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Ramadhin Singh v. Siaram Singh And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff appealed against a decision of the Subordinate Judge dated 29-11-1950, which had reversed an earlier decree granted by the Munsif dated 16-6-1950. The underlying suit alleged that the defendant had executed a handnote in favour of the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 1275/-. The defendant's pleaded defence was a total denial: he denied borrowing any sum from the plaintiff and gave a specific explanation for the thumb mark on the document. The defendant said that some years before the suit a panchaiti had taken his thumb mark on a blank piece of paper and that that blank sheet had later been used by the plaintiff to create the handnote sued upon. The Munsif accepted the plaintiff's evidence and decreed the suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed that finding, held the handnote was not genuine and not supported by consideration, and dismissed the suit with costs. The present appeal challenges the Subordinate Judge's reversal of the Munsif's decree.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Subordinate Judge was entitled to reverse the Munsif's finding that the handnote was genuine and supported by consideration, given the Munsif's opportunity to assess witness demeanour.
- Whether the appellate court erred by not considering some of the reasons given by the Munsif (as argued under the authority of Sarju Pershad v. Jwalesnwari, AIR 1951 SC 120).
- Whether, on the facts of the case (in particular the presence of the defendant's thumb mark and the expert opinion confirming it), the onus of proof for execution and payment of consideration should properly rest on the plaintiff or shift to the defendant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- Mr. K.K. Sinha for the appellant relied on the Supreme Court decision in Sarju Pershad v. Jwalesnwari (AIR 1951 SC 120), arguing that the appellate court should not, absent compelling reasons, overturn the Munsif's appreciation of oral evidence who had the advantage of seeing witness demeanour.
- The appellant contended that the Subordinate Judge wrongly shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff as the handnote bore the defendant's thumb mark; after the expert opinion confirming the thumb mark, the appellant argued that the onus should not have remained with the plaintiff.
- The appellant relied on a single-judge decision (Sahdeo Mauar… v. Pulesar Nonia…, 11 Pat LT 606 : AIR 1930 Pat 598) which, as cited by counsel, supported placing the onus on the defence where the defendant admitted putting his thumb mark on a blank paper later used for the handnote.
Defendant's (Respondent's) Arguments / Defence
- The defendant denied borrowing money or executing the handnote sued upon.
- He explained the presence of his thumb mark by stating that at a panchaiti some years earlier his thumb mark had been taken on a blank piece of paper which was later alleged to have been used by the plaintiff to fabricate the handnote.
- Evidence for the defence included testimony (D.W.3) to the effect that the document on which thumb marks were taken at the panchaiti contained thumb marks of both the defendant and the opposite party.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sarju Pershad v. Jwalesnwari, AIR 1951 SC 120 | The appellate court should not lightly discard the Munsif's appreciation of oral evidence (demeanour and credibility) unless there are compelling reasons. | The court considered the appellant's reliance on this authority but found that the Subordinate Judge had, in fact, considered the evidence from all aspects and had given cogent reasons for rejecting the plaintiff's testimony. Therefore the Sarju Pershad principle did not require reversal of the Subordinate Judge's judgment in this case. |
| Chulhai Lal Dass v. Kuldip Singh, 12 Pat LT 231 : AIR 1931 Pat 266 | When a defendant admits only to putting a thumb mark or signature on a document other than the handnote sued upon (e.g., a different paper), such admission does not constitute admission of execution of the handnote; the onus to prove execution of the particular handnote remains on the plaintiff. | The court treated this Division Bench authority as controlling: on its basis the onus lay on the plaintiff to prove execution and payment of consideration. The learned Subordinate Judge was therefore right to place the burden of proving execution on the plaintiff. |
| Sahdeo Mauar… v. Pulesar Nonia…, 11 Pat LT 606 : AIR 1930 Pat 598 | (Single-judge authority) Suggested that where a defendant admitted putting his thumb mark on a blank paper later used for a handnote, the burden may lie on the defence to explain how the handnote came into existence. | The appellant relied on this authority, but the court held that it was not a good authority in the face of the Division Bench decision in Chulhai Lal Dass (12 Pat LT 231). The court treated Sahdeo Mauar as effectively overruled or not authoritative for present purposes. |
| Hridaysingh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1940 Pat 377 | Considered prior authorities; where the execution portion of a handnote makes clear the executor was signing a handnote and the executor admitted acceptance of consideration, the onus may lie on the defendant. | The court found this case distinguishable on its facts and noted that it had considered both Chulhai Lal Dass and Sahdeo Mauar. The present case, however, was found to fall within the principles of Chulhai Lal Dass rather than the circumstances of Hridaysingh. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by examining (a) whether the Subordinate Judge had properly considered the evidence and reasons given by the Munsif, (b) the correctness of the appellate court's factual findings, and (c) the proper allocation of the burden (onus) of proof in light of the precedents.
