Raj Kishore Prasad, J.:— In this case a rule has been obtained, from the High Court, by the petitioner on an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against the opposite party to show cause why a writ, in the nature of certiorari, would not be issued quashing the order, of the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority dated 3-3-1956, passed on an appeal Abdul Majid Khan, opposite party No. 2. The Advocate-General has shown cause against the rule on behalf of the opposite party but no counter-affidavit has been filed on their behalf.

2. The petitioner applied for a stage carriage permit under Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Act IV of 1939), hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for the Purnea-Kishunganj route. On 26-9-1950, Abdul Majid Khan, opposite party No. 2 also applied for a similar permit for the same route. On 29-5-1951, the East Bihar Regional Transport Authority hereinafter mentioned as “R.T.A” granted stage carriage permits to both the petitioner and opposite party No. 2 for the Purnea-Kishunganj route.

3. One Suraj Narain Mitra, who was also one of the applicants for a similar permit for the same route, being aggrieved by the above order of the R.T.A preferred an appeal, under S. 64(a) of the Act to the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority hereinafter mentioned as the “Appeal Board”. On 7-1-1953, the Appeal Board directed one of the two permits to be granted to the appellants Suraj Narain Mitra, and remanded the matter to the R.T.A for deciding which of the two persons, namely the petitioner and opposite party No. 2 should get the second permit. The petitioner on notice by the R.T.A appeared but opposite party no. 2 did not appear before the R.T.A The R.T.A therefore on 26-2-1953, allowed the permit of the petitioner to stand and cancelled the permit of the opposite party No. 2 and directed him to surrender his permit. On 17-3-1953, opposite party No. 2 filed an application for review of the above order of R.T.A passed in his absence on the ground that he had not been served with any notice of the hearing of the matter before the R.T.A In the said application he also prayed for stay of the operation of the order of the R.T.A dated 26-2-1953, asking opposite party No. 2 to surrender his permit. On 29-3-1953, the R.T.A admitted this application of opposite party No. 2 and stayed the operation of its order dated 26-2-1953, and asked for a report from the Secretary, R.T.A regarding the complaint of opposite party No. 2 about the non-receipt of the notice of the hearing of the case before the R.T.A by opposite party No. 2. On 25-4-1953, the R.T.A found after receipt of the report of the Secretary, that notice had been served on opposite party No. 2 and, therefore, rejected the application for review filed by opposite party No. 2 and vacated the order of stay.

4. On 25-5-1953, opposite party No. 2 filed an appeal against the above order of the R.T.A dated 25-4-1953. To the said petition of appeal presented by opposite party No. 2, is annexed ‘A’ of the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner. On 6-7-1953, the appeal of opposite party No. 2 was admitted in spite of the objection of the Secretary R.T.A that no appeal lay, because no appeal was provided against an order rejecting a review application. On 3-12-1953, the petitioner received a telegram from the Appeal Board to appear before it on 5-12-1953, at the time of the hearing of the appeal filed by opposite party No. 2 but the petitioner did not appear on the said date, because, according to him, he had no information of this appeal earlier.

5. The Appeal Board, therefore, on 5-12-1953, passed an order, in the absence of the petitioner, setting aside the order of the R.T.A granting permit to the petitioner. The petitioner, thereafter, moved the State Government under S. 64(a) of the Act, but the petitioner's application for revision was rejected with the direction that, in view of competition an extra, route may be advertised for issue of temporary permit within the next three weeks, & Abdul Majid Khan (opposite party 2) may apply along with others, and he should surrender his permanent permit. The petitioner then, moved the High Court on 14-5-1054, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, for a writ to call up and quash the order of the Appeal Board dated 5-12-1953. This application was registered in this Court as Misc. Judicial Case No. 265 of 1954 (Pat) (A).

6. This was heard by Das, C.J and Imam, J. who on 29-3-1955, allowed the application, and quashed the order of the Appeal Board dated 5-12-1953, with the observation that

“it is open to the State Transport Appellate Authority to hear the appeal again on merits (including the question of its maintainability) after complying with the statutory rule regarding the issue of a notice to the parties concerned, as laid down in R. 71 of the Rules made under the Indian Motor Vehicles Act.”

