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State v. Hira Dubey
Judgment Summary — Shearer, J. (with Ahmad, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter is a reference under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Sessions Judge of Shahabad seeking confirmation of death sentences imposed on two men, Hira Dubey and Shriram Pandey, convicted of murdering Radha Pathak. The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences; the appeal was heard together with the reference.
Radha Pathak was assaulted in the early morning of 26 April 1951 near the boundary of the village Nimia while travelling toward Kapasia. Blood was found at the spot and a post-mortem showed he received about six or seven blows with lathis, including a blow to the head causing a skull fracture; he died the same day at the police station. Before dying he gave a detailed account attributing the assault to the two appellants, stating a motive linked to his earlier testimony in a prosecution in which one appellant (Hira Dubey) had been convicted (later successfully appealed).
The prosecution relied on Radha Pathak's dying declaration, evidence from three witnesses who claimed to have seen the assault (Ramnath Mahto, Ramsarekha Choudhuri and Janak Rai), and motive. Questions arose as to the credibility and precise observations of some witnesses, including an earlier statement by Janak Rai under section 164 CrPC that differed from his trial testimony.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the convictions of Hira Dubey and Shriram Pandey for murder were sustainable on the evidence presented, including the dying declaration, eyewitness testimony and motive.
- Whether section 34 of the Penal Code applied to make each appellant liable for the fatal result occasioned during a joint assault.
- Whether the Sessions Judge's confirmation of the death sentences should be upheld or modified (i.e., whether the reference under section 374 CrPC should be accepted).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defence) Arguments — as advanced by Mrs. Dharamshila Lall
- The defendants' purpose was to cause bodily injury, not to kill; therefore each appellant must have intended to kill for a murder conviction to stand.
- It was asserted that to convict both men of murder it must be shown that each intended the fatal result (i.e., the fatal blow), and that the fatal blow should not be treated as the singular criminal act referred to in the opening words of section 34.
- Several precedents were asked to be referred to by the defence, including: Emperor v. Mujjaffar Sheikh; Koramutla Narasinqadu; In re: Basappa's; Emperor v. Mahabir; Zahid Khan v. Emperor; and Queen-Empress v. Duma Baidya.
Prosecution's Arguments — as advanced by the Learned Government Advocate
- The prosecution relied on Radha Pathak's dying declaration, corroborative eyewitness evidence (notably Ramnath Mahto) and an established motive arising from previous testimony given by Radha Pathak.
- The Government Advocate referred the court to a recent Allahabad High Court decision, Nazir v. Emperor, which the opinion records as directly in point.
- The prosecution's position implicitly asserted that section 34 applied to hold both appellants liable for the fatal result arising out of a common enterprise to assault the deceased.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor | The opinion states this case explains that section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability dependent on the existence of a common intention animating the accused. | The court relied on Mahbub Shah to explain the meaning of section 34, including that the words "in furtherance of the common intention of all" were inserted to clarify (not modify) the pre-existing law and to place the onus on the prosecution when doubt arises whether a particular act was in pursuance of a common purpose. |
| Reg. v. G. Salmon, J. Salmon and A. Hancock | The opinion uses this decision illustratively: members engaged in a common pursuit are answerable for acts of others during that pursuit (example given involved manslaughter when a shot killed a boy). | Used as an illustration of the principle that participants in a common enterprise may be held responsible for acts of each other committed in prosecution of that enterprise. |
| Queen v. Guru Chand Gopee (1866) | The opinion quotes Chief Justice Peacock to the effect that persons present but not participating are not involved unless the act was in furtherance of the common intention. | The decision was cited to show that culpability of non-active participants depends on whether the act was in furtherance of the common intention; the court used it to frame the analysis of when joint liability attaches. |
| Emperor v. Mujjaffar Sheikh | The opinion lists the case as one the defence asked the court to refer to but does not state a rule or principle from it. | The court recorded that the defence referred to this authority; no specific application or rule taken from it is stated in the opinion. |
| Koramutla Narasinqadu | The opinion lists the case as referred to by the defence but does not state a rule or principle from it. | The case is noted as cited by the defence; the opinion does not describe how it was applied. |
