Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Mohammad Afaque v. The State Of Bihar And Others Opposite Party.

Patna High Court
Dec 22, 1955
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Sinha, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Chaudhry Mohammad Afaque, filed the present application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking appropriate writs, orders or directions against the opposite party (the State). The petitioner claimed intermediary interest and occupancy of approximately 700 bighas of raiyat kasht lands under various proprietors (including the Islampur Waqf Estate), and had cultivated raiyati and some bakasht lands. A series of historical transactions, settlements and a sale (including a 1925 sale from one Dolo to the petitioner and several registered settlements by the Mutwalli Mohammad Yusuf) formed the basis of the petitioner’s claim of possession and of proprietorship of a mela known as Yusufganj (Islampur Mela).

The Islampur Waqf Estate vested in the State of Bihar on 26-1-1955 under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Following an inquiry, reports and administrative action, the Additional Collector issued an order dated 8-11-1955 concluding that the mela had prima facie vested in the State; notices under Section 4(g) and Section 40 of the Act were issued, and the State took possession of the mela on 14-11-1955. The petitioner challenged that administrative action in the present writ application. The State filed a counter-affidavit denying the petitioner’s claimed rights. The High Court allowed the application, issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the Additional Collector’s order dated 8-11-1955 and related acts, with costs and a hearing fee of Rs. 100; Rai, J. agreed with Sinha, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of Section 4(a) and Section 4(g) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act are attracted in respect of the petitioner’s right to hold the mela and to collect tolls therefrom.
  2. Whether the Collector (and the Additional Collector) had jurisdiction under Section 4(g) of the Act to require surrender of and to take possession of the mela (a non‑explicitly‑land asset), and thereby to issue notices and take possession of property described as a mela held on portions of specific plots.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted long possession of the lands in question arising from purchases and settlements (including a 1925 purchase and subsequent settlements by the Mutwalli), cultivation, and physical development (houses, mosque, cattle-shed) on portions of the relevant plots.
  • The petitioner relied on documentary evidence and an order in a claim case (Misc. Case No. 51 of 1948 under Order 21, Rule 58 CPC) that concluded he had been in possession of the lands since his purchase from Dolo and therefore such lands were not liable to execution proceedings against his father (the judgment‑debtor).
  • The petitioner produced correspondence (including a 21-10-1954 letter from the Sub-divisional Officer identifying the petitioner as proprietor of Islampur Mela) to evidence proprietorship and arrangements for holding the mela.

Opposite Party / State’s Arguments

  • The State’s counter-affidavit essentially denied the rights claimed by the petitioner in the lands and alleged that the mela used to be held on behalf of the Waqf Estate.
  • The Circle Officer’s inquiry (report dated 4-10-1955) concluded that the transactions in favour of the petitioner (including the sale by Dolo and subsequent settlements) were farzi and that the mela was held on behalf of the Waqf Estate.
  • The Additional Collector (in his order dated 8-11-1955) treated the mela as having prima facie vested in the State under the Land Reforms Act and issued notices under Section 4(g) and Section 40 to take charge of the mela.
  • The Advocate-General (as noted in the opinion) contended that the word “mela” could be included within the phrase “all other sairati interests” in Section 4(a), thereby bringing the mela within the interests that vested in the State on vesting of the Waqf Estate.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court confined itself to the single question whether Sections 4(a) and 4(g) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act applied so as to permit the State (through the Collector) to take possession of the mela and to prevent the petitioner from holding it and collecting tolls. The court expressly declined to decide whether the petitioner had acquired raiyati interest by the several transactions; that factual/legal question was taken as not necessary to resolve the present issue.

The court’s analysis proceeded by textual construction of the relevant statutory terms and provisions as they appear in the Act:

