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Sam Narain v. Raghubans Mani
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal by the judgment-debtors from an appellate order of the Additional District Judge, Gaya, which had dismissed the judgment-debtors' objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure to an application for execution.
The decree under execution was a money decree passed on 26 October 1944 by the third additional court of the Subordinate Judge, Gaya (the suit had originally been filed in the third court of Subordinate Judge but was transferred and finally disposed of by the third additional court). The decree-holder filed an application for execution on 8 October 1947 in the third court of Subordinate Judge. The court office noted that the decree had in fact been passed by the third additional court of the Subordinate Judge; the decree-holder's pleader initially disputed that note and was asked to produce the certified copy of the decree.
Upon production of the decree, it was apparent that it had been passed by the third additional court of the Subordinate Judge. Consequently, on 19 January 1948 the execution application was returned for presentation to the proper court, and on the same day it was filed in the third additional court of the Subordinate Judge.
The judgment-debtors objected under section 47 CPC that the decree was barred by limitation. The decree-holder sought to exclude the period from 8 October 1947 to 19 January 1948 under section 14 of the Limitation Act. The trial court (learned Additional Subordinate Judge, third court) sustained the objection and dismissed the execution application as time-barred. On appeal the Additional District Judge allowed the decree-holder the benefit of section 14 and directed execution to proceed. The judgment-debtors appealed against that appellate decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the decree-holder is entitled to exclude, under section 14 of the Limitation Act, the period from 8 October 1947 to 19 January 1948 on the ground that the earlier prosecution of the execution application in the third court of the Subordinate Judge was a proceeding prosecuted "in good faith" though in a court which was, for a like reason, unable to entertain it.
- Whether, alternatively, the application for execution filed on 8 October 1947 in the third court of the Subordinate Judge was properly filed in a court competent to entertain execution (for reasons including that the suit had originally been instituted in that court), so that the later filing on 19 January 1948 was within time.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Judgment-Debtors') Arguments
- Mr. K.C. Sanyal argued that the decree-holder could not claim the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act because the earlier execution application (filed in the third court of the Subordinate Judge) was not prosecuted in good faith. He relied on the wording of section 14(2) and the definition of "good faith" in section 2(7) of the Limitation Act (which requires due care and attention), contending that the decree-holder's pleader failed to exercise ordinary care when the office pointed out the correct court and therefore persisted in the mistake.
Respondent's (Decree-Holder's) Arguments
- The decree-holder submitted that the heading of the decree ("In the court of Additional Subordinate Judge") was misleading because it did not state the number of the court, and that this could have misled the pleader into filing in the third court of the Subordinate Judge.
- It was also contended that any mistake was due to the pleader's erroneous advice rather than lack of good faith by the decree-holder, and therefore the decree-holder should be entitled to the section 14 exclusion.
- Separately, Mr. T.S. Sinha for the decree-holder argued that even if the benefit of section 14 were denied, the application for execution was nevertheless within time because the third court of the Subordinate Judge was the court in which the suit had originally been filed and thereby had jurisdiction to entertain the execution application; this argument relied on two precedents (Manogi Lal Sah v. Jog Sah; Chanamal Marwari v. Raja Shiba Prasad Singh) and on an interpretation of section 3 of the Bengal, Agra & Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Manogi Lal Sah v. Jog Sah (I.L.R. 13 Patna, 5) | Explains that a court of Additional Munsif is to be treated as the court of the Munsif for execution purposes; the person who pronounced the decree as Additional Munsif is considered to have been trying suits appertaining to the territorial area of the first Munsif, so execution in the court of the first Munsif can be appropriate. | The court reviewed the decision and observed that Saunders, J. apparently assumed that the Additional Munsif in existence when the earlier execution application was filed was not the same Additional Munsif who had passed the decree. The present case contains no suggestion that the third additional court in existence at the time was different from the Additional Court that passed the decree; therefore the facts of that case were distinguishable and the precedent did not support the decree-holder's position here. |
| Chanamal Marwari v. Raja Shiba Prasad Singh (I.L.R. 13 Patna, 21) | Holds that a decree-holder may apply to the court which passed the decree for execution even where the property is outside that court's territorial jurisdiction; such an application can be entertained and, if made within time, will save limitation. | The court noted that while the cited case was relied upon for an interpretation of section 3 of the Bengal, Agra & Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, the facts in the cited case were distinguishable from the present facts. The decision was discussed but did not persuade the court that the third court of the Subordinate Judge was the proper court for the execution application filed on 8 October 1947 in this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the dispute in two principal stages: (A) whether the decree-holder could exclude the period between 8 October 1947 and 19 January 1948 under section 14 of the Limitation Act because the earlier prosecution of the execution application had been in a court unable to entertain it, and (B) whether, alternatively, the initial filing in the third court of the Subordinate Judge was in fact proper so that the time would be saved.
