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Kamta Prasad Singh v. Ram Narayan Lall .

Patna High Court
Nov 24, 1955
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a defendant's second appeal against concurrent decrees passed by the courts below in a suit for ejectment brought by the plaintiff-respondents. The plaintiffs' father purchased the suit lands at a court sale and thereafter obtained delivery of possession through the court. He was entered in the survey Record of Rights in respect of the disputed lands; the final publication of that Record of Rights took place on 21-1-35. After his death the plaintiffs came into possession. The plaintiffs alleged dispossession by the defendant in April 1937 from Khata 192 and later in 1946 from Khata 194 when the defendant allegedly constructed a house. On these allegations the plaintiffs sued for declaration of title and recovery of possession.

The defendant contested the suit, asserting that the suit was barred by limitation, that the sale to the plaintiffs' father was illegal (claiming the lands were held by the defendant's father in lieu of service under the Maharaja of Chotanagpore), that there was never any delivery of possession through court to the plaintiffs' father, and that the defendant had always been in possession. The trial court found for the plaintiffs (title, delivery of possession, correct entry in record of rights, and that the suit was not barred by limitation) and decreed the suit. On the defendant's first appeal the Subordinate Judge affirmed the findings and dismissed the appeal. The defendant prosecuted the present second appeal.

Procedural events relevant to limitation and presentation of the plaint: the plaint was originally filed on 20-1-47 in the Munsif's Court (valued at Rs.192/8/-). The Munsif, after considering evidence, held on 28-2-48 that the proper valuation was Rs.2,100 and directed presentation to the proper court. The plaintiffs appealed that order to the Subordinate Judge, who agreed on valuation but (by order dated 30-3-49) allowed a fortnight's time to the plaintiffs to pay the proper court fee and accept the plaint, since by then the Munsif had been vested with jurisdiction up to Rs.4,000. The Munsif then directed that the plaint be filed with proper valuation and court fee by 30-4-49. Due to a register/recording difficulty the Munsif ordered on 22-4-49 that the suit be converted into a new title suit and it was registered as a new suit on 23-4-49. The question whether the suit should be treated as instituted on 20-1-47 or 14-4-49 (or 23-4-49 as registered) is central to the limitation issue litigated on this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation (argument invoking Article 142 of the Limitation Act and the effect of the final publication of the Record of Rights dated 21-1-35).
  2. Whether the plaint originally filed on 20-1-47 should be treated as validly presented (i.e., whether the period spent prosecuting the suit and appeal between 20-1-47 and 14-4-49 is to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, or whether the suit must be deemed instituted only when it was reregistered).
  3. Whether the courts below wrongly shifted the onus to the defendant to prove continuous possession when the plaintiffs themselves pleaded dispossession in April 1937.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The suit is barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act because the courts below did not give a specific finding that the plaintiffs had subsisting title in the lands in suit.
  • The plaint originally filed on 20-1-47 should not be treated as validly instituted because it was reregistered as a new suit on 14-4-49 (and later registered/treated as a new suit on 23-4-49), so limitation should be counted from the date of re-registration/refiling.
  • The courts below misplaced the onus by shifting it to the defendant to establish continuous possession; the onus lies on plaintiffs to prove title, antecedent possession and dispossession within 12 years (relying on Ramchandra v. Manu Swamy).
  • At trial the defendant maintained that the sale was illegal, there was never delivery of possession to the plaintiffs' father, and that the defendant had always been in possession.

