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Members Of The Sasamusa Workers Union v. State Of Bihar And Others
Judgment Summary — Ramaswami, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Secretary of the Sasamusa Workers' Union, obtained a rule calling on the State of Bihar and other respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus under Article 225 of the Constitution should not be issued commanding the State to refer the entire dispute between the petitioner and Sasamusa Sugar Mills Ltd. to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Procedural posture: Notice of the rule was given to the State of Bihar which showed cause; respondents Nos. 2 and 3 did not appear. The material facts were not controverted.
Relevant factual chronology (as stated in the opinion):
- 28 Aug 1949: The Workers' Union sent a letter to the Manager containing 15 demands about disputed matters (including alleged non-implementation of awards).
- 31 Oct 1949: Further demands made; conciliation proceedings were initiated by the Labour Commissioner of Bihar.
- Conciliation resulted in a settlement on most matters; remaining points were left to the Assistant Commissioner of Labour to decide by agreement of the parties.
- The Assistant Commissioner decided those points and the whole settlement was published by Government Notification on 9 Jan 1950.
- 11 Jan 1950 (two days earlier than publication date recorded in the opinion): The Workers' Union served a notice of strike alleging 44 specific demands (the opinion records that the strike notice was served two days prior to the 9 Jan publication).
- 19 Jan 1950: Labour Officer visited Sasamusa and made a report.
- 22 & 24 Jan 1950: Letters from the Assistant Commissioner and the Labour Commissioner indicating the strike might be illegal, and requesting attendance at a meeting.
- 6 Feb 1950 (shortly after): The Government of Bihar, invoking Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, referred an industrial dispute between managements of certain Sugar Mills and their workers to the Industrial Tribunal, specifying four matters in Schedule A of the notification.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the State of Bihar could lawfully refer only the four matters specified in Annexure/Schedule A to an Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, as opposed to being required to refer the entire dispute asserted by the Workers' Union (specifically the 44 demands in the strike notice), and whether a mandamus should issue directing the State to refer the remaining matters.
- Whether the decision of the Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 7th December 1949 (arising from the parties' agreement that he would examine certain dismissed workers' cases and that his decision be final) was illegal and ought to be quashed, particularly in light of Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the contention over what constitutes a "settlement of the dispute."
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Mr. T.K. Prasad) Arguments
- The dispute comprised the 44 specific items set out in the notice of strike served on 11 January 1950, so the State had no competence to refer only four matters; the whole dispute ought to have been referred to the Industrial Tribunal.
- The decision of the Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 7 December 1949 was illegal and should be quashed (argument founded on Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act and an asserted meaning of "settlement of the dispute").
Respondent / State's Position (as addressed in the opinion)
- The material before the Court did not establish that there was an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) in relation to the 44 demands: counsel could not show the strike notice was communicated to management or that management had reasonable opportunity to comply, and the affidavits did not state management was aware of the demands.
- Even if the 44 demands did amount to disputes, Section 10(1) confers a discretionary power on the appropriate Government to refer matters to a Tribunal (and the proviso indicates the Government may refuse referral in certain circumstances); the Government was therefore entitled to refer only the four matters in Annexure A.
- As to the Assistant Labour Commissioner's decision, it was made pursuant to an express agreement between the parties during conciliation that his decision would be final on certain discharged workers' cases, and such an arrangement falls within what may be a "settlement of the dispute" under Section 12.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bagaram Tulpule v. State of Bihar, AIR (37) 1950 Pat 387 (Full Bench) | That a writ of mandamus under Article 226 cannot be issued directing the Government to refer a dispute where the State Government has refused to refer under the proviso to Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the State's refusal to refer matters under the proviso is not ordinarily subject to mandamus relief; it reinforced the view that Section 10(1) confers discretion on the Government. |
| King v. Marshland Smeeth and Fen District Commissioner, (1920) 1 KB 165 | General principle that where an Act confers a discretion or a power rather than a duty, and that discretion is bona fide exercised, the prerogative writ of mandamus will not control that exercise; distinction between judicial discretion (subject to supervision to secure hearing/determination) and discretionary public powers (less amenable to mandamus). | The Court invoked McCardie J.'s reasoning from this case to explain and justify the conclusion that Section 10(1) vests a discretion in the Government which, if exercised bona fide, is not subject to mandamus to direct a particular decision. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeds in distinct steps grounded on the facts and statutory text set out in the opinion:
- Assessment of evidentiary foundation for the asserted 44-item dispute:
- The Court found no material in the record to establish that the 44 demands identified in the strike notice had given rise to an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act because there was no proof the notice had been communicated to management or that management had been given reasonable opportunity to comply with those demands. References to an impending strike appear in correspondence, but the petitioner's affidavit did not state the notice was communicated to management.
