Ramaswami, J.:— In this case the petitioner has obtained a rule calling upon the House Controller of Patna to show cause why a writ in the nature of Prohibition or Certiorari should not be issued for quashing his order dated 12-9-1952, directing the petitioner to vacate a house.

2. The petitioner is tenant of a house bearing holding No. 67, circle No. 27, ward No. 9 of Patna City Municipality. Respondent 1, Nagindra Narain Sinha and others two respondents are the landlords who had let out the house to the petitioner on rent of Rs. 35/- per month. In May, 1951, respondents 1 to 3 made an application to the House Controller under Section 11 of the Bihar Act 3 of 1947 praying that the petitioner should be ordered to vacate the house on the ground that respondents 1-3 required the house ‘bona fide’ for their own occupation. The petitioner appeared and showed cause. The case of the petitioner was that the respondents had previously made an application to the House Controller in 1948 on the same ground of personal necessity but the application was rejected by the House Controller. An appeal was preferred to the Commissioner against the carder of the Controller on behalf of the respondents but the appeal was dismissed.

3. The petitioner, therefore, contended before the House Controller that the second application was barred under Section 22 of the Bihar Buildings Control Act of 1947. The Controller disallowed the objection holding that respondents 1-3 required the house ‘bona fide’ for their own occupation. The Controller made the order of eviction against the petitioner on 12-9-1952. It is necessary to set out the legislative background of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act of 1947. On 1-10-1946, the Governor of Bihar enacted the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Ordinance of 1946. The provisions of the ordinance were re-enacted by the Bihar Legislature with some modification in Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act of 1947. Sub-section 3 of Section 1 of the Act of 1947 stated that the Act shall remain in force for such period as the Provincial Government may, by notification fix. Possibly on account of the decision of the Federal Court in — ‘Jatindra Nath v. Province of Bihar’, AIR 1949 FC 175 (A), the Bihar Legislature enacted Bihar Buildings (Lease, Bent and Eviction) Control (Amending and Validating) Act, 1949. This Act amended sub-s. (3) of S. 1 of the Act of 1947. The amendment was to the effect that the Act of 1947 shall remain in force for a period of five years. This period of five years terminated on 14-3-1952. Before this date the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act of 1951 was passed to which the Governor assented on 23-11-1951. By this amending Act, for the words “for five years” in S. 1, sub-s. (3) the words and figures “up to and including 14th March 1954” were substituted.

4. In — ‘Mangtulal v. Radha Shyam’, AIR 1953 Pat 14 (FB) (B), it was declared by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court that the amending Act of 1951 was unconstitutional as it did not receive the assent of the President under Article 254 of the Constitution. The judgment was pronounced on 23-9-1952. On the next date the Governor promulgated Ordinance 5 of 1952 by which the Bihar Act of 1947 was continued in force for so long the Ordinance remained in force. On 9-3-1953, the Bihar Amending Act 5 of 1953 was passed by the Bihar Legislature and in sub-s. 1 of Section 3 of the Bihar Act of 1947, the words and figures “Up to and including 14th March 1954” were substituted for the words' “for five years”. The amending Act received the assent of the President on 9-3-1953.

5. In support of this rule Mr. B.C Ghose submitted in the first place that Section 11 of the Bihar Buildings Control Act of 1947 was unconstitutional and void. The contention of the learned counsel was that the Bihar Legislature had no competence to enact such legislation. The learned counsel submitted that the subject-matter of the legislation would fall under items 6, 7 and 13 of the Concurrent List Item 6 is “transfer of property other than agricultural land; registration of deeds and documents”. Item 7 is “Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of carriage” and “other special forms of Contracts but not including contracts relating to agricultural land” and Item 13 is “Civil Procedure including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the commencement of this Constitution, limitation and arbitration”.

