December, 1944, the Small cause court suit was decreed. It, therefore, became necessary for the plaintiff to institute the present suit which was filed on the 27th March, 1945. After about a treat of the institution of the present suit the plaintiff got the plaint amended by impleading defendants 3 to 5 on the allegation that on the 23rd July, 1946, defendants 1 and 2 had executed a registered sale deed in favour of Lachhman Thakur and others in respect of 2 kathas of land out of plot Nos. 2788 and 2789, and the purchasers had forcibly constructed a hut on a portion of the suit land. The plaintiff got the relief portion of the plaint also amended to the effect that he be granted a decree for recovery of possession in case he be found to have been dispossessed during the pendency of the suit.
4. The suit was contested by defendants 1 and 2 who filed one set of written statement. They pleaded, inter alia, that defendant no. 1 had purchased the suit land from Ramkhelawan Nonia under a sale deed dated the 11th May, 1933, and since then he had been coming in possession of the same. According to the contesting defendants, the suit land did not form part of the waqf estate of Mir Mehdi Hussain Saheb but was really in the patti of Syed Mohsin. Nawab of Patna. The defendants further pleaded that the plaintiff had acquired no title by the alleged settlement in his favour.
5. Another written statement was filed on behalf of defendants 4 and 5 who pleaded that they were coming in possession of the suit land after having purchased it from defendant no. 1. According to them, defendant no. 1 had purchased the entire plot in suit from Ramkhelawan Nonia in the year 1953. They also asserted that the lands in suit did not form part of the estate of Mehdi Hussain but it belonged to the estate of Fazle Nawab which after his death had passed into the hands of his sons Mohsin Nawab and Syed Amaran Nawab of Patna. They also asserted that the plaintiff had acquired no title by the alleged settlement in his favour.
6. The learned Munsif, who heard the suit, came to the conclusion that as the settlement in favour of the plaintiff was for building purposes, the kabuliat executed by him did not confer any valid title on him. He was further of opinion that the area in suit had, at the time of the Collectorate partition, fallen to the share of a number of co-sharers including the settlor of the plaintiff (vide exhibits 7 and 9) and, as such, the plaintiff being a settlee from only one of the co-sharers had not acquired any valid title to the area settled. He further held that the defendants had failed to prove their title to the lands in suit. He, however, dismissed the suit on the ground that no valid title had passed to the plaintiff.
7. The plaintiff thereafter went in appeal which was heard by Mr. K.S Pandey, 1st Additional Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur. The learned Subordinate Judge disagreed with the learned Munsif and held that the settlement by a co-sharer landlord of a piece of land which was in his exclusive possession was not void. According to him, it may not be binding on the other co-sharer landlords if it falls to their share as bakasht after partition, but as long as it is not objected by other co-sharers, the settlee would be entitled to remain in possession of the same by virtue of the settlement by one of the co-sharer landlords.
8. The learned Subordinate Judge further held on the authority of the decision in the case of Ramkeshwar v. Haricharan, AIR 1947 Pat. 444 (A) that the plaintiff would be entitled to get back possession from the defendants who had no title at all even if it be held that the registered Kabuliat (Exhibit 2) had not conferred any valid title on the plaintiff because of the provisions of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Subordinate Judge further held that the lessor of the plaintiff was in exclusive possession of the area in suit. He also agreed with the learned Munsif that the defendants had failed to prove their title to the lands in suit. With respect to the question of possession the learned Subordinate Judge recorded the following finding:
“On a careful consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on record I hold that the plaintiff has proved his title to the suit land and his case of possession and dispossession over the suit land, whereas the defendants have not been able to prove that they were in possession over the suit land prior to the decree obtained by defendant no. 1 against Saudagar in Small Cause Court Suit no. 378 of 1944”.
9. On these findings the appeal was allowed and the suit was decreed. Defendants 1 and 2 thereafter came up in second appeal before this Court.
10. Mr. Prem Lall, who appeared for the, appellants, contended that the settlement in favour of the plaintiff being for non-agricultural purposes the registered kabuliat executed by him did not confer any title on him. In this connection he drew our attention to the following passage from the evidence of the plaintiff: “I took this land on settlement for constructing house thereon”, In support of his contention Mr. Prem Lall referred to the provisions of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. In my view, there is no force in the contention of Mr. Prem Lall. From the Kabuliat (exhibit 2) and the rent receipts granted by the landlord (exhibit 3 series) it is quite clear that the settlement was made for agricultural purposes. I would better quote the following English rendering of a portion of the kabuliat which was scribed in Urdu:
“It is requisite that I, the executant, shall properly cultivate the said lands and appropriate the produce thereof.”