Respondent's (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs relied on the original filing date of 20-1-47 and contended that the time spent prosecuting the suit and the appeal between 20-1-47 and 14-4-49 should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act because the proceedings were bona fide and prosecuted with due diligence in a court which, due to a defect of jurisdiction (pecuniary), was unable to entertain it.
  • The plaintiffs argued that there was no refiling in another court; the plaint remained in the Munsif's Court throughout and the Munsif later acquired jurisdiction (up to Rs.4,000) so the plaint was always effectively in the same court and should be treated as validly presented on 20-1-47.
  • They relied on authorities (including Raghunath Bhagat v. Syed Samad Seah and Brijlal Goinka v. Janendra Narain Chauahari Bahadur) supporting exclusion of time spent in bona fide prosecution in a court which was unable to entertain the suit, and relied upon Section 14.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Sk. Barakat v. Basant, 39 Ind Cas 356 : AIR 1917 Cal 79 Where the record of rights raises a presumption in plaintiffs' favour, the onus shifts to the defendant to establish affirmatively that the plaintiff has been out of possession for more than 12 years. The Subordinate Judge relied on this authority to justify placing the onus on the defendant to show prolonged adverse possession once the record of rights favoured the plaintiffs; the present court noted this reliance when considering the onus point.
Mahadeva Sastrigal v. Marulai Raddiar, AIR 1933 Mad 874 Without an amendment of the plaint, plaintiffs cannot be allowed to take a ground which would save limitation if that ground was not taken in the plaint. Relied upon by appellant to argue that Section 14 could not be invoked unless pleaded; the court rejected this submission because application of S.14 arose later in the proceedings and need not have been anticipated in the original plaint.
Raghunath Bhagat v. Syed Samad Seah, 12 Cal WN 617 Held by a Division Bench that the period during which a suit was prosecuted bona fide in a court without jurisdiction was properly ??? in computing the period of limitation (text as cited). Relying counsel for the plaintiffs cited this case in support of applying Section 14; the court accepted the principle that bona fide prosecution in a court lacking jurisdiction can be relevant in computing limitation (the opinion references this case in that context).
Ramdutt Ramkissendass v. P.D. Sasoon & Co., 56 Ind App 128 : AIR 1929 PC 103 Where a suit has been instituted in a court which has no jurisdiction and a second suit is raised, the second suit cannot normally be treated as a continuation; however, the hardships are addressed by the Limitation Act (and S.14 can apply by analogy). The court discussed this Privy Council authority, noting that Their Lordships applied S.14 by analogy and that this supports an equitable application of S.14 in appropriate cases like the present.
Ramchandra v. Khodaijatulkubra, ILR 24 Pat 462 : AIR 1945 Pat 369 If a plaint is deliberately undervalued and thus filed in a court lacking jurisdiction bona fides is absent and S.14 does not apply. The court distinguished that case from the present because neither the Munsif nor the Subordinate Judge found deliberate undervaluation or mala fide on the plaintiffs' part; hence Ramchandra did not apply here.
Jiwan Ram Ramchandra v. Jagernath Sahu, 18 Pat LT 250 : AIR 1937 Pat 495 Where a court has no jurisdiction it cannot pass prejudicial orders; a plaint returned for presentation to the proper court does not entitle the plaintiff to claim time for limitation unless the plaintiff acted diligently and in good faith. The court considered this case and held it inapplicable because, unlike that case, here the plaintiffs acted in good faith and were diligent; therefore the equitable considerations behind S.14 favoured exclusion of time.
Brijlal Goinka v. Janendra Narain Chauahari Bahadur, AIR 1935 Pat 82 Section 14 entitles a plaintiff to exclude the time spent prosecuting a suit in a court unable to entertain it, whether the matter comes up on the original plaint or with a new plaint. The court cited this decision as supporting the application of S.14 to the present facts and held that its principles apply here, reinforcing the conclusion that time spent between 20-1-47 and 14-4-49 should be excluded.
Perumal v. Pandaram, AIR 1951 Trav-C 26 (Cited by respondent; principle not elaborated in detail in the opinion beyond citation.) Cited by counsel for the plaintiffs in support of applying Section 14; the court referenced this reliance as part of the body of supporting authorities in favour of S.14 applying.
L.B. Lall v. B.M. Khatri, ILR 28 Pat 102 : AIR 1949 Pat 293 Authority stating the conditions necessary for attracting Section 14 (conditions summarized in the opinion). Used in the opinion to enumerate and confirm the three conditions required to attract S.14 and to apply those conditions to the facts of the present case.
Yeswant Deorao Deshmuch v. Walchand Ramchand, 1950 SCR 852 : AIR 1951 SC 16 Authority confirming the conditions for exclusion of time under Section 14. Relied on by the court in setting out the test for applicability of Section 14 and in concluding that those conditions were satisfied here.
Ramchandra v. Manu Swamy, AIR 1948 Pat 31 Held that the onus lies on the plaintiffs to prove title, antecedent possession, and that they were dispossessed on the alleged date or within 12 years; the alternative arises only if plaintiffs fail to prove dispossession on the alleged date. The appellant relied on this case to contend that the onus was improperly shifted; the court held that the case did not assist the appellant because both lower courts had found the suit was within 12 years from final publication of the Record of Rights, making the precise date of dispossession immaterial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

