- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Gopi Nath Pandey v. Bhukhan Opposite Party.
Opinion Summary — Narayan, J. (with C.J. Imam concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit was instituted by Bhukhan Pandey and dismissed with costs by the 3rd Additional Subordinate Judge of Arrah on 15-12-1951. The suit had been instituted in forma pauperis. The plaintiff initially filed an application in this Court (High Court) for leave to appeal in forma pauperis under Order 44 Rule 1 along with a memorandum of appeal but did not file certified copies of the trial court's judgment and decree with that application. That application was withdrawn on 22-8-1952.
The plaintiff then applied to the District Judge of Shahabad on 4-9-1952 for permission to appeal in forma pauperis. The District Judge rejected that application on 6-9-1952, holding that the findings of the Subordinate Judge were not erroneous or unjust within the proviso to O. 44 R. 1, and required court-fee to be paid by 17-9-1952. The applicant sought time and then deposited the court-fee on 23-10-1952. The District Judge fixed 29-10-1952 to hear the question of limitation. On that date the respondent (listed as respondent 5 and the petitioner before the High Court) appeared and urged that the memorandum of appeal be rejected as time-barred. By order dated 24-11-1952 the District Judge condoned the delay and admitted the appeal, stating he was condoning delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
The present application to the High Court challenges the District Judge's order of 24-11-1952 admitting the appeal and condoning delay on the basis of Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the District Judge could lawfully condone delay in presenting the appeal under Section 14 of the Limitation Act (i.e., whether Section 14 is directly applicable to appeals).
- Alternatively, whether the principle of Section 14 may be applied by way of analogy when deciding an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to extend time for filing an appeal.
- Whether the proceedings before the High Court (presentation and prosecution of the in forma pauperis application and memorandum of appeal) were prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence so as to constitute sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC 156 | Supported the view that the principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act may be considered for purposes of extending time, even though S.14 does not strictly apply to appeals. | The Court noted that the Judicial Committee in that case were inclined to take the view that S.14's principle may be applied; the opinion accepts that authorities allow the principle of S.14 to be considered when applying S.5, but distinguishes and applies the principle to the facts here. |
| Lal Behari Lall v. Bani Madhava Khatri, AIR 1949 Pat 293 (Full Bench) | Held that circumstances contemplated in Section 14 should ordinarily constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act (i.e., bona fide prosecution of a proceeding in the wrong court may be sufficient). | The Court cited the Full Bench as authority that the circumstances in S.14 may ordinarily amount to sufficient cause under S.5; nevertheless, the Court found the facts of the present case materially different and concluded that S.14's principle could not be invoked here because the proceedings were not in good faith nor prosecuted with due diligence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by identifying the correct legal framework and then applying it to the undisputed chronology and conduct of the appellant/petitioner:
- Statutory framework:
- The Court emphasized that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not in terms applicable to the computation of time for filing appeals: sub-s. (1) of S.14 refers to suits and sub-s. (2) to applications. Hence, S.14 cannot directly be invoked to condone delay in filing appeals.
- The proper statutory provision to seek extension for time to present an appeal is Section 5 of the Limitation Act; only Section 5 permits condonation of delay by showing sufficient cause.
- The authorities, including the Judicial Committee in Brij Indar Singh and the Full Bench in Lal Behari Lall, establish that the principle embodied in Section 14 may be relevant when considering whether sufficient cause exists under Section 5, but S.14 itself is not directly applicable to appeals.
- Procedural requirements and failures:
- Order 41 Rule 1 CPC requires that a memorandum of appeal be accompanied by certified copies of the judgment and decree. Order 44 Rule 1 CPC (dealing with appeals in forma pauperis) requires the applicant to file the judgment and decree so the court can determine prima facie whether the decree is contrary to law or otherwise erroneous or unjust.
- The Court found that the appellant presented the in forma pauperis application to the High Court without the necessary copies and thereafter failed to file the certified copies promptly after they became available. Specific dates were recorded: the copy of the judgment became ready and was delivered on 24-1-1952 but was filed only on 26-2-1952; the decree copy became ready on 13-2-1952 and was filed only on 9-4-1952 (after Court orders to file certified copies within fixed time). The Court observed no satisfactory explanation for these delays.