  • It examined the definitions in the Act: “estate” was held to refer to lands (an “estate” is any land included under one entry in the general registers); “tenure” and “tenure-holder” similarly relate to interests in land; “intermediary interest” is the interest of an intermediary in an estate or tenure. From those definitions the court inferred that the statutory language in Section 4(a) is primarily land‑focused.
  • The court observed that Section 4(a) lists a number of interests—“trees, forests, fisheries, jalkars, hats, bazars & ferries and all other sairati interests”—but concluded that, read in context with the Act’s definitions, these expressions must be understood as referring to interests that are derived from or connected with lands which vested in the State under the Act (i.e., the interests relate to landed estate or tenure rights).
  • The court considered the Advocate‑General’s contention that “mela” could fall within “all other sairati interests” but held (without deciding the broader question) that even if “mela” could be so included, such sairati interests must have been derived from lands in the direct possession or control of the proprietor or tenure-holder whose estate vested in the State. In short, the statutory interests that vest must be referable to lands of which the State acquired possession by operation of the Act.
  • The court then turned to Section 4(g), which it quoted and emphasized: Section 4(g) permits the Collector, where the right to possession of an estate or tenure vests in the State, to require any person in possession of “any lands and buildings” comprised in such estate or tenure to give up possession and to use force if necessary. The court stressed the explicit limitation of Section 4(g) to “lands and buildings.”
  • By textual and contextual construction, the court concluded that Section 4(g) supplied the key to interpreting Section 4(a): if the items listed in Section 4(a) are not referable to lands of which possession vested in the State, the Collector does not have power under Section 4(g) to take possession of them. The Collector’s power under Section 4(g) is confined to lands and buildings and cannot be extended to other kinds of property not referable to lands vested in the State.
  • Applying this construction to the facts, the court found that the Additional Collector had no jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 4(g) or to authorize taking possession of the mela held on portions of the specified plots. Thus the administrative acts based on that exercise of power were ultra vires.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: APPLICATION ALLOWED; ORDER OF THE ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR DATED 8-11-1955 QUASHED.

The court issued a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the Additional Collector’s order dated 8-11-1955 and held that all acts done in pursuance of that order (including the taking of possession of the mela on 14-11-1955) were done without jurisdiction. The application was allowed with costs; a hearing fee of Rs. 100 was awarded.

Direct consequences: the administrative notices issued under Section 4(g) and the State’s subsequent acts of possession in reliance on the Additional Collector’s order were declared void for want of jurisdiction as the statutory power in Section 4(g) is confined to lands and buildings referable to vested estates/tenures. The opinion does not purport to decide whether the petitioner in fact held raiyati interest; rather, it confines relief to the absence of statutory power to dispossess or take the mela by invoking Section 4(g).

Broader implications: the opinion does not purport to lay down broader precedent beyond interpreting the limits of Sections 4(a) and 4(g) as to the Collector’s power. No broader legislative or policy consequences are articulated in the judgment; the decision’s practical effect is to restore to the petitioner the protection against an administrative dispossession carried out under Section 4(g) in circumstances where the asset taken was not within the statutory ambit of “lands and buildings” vested in the State.


Opinion authored by Sinha, J.; Rai, J. concurred. Order: Application allowed.

Show all summary ...

Sinha, J.:— The petitioner, Chaudhry Mohammad Afaque, has filed this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and has prayed for issue of appropriate orders, directions or writs against the opposite party.

2. The petitioner is the holder of intermediary interest and also 700 bighas of raiyat kasht lands under different proprietors, including Islampur Waqf Estate, and he has been cultivating the raiyati lands and also some bakasht lands. A short genealogy of the petitioner's family will not be out of place to understand the case:

3. This genealogy does not purport to be exhaustive. It appears that Chaudhry Abdul Aziz was possessed of some properties, and, in 1908, he made settlement of about 20 bighas of land in villages Islampur Chopra Jhar. There is he dispute in this proceeding in regard to this land. On 14-4-1909, Abdul Aziz, had created a waqf-al-aulad’ in respect of all his properties. Abdul Aziz died in 1916, and he was succeeded by his son, Mohammad Yusuf, father of the petitioner, as Mutwalli, and the other two brothers of Mohammad Yusuf became Naib Mutwallis, according to the terms of the Waqfnama. On 8-2-1923, the Mutwalli, namely, Mohammad Yusuf, settled lands comprised in khata No. 2, parts of plot No. 5 and plot No. 10, with one Dolo for nine years under a registered deed of settlement, along with other lands, including khata No. 64, plot No. 7 (part) and plot No. 9 (part), and khata No. 63, plot No. 8 (part), totalling an area of 40 bighas 1 katha 11 dhurs, at a rental of Rs. 40/-.

4. On 14-9-1925, more than two years after, the said Dolo sold the said 40 bighas 1 katha 11 dhurs to the petitioner, who was then minor, under a registered document for a consideration of Rs. 1,500/-. On 19-3-1938, the Mutwalli settled an area of 113 bighas 14 kathas 6 dhurs with the petitioner, including khata No. 2, plot No. 5 (part) and plot No. 10 (part), and other lands for a rental of Rs. 35/6/-.