(A) Good faith under section 14:).
- The court quoted section 14(2) Limitation Act and the statutory definition of "good faith" (section 2(7)): an act is not in good faith if it is not done with due care and attention.
- Upon examining the decree, the court observed that although the heading of the decree read "In the court of Additional Subordinate Judge" (without a numeric identifier), the very opening line of the body of the decree and the signature at its foot clearly identified it as a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge, third court. Thus the decree plainly showed the correct court.
- The court concluded that the decree-holder's pleader, if he had referred only to the heading and not read the recitals and opening line of the decree, did not exercise the requisite care and attention. That lack of due care meant that the prosecution of the earlier application was not in "good faith" for the purpose of section 14(2).
- The court rejected the submission that the decree-holder could shelter behind mistaken advice of the pleader: if the pleader's conduct lacked due care (and so was not in good faith), the decree-holder could not claim the statutory exclusion under section 14 of the Limitation Act.
- Accordingly, the court held that the decree-holder was not entitled to exclude the period 8 October 1947 to 19 January 1948 under section 14.
(B) Whether the initial filing was nevertheless in a proper court:
- The decree-holder's alternative argument relied upon the proposition that a court which originally entertained the suit (even if execution would require transmission) may be a competent forum to apply for execution; the decree-holder relied on the two precedents set out above and an interpretation of section 3 of the Bengal, Agra & Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887.
- The court reviewed the statutory scheme. It interpreted section 3 of the Bengal, Agra & Assam Civil Courts Act as classifying courts into four classes in general terms, but it emphasised that the class "court of the Subordinate Judge" could include multiple distinct subordinate-judge courts at a particular place (e.g., first, second, third courts of Subordinate Judge). The court observed that "Additional Subordinate Judge" courts are in substance additional courts of the Subordinate Judge and fall within class (3) of section 3.
- The court then analysed relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code: section 38 (a decree may be executed either by the court which passed it, or by the court to which it is sent for execution), section 37 (definition of "court which passed a decree" for execution purposes), and Order 21, rule 10 (application for execution must be made to the court which passed the decree or to the court to which it has been sent for execution).
- On the combined statutory scheme, the court concluded that it was not possible to hold that the third court of the Subordinate Judge (in which the decree-holder initially filed on 8 October 1947) was the proper court to entertain the execution application: the court that had passed the decree was the third additional court of the Subordinate Judge, and section 38/37 and Order 21, rule 10 require application to the court which passed the decree or to the court to which it has been validly sent.
- The court also observed that when the third court of the Subordinate Judge returned the application on 19 January 1948 for presentation to the proper court, the decree-holder could have appealed or sought revision from that order if it believed the return was wrong; having failed to do so, it could not later contend the order was incorrect.
- On that basis the court concluded that the execution application filed in the third additional court on 19 January 1948 was time-barred.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal by the judgment-debtors is allowed. The court set aside the decision of the Additional District Judge and held that the decree-holder is not entitled to exclude the period from 8 October 1947 to 19 January 1948 under section 14 of the Limitation Act, and that the execution application filed on 19 January 1948 is time-barred. The application for execution is dismissed as time-barred. There is no order for costs.
Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by dismissing the execution application as barred by limitation and denying the statutory exclusion under section 14 on the ground that the earlier prosecution was not in "good faith" because the pleader failed to exercise due care and attention. The court based its determination also on provisions of the Civil Procedure Code that restrict execution to the court which passed the decree or to a court to which the decree was properly sent. The opinion does not announce that it is establishing a novel binding precedent beyond its application to these facts.