  1. Limitation and Possession Findings:
    • The trial court found the plaintiffs were dispossessed in April 1937 (as pleaded) and, alternatively, were in possession from the final publication of the Record of Rights on 21-1-35. Counting limitation from that publication, the suit instituted on 20-1-47 was within 12 years and therefore not barred.
    • The Subordinate Judge did not decide conclusively on the April 1937 date but accepted that dispossession occurred sometime after 21-1-35 and thus held the suit was within 12 years.
  2. Onus:
    • The Subordinate Judge relied on Sk. Barakat v. Basant for the proposition that where the record of rights raises a presumption favouring plaintiffs, the onus shifts to the defendant to prove the plaintiffs had been out of possession for more than 12 years.
    • The appellate court here observed that because the courts below found the plaintiffs' possession to be within 12 years, the question of precise date of dispossession (April 1937) was immaterial; hence the appellant's reliance on Ramchandra v. Manu Swamy did not assist him.
  3. Valid Presentation of the Plaint (Application of Section 14):
    • The central legal focal point was whether the original plaint filed on 20-1-47 should be regarded as validly presented despite a valuation objection and subsequent directions to present to the proper court.
    • The court examined Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act and reiterated the three conditions necessary for its application: (1) plaintiff prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding; (2) both proceedings founded on the same cause of action; (3) the other proceeding prosecuted in good faith in a court unable to entertain it due to defect of jurisdiction or similar cause.
    • The court reviewed authorities both supporting and limiting S.14. It distinguished cases where plaintiffs acted mala fide or deliberately undervalued the suit (e.g., Ramchandra), and it relied on authorities where S.14 was applied to protect bona fide litigants (e.g., Brijlal Goinka, the Privy Council Ramdutt Ramkissendass analogy, L.B. Lall and Yeswant Deorao Deshmuch).
    • Factually, neither the Munsif nor the Subordinate Judge found deliberate undervaluation or mala fide by the plaintiffs; the plaintiffs appealed the valuation order and were prosecuting the matter diligently and in good faith. Therefore Section 14 applied and the time spent between 20-1-47 and 14-4-49 was to be excluded for the purpose of computing limitation.
  4. Additional Reason for Excluding Limitation:
    • The court noted that the plaint remained physically in the Munsif's Court during the pendency of the appeal; subsequently the Munsif acquired jurisdictional power to try suits up to Rs.4,000 so he was competent to entertain the suit. The court reasoned that because the same court (and personnel) remained involved, the procedural recording of the plaint as a "new suit" did not convert it in substance into a second suit; consequently, there was no question of limitation arising from refiling.
  5. Conclusion of Analysis:
    • Considering the application of Section 14, the bona fides and diligence of the plaintiffs, the absence of any finding of mala fides by the lower courts, and the subsequent vesting of jurisdiction in the Munsif, the appellate court concluded the plaint must be treated as validly presented on 20-1-47 and that the suit was not barred by limitation.
    • The court also found no merit in the contention that the onus was misplaced, given the lower courts' concurrent findings on title and possession within the limitation period.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding (core ruling): The second appeal is without merit and is dismissed with costs. The court held that:

  • The plaint filed on 20-1-47 must be treated as validly presented; the time spent prosecuting the suit and appeal between 20-1-47 and 14-4-49 is excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act because the plaintiffs prosecuted the matter in good faith and with due diligence in a court which, at the time, had a defect of pecuniary jurisdiction.
  • Alternatively, since the plaint remained in the Munsif's Court and the Munsif subsequently acquired jurisdiction to try the suit, the plaint was never effectively removed from that court and should not be treated as a second suit for limitation purposes.
  • The concurrent decrees in favour of the plaintiffs (as passed by the trial court and affirmed by the Subordinate Judge) stand affirmed.

Implications: Direct consequences are the dismissal of the defendant's appeal and the affirmation of the decrees in favour of the plaintiffs as previously pronounced by the courts below. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general precedent beyond applying established principles (notably Section 14 of the Limitation Act and the cited authorities) to the facts at hand.

H.G.P

Appeal dismissed (final line of the opinion).

Show all summary ...

1. This is a defendant's second appeal, against the concurrent decrees, passed by the courts below in a suit in ejectment, brought by the plaintiff-respondents.

2. The plaintiffs' father purchased the suit lands at a court sale, and thereafter got delivery of possession over them through court. The plaintiffs' father was recorded in the survey Record of Rights also in respect of the disputed lands. The final publication of the Record of Rights took place on 21-1-35. Thereafter, the plaintiffs' father died, and the plaintiffs came in possession of the disputed properties.

3. It was alleged that they were dispossessed in April, 1937, by the defendant, from Khata 192. Subsequently in 1946, they were dispossessed from Khata 194 also by the defendant when he constructed a house on this plot. On these allegations, the plaintiffs brought the suit for a declaration of title, and recovery of possession, in respect of the disputed lands. The defendant contested the suit. His defence was that the suit was barred by limitation, and that the sale of the disputed lands was illegal, as it was held by the defendant's father, in lieu of service, under the Maharaja of Chotanagpore, & that there was never any delivery of possession through court in favour of the plaintiffs' father, nor, was he ever in possession of the lands. The defendant asserted that he had always been in possession of the disputed lands.

4. The first court found that the suit lands were purchased by the plaintiffs' father, who obtained delivery of possession through court, and that the entry in the record of rights of the revisional survey was correct. It also found that the suit was not barred by limitation. On these findings, it decreed the suit.

5. On appeal by the defendant, the learned Subordinate Judge affirmed the findings of the first court, and held that the suit was not barred by limitation, and, therefore, the decree passed by the first court was correct. On these findings lie dismissed the appeal.

6. The defendant, against the aforesaid decree, has preferred the present appeal.

7. Mr. Krishna Ballabh Narain Singh, appearing for the appellant, has substantially taken three points before me; (1) that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation under Article 142 of the Limitation Act, inasmuch as the court of appeal below had given no specific finding that the plaintiffs had subsisting title in the lands in suit; (2) that the courts below have taken a wrong view of the law in treating the suit originally instituted on 20-1-47, as having been validly instituted, in spite of the fact that the plaint was reregistered as a new suit on 14-4-49; and (3) that the court of appeal below had misplaced the onus by wrongly placing it on the defendant to establish the continuous possession of the plaint is from the survey record of rights, even when the plaintiffs themselves pleaded that they were dispossessed in April 1937 from Khata 192.

8. In order to appreciate the second objection, mentioned above, it is necessary to state a few more facts. The plaint was originally filed on 20-1-47 before the Munsif of Ranchi, because the valuation of the suit mentioned in the plaint was Rs. 192/8/-, the amount at which the entire property, only a portion of which was in dispute, had been purchased by the plaintiffs' father. An objection was taken by the defendant about the undervaluation of the suit, and the jurisdiction of the court to try the suit.