| In re: Basappa's (Basapwa's) case | The opinion indicates this decision existed but states its facts were not similar to the present case (it involved a murder in the course of a burglary); no specific legal principle is quoted. | The court observed Basappa's case had different facts and therefore was not analogous for present purposes. |
| Emperor v. Mahabir | The opinion lists the case among those the defence wanted referred to but does not state a rule or principle from it. | No specific application or principle from this decision is described in the opinion. |
| Zahid Khan v. Emperor | The opinion lists the decision but does not state a rule or principle taken from it. | No specific application or use of this decision is described in the opinion. |
| Queen-Empress v. Duma Baidya | The opinion lists the decision but does not state any particular rule or principle cited therefrom. | The decision is recorded as cited by the defence; no further application is set out. |
| Nazir v. Emperor (Allahabad High Court) | The opinion states this decision is "directly in point" but does not elaborate the legal principle in detail in the text provided. | The court accepted the Allahabad High Court decision as being directly in point and agreed with observations in that decision regarding practical difficulties in proving a negative common intention (i.e., that assailants had agreed no mortal blow should be struck). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a series of legally focused steps:
- Statutory framing: The court examined the opening words of section 34 of the Penal Code (interpreting singular/plural) and explained that section 34 addresses criminal acts done by several persons or several persons engaging in a criminal enterprise. It emphasized that to invoke section 34 the prosecution must first show existence of a common purpose, design or enterprise; absent that, each accused is liable only for his own acts.
- Nature of the "act" under section 34: The court distinguished between a single criminal act done by one person and the totality of acts done by several persons. It held that where several persons engage in a similar act (e.g., multiple blows with lathis), each participant is liable for the whole insofar as each act was done in pursuance of the common purpose.
- Effect of the 1870 amendment to section 34: The court explained that the words "in furtherance of the common intention of all" were added in 1870 to clarify the law. Citing Mahbub Shah, the court stated the amendment shifted the evidential onus in cases of doubt onto the prosecution to show a particular act was done in pursuance of the common purpose.
- Application to the facts: The court considered the evidence — Radha Pathak's dying declaration, eyewitness testimony (notably Ramnath Mahto) and motive arising from earlier litigation — and concluded that a common intention to administer a severe beating existed. It found that the fatal blow was struck in furtherance of that common intention and that it would be impossible to hold that, if a single assailant had committed the assault, the result would not have been murder. Therefore section 34 applied to render both appellants guilty of murder.
- Consideration of alternative scenarios and authorities: The court addressed the defence contention that each appellant must have specifically intended the killing. It rejected this by reference to accepted common-law illustrations (e.g., Reg. v. Salmon) and to the accepted meaning of section 34 after amendment. The court also agreed with observations in Nazir v. Emperor about practical difficulties in proving a pre-arranged agreement that no deadly blow would be struck but treated that as unnecessary speculation here because the totality of blows constituted the criminal act in furtherance of a common purpose.
- Sentence mitigation: While affirming the correctness of the murder convictions, the court considered sentencing. It noted evidence that the attack was not premeditated and that the appellants would not have acted but for suggestion by another man who encouraged them to take advantage of the victim being unaccompanied. Given those mitigating considerations, the court declined to confirm the death sentence and instead commuted the sentences to transportation for life.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The convictions for murder of Hira Dubey and Shriram Pandey are affirmed; the reference to confirm the death sentences is rejected; the death sentences are commuted to transportation for life; the appeal is dismissed subject to this modification.
Implications and consequences:
- The court held that where several persons jointly assault a victim with similar weapons in furtherance of a common intention to cause serious bodily harm, each can properly be convicted of murder under section 34 of the Penal Code when the fatal result is caused in pursuance of that common intention.
- Although the court affirmed the legal basis for joint liability and the convictions, it exercised sentencing discretion to commute capital punishment to transportation for life because the attack was not shown to have been premeditated and there were mitigating circumstances (including the suggestion by another person encouraging the assault).