- Good faith and due diligence:
- The Court identified three critical factors undermining a claim of good faith and due diligence: (a) it was well known that the District Judge had jurisdiction to entertain appeals where the suit value did not exceed Rs. 5,000 (the valuation here was Rs. 4,500), yet the application and memorandum were filed in the High Court; (b) the appellant did not promptly file the certified copies even after obtaining them; and (c) when confronted with the stamp-report pointing out limitation and jurisdictional defects, the appellant withdrew the application rather than offering an explanation.
- The Court equated "good faith" with conduct "with due care and attention" (referencing Section 2(7) of the Limitation Act) and concluded that the conduct did not meet that standard. The prosecution of the proceedings in the High Court therefore could not be treated as bona fide prosecution with due diligence.
- Application of authorities:
- Although authorities allow the principle of Section 14 to be considered when assessing Section 5 claims, the Court held that such principle is relevant only where the proceedings in the wrong court were bona fide and prosecuted with due diligence. On the facts, the Court found no such bona fides or diligence here.
- Consequently, the District Judge's explicit reliance on Section 14 to condone delay was a legal error: the District Judge should have considered the matter under Section 5 and, in any event, should have applied the test of good faith and due diligence which the Court found was not satisfied.
- Relief granted:
- Because the Court concluded the appeal and related application had not been presented in good faith nor prosecuted with due diligence, it allowed the application challenging the District Judge's order, set aside the order condoning the delay and admitting the appeal, and awarded costs (hearing fee Rs. 48).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application is allowed; the order of the District Judge condoning the delay under Section 14 and admitting the appeal is set aside.
Direct consequences:
- The District Judge's order (24-11-1952) condoning the delay and admitting the appeal is quashed and set aside.
- The applicant who sought admission of appeal is not entitled to rely upon Section 14 to condone delay in this appeal; any extension of time must be considered under Section 5 and requires a demonstration of sufficient cause (bona fide prosecution and due diligence), which was not established.
- The Court awarded costs in favour of the successful party in this application and fixed the hearing fee at Rs. 48.
Broader implications:
- The decision reiterates the principle that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not directly apply to appeals; at best its principle may be considered when applying Section 5. However, the Court emphasizes that the benefit of Section 14's principle is only available where the prosecution of proceedings in the wrong forum was bona fide and prosecuted with due diligence.
- The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle; it applies and distinguishes existing authorities on the point and clarifies the limited circumstances in which S.14's principle may influence a Section 5 inquiry.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: "I would allow this application with costs and set aside the order of the learned District Judge condoning the delay and admitting the appeal. Hearing fee Rs. 48/-. Application allowed." (Narayan, J.; Imam, C.J. concurred.)
Narayan, J.:— This application is directed against an order of the District Judge of Shahabad admitting an appeal against a decree passed in a Title Suit. The suit had been instituted by one Bhukhan Pandey, and it was disposed of by the 3rd Additional Subordinate Judge of Arrah on 15-12-1951. The suit had been instituted in forma pauperis, and by his judgment dated 15-12-1951 the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit with costs.
2. Thereafter, an application accompanied by a memorandum of appeal was filed in this Court by the plaintiff according to the provisions of R. 1 of O. 44. But the copy of the judgment and the copy of the decree of the trial court were not filed along with the application, and the application was ultimately withdrawn on 22-8-1952. On 4-9-1952 the plaintiff filed an application for permission to appeal in forma pauperis before the District Judge of Shahabad, and on 6-9-1952 the learned District Judge held that the findings arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge being neither erroneous nor unjust within the meaning of the proviso to R. 1 of O. 44, the applicant was not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis. The application to prosecute the appeal in forma pauperis was, therefore, rejected, and the applicant was called upon to pay court-fee by 17-9-1952. On 17-9-1952 the applicant applied for time and stated that he was going to move this Court against the order refusing permission to prosecute the appeal in forma pauperis. Time was allowed till 23-10-1952 and on this date the applicant deposited the entire amount of court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal. The court then fixed 29-10-1952 for hearing on the question of limitation, and on 29-10-1952 the respondent 5, who is the petitioner before this Court, appeared and prayed that the memorandum of appeal should be rejected as time-barred. The court thereafter heard the parties on the question of limitation, and by its order dated 24-11-1952, which is the order under appeal, it condoned the delay and admitted the appeal. The learned District Judge has observed that “If the memo, of appeal is rejected now, it will amount to penalising the appellant for want of rudinientary knowledge on the part of the advocate Mr. Ramjee Sharma as to where such an appeal was to be filed”, and he says that there are several authorities which lay down that such an appellant should be given the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The operative part of his judgment is in the following word: “I would, therefore, condone the delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and admit this appeal”.