9. This was considered by the learned Munsif, and he by his order dated 28-2-48 found that the price mentioned in the sale certificate was no guide;, as the market value of the land had to be taken, into consideration. He accordingly, after consideration of the evidence of the parties, came to the conclusion that the proper valuation of the suit land should be Rs. 2,100, which was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court. He, therefore, directed that the plaint should be presented to the proper court on or before 28-3-48.

10. It may be mentioned here that the learned Munsif did not find that the valuation given by the plaintiffs was deliberately low and mala fide. Against this order the plaintiffs preferred an appeal, which was heard by the learned Subordinate Judge, who has decided the present appeal. He by his order dated 30-3-49 agreed with the finding, of the learned Munsif on the point of valuation. He, however, towards the end of his judgment gave the following direction:

“I find that the plaint has not yet been returned to the filing pleader for presentation to the proper court as directed, and since the learned Munsif has been vested with powers to try suits up to the valuation of Rs. 4000, he will allow a fortnight's time to the plaintiffs to pay the proper court fee, and accept the plaint”.

11. With the above observation, the plaintiffs' appeal was dismissed. On receipt of this order, the learned Munsif on 14-4-49 passed art order to the effect that let the plaint be filed with proper valuation and court fee by 30-4-49. As the plaint was lying in the court of the Munsif, and it had not been taken back by the plaintiffs' lawyer, nor had it been returned to him, the plaintiffs' pleader objected to the refiling of the plaint on the ground of limitation. On this object on of the plaintiffs, the learned Munsif passed the following order on 22-4-49.

“But there is a statistical difficulty, inasmuch as the appeal has been dismissed, and this suit has been disposed of and so shown in the register. Hence to avoid all difficulties let this suit be converted into a new title suit of this year and numbered as such”.

12. In accordance with this order the plaint was registered as a new suit on 23-4-49. In view of these facts, it is contended that the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, should be deemed to have been instituted on 14-4-49, and not on 20-1-47, and on this basis submissions at length have been made by Mr. Singh, which will be considered hereafter.

13. As regards the first contention of Mr. Singh, the first court found that the plaintiffs' case that they were dispossessed from the suit lands in April 1937 was correct. He further found that even if the alleged date of dispossession in April 1937 be supposed to be not correct, the plaintiffs were certainly in possession from the date of the final publication of the Record of Rights, that is, from 21-1-35, and, therefore, the suit having been instituted on 20-1-47, it was within 12 years from the date of the final publication of the Record of Rights, and as such the suit was not barred by limitation.

14. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge did not give any specific finding as to whether the plaintiffs' story that they were dispossessed in April 1937 was correct, or not. He took the view that it was certain that the plaintiffs were dispossessed sometimes after 21-1-35, the date of the final publication of the Record of Rights, and, therefore, the suit was not barred by limitation.

15. He also rejected the defendant's case that he continued to be in possession from before the survey, and that there was no delivery of possession in favour of the plaintiffs' father. He, therefore, relied on Sk. Barakat v. Basant, 39 Ind Cas 356 : (AIR 1917 Cal 79) (A), in which it has been held that where in a suit for ejectment, the record of rights raised a presumption in plaintiffs' favour, the onus is shifted to the defendant to establish affirmatively that the plaintiff has been out of possession for more than 12 years.

16. Mr. Singh's contention that there is no specific finding by the court of appeal below that the plaintiffs had subsisting title is correct, but when the learned Subordinate Judge accepted the plaint filed on 20-1-47 to be validly presented, and further found that the plaintiffs had proved their possession within 12 years of the suit, counting the limitation from the date of the final publication of the record of rights, I think that finding as enough to negative the contention of the defendant that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by limitation. There is no question of limitation, if the suit be deemed to have been instituted on 20-1-47. The first contention must, therefore, be overruled.

17. The second contention, which is the main question for determination is whether the plaint filed on 20-1-47 should be considered to have been validly presented, in the circumstances stated before. Mr. Naseem Ahmad, appearing for the plaintiffs respondents, contends that the period spent in prosecuting the suit and the appeal from 20-1-47 to 14-4-49 should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, although in the present case there is no question of refiling the plaint in a new court after taking it back from the first court, inasmuch as the court was the same and the plaint filed in this court was never returned to the plaintiffs, nor did they themselves take out the plaint from there for presenting it before another court.