5. There was another settlement with the petitioner in the same year by the Mutwalli in respect of 107 acres and odd which included khata No. 2, plot No. 5 (part) and plot No. 10 (part). There was a third settlement of 10 acres and odd with the petitioner and the rental of these two pieces of land (107 acres and odd and 10 acres and odd) was fixed at Rs. 75/8/-. It is stated that the petitioner has been in possession all along since the dates of purchase and settlements and that he has built on portions of plots Nos. 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 his residential houses, out-houses, private mosque, cattle-shed etc.

6. Abdul Aziz, the founder of the Waqf, remained Mutwalli from 1909, the date of the creation of the Waqf, till sometime in 1916. Mohammad Yusuf was the Mutwalli after the death of Abdul Aziz in 1916 up to 26-4-1955. During his tenure as Mutwalli, one Mohammad Sahib was appointed a Receiver by the Subordinate Judge, Pur-nea, in 1939 in execution case No. 196 of 1933.

7. The receivership terminated sometime in March, 1940, when he was discharged, and Mohammad Yusuf was appointed Receiver for a short-while. Thereafter, for about a year, one Pazlur Rahman was appointed Manager, with the consent of the parties, on 26-7-1940. Mohammad Ayub; succeeded to the Mutwalliship on 26-4-1955, on the death of Mohammad Yusuf. According to the petitioner's case, there was ill-feeling between Mohammad Yusuf and Mohammad Ayub, and there were several criminal and civil litigations between them.

8. It is also stated that he has always been in possession of the lands purchased by him and settled with him, as mentioned above, on payment of rent to the Waqf Estate all along, including the time when the Receiver was appointed and a Manager had been put in charge of the Waqf Estate.

9. The case of the petitioner is that, since 1925, on portions of plots Nos. 5 and 10 of khata No. 2, khewat No. 1, and a portion of plot No. 7 of khata No. 64, a mela, known as Yusufganj Mela Islampur, is held by him, and that, during the period of his minority, his father, Mohammad Yusuf, and his brother, Mohammad Yaqub, used to look after his properties, including the mela.

10. The petitioner, in support of his actual physical possession of the lands in question, as also the proprietorship of the mela, has relied upon a number of documents, including an order in a claim case (Miscellaneous Case No. 51 of 1948, under O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC), in which a decree-holder against his father, Mohammad Yusuf, had attached certain properties, including plots Nos. 5 and 10 of Knata No. 2 in village Islampur.

11. The petitioner filed a claim case, under O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC and, on 28-2-1947, it was decided that the petitioner had been in possession of the lands since his purchase from one Dolo, and, accordingly, they were not liable to be proceeded against in execution of the decree against his father, and that the judgment-debtor, namely, the father of the petitioner, was not in possession. He has also attached with his affidavit and supplementary affidavit a number of correspondence showing that he himself had always made arrangements for the mela, and that is apparent from a number of letters receiyed by him from the Chairman, District Board, Purnea, and other officers of Government.

12. Special mention has been made of a letter from Mr. R.C Prasad, Sub-divisional Officer, Kishanganj, to the petitioner wherein the latter has been described as the proprietor, Islampur Mela. The letter is dated 21-10-1954, in which the petitioner has been told that, under the auspices of National Extension and Block Development Exhibition, stalls will be erected in the Islampur Mela ground commencing from 25-10-1954, for a month.

13. In the view which I am inclined to take, it is not necessary to mention the letters and other correspondence referred to by the petitioner in any greater detail.

14. Now coming to the present dispute, it has to be mentioned that the Islampur Waqf Estate vested in the State of Bihar on 26-1-1955, under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, and the officers on behalf of the State Government wanted to interfere with the petitioner's right to hold the mela on the plots aforesaid.

15. On 12-4-1955, the petitioner filed a petition before the Collector of Purnea mentioning therein that he had been in cultivating possession of the lands in question, and was holding the mela since a long time, and that his (Collector's) subordinate officers were interfering with his possession, so far as the holding of the mela for the year 1955 was concerned.