- The opinion expressly notes that no broader change in the law was made; the court applied existing principles (including Mahbub Shah and related authorities) to the facts and adjusted the sentence in the exercise of judicial mercy in light of mitigating facts.
Shearer, J.:— This is a reference made by the learned Sessions Judge of Shahabad under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for confirmation of the sentence of death imposed by him on two men, Hira Dubey and Shriram Pandey, who have been convicted of the murder of one Radha Pathak. Hira Dubey and Shriram Pandey have appealed against their convictions and sentences, and the appeal has been heard along with the reference. Radha Pathak died in consequence of an assault which was committed on him in the early morning of the 26th of April, 1951. Radha Pathak belonged to Kapasia, but resided in another village Nimia, where he had relations. In the early morning of the 26th of April, 1951, he left his house in Nimia intending to go to Kapasia. According to the prosecution, the two appellants followed and overtook him at a point close to the boundary of Nimia and assaulted him with lathis. Blood was found by the sub-inspector at this point, and it is not suggested that it was not the venue of the occurrence. The post-mortem shows that Radha Pathak was struck some six or seven, or possibly more, blows with lathis. One of the blows was on the head, and caused a fracture of the skull to which Radha Pathak succumbed the same day at the police-station. When, however, he reached the police-station, he was still in a position to give a fairly detailed account of the occurrence. The reason which he then gave for the appellants having attacked him was that about two months earlier he had given evidence for the prosecution, in a case instituted by one Musammat Lakhia, who was a Gareri, against five men, one of whom was a Gareri and the other four of whom were Brahmans. One of these Brahmans was the appellant Hira Dubey and other. Rambaran Pandey, was a relation of the appellant Shriram Pandey. Hira Dubey and Rambaran Pandey were convicted on the 3rd of February, 1951, but an appeal, which was pending when Radha Pathak was killed, was preferred and was ultimately successful. In order to corroborate the version of the occurrence contained in the dying declaration of Radha Pathak the prosecution relied on the evidence of three men, who claimed to have seen it. One of these men, Ramnath Mahto, said that he had been to another village and was on his way back to Nimia, when he saw the two appellants coming up on Radha Pathak from behind. Radha Pathak did not see them until they were quite close to him, and then ran towards Ramnath Mahto for protection. Ramnath Mahto said that the appellant Shriram had brandished his lathi at and threatened him, and that, thereupon, he had got out of the way and stood by, while the assault was committed. The other two men, Ramsarekha Choudhuri and Janak Rai, both belong to Ekwania, a village which appears to be contiguous to Nimia. According to Ramsarekha Choudhuri he had gone to Nimia in which he has a good deal of land in order to realise money which was due to him by. One Sarju Gorain, who was his bataidar. According to Janak Rai, he had wanted to borrow some bullocks from Ramsarekha and, on learning that Ramsarekha had gone to Nimia, had followed him there. The bataidar Sarju Gorain lives in or close to the house of one Sudarsan Choudhuri, and Ramsarekha and Janak were both at this man's duar, when they were told that the appellants had gone in pursuit of Radha Pathak in order to assault him. They both went in the direction which the two men had taken, and shouted a warning to Radha Pathak. A strong west wind, however, happened to be blowing, and, in consequence, Radha Pathak did not hear their cries and did not realise that he was being pursued until the appellants were quite close to him. It was suggested that Sudarsan Choudhuri had been anxious to purchase a certain house and had been unsuccessful as Rambaran Pandey had been prepared to pay more for it than he was. It was in consequence of an incident over this house that Rambaran and Hira were prosecuted. It is true that Ramsarekha and Janak are both Kurmis, as is Sudarsan Choudhuri, but there is no good reason on that ground to suppose that they were suborned. They undoubtedly appear to have got to the scene of occurrence immediately after Radha Pathak was struck down and to have taken Radha Pathak to the house of Sudarsan. A more cogent reason for suspecting that they may not, perhaps, have told the whole truth is that when their statements were recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, one of them, Janak Rai, said that he had seen the appellants returning to the bustee after having assaulted Radha Pathak. I am inclined myself to think that this statement was untrue, and that the evidence which Janak Rai gave at the trial was true. But, even if Janak Rai and Ramsarekha Choudhuri did not see the actual assault, and merely saw the appellants returning to the bustee, with lathis in their hands, that would be a circumstance going to connect them with the crime. In any event, the dying declaration of Radha Pathak himself, and the evidence of Ramnath Mahto coupled with the existence of a motive on the part of the appellants, was sufficient to justify their conviction, the only question of any difficulty that arises in the appeal is as to whether or not the learned Sessions Judge was correct in convicting both men of murder.
