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D.N Singh v. State
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This Bench was constituted to determine the character of appeals filed under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure when the underlying complaint is made by a Civil Court under section 476 — specifically whether such appeals are civil or criminal in nature.
The District Judge of Shahabad (a Civil Court that also sometimes exercises Sessions Judge powers) filed a complaint under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against Dhup Narain Singh for offences alleged to have been committed in the course of Probate Case no. 17 of 1950 (Title Suit no. 4 of 1952) in the District Judge's court; the criminal charges alleged included sections 197, 199 and 471 of the Penal Code. Dhup Narain Singh filed an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this Court, giving rise to the question placed before the Bench.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, from an order made under section 476 by a Civil Court, is in the nature of a civil appeal or a criminal appeal.
- If the appeal is of a particular nature, which procedural code's provisions (Code of Criminal Procedure or Code of Civil Procedure) and which limitation periods apply to such an appeal.
- How revisional jurisdiction of the High Court over a Civil Court that has exercised powers under section 476/476B should be understood (i.e., whether under section 439 CrPC or section 115 CPC), as addressed in the cited Full Bench decision.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Deonandan v. Ramlakan (Full Bench) | Held that an application in revision against an appellate order of the District Judge under section 476B (CrPC, 1898) is governed not by section 439 CrPC but by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. | The Court considered this decision consistent with its view: although a Civil Court may act under section 476/476B of the CrPC, it does not become a criminal court; therefore, the High Court's revisional power over such a Civil Court is exercised under section 115 CPC rather than section 439 CrPC. The present opinion does not contradict the Full Bench decision and relies on its analysis for the specific question of revisional jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining statutory text and practical tests rather than relying on the character of the court that made the order. Key points in the step-by-step analysis are:
- Statutory authority: Section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly authorises any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court to make a complaint concerning offences (specified in section 195(1)(b) or (c)) that appear to have been committed in or in relation to proceedings in that court. This confers a power on such courts but does not convert a Civil or Revenue Court into a Criminal Court when they exercise it; the court retains its original character.
- Nature of the appeal: Section 476B provides an appeal from an order making or refusing to make a complaint under section 476 to the court to which the subordinate court is subordinate (as defined in section 195(3)). The appellate court will often be a Civil Court exercising civil jurisdiction (for example, an appeal from a District Judge would lie to the High Court in its civil jurisdiction). Prima facie that might suggest a civil appeal.
- Statutory anchoring of the appeal: Despite the character of the court which made the order, the appeal under section 476B is created by the Code of Criminal Procedure and not by the Code of Civil Procedure. The CrPC contains the specific provision creating the appeal; the CPC contains no parallel provision making it the governing code for such appeals, nor does section 476B itself incorporate the CPC's appeal provisions.
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Tests applied by the Court:
- Textual test: Because the appeal is provided by the CrPC, it logically ought to be regarded as a criminal appeal rather than a civil appeal—the statute that creates the appeal points to its character.
- Limitation test: The Court compared limitation periods. Articles 154 and 155 of the Limitation Act apply to appeals under the Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 155 provides a period of GO days to the High Court from the date of the order; Article 154 provides 30 days to any other Court). By contrast, Article 156 and Article 152 of the Limitation Act prescribe 90 days and 30 days respectively for appeals under the Code of Civil Procedure. Because an appeal under section 476B should conform to the limitation scheme applicable to CrPC appeals, the Court concluded that the correct limitation is 60 days to the High Court and 30 days to any other Court (as stated in the opinion), aligning it with CrPC appeals rather than CPC appeals.
- Absence of express incorporation of CPC: The Court emphasised there is no express provision in section 476B incorporating the Code of Civil Procedure or stating that CPC appeal provisions apply. Adopting the CPC rules for such appeals without statutory authority would be unwarranted.
- Applicability of CrPC appeal provisions: The Court observed that, in the absence of express exclusion, various provisions of the CrPC relating to appeals (specifically sections 419, 421, 422 and 423 were mentioned) are not so worded as to entirely preclude their application to appeals under section 476B; therefore, where applicable, CrPC appeal provisions should govern.
- Revisional jurisdiction: The Court accepted and relied on the Full Bench decision in Deonandan v. Ramlakan to explain that the High Court's revisional jurisdiction over a Civil Court which acted under section 476/476B is exercised under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure rather than under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the Civil Court does not become a criminal court merely by exercising the power conferred by section 476.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Bench decided the point for which it was constituted as follows:
An appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure from an order passed under section 476 by a Civil Court is to be deemed a criminal appeal, and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so far as they are applicable to appeals, apply to such an appeal.