11. From the above expression in the kabuliat it is quite clear that the settlement was taken for agricultural purposes. This inference is further strengthened by the nature of receipts granted by the landlord to the plaintiff at the time of settlement and during the subsequent years. These receipts were granted on forms printed in accordance with the provisions of the Bihar Tenancy Act.
12. In my view, the deposition of the plaintiff to the effect: “I took this land on settlement for constructing house thereon” may indicate that in future he intended to build a house on it, but at the time of the execution of the kabuliat both the parties understood that the area was being settled for agricultural purposes, and as such there was no necessity to execute a document in accordance with the provisions of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. I, therefore, hold that the settlement in favour of the plaintiff had conferred a valid title on him to maintain the present suit.
13. Mr. Prem Lall thereafter urged that settlement by one of the co-sharer cannot confer any occupancy right on the plaintiff. In support of his contention he relied on the decision in the case of Bibi Kaniz Fatma v. Hussainuddin Ahmad, ILR 22 Pat 382 : (AIR 1943 Pat 194) (FB) (B). In my opinion, this case also cannot stand in the way of the plaintiff to get the relief sought in the present suit as against the defendants. The court of appeal below has held that the lessor of the plaintiff was in exclusive possession of the lands settled by him. On this finding the court of appeal below was, in my opinion, justified in holding that the plaintiff would be entitled to remain on the lands settled until the other co-sharers raise any objection to that effect. The view taken by the court below does not appear to be contrary to the view taken by their Lordships of the Full Bench in ILR 22 Pat. 382 : (AIR 1943 Pat 194) (B), mentioned above.
14. In that case just before the beginning of a Collectorate partition one of the co-sharer proprietors had settled one bigha of Bakasht land which was in his exclusive possession after taking a salami of Rs. 700/-. At the time of partition that land was, in spite of the settlement treated as Bakasht and allotted to the share of another proprietor, namely, Fazlur Rahman. The widow of Fazlur Rahman instituted the suit for possession of the above-mentioned settled land from the settlee who pleaded, inter alia, that he had acquired a right of occupancy in the land and could not be evicted therefrom. The dispute came up before this court in Second Appeal No. 955 of 1939: (AIR 1943 Pat 194) (B), which was ultimately decided by a Full Bench. Their Lordships of the Full Bench held that a person who is inducted upon a land belonging to a number of co-sharers by one co-sharer without the consent or authority express or implied of all the co-sharers is not a raiyat in respect of the entire land and he cannot acquire a right of occupancy by remaining in possession for 12 years or upwards. In the present case, however, the claim of the plaintiff to remain in possession is not opposed by any of the other co-sharer landlords but is being opposed by the defendants who, on the findings of the courts below, have no title whatsoever. In my opinion, the decision in the case of Bibi Kaniz Fatma cannot be a bar to the plaintiff being granted the relief sought in the present suit.
15. Mr. Prem Lall thereafter contended on the authority of the decision in the case of Abdul Kabir v. Mt. Jamila Khatoon, AIR 1951 Pat 315 (C), that the plaintiff can at best, get a decree for joint possession with the defendants. The facts of that case were as follows: Holdings nos. 221 and 224-A within the Giridih Municipality belonged at some time to Bulaki Mian. After his death his two sons Ishaq (defendant no. 4) and Jabbar (defendant no. 5) sold 3 kathas out of holding no. 224A to Mohammad Qasim who in his turn sold it to defendant no. 2 in the farzi name of defendant no. 3. The relationship of the various defendants of that suit will appear from the following genealogy of their family:
16. On the 16th February, 1938, the plaintiffs of that suit purchased from Ishaq and Jabbar the entire holding no. 221. The plaintiffs thereafter instituted Title suit no. 144 of 1943 for declaration of their title to the lands shown in schedule Kha of that suit. They further prayed for recovery of direct possession after dispossessing defendants 1 to 6 from the suit lands. The case of the plaintiffs was that none of the defendants had any title to the lands shown under schedule Kha. It was further alleged by them that while constructing a house on the portion of holding no. 224A purchased by defendants 2 and 3 from Md. Qasim they had encroached upon a portion of holding no. 221.
17. The suit was contested by defendants 1, 2 and 3. They denied the title of the plaintiffs to the entire holding no. 221. It was also pleaded by the contesting defendants that the plaintiffs had wrongly shown the extent of the holding no. 221 under schedule Kha of the plaint.
