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Dulhin Suga Kuer And Another v. Deorani Kuer And Others Opposite Party.

Patna High Court
Aug 1, 1951
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit sought a declaration of title and confirmation of possession in respect of certain lands and was decreed ex parte on 25 October 1949. On 24 November 1949 defendant No. 1, Mt. Deorani Kuer, filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to set aside the ex parte decree, alleging fraudulent suppression of summons. The plaintiffs resisted, asserting proper service. The learned Munsiff found summonses were duly served and rejected the application on 30 March 1950. Two persons to whom defendant No. 1 had transferred the disputed lands (the transfer occurred after the ex parte decree but before the filing of the Order IX, Rule 13 application) appealed to the District Court. The Additional Subordinate Judge overruled an objection to the maintainability of that appeal, found that summons had been fraudulently suppressed, allowed the appeal and set aside the ex parte decree. The plaintiffs filed the present application in revision challenging that appellate order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal preferred by the transferees (persons to whom defendant No. 1 had transferred the land) was maintainable under Section 146 of the CPC.
  2. Whether the ex parte decree should be set aside on the ground of fraudulent suppression of summons under Order IX, Rule 13 of the CPC (i.e., whether summons had in fact been served on defendant No. 1).
  3. Whether a transferee who acquired title after an ex parte decree but before an application under Order IX, Rule 13 can take advantage of the original defendant's application or must file a separate application or appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The appeal in the Court below (by the transferees) was not competent; consequently the Court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decree.
  • Section 146 of the CPC, which permits proceedings to be taken by or against persons claiming under a party, does not apply because the transfer was effected prior to the initiation of the proceeding under Order IX, Rule 13 (the contention being that Section 146 would not cover a transfer effected before the proceeding was initiated).
  • Reliance was placed on the decision in Beni Ram v. Rani D.R Kunwar’, 13 Luck 554, as supporting the proposition that Section 146 contemplates a change of ??? after the decree (as cited in the opinion).

Transferees / Respondents' Position (as reflected in the appeal and the lower appellate court)

  • The learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that under Section 146 of the CPC the transferees were competent to prefer the appeal.
  • The transferees were directly affected by the ex parte decree because the transfer was made after the ex parte decree; therefore they had a sufficient interest to challenge and seek to set the decree aside.
  • It was submitted (as recorded) that transferees could take the benefit of the original defendant's application under Order IX, Rule 13; when that application was rejected, the transferees were entitled to prefer an appeal because the original defendant apparently no longer had an interest and did not appeal herself.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Beni Ram v. Rani D.R Kunwar’, 13 Luck 554 Relied upon for the proposition that Section 146 of the CPC "contemplates a change of ??? after the decree" (as stated in the opinion). The court considered this authority but framed the operative test as whether the transferee is affected by the order or decree. The court concluded that because the transfer was subsequent to the ex parte decree the transferees were affected and therefore entitled to prefer an appeal, reducing the weight of the cited formulation for the facts before it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two connected strands of analysis: jurisdiction/competence and the merits concerning service of summons.

  1. Jurisdiction / Competence under Section 146 CPC:

    The learned Additional Subordinate Judge applied Section 146, which allows proceedings to be taken by or against persons claiming under a party, to hold that the transferees could prefer the appeal. The opinion explains that the proper test is whether the transferee is affected by the order or decree in question. Applying that test, the court found that because the transfer of the disputed lands occurred after the ex parte decree, the transferees were indeed affected by that decree and thus had a sufficient interest to challenge it by appeal. The petitioners' reliance on an authority said to limit Section 146 was considered but the court adopted the "affected interest" test for the circumstances of the case.

  2. Relation between defendant's Order IX, Rule 13 application and transferees' right to appeal:

    The court observed that defendant No. 1 had filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13 alleging fraudulent suppression of summons. When that application was rejected by the Munsiff, it remained open to defendant No. 1 to appeal; however, she apparently did not do so because she no longer had an interest after the transfer. The transferees, being vitally interested in setting aside the ex parte decree, could take the benefit of the position and were entitled to prefer an appeal in the circumstances.

  3. Merits regarding service of summons:

    On the merits the Additional Subordinate Judge found that summons had been fraudulently suppressed and were not served upon defendant No. 1, and on that basis allowed the appeal and set aside the ex parte decree. The record shows that the learned Munsiff had earlier concluded the summons were duly served and had rejected the Rule 13 application, but the appellate court reached the contrary conclusion after hearing the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision dismissed.

Direct effect on the parties: The appellate court's decision (that the appeal by the transferees was maintainable under Section 146 and that the ex parte decree should be set aside for fraudulent suppression of summons) stands. The petitioners' application in revision was dismissed with costs (hearing fee: one gold mohur).

The opinion does not purport to lay down a new broad precedent beyond applying the test whether a transferee is "affected" by an order or decree for the purpose of Section 146; it limits its reasoning to the facts before the court.

Show all summary ...

1. This application in revision is directed against an order of the appellate Court setting aside an ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13 of the CPC.

2. The suit was for declaration of title and confirmation of possession in respect of the lands mentioned in the plaint. The suit was decreed ex parte on the 25th of October 1949. On the 24th of November 1949, defendant No. 1, Mt. Deorani Kuer filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the CPC for setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground that there was fraudulent suppression of summons.

3. The application was resisted by the plaintiffs who asserted that there was proper service of summons.

4. The learned Munsiff held that the summonses were duly served. He accordingly rejected the application on the 30th of March 1950. Against this order an appeal was preferred to the District Court by two persons to whom defendant No. 1, Mt. Deorani Kuer transferred the disputed lands.

5. This transfer appears to have been effected subsequent to the ex parte decree but before the filing of the application under Order IX, Rule 13 of the CPC.

6. An objection was taken in the Court below that the appeal by the transferees was not maintainable, but the learned Additional Subordinate Judge who heard the appeal overruled that objection. On the merits, he held that the summons was fraudulently suppressed and was not served upon defendant No. 1. He accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the ex parte decree. The plaintiffs, therefore have presented this application in revision.

7. Mr. Brahmadeo Narain on behalf of the petitioners contends that the appeal in the Court below was not competent and the Court had, therefore, no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decree. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that under Section 146 of the CPC the transferees were competent to prefer the appeal. Section 146 provides:

“Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any law for the time being in force, where any proceeding may be taken or application made by or against any person, then the proceeding maybe taken or the application may be made by or against any person claiming under him,”

8. Mr. Brahmadeo Narain argues that Section 146 has no application because the transfer was effected prior the initiation of the proceeding under Order IX, Rule 13. It is said that if the transfer had been made subsequent to the initiation of that proceeding the section might have been applicable. In support of his contention, reliance is placed on “Beni Ram v. Rani D.R Kunwar’, 13 Luck 554, in which it was laid down that Section 146 of the CPC contemplates a change of ??? after the decree. In that case the transfer was effected before the date of the suit. The true test, in my opinion, is whether the transferee is affected by the order or decree in question. Here, the transfer was subsequent to the ex parte decree. Therefore, the transferees were certainly interested in setting aside the ex parte decree. Mr. Brahmadeo Narain argues that it was open to them to file an application under Order IX, Rule 13. But defendant No. 1, herself filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13 and the transferees could certainly take the benefit of her application and it was not necessary for them to file a separate application. When the application was rejected, it was, of course, open to defendant No. 1 to file an appeal, but apparently she did not prefer any, because she had no longer any interest in the property. The transferees were vitally interested in setting aside the ex parte decree who were, in the circumstances, entitled to prefer an appeal.

9. The application is dismissed with costs: hearing fee one gold mohur.

K.S

10. Revision dismissed.