6. The argument on behalf of the petitioner was that the Controller was not a “Court” in its proper sense and under item 13 of the Concurrent List, the State Legislature had no power to create the office & jurisdiction of the Controller for the purpose of carrying out the object of the statute. To put it differently, the contention of the learned counsel was that none of the three legislative lists covered a subject-matter like the office of the House Controller and, therefore, the jurisdiction to deal with the subject-matter was confined to the Union Parliament under the residuary power of Legislation granted by Article 248 of the Constitution.

7. On the question whether the House Controller was a Court or not, Mr. Ghose referred to Section 11(2) of the Bihar Buildings Control Act and pointed out that the Controller had been given authority to make an order of eviction if “he was satisfied that the tenant was liable to be evicted under the provisions of S. 11(1)”. Section 11(2) states:

“A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant under sub-s. (1) shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied that the tenant is liable to be evicted under the provisions of sub-s. (1) he shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if the Controller is not satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting, the application.”

The contention on behalf of the petitioner was that in making an order of eviction against a tenant the House Controller was given a large measure of discretion under the statute since the question depended upon the personal satisfaction of the House Controller.

8. Reference was also made to S. 17 of the Act which states:

“Every order of the Controller passed under this Act and every order of the Commissioner passed on appeal under S. 18 shall be executed by the Court having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the recovery of arrears of rent in respect of the building in relation to which the order to be executed is passed, as if such order were a decree passed by such Court.”

The contention of the petitioner was that the House Controller himself had no power to execute his order and in the absence of such power the House Controller cannot be said to be a Court in the proper sense.

9. The learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner also referred to the fact that the statute has imposed no duty on the House Controller to record evidence before passing any order against the parties. The counsel bases his submission on the decision of this High Court in — ‘×Mt. Dirji v. Sm. Goalin’, AIR 1941 Pat 65 (FB) (C), in which Fazl Ali, J. states:

“A Court cannot function properly unless it is armed with certain powers, such as the power to receive evidence bearing on the matter which it is called upon to decide, the power to enforce the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and material objects before it and the power to pronounce judgment and carry it into effect between the person and parties who bring a case before it for decision.”

10. I do not think it is necessary for the purpose of this case to decide whether the office of the House Controller under the Act is a Court or not. Assuming but not accepting that the House Controller is not a Court, is it a correct proposition to state that the Bihar Legislature has no competence to create the office and jurisdiction of the House Controller? In my opinion, the argument of the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner proceeds upon a misconception. It is not correct to state that none of the items of the three lists cover the subject-matter of a tribunal like that of a House Controller.

11. I think that the validity of the legislation could be supported by the State power under item 3 of the State List, namely, “Administration of Justice”. If the various provisions of the impugned Statute are closely examined, it is apparent that the Legislature has created a quasi-judicial Tribunal in the office of the House Controller for carrying out the declared object of the statute, namely, to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenant and to regulate and control the letting cut of buildings. The House Controller has been given authority under the statute to make orders imposing liability or affecting the rights of the parties, in respect of building given on lease. It is pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that S. 11(2) states that the House Controller may make an order of eviction if he is satisfied that the tenant is liable to be evicted under S. 11(1).

12. It is true that a great measure of discretion is left to the House Controller but nevertheless it is clear that the House Controller in exercise of his jurisdiction has to act judicially. Under S. 16(3) the Controller has power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of documents in the same manner and by the same means as in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 20(2) states that whoever fails to comply with any direction of the Controller shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year. Section 19 states that the Controller shall give notice to the landlord or tenant before exercising any of his powers under the Act. A quasi-judicial tribunal of this description is, in my opinion fully covered by item 3 of the State List, namely, “Administration of Justice”.

13. On behalf of the petitioner Mr. B.C Chose contended that item 3 would refer to constitution and organization of Courts in the proper sense and not of a quasi-judicial Tribunal like that of a House Controller. In my opinion, this argument is not correct. Item 3 states:

“Administration of justice; constitution and organisation of all Courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Court; officers and servants of the High Court, procedure in rent and revenue Courts; fees taken in all Courts except the Supreme Court.”