16. There was an enquiry made by the Circle Officer, who, by his report dated 4-10-1955, held that the transactions in favour of the petitioner, commencing from the settlement with Dolo and Dolo's sale to the petitioner and the settlements by the Waqf Estate with the petitioner, were all farzi transactions, and that the mela in question was held on behalf of the Waqf Estate. On 27-10-1955, just a few days before the mela was to commence, Mr. M. Singh, Deputy Collector in charge Z.A Works, Kishanganj, in his letter No. 3590 R.S to the Additional Collector, Purnea, referred to the dispute in the Civil Court with reference to the claim case of the petitioner, and he said:

“The fact that plots Nos. 5 and 10 are recorded as raiyati land of Ch. Md. Afaque cannot be challenged. The only point which remains to be examined is if the transaction through which these plots were acquired was a farzi one…. In view of this clear finding (referring to the order in the claim case) I do not see there are materials enough to hold those transactions as Benami.”

17. This was followed by the order of the Additional Collector, Mr. B. Singh, dated 8-11-1955, observing that Dolo had no right to sell the lands to the petitioner, that according to the report of the Circle Officer, the transaction was absolutely farzi, that the purchase was actually made not by the petitioner but his father, the Mutwalli, Chaudhry Mohammad Yusuf, that certain receipts indicated in the report of the Circle Officer snowed that the ??? was being held on behalf of the Waqf Estate, and that the Islampur Mela Yusufganj has ‘prima facie’ vested in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act. After these observations, the learned Additional Collector made the following remarks:

“It was also argued on behalf of the applicant in course of the argument that the applicant has been cultivating some portion of the lands on which the mela is held. If the applicant has been cultivating lands on which mela is held, the question does not arise. He should cultivate the lands as usual but if he has been cultivating lands on a portion of which mela is held the mela will be held on such portion also and the State of Bihar having stepped into the shoes of the ex-tenure-holder of the Waqf Estate has also the same right to hold the mela even on such lands which are cultivated during the period when the mela is held, but after the mela is over, the person or persons concerned may cultivate such lands as-usual as is done in some other melas of the District.”

18. Finally, the learned Additional Collector held as follows:

“As the mela has vested in the State of Bihar under the provisions of the L.R Act, it is necessary now to take charge of this Mela. Accordingly, issue notice under Section 4(g) of the L.R Act requiring the ex-tenure-holder the Mutwala (Present Mutwalli) of the Waqf Estate and the applicant objector to give up possession by 13-11-1955-and also issue notice under S. 40 of the Act asking them to make over charge of the said Mela by 14-11-1955.”

19. Notices under S. 4(g), were, thereupon, issued to both Mohammad Ayub, the ex-tenure-holder Mutwalli of the Waqf Estate, and also to the petitioner, Mohammad Afaque; and the State of Bihar took possession of the mela on 14-11-1955; the mela started on the 15th November. It is on these facts that the present application is founded.

20. The opposite party has filed a counter affidavit sworn by Narendra Narain Sinha, Circle-Officer, Islampur. Then there was a supplementary affidavit in reply to the counter-affidavit. This counter-affidavit on behalf of the State is, nothing more than denial of the rights acquired by the petitioner in the land in question. There is no allegation that on the relevant date these lands were in direct possession or control of the Waqf Estate. It is true, allegations have been made that the mela in question used to be held on behalf of the Waqf Estate.

21. For the purpose of the present application, it should be stated that the opposite party claim possession of the mela and the right to hold the mela on the lands in question irrespective of the fact whether the lands were in actual physical possession of the petitioner as raiyat, or these lands were in khas possession of the Waqf Estate as such.

22. In this view of the matter, I am not called upon to decide in this case as to whether the petitioner acquired raiyati interest in the lands to: question by the several transactions mentioned above; and it has been taken for granted by the Additional Collector that the lands are in possession of the petitioner.

23. The only question that has to be decided is whether the provisions of S. 4(a) and 4(g) are attracted so far as the right to hold the mela and to collect tolls therefrom is concerned. This brings me to the question as to the interpretation that has to be put upon these provisions. It is not disputed that the Waqf Estate has vested in the State of Bihar on 26-1-1955. Section 4 reads as follows:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, on the publication of the notification under sub-s. (1) of S. 3, or sub-s. (1) or (2) of S. 3-A the following consequences shall ensue, namely,

“(a) Subject to the subsequent provisions of this Chapter, such ‘estate or tenure’ including the interests of the ‘proprietor or tenure-holder’ in any building or part of a building comprised in such estate or tenure and used primarily as office or cutchery for the collection of rent of such estate or tenure, and his interests in trees, forests, fisheries, jalkars, hats, bazars & ferries and ‘all other sairati interests’ as also his interest in all sub-soil including any rights in mines and minerals, whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether being worked or not, inclusive of such rights of a lessee of mines and minerals, comprised in such estate or tenure (other than the interests of raiyats or under-raiyats) shall, with effect from the date of vesting, vest absolutely in the State free from all incumbrances and such proprietor or tenure-holder shall cease to have any interest in such estate or tenure, other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act.