Administrative note: Lakshmikanta Jha, C.J. agreed with this reasoning. The appeal was allowed.
Chatterji, J.:— This is an appeal by the judgment-debtors from an appellate order of the learned Additional District Judge of Gaya, dismissing their objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The decree under execution is a money decree passed by the third court of Additional Subordinate Judge, Gaya, on the 26th October, 1944. On 8th October, 1947, the decree-holder filed an application for execution in the third court of Subordinate Judge Gaya. On this application the office submitted a note that the decree was passed, not by the third court of Subordinate Judge, but by the third additional court of Subordinate Judge. Against this office note the decree-holder's pleader noted on the application.
“The decree was not passed by Additional Subordinate Judge III. It was passed by Additional Subordinate Judge which court is not existing. Original court was Sub-Judge III”.
The decree-holder's pleader was thereupon asked to produce the certified copy of the decree. When the decree was produced it became clear that the decree was passed, not by the third court of Subordinate Judge, but by the third additional court of Subordinate Judge. Accordingly, on 19th January, 1948, the application for execution was returned for presentation to the proper court. On the same day it was filed in the third additional court of Subordinate Judge. It may be stated here that the suit had been originally filed in the third court of Subordinate Judge, but it was transferred to the third additional court of Subordinate Judge and eventually disposed of by the latter court.
The judgment-debtors filed an objection under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the decree was barred by limitation. The decree-holder, on the other hand, sought to save limitation by excluding the period from 8th October, 1947, to 19th January, 1948, under section 14 of the Limitation Act.
The learned Additional Subordinate Judge, third court, upheld the judgment-debtors' objection and dismissed the application for execution as time barred.
On appeal the learned Additional District Judge held that the decree-holder was entitled, under section 14 of the Limitation Act, to exclude the period from 8th October, 1947 to 19th January, 1948. He accordingly allowed the appeal and directed the execution to proceed.
Mr. K.C Sanyal on behalf of the judgment-debtors contends that the decree-holder is not entitled to the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act because the application for execution filed in the third court of Subordinate Judge was not prosecuted in good faith. Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act runs as follows:
“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding whether in a court of first instance or in a court of appeal against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it”.
“Good faith” is defined in section 2(7) as follows:
“Nothing shall be deemed to be done, in good faith which is not done with due care and attention”.
Mr. Sanval's contention is that when the office pointed out that the decree was passed, not by the third court of the Subordinate Judge, but by the third additional court of Subordinate Judge, which court was the existing, the decree-holder's pleader did not take the ordinary care to look at the decree, but tried instanced to refute the office report and thus persisted in the mistake committed by him. On behalf of the decree-holder it is pointed out that the heading in the decree reads
“In the court of Additional Subordinate Judge”.
which is misleading, because the number of the court is not stated; and this apparently misled the decree-holder's pleader. But the very, opening line in the body of the decree shows that the suit came up for final disposal before the Additional Subordinate Judge, third court. At the foot also there is the signature of Mr. Damodar Prasad, Additional Subordinate Judge, third court. If the decree-holder's pleader referred only to the heading and did not care to read the recitals in the decree, of which the very opening line is clear, it is not possible to hold that he at with due care and attention. Consequently, he cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
On behalf of the decree-holder, it is contended that he acted on the mistaken advice of his pleader and, therefore, he should not be disentitled to the benefit of section 14. But if the pleader did not act in good faith, it is difficult to see how the decree-holder can claim the benefit of section 14. Presumably he must have shown the copy of the decree to the pleader, and if the pleader without caring to read the decree, advised him to file the application for execution in the third court of Subordinate Judge, there was negligence on the part of the pleader and the decree-holder cannot take shelter under any mistaken advice.
In my view, therefore, the decree-holder is not entitled, under section 14 of the Limitation Act, to exclude the period from 8th October, 1947 to 19th January, 1948.
On behalf of the decree-holder, however, Mr. T.S Sinha contends that even if the benefit of section 14 be not allowed, still the application for execution is within time. It is said that the third court of Subordinate Judge was the court in which the suit was originally filed and that court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for execution. In support of this contention reliance is placed on Manogi Lal Sah v. Jog Sah and Chanamal Marwari v. Raja Shiba Prasad Singh.