Implications and direct consequences stated in the opinion:
- The appeal under section 476B is an appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure (and not under the Code of Civil Procedure), so the CrPC's appeal provisions should govern the filing, admission and disposal of the appeal insofar as they are applicable.
- For limitation purposes the opinion expresses that the time to file such an appeal is 60 days to the High Court and 30 days to any other Court (thus aligning limitation periods with those applicable to appeals under the CrPC rather than those under the CPC).
- There is no express provision in section 476B making the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to such appeals; therefore, the CPC's appeal regime (for example Order 41/Order 43 rules) does not automatically apply.
- Sections 419, 421, 422 and 423 of the CrPC are not so worded as to entirely prevent their application to appeals under section 476B; consequently, the CrPC appeal framework can be applied as far as it is relevant.
- With respect to revisional jurisdiction, where a Civil Court has acted under section 476/476B, the High Court's revisional power over that Civil Court is to be exercised under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as explained with reference to Deonandan v. Ramlakan) and not under section 439 of the CrPC.
- The immediate procedural direction in the opinion was that the appeal under section 476B should now be disposed of in due course.
The decision was delivered by Imam, J., with Rai, J. and Choudhary, J. concurring. The Court ordered accordingly.
Imam, J.:— This Bench was constituted to consider the nature of appeals filed under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure where a complaint has been filed by a Civil Court under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; in other words, whether such appeals are in the nature of civil appeals or criminal appeals.
The District Judge of Shahabad filed a complaint under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against Dhup Narain Singh under sections 197, 199 and 471 of the Penal Code, alleged to have been committed by Dhup Narain Singh in the course of Probate Case no. 17 of 1950 (Title Suit no. 4 of 1952) in the court of the District Judge. An appeal under section 476B of the Code has been filed by him in this Court.
The court of the District Judge is undoubtedly a Civil Court and not a Criminal Court, although the District Judge in this State also exercises the powers of a Sessions Judge. When the District Judge is exercising the powers of a Sessions Judge, he is undoubtedly a Criminal Court. section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has given authority to every Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court to make a complaint, if it is expedient in the interest of justice, concerning any offence referred to in section 195, sub-section (1), clause (b) or clause (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that court. This authority or power has been given expressly by a statutory provision, although it is to be found in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Code of Criminal Procedure is a statute, and if it contains a provision of the kind to be found in section 476 of the Code, a. Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is entitled to proceed under it in given circumstances. When a Court, however, proceeds to act under section 476 of the Code, it does not lose its character as a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, as the case may be, that is to say, a Civil Court acting under section 476 of the Code does not cease to be a Civil Court, although it is exercising a power given to it under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Similarly, a Revenue Court does not lose its character as a Revenue Court merely because it exercises a power conferred by a statute. Whatever may be thought as to the nature of the proceedings under section 476 of the Code, when such proceedings take place in a Civil Court, that Court continues to be a Civil Court and does not become a Criminal Court.
An appeal is provided under section 476B from an order making a complaint or refusing to make a complaint by a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court under section 476, and the appeal lies to the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of section 195, sub-section (3) of the Code, and the appellate Court, after notice to the parties concerned, may either direct withdrawal of the complaint or may itself make the complaint which the subordinate Court might have made under section 476. Section 195, sub-section (3) states:—
“For the purposes of this section, a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court; or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal ordinarily lies to the principal Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such Civil Court is situate.
Provided that—
(a) where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; and
(b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.”