- On that factual basis, the Court concluded it was impossible on the materials furnished to treat the 44 demands as an industrial dispute under Section 2(k), and therefore the contention that the State had referred only part of an existing dispute failed for lack of foundational material.
- Statutory construction of "industrial dispute" and the character of multiple demands:
- The Court quoted Section 2(k) and reasoned that each demand, when refused by management, may give rise to a separate industrial dispute — i.e., 44 demands could constitute an aggregate of 44 disputes rather than a single dispute.
- From that view, even if all demands were disputes, the Government is not legally obliged to refer every such dispute under Section 10(1) merely because some arise out of the same broader labour context.
- Interpretation of Section 10(1) — power versus duty:
- The Court reproduced Section 10(1) and its proviso and reasoned that the language of the sub-section and proviso (for instance phrases like "unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given" or "that it would be inexpedient so to do") evince that the statute confers a power or discretion on the appropriate Government rather than imposes an obligatory duty to refer every matter.
- Accordingly, the Government may, in its discretion, refer a dispute or only selected matters to a Tribunal; that discretion is not amenable to mandamus directing a different choice absent evidence of arbitrary or bad-faith exercise.
- Reliance on precedent and English authority:
- The Full Bench decision in Bagaram Tulpule was cited to show prior local authority that mandamus cannot ordinarily be used to compel the Government to make a reference under Section 10(1) where it has refused to do so under the proviso.
- The English decision in King v. Marshland Smeeth was used to articulate the general principle that where a statutory power or discretion is conferred on a public body, the prerogative writ of mandamus will not normally control a bona fide exercise of that discretion; mandamus is available to compel hearing/determination where a judicial tribunal refuses jurisdiction, but not to dictate how a discretionary public power be exercised.
- On the challenge to the Assistant Labour Commissioner's decision:
- The Court examined the conciliation record showing an agreement that the Assistant Labour Commissioner would examine certain discharged workers' cases and that his decision would be final.
- The Court rejected the contention that such a decision could not be regarded as part of a "settlement of the dispute" under Section 12, observing parties may legitimately agree to have particular items decided by a third party whose decision will be final; hence no illegality was established and inclusion of that decision in the conciliation notification of 9 Jan 1950 was lawful.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The application is dismissed and the rule is discharged.
More precisely, the Court held:
- It was lawful for the State of Bihar to issue the notification referring only the four matters specified in Annexure/Schedule A to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act; the statute confers a discretion on the appropriate Government to refer disputes or only selected matters.
- No writ in the nature of mandamus could be issued directing the State Government to refer the remaining matters alleged to be in dispute in the circumstances of this case.
- The decision of the Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 7 December 1949 was not illegal and properly formed part of the conciliation settlement published on 9 January 1950.
Direct consequences set out by the Court:
- The petition is dismissed; the rule discharged with costs awarded to respondent No. 1.
- Hearing fee fixed at five gold mohars.
Implications beyond this case: The opinion rests on an interpretation that Section 10(1) vests a discretion in the appropriate Government and, following cited authority, holds that mandamus is generally not a remedy to compel exercise of such a discretion. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond applying established precedent and the statute to the facts of this case.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Rule discharged." (Sinha, J. agreed.)
Ramaswami, J.:— In this case the petitioner who is the Secretary of the Sasamusa Workers Union has obtained a rule calling upon the State of Bihar and other respondents to show cause why a writ in the nature of mandamus under Article 225 of the Constitution of India should not be issued commanding the State of Bihar to refer the entire dispute between the petitioner and Sasamusa Sugar Mills, Limited, for being decided by the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act.”