It is manifest that in item 3 of the State Legislation List the governing phrase is “Administration of justice” which is a conception of the most general nature. The following words namely, “constitution and organization of all Courts except the Supreme Court and High Courts”, are not words of limitation but they are words of explanation or illustration. These words do not in any way control or limit the scope of the general phrase “Administration of justice” preceding them by which the whole matter of administration of justice in a modern State is included. The modern conception of a planned State requires that Government should take a more positive part in the control of economy and in the provision of social welfare. A great mass of judicial function has, therefore, been entrusted by the Legislature to departments of Government or administrative tribunals. Such tribunals have to decide matters between contending parties and give decisions which seriously affected the rights of subjects.

14. I think that the expression “Administration of justice” in item 3 is wide enough to include in it not merely administration of justice through, Courts properly so called, but “administrative justice” that is justice through the machinery of administrative tribunals. In my opinion, item 3 of the State List is sufficient to give express power, to the State Legislature to create and determine the powers and jurisdiction of the office of the House Controller, which is in the nature of a quasi-judicial Tribunal.

15. Even if the express power granted by item 3 of State List was non-existent, the validity of the statute could, I think, be based on the implied power of the State Legislature under items 6, 7 and 13 of the Concurrent List. The object of the impugned Statute is to regulate the lease of buildings and to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State of Bihar. In order to carry out the object of this statute, the State Legislature is competent to create a Tribunal in the nature of a House Controller with jurisdiction and power mentioned in the statute. It is a familiar principle of interpretation that the grant of an express power carries with it by necessary implication all subsidiary and ancillary powers which are reasonably necessary for the efficient exercise of the express power. For instance in — ‘United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum’, AIR 1941 FC 16 (D), the Federal Court observed:

“None of the items in the legislative lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense, and each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.”

It was held by the Federal Court in that case that the validation of doubtful executive orders is a power subsidiary or ancillary to the power of legislating on the particular subjects in respect of which the executive orders might have been issued. It was further held that the power to impose penalties for disobedience of the laws enacted by the Legislature was essential to the effectiveness of the powers to legislate any particular subject-matter.

16. In a Canadian Case — ‘Cushing v. Deputy’. (1880) 5 AC 409 (E), the Judicial Committee observed:

“It would be impossible to advance a step in the construction of a scheme for the administration of insolvent estate, without interfering with and modifying some of the ordinary rights of property and other civil rights, nor without providing some special mode of procedure for the vesting, realization and distribution of the estate………. Procedure must necessarily form an essential part of any law dealing with insolvency. It is therefore to be presumed that the Imperial Statute, in assigning to the Dominion Parliament the subjects of bankruptcy and insolvency intended to confer on it legislative power to interfere with property, civil rights, and procedure with the Provinces, so far as a general law relating to those subjects might affect them.”

Applying this principle in the present case, I hold that even apart from the express power granted to the State Legislature under item 3 of the State List, the State Legislature had full competence to create and determine the jurisdiction of the Controller under the Bihar Act 3 of 1947.

17. The next argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner was that the Bihar Act 3 of 1947 had expired on 14-3-1952, since the duration of the Act was limited to five years. It was argued that neither the Ordinance 5 of 1952 nor Binar Act 5 of 1953 could amend an Act which had already expired. It was contended, therefore, that Bihar Act 3 of 1947 was non-existent and the House Controller had no jurisdiction to make any order of eviction against the petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that the Bihar Legislature had proceeded on the footing that the whole Act was alive on the date when the amending Act was passed and the Bihar Legislature merely purported to amend Section 1(3) of the old Act. It was argued that there could be no amendment of an Act which was not in existence on the date of amendment.