18. The trial court held that the plaintiffs had acquired no valid title to the share of Mt. Jamila (defendant no. 1) and Mt. Hasiba (defendant no. 6) by virtue of the sale deed dated the 16th February, 1938. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the share of defendants 1 and 6 was one-third in the holding no. 221. It was further held by the trial court that; the entire one-third share of Ishaq, defendant no. 4, had not passed to the plaintiffs, and that they had acquired a valid title to the extent of 9 annas 4 pies share only in the municipal holding no. 221 by virtue of the sale deed dated the 16th February, 1938. The learned Subordinate Judge also held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove the correct area of holding no. 221 and the extent of a encroachment alleged to have been made by defendants 2 and 3 over a portion of holding no. 221. The trial court ultimately came to the following conclusion:
“The plaintiffs have got a cause of action for this suit inasmuch as they are entitled to a declaration of their title to the extent of 9 annas 4 pies in holding no. 221. Of course, they are not entitled to eject Mt. Jamila defendant no. 1, because she is a co-owner of holding no. 221. The plaintiffs also cannot eject defendants 2 and 3 because they have not proved the extent of encroachment and also because the plaintiffs have not impleaded Mt. Hajra, Israil, ??? and Israfeel, the co-owners of holding no. 221 as party to the present suit.”
19. The plaintiffs thereafter came up in appeal before this Court in First Appeal No. 387 of 1946, where it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a 12 annas share of the area in dispute as described in schedule Kha of the plaint. The plaintiffs were held entitled to a decree for joint possession of their 12 annas share with defendants 1, 2 and 3 of the land in dispute. Mr. Prem Lal relied upon the following passage in the judgment of that case:—
“On behalf of the respondents the argument was stressed that since Mt. Hajra, Israil, Mikael and Israfeel have not been impleaded, the plaintiffs cannot get a decree for ejectment. But this argument is not tenable. Although a co-sharer by himself cannot get, against a trespasser, a decree for ejectment from the whole of the land, he can get a decree for joint possession to the extent of his share. He has to work out his further rights by means of a suit for partition. Vide Huldhur Sein v. Gooroo Das Roy 20 W.R 126 (D); Radha Proshad v. Esuf, ILR 7 Cal. 414 : 9 Cal LR 76 (E), and Naresh Chandra v. Haydar Sheikh Khan, 49 Cal LJ 83 : AIR 1929 Cal 28 (F).”
20. In my view, the above observation in the judgment of that case cannot be considered detached from the facts and circumstances of that case. As has been said above, defendant no. 1 of that suit was found to have a share in holding no. 221. On this finding the plaintiffs of that suit could not get exclusive possession of the entire holding no. 221. Defendant no. 1 had not so far objected to the encroachment made by defendants 2 and 3 over a portion of holding no. 221. In that view of the matter, the court had rightly not given a decree for khas possession of the entire holding no. 221 to the plaintiffs who were held to have purchased only 12 annas share in it.
21. In 20 Suth. W.R 126 (D) the co-sharers other than the plaintiffs of that suit were supporting the possession of the trespassers. In ILR 7 Cal 414 (E), the pro forma defendants, who were the remaining co-sharers of the plaintiffs of that suit, were also supporting the title and possession of the trespassers and were desirous that the trespassers should remain on the land. It appears that in view of the support given to the trespassers by the co-sharers of the plaintiffs of those suits, it was held that they were entitled only to joint possession with the trespassers who were holding possession on behalf of some of the co-sharer landlords.
22. In AIR 1929 Cal 28 (F), the plaintiff who was held to have purchased in execution of a money decree wanted to eject some of the heirs of the recorded tenants who were not party to the rent suit or the execution proceedings. In those circumstances it was held that the plaintiff having purchased only the right, title and interest of some of the co-sharer tenants was entitled to joint possession with the remaining tenants of the land. It was not case of rank trespasser as we find in the present suit. The facts of the present case are, however, different. The entire area was settled with the plaintiff by Mir Mehdi Hussain who was in exclusive possession of the same.
23. From exhibit 9 it appears that one set of co-sharer proprietors including the lessor of the plaintiff were given a large number of Ghairmazrua plots in their share. There may, be some understanding amongst them for exclusive possession of a particular Ghairmazrua plot by a particular co-sharer. It may be due to this that no other co-sharer landlord has made any objection to the settlement in favour of the plaintiff. In my view, the plaintiff was entitled to khas possession of the lands in suit. I fail to understand how a suit for partition will lie against the defendants of this suit.
24. If any of the co-sharers of Mir Mehdi Hussain had objected to the exclusive possession of the lessor or the lessee over the area in suit there may have been a necessity for bringing a suit for partition, but in absence of any interference by them, there can be no occasion for the plaintiff to bring a suit for partition.
25. In my view, the present case is governed by the decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Currimbhoy and Co. Ltd. v. L.A Creet, AIR 1930 Cal 113 at p. 125 (G), and also by a decision of this Court in the case of Sambhu Gossain v. Piyari Mian, AIR 1941 Pat. 351 (H), where it was held that one of several co-owners is entitled to maintain an action in ejectment against a trespasser without joining the other co-owners as parties to the action.
26. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
27. Choudhary, J.:— I agree.
M.K.S
28. Appeal dismissed.
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