2. Cause was shown against the rule by the State of Bihar to whom notice of the rule was given. The other respondents, Nos. 2 and 3, have not entered appearance and contested the rule. The material facts are not controverted. On 28th of August 1949 the Sasamusa Workers' Union sent a letter to the Manager of the Sugar Mills in which they set out 15 demands with respect to certain disputed matters like non-implementation of certain awards. On 31st October, 1949 further demands were made by the petitioner upon which conciliation proceedings were started at the instance of the Labour Commissioner of Bihar. A settlement was arrived at between the Workers' Union and the management with respect to most of the matters in dispute. The remaining points were left for the decision of the Assistant Commissioner of Labour by the agreement of both the parties. The Assistant Commissioner of Labour accordingly decided the point and the whole settlement was published on 9th of January 1950, in a Government Notification. Two days later the Workers' Union served a notice of strike on the factory management setting forth 44 specific demands. On 19th of January 1950 the Labour Officer visited Sasamusa and made a report after making certain enquiries. On 24th January, 1950 the Labour Commissioner wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Workers' Union requesting him to attend a meeting at Mirganj intimating that the strike will be illegal in view of the fact that conciliation proceedings had already started. Shortly after the Government of Bihar acting under Section 10, Sub-section (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act referred the industrial dispute existing between the managements of certain Sugar Mill Factories in the State of Bihar and their workers as represented by the Union regarding four matters which were specified in Schedule A of the notification.
3. In support of this petition it was argued by Mr. T.K Prasad, in the first place that the dispute between the management and the Workers' Union related to 44 specific items set forth in the notice of strike sent on 11th January, 1950 and it was not competent for the State of Bihar to refer to Tribunal only the four matters specified in Annexure A of the notification. But there is no material in the present case adduced on behalf of the petitioner that there was industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act with reference to the “44 demands specified in the notice of strike.” Learned Counsel was unable to point out that the notice of strike was in fact served upon the management or that reasonable opportunity was given to the latter to comply with the demands made on behalf of the Workers' Union. It is true that there is reference to the impending strike in the letter of the Labour Commissioner, dated 24th of January 1950, and also in the letter of the Assistant Commissioner of Labour dated 22nd of January 1950, printed at pages 24 and 26 of the paper book. But it is not stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner that the notice of strike was in fact communicated to the management of the factory or that the management was otherwise aware of the demands made on behalf of the Workers' Union. It is impossible to hold upon the materials furnished that there was an “industrial dispute” with reference to the “44 demands” within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It cannot, therefore, be held that the reference made by the State of Bihar in the notification of 6th February, 1950 was only with respect to a ‘part’ of the industrial dispute as contended by the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner.
4. Even assuming that there is material to establish that there was industrial dispute with respect to the 44 demands made by the Workers' Union in the strike notice it must nevertheless be held that the Government of the State had discretion to refer to Industrial Tribunal for adjudication only the matters specified in Annexure A of the notification. It was contended by the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner that the dispute itself comprised the entire list of 44 demands and it was Iseyond the jurisdiction of the State Government to refer only a part of the dispute, meaning thereby the items specified in Annexure A of the notification. In my opinion the argument of the learned counsel is untenable and cannot prevail. Section 2(k) of the Act defines an industrial dispute to be:
“any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.”
5. According to this definition, each demand when made by the Workers’ Union and refused by the management gives rise to an ‘industrial dispute.’ In conceive therefore that 44 demands in the strike notice would give rise not to a single trade dispute but to an aggregate of 44 such disputes. For the reasons that I shall presently state the Government is not legally bound to refer all such disputes under Section 10(1), even if a public utility service is involved and notice of strike under Section 22 has been given. It follows that the reference made by the State Government with reference to the four matters mentioned in annexure A of the notification is intra vires and legal.
6. Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act states:
‘If any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government may, by order in writing,
(a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or
(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or
(c) refer the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication.”
7. There is a proviso to the effect that
“where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under S. 22 has been given, the appropriate Government ‘shall’, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this subjection notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced.”
8. Reading the whole sub-section with the proviso it is clear that the statute has granted a power rather than imposed a duty, that it has conferred a discretion but did not impose an obligation. The section merely intends to give the appropriate Government a power to refer for settlement or adjudication an industrial dispute relating to a public utility service when strike notice has been given notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced. It is a power or discretion which is given and not duty or obligation. This construction is supported by the fact that the expressions, such as “unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given” or “that it would be inexpedient so to do” confer a wide and unfettered discretion on the appropriate Government.