18. In my opinion, the argument is attractive but unsound. It is undoubtedly competent to the State Legislature, acting in exercise of its plenary powers, to revive or re-enact legislation which had already expired by lapse of time. The State Legislature is also competent to enact legislation with retrospective effect. The question in the present case, therefore, arises whether as a matter of construction of the Ordinance of 1952 or the Amending Act of 1953, the respective Legislative authority intended to amend a dead Act or to make a new enactment on the same line as the old Act with retrospective effect.

19. Reference should be made in this connection to S. 2 of Bihar Ordinance 5 of 1952 which states. Section 2—“Continuance of Bihar Act 3 of 1947. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-S. (3) of Section 1 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, (Bihar Act 3 of 1947) as in force on the eleventh day of December, 1951 (which Act is hereinafter referred to as the said Act) and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court to the contrary, the said Act ‘shall be deemed not to have expired on the expiration of the period specified in that sub-section but shall be deemed to have continued’ in force and shall continue in force for so long as this Ordinance remains in force.”

If the language of the section is carefully examined, it becomes apparent that the Governor of Bihar was not merely amending the Bihar Act of 1947 but was in substance reviving and re-enacting the provisions of the Act of 1947 with express retrospective effect. It follows, therefore, that on the date when Bihar Act of 1953 was passed, the Bihar Act of 1947 was not dead but fully alive. Section 2 of the Bihar Act 5 of 1953 is significant. This section states:

“In sub-S. (3) of Section 1 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), for the words ‘for five years’, the words and figures ‘upto and including the 14th March, 1954’ shall be substituted, and shall be deemed always to have been substituted with effect from the eleventh day of December, 1951.”

20. The section on the face of it purports to make an amendment of Section 1 of the Bihar Act 3 of 1947 but if the language is closely analysed it is clear enough that the Bihar Legislature was not merely making an amendment but was re-enacting all the provisions of Bihar Act 3 of 1947 with retrospective effect. As a matter of construction I am of opinion that the Bihar Ordinance 5 of 1952 and the Bihar Act 5 of 1953 must be interpreted to mean that the appropriate legislative authority intended that Act 3 of 1947 should be revived and resurrected and not merely amended in a particular respect.

21. On behalf of the petitioner Mr. B.C Ghose referred to Section 9 of the Bihar General Clauses Act & argued that the word “revived” should have been expressly used instead of the word “continued” if the Legislature intended that Act 3 of 1947 should be reenacted. Section 9 of Bihar General Clauses Act states:

“…. it shall be necessary, for the purpose of reviving, either wholly or partially, any enactment wholly or partially repealed, expressly to state that purpose.”

22. But S. 9 has no relevance to the present case for Bihar Act 3 of 1947 was not repealed. It was a temporary Act which expired on 14-3-1952 on the expiry of its terms.

23. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed much reliance on ‘AIR 1949 P.C 175 (A)’ in which it was held by the Federal Court that the Bihar Amending Act, Act 5 of 1949, merely made an amendment in the original Act of 1947 which had died a natural death on 18-3-1948 and unless that Act had been revived, no amendment made in it would be of any effect.

24. But the principle of that case cannot govern the present case as the material facts are different. Act 5 of 1949, which was considered in —‘Jatindra Gupta's case, (A)’, is to the following effect:

“Whereas it is expedient to amend the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, in the manner hereinafter appearing. It is hereby enacted as follows:

1. This Act may be called the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order (Amendment) Act, 1949.

2. In sub-Section (2) of Section 1 of the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act 1947, for the words ‘for a period of one year from the date of its commencement’ the words and figures ‘till the 31st March, 1950’ shall be substituted.”

25. It is important to notice that the Legislature has not manifested its intention that the amendment would take retrospective effect or that the old Act, namely, Bihar Act 5 of 1947 should continue to be in existence after its expiry in 1948. In the present case there is a marked difference in the language employed both in the Ordinance and the Amending Act. In Ordinance 5 of 1952 there is an express statement by the Legislature that the old Act

“shall be deemed not to have expired on the expiration of the period specified in that sub-section, but shall be deemed to have continued in force and shall continue in force for so long as the Ordinance remains in force.”