18. Mr. Singh's contention is that if examination is sought under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, then that fact has to be pleaded in the plaint, as required by O. 7, R. 6 of the CPC; and if it is not so pleaded, then it is not open to the plaintiffs to seek any aid from Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In support of his contention he relies on Mahadeva Sastrigal v. Marulai Raddiar, AIR 1933 Mad 874 (A-1), in which it was laid down that without an amendment of the plaint, plaintiffs cannot be allowed to take a ground, which would save limitation, not taken in plaint.

19. In reply to this Mr. Naseem Ahmad relies on Raghunath Bhagat v. Syed Samad Seah, 12 Cal WN 617 (B). in which a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the period, during which a suit was prosecuted bona fide in a court without jurisdiction was properly ??? in computing the period of Limitation, although the plaintiff in his plaint did not expressly ask for an extension of time on that ground. As regards this objection of Mr. Singh, in my opinion it has no substance.

20. The plaint was filed with an allegation that the plaintiffs were dispossessed in April 1937 and 1946, and on those allegations these two dates were the causes of action for the suit. On these two dates there was no question of limitation, nor there was any question of the plaintiffs asking for exemption from limitation. This question arose subsequently in view of the facts stated before.

21. None of he Courts below have either referred to, or relied upon Section 14 of the Limitation Act, obviously because no reliance was placed on Section 14 of the Limitation Act. If in the course of a suit a question of limitation arises, although on the plaintiffs' own case, there is no question of limitation, then, in my opinion, in such a case it is not at all necessary, nor is it possible for the plaintiffs to anticipate that a circumstance would arise hereafter, which may make them rely on Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the objection that the application of S. 14 of the Act cannot be considered by this Court, because no such ground has been taken in the plaint, must be overruled.

22. The question, therefore, for consideration is whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act should be applied to the present case.

23. Section 14(1) of the Limitation Act runs thus:

“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance, or in a Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action, and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.”

24. For the contention that it has no application reliance has been placed on Ramdutt Ramkissendass v. P.D Sasoon & Co., 56 Ind App 128 : (AIR 1929 PC 103) (C); Ramchandra v. Khodaijatulkubra, ILR 24 Pat 462 : (AIR 1945 Pat 369) (D) and Jiwan Ram Ramchandra v. Jagernath Sahu, 18 Pat LT 250 : (AIR 1937 Pat 495) (E). Mr. Naseem Ahmed has in reply relied on two cases, namely, Brijlal Geinka v. Janendra Narain Chauahari Bahadur, AIR 1935 Pat 82 (F) and Perumal v. Pandaram, AIR 1951 Trav-C 26 (G).

25. Where a suit had been instituted in a Court, which is found to have no jurisdiction, and it is found necessary to raise a second suit in a Court of proper jurisdiction, the second suit cannot be regarded as a continuation of the first, even though the subject-matter and the parties to the suit, were identical. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, while laying down the above proposition in the case of Ramdutt Ramkissendass (C), referred to above, further observed that the hardships that might arise in such a case have, however, been expressly provided for by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. Their Lordships were not considering the case of two suits, but of two arbitration proceedings. But their Lordships' judgment proceeded on the analogy of the arbitration proceedings to suits. Their Lordships, therefore, applied S. 14 to that case.

26. In the case of Ramchandra (D) referred to above the valuation given by the plaintiff was found to be a gross under-statement of the value of the property in dispute. In the suit, out of which the appeal arose, the Court below hod held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act because they deliberately undervalued their plaint, which was filed in the Munsif's Court. Hence, it was of the opinion that it cannot be said that the plaintiff had been prosecuting the suit bona fide and with due diligence in the Munsif's Court as required by the provisions of S. 14 of the Act. In those circumstances their Lordships, who decided that case, held that S. 14 did not apply, and, therefore, the time spent in prosecuting the suit in the Munsif's Court, could not, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, be allowed for computing the period of limitation in the suit.