9. This view is supported by the decision of the Full Bench in ‘Bagaram Tulpule v. State Of Bihar*’, AIR (37) 1950 Pat 387 in which it was held that a writ of mandamus under Article 226 cannot be issued directing the Government to refer the dispute in a case where the State Government has refused to refer the industrial dispute under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
10. Reference should be made in this context to ‘King v. Marshland Smeeth and Fen District Commissioner’, (1920) 1 KB 165 in which Section 1 of the Marshland Smeeth and Fen District Act, 1796 (36 Geo. III, C. 100) provided as follows:
“Be it enacted that the said tracts of common and waste lands called Marshland Smeeth and Marshland Fen, shall be effectually regulated, set out inclosed, divided, and allotted, by such Commissioners, in such manner and under such powers and authorities, and subject to such rules, orders and directions, as are hereinafter appointed, mentioned and declared.”
11. One of the owners of land in the district alleged Commissioners had neglected to drain the district effectually, commanded them to do so. The Commissioners by their return to the writ alleged that they had carried out the order of the Court to the best of their ability. The plaintiff by his reply to the return joined issue thereon, and claimed damages for injury sustained by his land through the Commissioners' neglect to drain the district. One of the questions raised was whether the Commissioners were entitled to argue that the writ of mandamus should not have been issued by the Divisional Court. McCardie J. held that the Commissioners were so entitled. He then observed as follows:
“Concisely put, the defendants contend that the Acts which govern them are permissive rather than directory, and that the Commissioners have a discretion as to the carrying out of those Acts of Parliament which, if exercised bona fide, cannot be supervised, governed or directed. The validity of this contention must, I think, depend in every case upon the true construction of the enactment in question. If, for example, a jurisdiction be given to an inferior Court all that Court can be called upon by the High Court to do, save in special circumstances, is to hear and determine the matters brought before it in a regular and proper manner. Hence, a mandamus is granted, if jurisdiction has been declined by the inferior Court, to hear and determine only. If the inferior Court has a discretion as to the decision it may give, then if that discretion be exercised bona fide and not arbitrarily or illegally and without reference to extraneous considerations the Court will not control the exercise of that discretion. See the cases cited in Short and Mellor on Crown Officer Practice, edition 2, pages 200 and 201.
12. But I conceive that Acts of Parliament which confer a judicial discretion upon a subordinate Tribunal are fundamentally different from Acts of Parliament which place duties upon such bodies as canal companies, dock companies, land drainage corporations and the like. The object of the former enactments is to secure a hearing and determination. They could scarcely provide that a decision should be given contrary to the view of the tribunal. But the object of the latter class of enactments is wholly distinct. They aim at securing a benefit to the public or a particular section of the community by creating a body for the performance of certain public works and the discharge of the duties appropriate thereto. But even in the latter class it may be that the Act of Parliament has granted a power rather than Imposed a duty, has conferred a discretion rather than an obligation. If a power or discretion only, as distinct from a duty, exists then the prerogative writ of mandamus will not be issued by the Court.”
13. My conclusion therefore is that under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act it is competent for the Government of the State to issue the notification which is impugned in the present case. I am also of the opinion that no writ in the nature of mandamus can be issued by this Court to the State Government directing them to refer the remaining matters which are alleged to be in dispute, between the Workers Union and the management of the Sasamusa Factory in the circumstances disclosed in the present case.
14. An argument has been addressed by Mr. T.K Prasad in support of this rule that the decision of the Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 7th December, 1949 was illegal and it ought to be quashed, From page 11 of the paper book it is apparent that as a result of the conciliation proceedings it was agreed between the Workers Union on the one hand and the management on the other that as regards certain workers who had been discharged the Assistant Labour Commissioner should examine their cases and his decision will be final. In accordance with the agreement entered into between the parties the Assistant Labour Commissioner examined the cases of the workers concerned and pronounced his decision which is printed at pages 13 to 17 of the paper book. The argument of the learned counsel is founded on Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act which enacts:
“1. Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under S. 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner.
(2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute.
(3) If a settlement of the dispute or any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to the appropriate Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute.”
15. It was contended that the phrase “settlement of the dispute” could not include the decision given by the Assistant Labour Commissioner in the present case. It is obvious that this argument is wholly untenable for the parties to a dispute may well agree that a particular item may be decided by a third party whose decision will be accepted as final. It is difficult therefore to hold that there is any illegality committed in the course of the conciliation proceedings or that the decision of the Assistant Labour Commissioner ought not to have been included in the notification published on the 9th January, 1950 as a part of the conciliation proceedings.
16. For the reasons assigned I hold that the application must be dismissed and the rule discharged with costs to respondent No. 1. Hearing fee five gold mohars.
17. Sinha, J.:— I agree.
V.B.B
18. Rule discharged.
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