26. In Bihar Act 5 of 1953 also the Legislature has deliberately expressed its intention that there 1 should be retrospective effect. Sub-section 2 states that the words and figures “upto and including the 14th March 1954” shall be “substituted and shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect from the eleventh day of December 1951.”

27. The next objection on behalf of the petitioner was that the Bihar Ordinance 5 of 1952 was constitutionally invalid since the legislative authority was exercising judicial power. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that on 23-9-1952, a Full Bench of Patna High Court ‘AIR 1953 Pat 14 (F.B) (B) declared that the amending Act of 1951 was invalid since the President's assent was not taken & that the Act of 1947 had expired on 14-3-1952. On the next date the Governor of Bihar acting in exercise of his powers under Article 213 of the Constitution enacted Ordinance 5 of 1952 with the object of nullifying the decision of the High Court. It was argued by the learned counsel that the Ordinance was unconstitutional as being a marked usurpation of judicial power.

28. I am unable to accept the argument. The Governor of Bihar did not intend to nullify the judgment of the High Court but declared that in spite of the decision of the High Court the Act of 1947 shall be deemed to continue in force for so long as the Ordinance lasted. I think that the case fails under the principle of the decision in —‘Piare Dusadh v. Emperor’, AIR 1944 F.C 1 (F) in which it was he;d that Ordinance 19 of 1943 was intra vires the Governor-General and that the ordinance was not invalid on the ground that the Governor General had validated by retrospective legislation proceedings held in Courts which were void for want of jurisdiction. The argument of the petitioner on this part of the case must, therefore, fail.

29. Lastly it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the House Controller had violated S. 22 of the Act and the order of eviction must in consequence be held to be bad on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The argument was that in year 1948 the landlords had previously applied to the House Controller evicting the petitioner on the ground that they required the house bona fide for their personal use. The petition was rejected by the House Controller and his decision was affirmed by the Commissioner on appeal.

30. Section 22 of the Act states:

“The Controller shall summarily reject any application which raises substantially the same issues as have been heard and finally decided in a former proceeding under this Act between the same parties or between parties under whom they are or any of them claim.”

31. The submission on behalf of the petitioner was that in view of the previous order rejecting the application of the landlords, the House Controller had no jurisdiction to try and determine the same issue between the parties for the second time.

32. In my opinion, the argument on behalf of the petitioner is not valid. In the year 1948 the landlords had applied for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that they required the house for their own use. At that time the land ords were living in a house a part of which was let out for Harijan Sewak Sangh. There was also another house belonging to the landlords which was vacant at that time. But the circumstances materially changed in the year 1951. After the previous case was disposed of, the entire house was let out by the landlords to Harijan Sewak Sangh. In the other house Girindra Narayan Sinha one of the landlords, permanently installed a press named Vaisali Press. In view of the changed circumstances the House Controller was of opinion that the landlords were in genuine need of a house for their occupation & ordered that the petitioner should be evicted. It is manifest that the question of necessity has to be judged by the House Controller in the context of different circumstances. The matter in issue in the previous application was not substantially the same as in the later application and Section 22 of the Bihar Buildings Act of 1947 has no application to the present case. I do not think that the House Controller misconstrued S. 22 or that he wrongly gave himself jurisdiction by any misconstruction of law. The argument on behalf of the petitioner on this point must fail.

33. For the reasons I have attempted to state, I think that no case is made out for the grant of any writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. I would dismiss the application with costs; hearing fee five gold mohors.