7. In pursuance of the above order, the Appeal Board heard the parties on 30-5-1955, and 2-7-1955. The Appeal Board finally passed the impugned order on 3-3-1956, reversing the order of the R.T.A dated 26-2-1953, and allowing the appeal of opposite party No. 2, the effect of which was that the petitioner's permit was refused and opposite party No. 2 was granted the permit. Against this order the petitioner has again moved this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India asking for a writ quashing the order of the Appeal Board dated 3-3-1956.

8. In support of the rule, Mr. B.C Ghose has in the first place, put forward the argument that the R.T.A has no power to review its order under the Act, or even under the rules framed under it, as such there can be no appeal against the order of the R.T.A dated 25-4-1953 rejecting the application of opposite party No. 2 dated 17-3-1953, asking for a review of the order of the R.T.A passed on 26-2-1953. In support of his contention, he has relied on Baij Nath Ram Goenka v. Nanda Kumar Singh, 6 Cal LJ 84 (B) which was approved in Baijnath Ram Goenka v. Nand Kumar Singh, 17 Cal WN 485 (PC) (C) and on Sm. Kusum Kumari Devi v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bihar, 1954 BLJR 148 : (AIR 1954 Pat 238) (D).

9. These cases, however, have no application to the present case. The first two cases were decided under the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act (VII B.C of 1868). It was held in those cases that an order of a Commissioner setting aside a sale for arrears of revenue is “final” according to Section 2 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, and, therefore, not open to review by the Commissioner. In the last case, my Lord the Chief Justice, who was a party to that case and who delivered the judgment of the Bench was considering a case under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (XXXI of 1950) and held that the Custodian acted illegally in acting in revision and in setting aside the order of the Deputy Custodian after a period of three years.

10. The above cases, therefore, have no direct bearing on the point raised by Mr. Ghose. True, the Act does not provide anywhere that an order of a R.T.A or even of the Appeal Board, shall be “final”. But in the Act or in the rules framed under it, there is no provision for a review by the R.T.A or even by the Appeal Board of its own order. It is well-settled that a power of review is not inherent in any authority. The moment a right to decide is exercised, the authority becomes functus officio, except for the matter of grave clerical error, or mistakes committed by the authority, for which the authority is responsible.

11. There is therefore no inherent power to review, apart from the statute except to correct its own mistake. When, therefore, the R.T.A had no power of review, obviously the order passed by the: R.T.A rejecting the application for review would not be open to appeal. It cannot be assumed that there is a right of appeal in every matter which comes under the consideration of a Judge, such right must be given by statute. The first question which arises in approaching the consideration of this question is, whether any right of appeal is given by the Act itself. There is nothing in the Act which would suggest it. The only section which gives a right of appeal is S. 64 of the Act.

12. It provides in Cls. (a) to (g) the matters on which an appeal can lie by any person aggrieved. None of these clauses deals with an order rejecting an application for review, obviously because there, is no provision for a review of its order by the R.T.A in the Act. My concluded opinion, therefore, is that the R.T.A has no power either to entertain an application for review of its own order, or to review its own order and that there is no appeal to the Appeal Board against an order pass by the R.T.A rejecting an application for review. The contention of Mr. Ghose on this point, therefore, is well founded, and must prevail.

13. The learned Advocate-General, in reply, admitted that there was no provision for a review of its order by a R.T.A, but he contended that the application made on the 17th of March, 1953, was not really an application for review but an application, in the nature of a proceeding under O. 41, R. 19 of the CPC, for reconsideration of its own order dated the 26th February, 1953, which has been passed, according to opposite party No. 2, without any notice to him and in his absence. Such an application, to continue the argument of the learned Advocate-General does not amount to an application for review.

14. In my opinion, there is no substance in this contention, because the application made on the 17th March, 1953, whether it is called a review application, or an application made for reconsideration of the order dated the 26th February, 1953, was non-etheless an application by which the R.T.A was asked to reconsider its order dated the 26th February, 1953, which it had no power to do. The remedy of the opposite party No. 2 who was aggrieved by the order dated the 26th February, 1953, was an appeal under S. 64(a) of the Act, because, in such a case, an appeal was appropriate, and specifically provided for in the Act.

15. Mr. Ghose has next contended that what the Appeal Board has done in the present case is to treat the appeal filed on the 25th of May, 1953, as an appeal against the R.T.A's original order dated the 26th February, 1953, and to condone the delay in filing the appeal, and dispose of the matter accordingly, but he contends, the Appeal Board has no jurisdiction to condone the delay. In my opinion, there is much force in this contention of Mr. Ghose also, and it must be upheld.