In the first case (I.L.R 13 Patna, 5) the decree sought to be executed was passed by the court of the Additional Munsif of Chapra on the 21st February, 1921. The decree was eventually confirmed by the High Court on second appeal on the 23rd December, 1924. Within three years from the date of the High Court decree an application for execution was filed in the court of the first Munsif at Chapra which was eventually dismissed by that court on 14th April, 1928. On 19th March, 1931, a fresh application for execution was filed in the court of Additional Munsif. Objection was taken that the execution was barred by limitation. The first two courts upheld this objection on the ground that the previous execution case was filed in a court which had no jurisdiction to entertain it as at that time a court of Additional Munsif was in existence. The High Court, however, held that the previous application for execution was made, in accordance with law and, therefore, the subsequent application was not time-barred. Saunders, J., with whom Courtney Terrel, C.J, agreed said:
“The civil courts in each district as provided by section 3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, are (1) the court of the District Judge; (2) the court of the Additional Judge, (3) the court of the Subordinate Judge, and (4) the court of the Munsif. The court of an Additional Munsif is a court of the Munsif. From time to time an extra munsif is deputed to a district to try such suits as may be made over to him by the District Judge by general or special order. The court of an Additional Munsif who may happen to be sent to a district in a particular year is not necessarily the same court as the court of the Additional Munsif deputed to the same area in other years. For the purpose of execution of the decree which the Additional Munsif pronounced his court was the court of the first Munsif for he was then trying suits appertaining to the area which was comprised in the territorial jurisdiction of the latter court”.
Apparently Saunders, J., proceeded on the assumption that the court of Additional Munsif which was in existence at the time the previous application for execution was filed in the court of the first Munsif was not the same court of Additional Munsif which had passed the decree. In the present case, there is no suggestion that the third additional court of Subordinate Judge, which was in existence when the application for execution was filed in the third, court of Subordinate Judge on the 8th October, 1947, was not the same Additional Court of Subordinate Judge which had passed the decree.
In the second case I.L.R 13 Patna, 21) the decree under execution was passed on appeal arising out of a suit instituted in 1911 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum sitting at Purulia. In October, 1917, a Subordinate Judge's court at Dhanbad in the district of Manbhum was established under section 13(1) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, (Act XII of 1887), the local limits of the executive sub-division of Dhanbad being fixed as the local limits of his jurisdiction. By a simultaneous notification under section 13(1) of the same Act, the local limits of the executive sub-division of Dhanbad also ceased to be included in the local limits of the Subordinate Judge of Purulia. In February, 1931, the decree-holder applied for execution in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Purulia, praying for attachment and sale of land situated in the sub-division of Purulia. The judgment-debtor resisted the execution on the ground that the proper court in which to institute an execution case was that of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Dhanbad. This objection was overruled by the High Court. Courtney Terrell, C.J, with whom Saunders, J., agreed said:
“But the decree-holders had always and still have the right to apply as of course to the court which passed the decree for its execution even if it be in respect of property outside the territorial jurisdiction of such court and even if execution by such court can be no more than execution by transmission to another court. Such an application can be entertained by such a court and if made within time would save 3 limitation”.
Thus, it appears that the application for execution was made in the court which had passed the decree. The learned, C.J, however, referred to the provisions of section 3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, and observed that under that section “no such court as that of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Dhanbad exists”.
Though the facts of the above cases are distinguishable from those of the present, Mr. Sinha on behalf of the decree-holder strongly relies on the interpretation put by their Lordships on section 3 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. Section 3 of the Act runs as follows:
“There shall be the following classes of Civil Courts under this Act, namely: (1) The Court of the District Judge; (2) The Court of the Additional Judge: (3) The Court of the Subordinate Judge, and (4) The Court of the Munsif”.
Clearly this section divides Civil Courts into four classes. In other words, there are only four classes of Civil Courts as specified therein. But when it refers to “the court of the Subordinate Judge” as a class, it does not follow that at any particular place there can be only one court of the Subordinate Judge.
Section 4 provides:
“The Provincial Government may alter the number of District Judges, Subordinate Judges and Munsifs now fixed”.