27. In the other case, Firm Jiwan Ram Ramchandra (E), referred to above it was held that where a Court has no jurisdiction to try a case it has no jurisdiction to pass an order to the prejudice of one of the parties. Where, therefore, a plaint is filed before a Court having no jurisdiction to entertain it, and the plaint is returned for being presented to the proper Court within a certain time, the plaintiff in computing the period of limitation is not entitled to take advantage of that order.

28. Their Lordships further laid down that the equitable rule that the Court returning the plaint ought to give a reasonable time to the plaintiff for presenting it to the proper Court, and should decide what reasonable time in a particular case is, can be invoked only in aid of a party who has been diligent in pursuing his remedy, and not of a person who having postponed the institution of his suit until the last date of limitation, institutes it in a Court which has no jurisdiction to try it. In this case the Court, where the suit was instituted previously, had admittedly no jurisdiction to entertain it, and in those circumstances, their Lordships held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any indulgence provided by Section 14 of the Limitation Act, obviously because in such a case it can not be said that the plaintiff acted in good faith. The last two cases, therefore, can have no application to the present case.

29. In the case of Brijlal Goinka (F), referred to above, a Division Bench of this Court held that S. 14 merely says that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting it in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, is unable to entertain it, shall be excluded; and the plaintiff is entitled to claim the benefit of this provision, whether it comes up on the second occasion with the original plaint, or with a new plaint. In this case, a suit was originally instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, when the area lying in Santal Parganas was under settlement, although it ought to have been instituted in the Court of the Settlement Officer, and the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain it. After being ordered by the Court to refile the plaint in the proper Court, the plaintiff instituted another suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, who by that time had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, since the settlement was completed. This Court upheld the order of the Courts below, applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act to the case. In my opinion, the principles laid down in this case, and the Privy Council case, referred to before, apply to the present case also.

30. Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose. There was a serious risk of injustice arising if the period of limitation should be strictly applied. Hence, the necessity for some provisions to protect a bona fide plaintiff from the consequences of some mistake which had been made by his advisers in prosecuting his claim. With this object in view, some provisions, like S. 14, were formulated, and provided in the Limitation Act. Section 14 is to protect a former infructuous, but bona fide litigation.

31. The principle underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act is that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits, but failing through the Court being unable to give him such a trial. The principle is clearly applicable not only to cases in which a man brings his suit in the Court, that is, a Court having no jurisdiction to entertain it, but also where he brings the suit in the wrong Court in consequence of a bona fide mistake of law, or defect of procedure. A litigant should not be deprived of his rights by reason of the applicability of the law of limitation, when he is diligently and bona fide proceeding to obtain the redress in the higher Court also.

32. In order to attract the application of S. 14 three conditions must co-exist: (1) The plaintiff must have been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding in a Court of first instance, or in a Court of appeal, against the defendant; (2) The two proceedings must have been for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, that is, both must have been founded upon the same cause of action; and (3) The other proceeding must have been prosecuted in good faith in a Court, which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. If these conditions are satisfied, the time, during which the plaintiff has been so prosecuting the other proceeding, shall be excluded see L.B Lall v. B.M Khatri, ILR 28 Pat 102 : (AIR 1949 Pat 293) (FB) (H) and Yeswant Deorao Deshmuch v. Walchand Ramchand, 1950 SCR 852 at p. 855 : (AIR 1951 SC 16 at p. 18) (I).

33. Bearing in mind the above principles, in my opinion, the present case stands on a firmer ground. Neither the Munsif, nor the Subordinate Judge, who decided the question of valuation, held that the suit has been deliberately undervalued. The only Court, which had jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the valuation originally given, was the Court of the Munsif, before whom the suit was instituted originally. There is nothing on record to show that the plaintiffs acted mala fide in presenting the plaint in the Munsif's Court in the first instance. The Munsif's Court after enquiry found that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, because on the valuation found by him the suit was beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction. It ordered the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. The plaintiffs thought that the order was not correct, and so they preferred an appeal to the District Judge.