Having regard to this provision, an appeal from the Court of a Munsif would lie to the District Judge, and an appeal from the Court of a Subordinate Judge would lie to the District Judge or to the High Court, as the case may be, depending upon the valuation of the suit or proceeding in such a Court. An appeal from the Court of a District Judge would lie to the High Court. In such cases an appeal to the District Judge would be to a Civil Court, and to the High Court in its Civil Jurisdiction. Looking at the matter from this aspect, prima facie, it might appear that an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure was in the nature of a civil, appeal. It has, however, to be borne in mind that although a Civil Court which is hearing an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not become a Criminal Court, it acts, as a Civil Court, exercising a power conferred upon it by a statute, namely, the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appeal is not under the Code of Civil Procedure, as that Code contains no such provision. It is to be further noticed that section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains no provision, as some other statutes, to the effect that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to an appeal under section 476B. As an example, reference may be made to section 299 of the Succession Act which does contain such a provision. When an appeal lies under a statute, generally the statute does not designate it as a civil appeal or a criminal appeal, and I think where there is no reference in the statute to the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code and the statute itself is silent as to what procedure is to be followed in the matter of filing admission, hearing and disposal of an appeal, one may have to look at the nature of the proceeding in which the order appealed against was made and the character of the Court which made the order and the Court to which the appeal lay; for instance, in an insolvency proceeding obviously an appeal filed could, in no sense, be regarded as a criminal appeal. It is necessary, therefore, to see what tests one can apply in judging as to whether an appeal, under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure from the order of a District Judge to this Courts a criminal appeal or a civil appeal. In my opinion, one of the tests would be that the appeal is certainly not under any provision of the Code of Civil Procedure but is certainly one under a provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If an appeal lies under a provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, logically speaking it should be termed as a criminal appeal and not a civil appeal for the simple reason that it is an appeal provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Another test would be as to what would be the period of limitation applicable to an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 155 of the Limitation Act provides a period of GO days from the date of the sentence or order appealed from when an appeal is made under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to a High Court, and under Article 154, 30 days to any other Court. An appeal under section 476B is certainly one under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the provisions of Articles, 154 and 155 of the Limitation Act would apply to such an appeal. Article 156 of the limitation Act, on the other hand, provides for 90 days as the time within which to file an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to a High Court from the date of the decree or order appealed from, and under Article 152, 30 days under the said Code to the Court of a District Judge. It will be noticed that for the purposes of limitation there is a clear difference in the matter of time in which to appeal to the High Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure from that in which to appeal to the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. If an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure be regarded in the nature of a civil appeal, then the provisions of Order 41 and Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply, and one would be forced to the conclusion that the time in which to appeal to the High Court must be 90 days. But this would be contrary to the provisions of the Limitation Act. It seems to me, therefore, that an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure being an appeal under the said Code, the limitation for filing such an appeal to the High Court must be 60 days and to any other Court, 30 days. That being so, there is, for the purposes of filing an appeal, no distinction, so far as limitation is concerned, between an appeal filed under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that filed under any other provision of the said Code. If there is no distinction in this respect, then obviously every appeal under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be regarded in the nature of a criminal appeal.
One may ask what is the justification for the view that in an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the District Judge or the High Court from a Court exercising civil jurisdiction, the appeal Court must exercise jurisdiction according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals. There is no express provision under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the effect that such an appeal shall be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. If, therefore, one takes the view that such an appeal must be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, then one holds the view without the authority of any express provision of law in support of it. Surely, the criterion cannot be that because the Court which passed an order under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a civil court, therefore, an appeal under section 476B must be governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court which passed the order under section 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, although a civil court, acted under a provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure and not under any provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. Similarly, an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure and not under the Code of Civil Procedure. My own view is that in the absence of any express provision in section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to appeals will not apply. It would be more logical to take the view that an appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure should be governed, as far as applicable, by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to appeals. Certainly such a view is not contrary to any provision in section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Having regard to the view I take, for the purposes of filing, admission and disposal of an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the provisions of sections 419, 421, 422 and 423 of the said Code are not so worded as to entirely prevent them being applicable to an appeal, under section 476B.
In the case of Deonandan v. Ramlakan it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that an application in revision against an appellate order of the District Judge under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is governed not by section 439 of the, said Code but by section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The opinion which I have expressed above is not inconsistent, in any way, with the decision of the Full Bench in Deonandan's case, as it has been expressed in that decision that section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be read with section 435 of the said Code, and the revisional jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under section 439 of the said Code is with reference to criminal Courts inferior to the High Court. Merely because a civil court is exercising powers under section 476 or section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it does not make that Court a criminal court. Consequently, the power of revision which the High Court has over such a Court is not under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Consequently, I would decide the point for which this Bench was constituted that an appeal under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure from an order passed under section 476 of the said Code by a civil court must be deemed to be a criminal appeal, and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so far as they are applicable relating to appeals under the said Code, apply to such an appeal.
The appeal filed under section 476B of the Code of Criminal Procedure should now be disposed of in due course.
Rai, J.:— I agree.
Choudhary, J.:— I agree.
K.D
Order accordingly.
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