Section 13(1) provides:
“The Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, fix and alter the local limits of the jurisdiction of any Civil Court under this Act”.
Section 13(2) contemplates that “the same local jurisdiction” may be “assigned to two or more Subordinate Judges”. It is, therefore, clear that the Provincial Government may appoint two or more Subordinate Judges at any particular place and the court of each of them will be a Civil Court under class (3) of section 3 and the Provincial Government may also fix the local limits of the jurisdiction of each of these courts. It will be opposed to the very policy and scheme of the Act to hold that in one particular place there can be only one court of the Subordinate Judge.
The Act, no doubt, does not provide for Additional Subordinate Judges, but it was obviously unnecessary. At any particular place there may be two or more permanent courts of the Subordinate Judge. At the same place there may also be two or more temporary courts of the Subordinate Judge, usually presided over by officiating Subordinate Judges. These temporary courts are called courts of Additional Subordinate Judges, but truly speaking, they are additional courts of the Subordinate Judge. In ordinary parlance, we speak of First Subordinate Judge, Second Subordinate Judge and so forth, but really speaking, by these expressions we mean the first court of Subordinate Judge, the second court of, Subordinate Judge and so forth. Similarly, by the Additional Subordinate Judge is meant the additional court of Subordinate Judge. The additional court of Subordinate Judge is unquestionably a Civil Court and it must come under class (3) of section 3 of the said Civil Courts Act of 1887.
The position with regard to “the court of Additional Judge”, referred to in class (2) of section 3, is different. The appointment of Additional Judges is specifically provided for in section 8 of the Act. They are to
“discharge any of the functions of the District Judge which the District Judge may assign to them”.
By section 9 of the Act
“the District Judge shall have administrative control over all the Civil Courts under this Act within the local limits of his jurisdiction”.
According to the scheme of the Act, the District Judge is the administrative head of all the Civil Courts in his district. Necessarily, the Additional Judge is subject to his administrative control. For obvious 3 reasons, the court of the District Judge and the court, of the Additional Judge, could not be brought under the same class. Consequently the court of the Additional Judge had to be put under class (2). As between the court of the Subordinate Judge and the court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, there is no such practical difference as would necessitate separate classification for these courts. The Additional Subordinate Judge is neither subject to the administrative control of the Subordinate Judge, nor does he discharge any of the functions of a Subordinate Judge which the Subordinate Judge may assign to him. For all practical purposes the position of the Additional Subordinate Judge is the same as that of the Subordinate Judge.
With all respect to the learned Judges who decided both the aforesaid cases, I cannot help observing that the classification of Civil Courts made in section 3 of the said Act hardly seems relevant in considering the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of deciding the question as to which court is the proper court to entertain an application for execution.
Now section 38 of the Civil Procedure Code clearly lays down:
“A decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it, or by the Court to which it is sent for execution”.
The words are clear enough and in view of this provision it is impossible to hold that any other court is competent to execute the decree. Section 37 of the Civil Procedure Code defines the expression “court which passed a decree” as follows:
“The expression ‘Court which passed a decree’ or words to that effect, shall, in relation to the execution of decrees, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to include—
(a) Where the decree to be executed has been passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the Court of first instance, and
(b) Where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit”.
Order 21, rule 10 then provides:
“Where the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the Court which passed the decree or to the officer (if any) appointed in this behalf, or if the decree has been sent under the provisions hereinbefore contained to another court then to such court or to the proper officer thereof”.
In the face of these provisions, it is difficult to hold that the third court of the Subordinate Judge was the proper court to entertain the application for execution filed on 8th October, 1947.
If, according to the decree-holder's contention, that court was the proper, court to entertain the application for execution, then its order, dated 19th January, 1948, returning the application for presentation to the proper court was obviously wrong and the decree-holder should have, therefore, preferred an appeal or revision against that order. But not having done so, it is not open to them now to Contend that order was wrong.
In my opinion, the application for execution filed on the 19th January, 1948, is time-barred.
I would accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the learned Additional District Judge and dismiss the application for execution as time-barred. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order for costs.
Lakshmikanta Jha, C.J:— I agree.
Appeal allowed.
K.D
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