“(g) Where, by operation of this Act, the right to the possession of any estate or tenure or any part thereof vests in the State, the Collector may, by written order served in the prescribed manner, require any person in possession of any ‘lands and buildings’ (other than the lands and buildings referred to in Ss. 5, 6 and 7) comprised in such estate or tenure to give up possession of the same by a date specified in the order and it shall be competent for the Collector to take, or cause to be used, such force as, in the opinion of the Collector, may be necessary for securing compliance with the said order or preventing any breach of the peace.”

24. The important words have been underlined by me. The word “estate” has been defined as meaning “any land included under one entry in any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and revenue-free lands…”. There is no doubt, therefore that “estate” refers to “lands”, as mentioned in the definition.

“Tenure” means “the interest of a tenure-holder or an under-tenure-holder………”; and “tenure-holder” is defined to mean “a person who has acquired from a proprietor or from any other tenure-holder a right to hold land for the purpose of collecting rent or bringing it under cultivation by establishing tenants on it……”. The words “estate”, “tenure” or “tenure-holder”, therefore, refer to lands. The words “intermediary interest” have also been defined as meaning “the interest of an intermediary in an estate or tenure”.

25. Construing these words, therefore, in my judgment, they must have reference to lands. In the light, therefore, of the definitions of these words given in the Act itself, in my opinion, the words “trees, forests, fisheries, jalkars, hats, bazars and ferries and all other sairati interests”, occurring in S. 4(a) must also have reference to lands which, by virtue of the Act, vested in the State. Mr. Advocate-General, being alive to the position that the word “mela” does not find place in S. 4(a), contended that it would be included within the expression “all other sairati interests”.

26. Even if it be conceded that the word “mela” could be covered within the expression “all other sairati interests”, but without deciding it, it should be held that such sairati interests must have been derived from the lands in direct possession or control of the proprietor or tenure-holder, as the case may be, whose estate has vested in the State. In other words, if trees, forests ??? hats and bazars have no reference to lands which have vested in the State, under the Act, the date is not entitled to the possession of any of these.

27. Sub-section (f) of S. 4, referred to by the learned Advocate-General, does not throw any light upon the controversy in question: it merely says that the Collector shall be deemed to have taken charge of such estate or tenure and of all interests vested in the State under this section.

28. Now, sub-s. (g) says in quite clear words that where, by virtue of the operation of this Act, the right to the possession of any estate or tenure of any part thereof vests in the State, the Collector may by written order served in the prescribed manner, require any person in possession of ‘any lands and buildings’ (underlined by me here into ‘’) comprised in such estate or tenure to give up possession of the same, and so the Collector is not entitled to take possession of any other kind of property. In my opinion, the provisions of sub-s. (g) also supply the key to the interpretation of sub-s. (a) of S. 4.

29. In other words, if trees, forests, fisheries, jalkars, hats, bazars and ferries and all other sairati interests are not referable to lands, of which possession is deemed to have vested in the State under S. 4 of the Act, they cannot be taken possession of by the Collector under S. 4(g); that is to say, the right given to the Collector under sub-s. (g) to take possession is confined to lands and buildings and to nothing more.

30. Viewed in the light of the construction put by me on the different provisions of the Act, referred to above. I am definitely of the opinion that the Collector or the Additional Collector had absolutely no jurisdiction to order issue of notice under S. 4(g) of the Act, nor the opposite party No. 3 was entitled, under that notice, to take possession of the mela in question, held on portions of plots Nos. 5 and 10 of khata No. 2 khewat No. 1, and portion of plot No. 7 of khata No. 64, khewat No. 1, as mentioned in para 10 of the petition.

31. I have no hesitation, therefore, in allowing the application, and I direct that a writ in the nature of certiorari should issue quashing the order of the Additional Collector dated 8-11-1955 and all other acts in pursuance of the said order must also be held as having been done without jurisdiction. In the result, the application is allowed with costs; hearing fee Rs. 100/-.

Rai, J.:— I agree.

D.S.P

32. Application allowed.