16. The appeal which was filed on the 25th of May, 1953 was specifically an appeal against the order of the R.T.A dated the 25th April, 1953, although in the relief portion the prayer made by opposite party No. 2 was that the permit should be granted to him, as he was entitled to the permit. The Appeal Board considered this appeal to be an appeal against the order of the R.T.A dated the 26th of February, 1953, revoking the permit of opposite party No. 2. The Appeal Board considered the maintainability of the appeal petition, and held that the period of limitation was to be counted from the 25th April, 1953, when the R.T.A passed final orders on what was designated as a review petition by opposite party No. 2, The Appeal Board said as follows:

“As the R.T.A delayed giving effect to its order an the review petition, the finality of the R.T.A's order can be deemed to take effect only from the day when it disposed of the review petition and time will count from this date and not the date of the original order.”

17. The Appeal Board therefore considered, in the light of its earlier order passed on the 6th July, 1954, at the time of the admission of the appeal, that the petition of appeal was not time-barred and that such delay as took place from the date of the original resolution of the R.T.A was, therefore, condoned. The Appeal Board thought that it was an administrative tribunal, and, therefore it did not like to go into the technicality, and it found no reason to differ from the earlier order of the Appeal Board condoning the delay and admitting the petition of appeal especially when it was satisfied that opposite party No. 2, who was the appellant before it, had received no notice from the R.T.A for the meeting when the original resolution was passed on the 26th February, 1953. In that view of the matter, the Appeal Board heard the appeal on merits, and disposed of the matter accordingly.

18. The order of R.T.A dated the 26th February, 1953, was, as I have stated earlier, appeal-able under S. 64(a) of the Act. It was therefore, open to opposite party No. 2 to prefer an appeal against that order, but he did not do so and, ultimately, the appeal, which he filed on the 25th May, 1953, was beyond the period of limitation of thirty days provided by R. 71 of the rules framed under S. 68 of the Act. There is no doubt, therefore, that the appeal, which was filed on the 25th of May, 1953, if it was considered to be an appeal against the original order of the R.T.A dated the 26th of February, 1953 was barred by limitation. In such circumstances, it could be entertained and the delay in filing the appeal condoned, only if the R.T.A had any power to condone such delay.

19. In the Act or in the rules framed under it, there is no provision for condoning the delay in filing an appeal under S. 64 of the Act beyond the statutory period of thirty days as provided by R. 71. Section 29, Clause (2) of the Indian Limitation Act (Act IX of 1908), provides as follows:

“(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule the provisions of S. 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—

(a) the provisions contained in S. 4, Ss. 9 to 18 and S. 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and

(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.”

20. The present Act is a special Act within the meaning of Section 29, Clause (2) of the Limitation Act, and it prescribes a period of limitation for filing an appeal different from the period prescribed therefor by the first schedule and therefore, Section 3 of the Limitation Act will apply to such a case. Section 3 provides that subject to the provisions contained in Ss. 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the first schedule shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence.

21. Section 29(2)(a) provides that the provisions Contained in Ss. 4, 9 to 18, and S. 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law. But Section 29(2)(b) provides that the remaining provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply usually to a special law, like the Motor Vehicles Act, unless it is specifically made applicable by such Act itself to its provisions. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is the only section which empowers 6 Court to admit an appeal after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant satisfied the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period.

22. But, Section 5 of the Limitation Act itself provides that any appeal, or application for a review of Judgment, or for leave to appeal or any other application, to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force, may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor. Admittedly, Section 5 of the Act has not been made applicable by the present Act, and, as such S. 5 will not apply to an appeal filed under S. 64 of the Act. In such circumstances the Appeal Board, can have no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation, or any power to abridge the time for an appeal. If S. 5 would have applied to the Act, then if it had been satisfied that sufficient cause had been made for not filing the appeal in time, the Appeal Board could have admitted the appeal, although it had been filed after the period of limitation prescribed therefor.

23. Section 9 of the Limitation Act provides that “once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it” except in the only case mentioned in the proviso to S. 9. The Indian Limitation Act is undoubtedly an exhaustive Code governing the law of limitation in India. The cases in which the running of limitation can be suspended are contained in the sections of this Act. There is nothing in the Limitation Act which would justify the Court in holding that once the period of limitation has begun to run, it could be suspended. If the Courts were to hold that by some reason the period of limitation was suspended, they would be deciding contrary to the express enactment of Section 9 of the Limitation Act.