On the first point, the court reviewed Mr. K.K. Sinha's contention (based on Sarju Pershad) that an appellate court should not lightly overturn a trial court's appreciation of oral testimony. The court found that the Subordinate Judge had considered the case from all aspects, including the circumstances the Munsif had relied upon, and that the Subordinate Judge had independently examined and rejected the plaintiff's evidence with cogent reasons. The court emphasised that the Subordinate Judge did not base his rejection of the plaintiff's evidence merely on the weaknesses of the defence; rather, he examined the plaintiff's witnesses separately and gave specific reasons for finding them untrustworthy.
On the factual contest regarding the thumb marks, the Munsif had placed weight on a circumstance derived from defence testimony (D.W.3) that a sheet produced at the panchaiti bore thumb marks of both parties; the presence of two thumb marks led the Munsif to disbelieve the defence explanation. The appellate court, however, implicitly disbelieved D.W.3 and observed that taking thumb impressions of both contesting parties on the same paper would defeat the panches' object in taking such impressions. The present court found the Subordinate Judge's observations on this point to be not "absolutely wrong."
The court also addressed the argument that it was inherently improbable for the panchaiti paper to have been kept for some 18 years and then used to fabricate the handnote. The court held that this circumstance, while pointed out by the Munsif, did not carry such inherent improbability as to render the entire defence false, and an appellate court is not required to repeat or separately adopt every circumstance the trial court considered so long as the appellate court has applied its mind and given cogent reasons for its conclusions.
On the allocation of onus, the court analysed the conflicting authorities. It accepted the binding force of the Division Bench decision in Chulhai Lal Dass (12 Pat LT 231 : AIR 1931 Pat 266) that an admission of placing a thumb mark on a different document does not constitute admission of execution of the handnote sued upon, and therefore the plaintiff bears the burden to prove execution of that particular handnote. The single-judge decision relied on by the appellant (Sahdeo Mauar) was treated as not good law in the face of the Division Bench authority. The court observed that on the facts of this case the Subordinate Judge rightly placed the onus on the plaintiff.
Finally, the court noted that, practically, both parties had adduced evidence and the Subordinate Judge examined and discussed evidence of both sides independently of the question of onus; on such consideration the Subordinate Judge found the plaintiff's case untrue. The court therefore concluded that the appellate judgment was not vitiated by any failure to consider every trial-court circumstance or by any misplacement of onus.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. The court expressly held that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge (which reversed the Munsif and dismissed the plaintiff's suit) was rightly decided and that there was no merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Implications:
- The direct practical effect is that the Subordinate Judge's decision standing for dismissal of the plaintiff's suit is affirmed by this court's dismissal of the appeal; the plaintiff's claim fails and the plaintiff must pay costs.
- The court did not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond applying existing authorities concerning the onus of proof where a defendant admits a thumb mark on a document other than the handnote sued upon. The opinion treats the Division Bench decision in Chulhai Lal Dass as determinative on the onus point and regards the single-judge authority relied upon by the appellant as superseded for present purposes.
This summary is limited to the statements and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond those expressly set out in the text.