34. Sinha, J.:— I concur. I felt at first impressed with the argument of Mr. Ghosh that, the Bihar Act 3 of 1947 having been declared to have expired on 14-3-1952, there was no Act in existence, and, therefore, the Bihar Ordinance 5 of 1952 or the Bihar Act 5 of 1953 could not be said to have revived or re-enacted the Act of 1947. After further consideration, I am of the opinion that the Bihar Act 5 of 1953 did revive and re-enact the Act of 1947. In the background of the history of this legislation, as mentioned by my learned brother, which I do not want to repeat, it is apparent that the Legislature did intend to revive and re-enact the previous Act (Act 3 of 1847). By the judgment of this Court in ‘AIR 1953 Pat. 14 (F.B) (B)’, which was delivered on 23-9-1952, it was held that the Amending Act of 1951 (was) unconstitutional with the result that the Act of 1947 was held to have expired on 14-3-1952, and the very next day, that is, on the 24th September, the Governor promulgated Ordinance 5 of 1953, which was replaced by Bihar Act 5 of 1953.

35. It is clear, therefore, that the Legislature intended to continue in force the Act of 1947. In view of such manifest intention of the Legislature, I am not prepared to hold that the Bihar Ordinance 5 of 1952 was merely an Amending Ordinance as is clear from the language used in the Ordinance itself to the effect that the said Act (Act 3 of 1947)

“shall be deemed not to have, expired on the expiration of the period specified in that sub-section but shall be deemed to have continued in force and shall continue in force for so long as this Ordinance remains in force.”

36. This Ordinance was followed by Act 5 of 1953. The Ordinance re-enacted the whole of the Act of 1947 and the Act of 1953 re-enacted and amended that Act. It is, therefore, a misnomer to call the Ordinance and the Act as merely amending enactments. I would, therefore, hold that there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Ghosh.

37. It had been argued on behalf of the petitioner that the power to legislate for eviction of a tenant from a building is not to be found either in the State List or in the Concurrent List, and, therefore, the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, was ‘ultra vires’. It has been held by this Court in —‘AIR 1953 Pat. 14 (F.B) (B)’, that S. 11 of the Act of 1947, as extended by Bihar Act 38 of 1951, was repugnant to the provisions of an existing law of Transfer of Property Act, 1382, inasmuch as the said Bihar Act was not reserved for the consideration of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. As a result of the repugnancy of Section 11 of the Act of 1947 to the Transfer of Property Act, the Bihar Act was declared invalid and as a result thereof the Act of 1947 was held to have come to an end on 14-3-1952.

38. The Ordinance aforesaid was enacted with the previous instruction of the President under Article 213 of the Constitution, and later the Act was enacted with the assent of the President under Article 254 of the Constitution. The result is that the Transfer of Property Act has been amended to the extent its provisions were affected by the Bihar Act of 1947. The Bihar Act of 1947 sets out provisions for determination of tenancy, and eviction of a tenant is merely incidental to the determination of tenancy. If the Bihar Legislature is competent to enact a law relating to the determination of tenancy, certainly it has power to legislate for giving effect to the said determination of tenancy and to provide machinery to give effect to the same. The Bihar Act, therefore, enacts nothing more than this. I would hold, therefore, that the legislation with respect to eviction as contained in this Act is not ‘ultra vires.’

39. It was contended that the provisions of S. 22 were bar to the landlord getting an order for eviction because a previous application on the same ground of personal necessity had been rejected. As I read the Section, its application must be limited to a prayer for eviction on the same grounds on which a previous application was founded. At that time it was held that the landlord did not require the house for himself. The circumstances having changed since the rejection of the previous application, in my opinion, it cannot be held that the provisions of S. 22 bar a similar application founded upon changed circumstances. The House Controller has found that the owner needs the house for himself. This is a finding of fact and was well within the jurisdiction of the House Controller and this Court cannot interfere with that finding of fact —‘Brij Raj Krishna v. S.K Shaw & Bros.’, AIR 1951 SC 115 (G).

40. It was then argued that it was a ‘mala fide’ application because at the time of previous application for eviction only a part of the house, which was occupied by the owner, had been let out on rent & after the application for eviction was rejected the whole house has been let out. The question of mala fides or bona fides is a question of fact and this Court possibly cannot go into that question.

41. In my opinion, therefore, this contention also must be rejected.

A./R.G.D

42. Application dismissed.