In a statute the singular is deemed to include the plural, and it is plain that the words at the beginning of section 34 of the Penal Code when a criminal act is done by several persons mean, and can only mean, “when criminal acts are done by several persons”, or to put it more broadly “when several persons engage in a criminal enterprise”. The acts may be different acts as when several men set out to burgle a house, and one of them keeps watch outside and the others enter the house, and one of the latter uses a fire-arm and shoots one of the inmates, or they may be similar acts as where several men combine to assault another. In either case, in order that section 34 may apply, it is incumbent on the prosecution to show, in the first place, the existence of a common purpose or design or enterprise. If this cannot be shown, each of the accused persons is liable only for what he himself actually did. Mahbub Shah v. King-Emperor. If, on the other hand, the prosecution succeed in showing the existence of a common purpose or design, then each of the accused persons is liable for any act done in pursuance of that common purpose or design. When the acts done are similar, as where a number of blows are struck with lathis, then each of them is liable for every one of the blows struck, and if in the event of every blow having been struck by one man, that man would have been guilty of murder, each of them is guilty of murder, it being immaterial whose blow it was was the direct and immediate cause of death. Now, even assuming for the moment that Mrs. Dharamshila Lall is correct in saying that the purpose of the appellants was to cause bodily injury to Radha Pathak, and not to kill him, nevertheless, it is clear that the fatal blow was struck in furtherance of that purpose, and it is also, I think, clear that if there had been one assailant, and not two, the assailant would have been guilty of murder, Radha Pathak was knocked down, and after he was knocked down he was belaboured with lathis, one of which at least was a particularly formidable lathi. It seems to me impossible to say that if the assault had been committed by one man it would have been culpable homicide not amounting to murder and not murder. It is contended by Mrs. Lall that, in order, to convict her clients of murder, it must be shown that each of them intended to kill Radha Pathak. Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability for acts done by several persons in pursuance of a criminal design or enterprise, and the principle laid down in the section, as originally enacted, was the same principle as is recognised by the common law in England. Under that principle one of several persons who engages in a criminal enterprise or design may be liable for an act done by another which he himself, never intended, and perhaps never contemplated. If, for instance, a number of men set out to burgle a house, and entrust, one among their number with a fire-arm, impressing on him that he is not to use it except under circumstances of compelling necessity, and if that man loses his head and shoots one of the inmates of the house, it would be no defence on the part of his companions to assert that they had never intended him to use his weapon in the way he did. The point is, I think, well illustrated by the decision in Reg. v. G. Salmon, J. Salmon and A. Hancock. In that case several members of a volunteer corps went out to practise shooting and put up their target in such a situation that a shot fired by one of them went wide and killed a boy. They were all convicted of manslaughter on the ground that each one of them was “answerable for the acts of the others, they all being engaged in one common pursuit”. Under section 34 as it stood originally it seems to me quite clear that each of the appellants would have been guilty of murder. In the Queen v. Guru Chand Gopee, a case decided in 1866, Peacock, C.J, observed: “It is laid down that when several persons are in company together engaged in one common purpose, lawful or unlawful, and one of them, without the knowledge or consent of the others, commits an offence, the others will not be involved in the guilt, unless the act done was in some manner in furtherance of the common intention.”