1. This appeal is by the plaintiff from a decision of the Subordinate Judge dated 29-11-1950, reversing the decision of the Munslf dated 16-6-1950. The suit giving rise to the present appeal was founded upon handnote alleged to have been executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 1275/-. The defence was a total denial of the allegations made by the plaintiff. The defendant denied that he had borrowed any sum from the plaintiff. As to the document purporting to bear his thumb mark, the defendant offered an explanation of the circumstances in which he happened to place his thumb mark on it. According to him, there was a panchaiti some years before the institution of the suit in which his thumb mark was taken on a blank piece of paper which was subsequently utilised by the plaintiff for the handnote sued upon. In short, he denied both the execution of the handnote and the passing of consideration thereunder.
2. The learned Munsif believed the evidence of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge in a well reasoned and well-considered judgment upset the finding of the learned Munsif and held that the handnote was not genuine and for consideration. On this finding, he allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs.
3. On the findings of the appellate Court, this appeal is concluded by findings of fact. Mr. K.K Sinha appearing for the appellant, However, argued, relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sarju Pershad v. Jwalesnwari, AIR 1951 SC 120 (A), that the appellate Court had not considered some of the reasons advanced by the learned Munsif for discarding the defence and accepting the plaintiff's case. He pointed out that the appellate Court should not, in absence of compelling reasons, discard the appreciation of the Munsif of the oral evidence who had the opportunity to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and judge their credibility. In this case, however, I find that the learned Subordinate Judge has considered the case from all aspects. All the circumstances which were pointed out to me relate mainly to the defence set up by the defendant. The learned Munsif on a consideration of those circumstances held that the defence propounded by the defendant was not true. Even assuming, though not affirming, that this is true, the plaintiff cannot obviously advantage himself by the weakness of the defence. The plaintiff's case must stand or fall upon the evidence adduced by him. The learned Subordinate Judge has carefully considered the evidence of the plaintiff and has given cogent reasons for rejecting it as untrustworthy.
4. The grievance of Mr. K.K Sinha is that in appreciating the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses, the learned Subordinate Judge was greatly influenced by the defence which, according to the appellate Court's observation, was correct. I do not think that this is correct. The learned Subordinate Judge has taken care to consider the evidence of both the sides separately, and in judging the credibility or otherwise of the witnesses examined by the plaintiff, the learned Subordinate Judge has not at all taken into consideration the demerits of the defence witnesses. He has given cogent reasons for not relying upon the testimony of the appellant's witness. He has also considered the facts which influenced the learned Munsif to come to a contrary decision.
5. Even with regard to the defence, I find, rightly or wrongly the learned Subordinate Judge has taken a view different from the view taken by the learned Munsif on all the points which were mooted before him. It was contended that there was; one vital circumstance in the defence which was sufficient to demolish the case set up by the defendant. It is this. According to the evidence of D.W 3, the document which, according to the defendant, was converted into the handnote, contains the thumb marks of both the defendant and the opposite party before the panchaiti.
6. The present handnote, however, contains only the thumb mark of the defendant. This circumstance greatly weighed with the learned Munsif and he found that the presence of two thumb marks goes a long way to show that the defence set up by the defendant was not correct. This aspect has also been considered by the appellate Court, and the appellate Court impliedly disbelieved the evidence of D.W 3 and held that the taking of the thumb marks of both the parties by the panches on the same paper would defeat the very object for which the thumb impressions of the two contesting parties were taken by the panches. In my opinion, the observations of the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be said to be absolutely wrong.
7. Another circumstance pointed out was that the panchaiti in which the defendant alleged to have put his thumb mark on a blank paper was convened some 18 years before the institution of the suit, and it was highly improbable that paper had been deliberately retained for so many years' to fabricate a handnote on false grounds. In my opinion, there is not such inherent improbability in this circumstance as to falsify the entire defence. While considering the evidence of both parties it is not incumbent upon the appellate Court to consider each and every circumstances separately which has been considered by the learned Munsif.