34. That itself would show that the plaintiffs were diligent in the matter, and they were prosecuting the case in good faith. None of the two Courts below on the present occasion also, have found that the plaintiffs were not acting in good faith in prosecuting the suit between 20-1-47 and 14-4-49. There is nothing to doubt the bona fides of the plaintiffs, and, therefore, in my opinion, Section 14 of the Limitation Act would certainly apply to the present case, and the time spent in prosecuting the suit between 20-1-47 and 14-4-49 would be excluded and, therefore, the plaint would be considered as validly presented on 20-1-47. The provision of S. 14 has been formulated as stated before to protect a bona fide plaintiff from the consequences of some mistake which had been made by his advisers in prosecuting his claim, and thus to protect a former infructuous, but bona fide, litigation. Section 14 has to be liberally applied. Consequently, the present suit is not barred by limitation.

35. There is another reason also for my holding that the question of limitation does not arise in the present case. The plaint was filed before the Munsif, and it was never returned to the plaintiffs. It remained throughout in that Court, during the pendency of the appeal, against the order of valuation passed by the Munsif, before the appellate Court. During the pendency of the appeal the same Munsif was vested with powers to try suits up to Rs. 4000/-, and, thereafter, he was quite competent to entertain the suit, and as a matter of fact this Court was the only Court, where the suit could be instituted.

36. The Subordinate Judge, in view of this subsequent event, directed that the learned Munsif should accept the plaint and grant a fortnight's time to the plaintiffs to pay the proper court-fee. The Court in view of some difficulty, which it felt, instead of continuing the previous suit, treated it as a new suit, and registered it as a new suit. In such circumstances, I do not understand how the same plaint, which was already lying in his Court, and which had been registered as a regular suit, can be treated as a second suit, and not a continuation of the first. The matter would have been different if the plaint would have been taken back from his Court, and refiled before another Court. In such a case, the second suit raised, on refiling of the first plaint, could not be regarded as a continuation of the first. It is true that the learned Munsif had pecuniary jurisdiction up to Rs. 2,000, and, therefore, he was unable to entertain the suit, and that subsequently he was vested with powers to try suits up to Rs. 4000, but the Court and the personnel remained the same. In such circumstances, the question of a second suit would not arise, and the mere fact that the plaint had been registered, obviously wrongly, as a second suit, will not affect the matter. For these reasons, I hold that there is no question of limitation in the present suit.

37. The last contention of Mr. Singh is that onus has been wrongly placed on the defendants. He has relied on Ramchandra v. Manu Swamy, AIR 1948 Pat 31 (J), in which it was held that the onus lies on the plaintiffs to prove not only that they had title and antecedent possession, but also that he was dispossessed on the alleged date or any other date within 12 years of the institution of the suit. The latter alternative arises only when the plaintiffs fail to prove dispossession by the defendant on the alleged date. In my opinion, this case does not help Mr. Singh at all, because on the findings of the two Courts below the suit was within 12 years from the date of the final publication of the record of rights, and as such the question of dispossession, whether in April 1937 or not, was quite immaterial.

38. If the plaintiffs would have come after 12 years from the final publication of the record of rights, then surely the question of dispossession would have assumed great importance and in that case the Courts below would have to consider whether the story of possession and dispossession of the plaintiffs is true. In such a case, if the Court found that the story of dispossession is false, or not proved, then obviously the plaintiffs' suit, being beyond 12 years, would be dismissed. But in the present case, that question does not arise. Both parties adduced evidence in the case, and after a consideration of the evidence of both sides, both the Courts below came to the concurrent finding that the plaintiffs had proved their title and possession.

39. In such circumstances, I do not think there is any substance in this contention.

40. For the reasons given above, I find that there is no merit in this appeal, and, it is accordingly dismissed with costs.

H.G.P

41. Appeal dismissed.