. In that case the question that arose was whether certain persons who had been present when a fatal assault was committed but had not themselves taken any part in it were acting in concert with the actual assailants and whether the beating was in furtherance of the common design of all of them and His Lordship the Chief Justice, without deciding the point as the case was remanded, expressed the opinion that in certain circumstances such an inference might be justifiably drawn. The argument which has been put forward by Mrs. Dharamshila Lall assumes that the fatal blow on the head is in this particular case the criminal act referred to at the beginning of section 34. That act, however, was not an act done by several persons. The act done by several persons was the totality of the blows struck or the beating itself. The only question that could arise under the section as originally enacted was whether or not this fatal blow was struck in pursuance of the purpose of both men, and as to this, there can., clearly, be only one answer. The words “in furtherance of the common intention of all” were inserted in section 34 in 1870, and as their Lordships of the Judicial Committee have pointed out in Mahbub Shah's case, the words were inserted in order to clarify and not in order to modify the pre-existing law. The result of the amendment made in the section was, at the most, merely this, that if a doubt arose as to whether a particular act was done in pursuance of the common purpose or design, the onus was, in future, on the prosecution to show that it was so done and not on the defence to show that it was not so done. In Mahbub Shah's case, after pointing out that section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act Sir Madhavan Nair observed: “Under the section the essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention.” Assuming that the common intention of the appellants was to administer a severe beating to Radha Pathak. It is clear that it was the existence of that intention which led to the fatal blow being struck, and that blow was struck in furtherance of such intention. Mrs. Lall did not cite any authority in the course of her argument, but she subsequently asked us to refer to the following decisions: Emperor v. Mujjaffar Sheikh: Koramutla Narasinqadu: In re: Basappa's(4); Emperor v. Mahabir(5): Zahid Khan v. Emperor(6): and Queen-Empress v. Duma Baidya(7). With one exception, these decisions were prior to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Mahbub Shah's case and in Basapwa's case the facts were not similar to those with which we have to deal here, that being a case in which a murder was committed in the course of a burglary. The learned Government Advocate, on the other hand, referred us to a recent decision of the Allahabad High Court. Nazir v. Emperor(8), which is directly in point. I respectfully agree with the observations which were made by Raghubar Dayal, J. as to the practical difficulty in the way of being satisfied in a case in which several men armed with the same or similar weapons commit a fatal assault that, prior to setting out to commit the assault, they all decided and agreed that no blow likely to cause death should be struck. It appears to me, however, that in such a case speculation of that kind is quite unnecessary. What section 34 of the Penal Code is aimed at is a criminal act done by several persons which, as I have already said, means each of the acts done by several persons in furtherance of their common intention. It is, I think, quite clear that an act may be done by one of several persons in furtherance of the common intention of them all without each one of them having intended to do the particular act in exactly the same way as an act may be done by one member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object which the other members of the unlawful assembly did not each intend to be done. In order to determine the common intention and to determine also whether a particular act was done in furtherance of that common intention regard must be had not solely to the particular act, but to all the acts that were done. If two or three of several men proceed to assault another man with their fists, and if suddenly one of the bystanders joins in the affray and, pulls out a knife and stabs him fatally, it might well be said that the stabbing was not part of the criminal act in which all of them had joined, but was the individual act of the man who used the knife. Where, however, two men, each armed with lathis, set out in pursuit of another and overtake and assault him, each of them striking him several blows, it seems to me quite impossible to argue that any particular blow was not struck in furtherance of the common intention. The appellants were, in my opinion, rightly convicted of murder. The reason presumably why the learned Sessions Judge imposed the extreme penalty of the law was that murderous assaults of this kind in Shahabad have, in recent years, become much too common. There is, however, evidence to show that this attack on Radha Pathak was not premeditated, and that the appellants would not have committed this crime at all unless another man had gone to them and suggested that they should take the advantage of Radha Pathak having gone out unaccompanied to administer a beating to him. I would, therefore, reject the reference, and while affirming the conviction, would alter the sentence to one of transportation for life. Subject to this modification, I would dismiss the appeal.
Ahmad, J.:— I agree.
Order accordingly.
K.D
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