8. If the appellate Court has applied its mind to the evidence properly and has given reasons which are cogent and which can be sustained on the evidence, the judgment of the appellate Court cannot be assailed simply because some of the reasons given by the learned Munsif either have not been considered or have escaped the notice of the appellate Court, especially when, even if those reasons stood, there will be no difference in the decision. In my opinion, the judgment of the appellate Court is not vitiated by the alleged non-consideration of the circumstances before the Munsif so as to bring this case within the purview of the decision of the Supreme Court above referred to.
9. It was next contended that the learned Subordinate Judge wrongly placed the onus upon the plaintiff to prove both the execution and the payment of the consideration. It was pointed out that the handnote sued upon bears the thumb mark of the defendant. After the expert's opinion, there is now no controversy that the thumb mark appearing on the handnote is in fact the thumb mark of the defendant. The question is whether the existence of the thumb mark on the paper is sufficient to shift the onus on the defendant.
10. The execution of a document implies intelligent and conscious appreciation of the contents and the facts connected with the document, and where the thumb mark or signature is appended to a piece of paper, which is blank and which does not contain the necessary contents of the transaction, there is, properly speaking, no execution of a document. In similar circumstances, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chulhai Lal Dass v. Kuldip Singh, 12 Pat LT 231 : (AIR 1931 Pat 266) (B) that when the defendant admitted only that he had put a thumb mark and signature on a document which was not the handnote sued upon, he did not admit the execution of the handnote in suit and therefore the onus of proving that the particular handnote, the basis of the suit, was duly executed by the defendant was upon the shoulders of the plaintiff.
11. On the basis of this authority, the onus was clearly upon the plaintiff. The appellant, however, relied upon the decision of a single Judge of this Court in the case of Sahdeo Mauar… v. Pulesar Nonia…Opposite Party., 11 Pat LT 606 : (AIR 1930 Pat 598) (C). In tills case, it was no doubt laid down that where in a suit on a handnote, the defendant admitted that he had put his thumb mark on a blank piece of paper upon which, he alleged, it was intended that a Kabuliyat should be written out and possibly, that paper had been utilised for the handnote, the, burden of proof was on the defence to explain how, the handnote bearing the defendant's thumb impression came into existence.
12. In my opinion, this decision is not a good authority in face of the Division Bench decision of this, Court above referred to. Both the cases came up for consideration in the case of Hridaysingh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1940 Pat 377 (D). That case is distinguishable from the present case as well as from the cases of 12 Pat LT 231 : (AIR 1931 Pat 266) (B) & 11 Pat LT 606 (AIR 1930 Pat 598) (C). In that case the execution portion of the handnote clearly indicated that the executor was appending his signature to a handnote and he also admitted the acceptance of the consideration. On these facts, their Lordships held that the onus was not on the plaintiff but on the defendant.
13. They also approvingly referred to the case of 12 Pat LT 231 : (AIR 1931 Pat 266) (B). They also referred to the case of 11 Pat LT 606 : (AIR 1931 Pat 598) (C), but did not in clear words express whether or not that decision was still a good law in face of the Division Bench decision in the case of 12 Pat LT 231 : (AIR 1931 Pat 266) (B). On the facts of that case, it was not necessary for their Lordships to express any definite opinion, so far as the present case is concerned, I think, it comes clearly within the four corners of the case reported in 12 Pat LT 231 : (AIR 1931 Pat 266) (B) and the case reported in 11 Pat LT 606 : (AIR 1930 Pat 598) (C) is, as stated above no longer a good law.
14. In my opinion, therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge rightly placed the onus upon the plaintiff to prove both the execution of the handnote and the payment of the consideration. At all events, the question of onus in this case is of no practical value at all. Both parties have adduced evidence and the learned Subordinate Judge was careful enough to examine and discuss the evidence of both sides independent of the question of onus, and on a careful consideration of the evidence he found that the plaintiff's case was not true.
15. Therefore, the judgment of the appellate Court cannot be assailed on that ground.
16. In my opinion, the case has been rightly decided, and there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.
V.B.B
17. Appeal dismissed.
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