3. The learned District Judge was in error when he passed such an order, inasmuch as there could not be any condonation of the delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. If there could be any condonaticn, it could be only under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not in terms applicable for the purpose of computation of time for filing appeals. What has been held in several cases is only this much that the principle of S. 14 may be applied. The question for determination is whether sufficient cause has been made out within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for not presenting the appeal in time.
4. Sub-section (1) of S. 14 refers to suits, and sub-s. (2) refers to applications. Obviously, therefore, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for filing an appeal this section has not to be taken into consideration. As I have already said, the authorities lay down only this much that although S. 14 does not apply to appeals, the principle embodied in the provision of this section is considered as relevant for the purpose of considering a case under S. 5. The Judicial Committee in — ‘Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram’, AIR 1917 PC 156 (A), were inclined to take this view, and this Court has in a recent Full Bench decision, — ‘Lal Behari Lall v. Bani Madhava Khatri’, AIR 1949 Pat 293 (B), considered S. 14 and has come to the conclusion that the circumstances contemplated in Section 14 of the Limitation Act should ordinarily constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of S. 5.
5. The facts of the Full Bench case were of course entirely different. That was a case in which the question for consideration was whether the time spent in prosecuting a Civil Revision against an order passed on an application under O. 21, R. 58 of the CPC, could be deducted in computing the period of limitation for a suit under O. 21, R. 63 of the Code. This Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to deduct the period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act as they were prosecuting the Civil Revision application with due diligence and good faith. Thus, the bona fide prosecution of a proceeding in a wrong court has been regarded as a proper ground or a sufficient cause within the meaning of S. 5 for extending the time for filing the application.
6. The question before us is whether the time which was spent in prosecuting the appeal before this Court can be deducted while computing the period of limitation. The application to appeal in forma pauperis was filed before this Court on 11-1-1952. It was accompanied by a memorandum of appeal, but the copies of the judgment and the decree had not been filed. The application for permission to appeal in forma pauperis was withdrawn on 22-8-1952, and the memorandum of appeal was returned on 3-9-1952. The appeal before the District Judge was filed on 4-9-1952 along with an application for prosecuting the appeal in forma pauperis, and the application to sue in forma pauperis was disposed of in the manner indicated above.
7. Now, even if the principle of Section 14 of the Limitation Act has to be applied for extending the time under S. 5, the question is whether it can legitimately be urged in this case that the proceeding before this Court had been prosecuted in good faith and with due diligence.
8. The provisions of O. 41, R. 1 of the CPC, are imperative, and according to this rule a memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment and a copy of the decree appealed against. The provisions of O. 44, R. 1 of the CPC, are even more stringent, inasmuch as this rule lays down that the court shall reject the application to prefer an appeal in forma pauperis unless, upon a perusal thereof and of the judgment and decree appealed from, it sees reason to think that the decree is contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, or is otherwise erroneous or unjust. Thus, R. 1 of O. 44 makes it incumbent upon the applicant to show to the court that prima facie the decree appealed against is contrary to law, erroneous or unjust, and if the applicant has to show that just when he presents the application, it is necessary that he should file the copies of the judgment and the decree along with the application.
9. It was never intended that it was for the court to call for the copies of the judgment and the decree and then to consider whether the application could be entertained. Thus, there cannot be any valid application for leave to appeal without the presentation of the copies of the judgment and the decree. During the course of the argument my Lord the Chief Justice pointed out to the Counsel for the parties that even after the copies of the judgment and the decree had been obtained by the appellant he did not file them promptly. It appears that the copy of the judgment became ready for delivery on 24-1-1952, and it was actually delivered to the appellant on 24-1-1952. Similarly, it appears that the copy of the decree became ready for delivery on 13-2-1952, and it was actually delivered to the appellant on 13-2-1952.