24. Therefore, there can be no saving of limitation apart from the provisions of the Limitation Act. Courts are not permitted to travel beyond the provisions embodied in the Limitation Act, and apart from the provisions of that Act there is no principles which can legitimately be invoked to add to, or supplement, its provisions. In my opinion, therefore, when Section 5 of the Limitation Act had no application to the appeal presented under S. 64 of the Act, and, when there is no provision in the Act itself empowering the Appeal Board to condone the delay, the Appeal Board had no jurisdiction to entertain the time barred appeal, and to extend the period prescribed by R. 71 for any equitable reason, whatsoever & therefore, the order passed by the Appeal Board, on the 3rd March, 1956 on the appeal filed by opposite party No. 2 on the 25th May, 1953, treating it as an appeal against the order of the R.T.A dated the 26th February 1953, must beheld to be without jurisdiction.

25. The learned Advocate-General contended, in reply, that Rule 71 provides he filing of an appeal against any order of the R.T.A, in respect of any of the matters mentioned in cls. (a) to (g) of S. 64 of the Act within thirty days of the date of the ‘order’, and, therefore, he contended, the words “the order” mean the date of the final order passed in the case. To continue his argument he submitted that as the operation of the order dated the 26th February, 1953, was stayed on the 29th March, 1953, by the R.T.A and, it was vacated on the 25th of April, 1953, therefore, the final order would be deemed to have been passed on the 25th April, 1953, when the operation of the order dated the 26th February, 1956, was revived, and when it became effective, and, as such, the appeal having been filed within thirty days, from the 25th of April, 1953, on the 25th May, 1953, was within time and, therefore, there was no question of any limitation.

26. I am unable to accept this line of reasoning put forward by the learned Advocate General. The limitation for filing the appeal against the order dated the 26th February, 1953, began to run from that very date, and the right to file an appeal against that order was extinguished the moment, thirty days expired, and, no appeal was filed with in that time. The mere fact that an application asking for the stay of the operation of that order was filed within thirty days on the 17th of March 1953, would not be enough to stop the operation of the order of the 26th February, 1953, unless the order was passed on that petition staying the operation of that order, which, however was done on the 29th March, 1953, when the period of limitation for filing the appeal had already expired.

27. In such circumstances, the order dated the 26th February, 1953, became final the moment thirty days, which is the period of limitation for filing an appeal against that order, had spent itself. The provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act are peremptory and impose a duty upon the Court to dismiss a suit, or an appeal, or an application, as the case may be which is out of time, unless the delay can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, or under any other provision of law for the time being in force. In such circumstances, the Appeal Board had no jurisdiction to entertain the time barred appeal, after condoning the delay, against the order dated the 26th of February, 1953.

28. In this connection, it was also argued by the learned Advocate-General that the R.T.A which passed the order on the 26th February, 1953, had the power by virtue of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act (Act X of 1897) to add, to amend, vary or rescind it and to make it effective from the 25th of April, 1953. This contention, however, is not sound, and must be rejected. Section 64 of the Act does not speak of any ‘order’.

29. What it speaks of is that any person aggrieved by the refusal of the R.T.A to “grant” a permit can appeal under S. 64(a) of the Act. Nowhere in S. 64, the word “order” occurs and as such, there is no question of varying, or rescinding, or amending any order and, therefore, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be applied to such a case.

30. There must be an order first before it can be varied or amended by virtue of S. 21.

31. The cases relied upon by the learned Advocate-General, namely, Bhuban Mohan Basak v. Chairman, Decca Municipality, 31 Cal WN 926 : (AIR 1927 Cal 704) (E); Basanta Chandra v. Emperor, ILR 23 Pat 968 : (AIR 1945 Pat 44) (FB) (F) and Basanta Chandra Ghose v. Emperor, AIR 1945 FC 18 : 1945 FCR 81 (G) and Balu Ram v. The State, AIR 1950 Ajmer 56 (H) have, therefore, absolutely no application to the present case, as in all these cases there was an existing order on which Section 21 of the General Clauses Act would operate.

32. For the reasons given above, I would allow the application make the rule absolute, and issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Appeal Board dated the 3rd March, 1956. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs, hearing fee Rs. 100/-.

33. Ramaswami, C.J:— I agree.

D.S.P

34. Application allowed.