10. But on 22-2-1952 a Bench of this Court had to pass an order that a certified copy of the judgment would be accepted if it was filed on the following Monday, and on this very date three weeks' time was allowed to file a certified copy of the decree. The copy of the judgment was actually filed on 26-2-1952, and one does not find any explanation why this copy of the judgment was not filed in this Court soon after it had been obtained. On 20-3-1952 there was another order passed that the certified copy of the decree should be filed within two-weeks failing which the application would stand rejected without further reference to a Bench. The certified copy of the decree was actually filed on-9-4-1952.
11. Then on 12-5-1952 there was a stamp-report inviting the attention of the Court to the fact that the petition for leave to appeal had been filed without the copies of the decree and the judgment and that the copies of the decree and the judgment had actually been filed on 25-2-1952 and 2-4-1952, respectively. The Stamp Reporter pointed out that by 2-4-1952 the period of limitation had expired, and, as such, the application was time-barred. It was also pointed out by the Stamp Reporter that the Miscellaneous Judicial case would not lie here but in the court of the District Judge as the valuation was below Rs. 5000. The valuation was only Rs. 4500, but still the appeal and the application had been presented to this Court.
12. On 20-7-1952 this Court allowed 21 days time to consider the stamp-report regarding limitation, and on 19-8-1952 the petitioner in the Miscellaneous judicial case, prayed before the court for permission to withdraw the application. The Registrar ordered that the matter should be placed before the Bench for orders, and on 22-8-1952 a Bench of this Court permitted the Counsel for the petitioner to withdraw the application.
13. There are very important factors to be considered in order to judge whether the application that had been presented to this Court can be deemed to have been presented in good faith and can also the deemed to have been prosecuted with due diligence. The first factor is that though it is very well known that the District Judge has got the power to entertain an appeal from a decree or order of a Subordinate Judge where the value of the original suit does not exceed Rs. 5000, this application along with the memorandum of appeal was presented to the High Court. The second factor is, as was so clearly pointed out by my Lord the Chief Justice during the course of the argument, that the applicant did not file the copies of the judgment and the decree before this Court even after he had obtained them. The third factor is that when the petitioner was called upon to show cause, after the stamp-report, as to how the application was to be treated as in time, instead of showing cause and offering explanation be withdrew the application.
14. In my opinion, these three factors should lead us to hold that the appeal and the application had not been presented to this Court in good faith, nor were they prosecuted with due diligence. The words “good faith” do connote “with due care and attention”, and according to Section 2(7) of the Limitation Act, nothing; shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. I do not think it can be urged with any show of reason that even though the District Judge has got the power to entertain appeals up to the value of Rs. 5000, the petitioner acted in good faith when he presented this appeal to this Court, and when the defects were pointed out the petitioner (O.P in this case) had no other option but to withdraw the application. And it can by no means be said that the petitioner had acted with due diligence when it is manifest that not only he did not file the copy of the judgment along with the application or the memorandum of appeal but that even after the copies of the judgment and the decree had been obtained, they were not promptly filed before this Court.
15. There was no exercise of due care and attention, and when we proceed to consider how far it was a bona fide conduct on the part of the petitioner (opposite party in this application) to have selected this Court as the forum, our answer must be in the negative. The benefit of S. 14 cannot be claimed where the good faith of the party prosecuting his remedy in a different proceeding is open to grave doubt. In the circumstance, I am of opinion that even if we apply the principle of S. 14 in this case, it cannot be held that the application and the memorandum of appeal had been presented to this Court in good faith and were prosecuted with due diligence. The learned District Judge completely misdirected himself when he said that he was condoning the delay under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In the result, therefore, I would allow this application with costs and set aside the order of the learned District Judge condoning the delay and admitting the appeal. Hearing fee Rs. 48/-.
Imam, C.J:— I agree.
V.S.B
16. Application allowed.
Alert