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Bir Singh v. Budhu Ram And Others

Patna High Court
Mar 22, 1950
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Das, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs-respondents sued for declaration of title and recovery of possession of 14 kathas and 17 dhurs in plot No. 390, village Banuchapra. They alleged temporary settlement of fruit rights with defendant-appellant for five years, after which they repossessed (post-1939). Structures on the land (a pacca house, a hut, a latrine and a nad) were in dispute: plaintiffs said they built them except the nad (made by appellant with permission); the appellant said he had a 1928 batai settlement with plaintiff-respondent 1's father and claimed under-raiyat occupancy rights and that he himself had constructed the structures (latrine and nad 8–9 years old; other structures over 12 years).

The learned Munsif (trial Court) found no settlement of the land, held appellant a trespasser as to the land but a licensee/tenant at will as to the structures (constructed with respondents' permission), and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiffs for the land but retained possession of the land on which the structures stood until the appellant was asked to quit or remove them (i.e., a modified decree excluding the portion occupied by the structures).

The appellant appealed against the part of the Munsif's decree that denied him possession of the land on which the structures stood. The Subordinate Judge affirmed the main findings but held that a notice to quit was not necessary and, although no cross-objection or appeal had been filed by the respondents, relied on O. 41, R. 33 CPC to modify the trial Court's decree to direct removal of the structures and restoration of the land. The present second appeal asked whether that exercise of power under O. 41, R. 33 was justified when respondents had not appealed or filed cross-objections.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court of appeal (Subordinate Judge) was justified under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) in modifying that part of the trial Court's decree which was favourable to the plaintiffs-respondents, when the plaintiffs had not preferred any appeal or cross-objection against that part.
  2. Whether the appellant's asserted batai settlement of 1928 (as pleaded) was true.
  3. Whether the appellant had acquired any right of occupancy as an under-raiyat under the provisions of Section 48-A of the Bihar Tenancy Act.
  4. Whether the disputed structures were built by the appellant or by the respondents.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere with that part of the trial Court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs when the plaintiffs had not appealed or filed any cross-objection.
  • Even if the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction under O. 41, R. 33 CPC, he should not have exercised it in this case (i.e., this was not an appropriate case for such interference).
  • On merits (briefly and faintly raised), the appellant contended he took settlement in 1928 and thereby acquired occupancy rights by continued possession.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents relied heavily on authorities (notably Subrammian Chettiar v. Sinnammal and Dayal Ram v. Ladha Ram) to support the proposition that Order 41, Rule 33 CPC confers wide powers on an appellate Court to make proper decrees even in favour of parties who have not appealed or filed cross-objections, and that such power may be exercised in appropriate cases.
  • They argued that the Subordinate Judge properly modified the decree to avoid multiplicity of suits and because the Munsif was wrong in thinking a notice to quit was necessary; respondents could bring another action after giving notice if required.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Chander v. Dwarka Nath, 5 Pat L.W. 213 (A.I.R. (4) 1917 Pat. 52) Interpreted O. 41, R. 33 CPC as applicable only where appellate Court must make material variation for ends of justice; cautioned against using R.33 to wipe out decrees not appealed from, as it would negate need for cross-appeals. The Court relied on it to show that an appellate Court should not, as a general rule, disturb parts of a decree not appealed from and that setting aside such decrees may be without jurisdiction in many circumstances.
Panahu v. Anand Thakur, 2 Pat. 712 (A.I.R. (11) 1924 Pat. 160) Noted theoretical possibility that O. 41, R. 33 is wide enough to permit dismissal of an entire suit on appeal even though some defendants had not been appealed against; considered the "possibility" rather than a directive to always exercise the power. Used to illustrate that R.33's language can be wide enough to admit theoretical interference, but courts may exercise caution; court regarded it as indicating a theoretical scope rather than a mandate.
Maharaja Bahadur Kesho Prasad Singh v. Narayan Dayal, 4 Pat. 37 (A.I.R. (12) 1925 Pat. 286) Held O. 41, R. 33 not applicable where plaintiff succeeded in part and the defendants accepted that part; R.33 is to give effect to appellate interference only where necessary in interests of justice. Cited as close in fact to the present case; the Court treated it as authority limiting R.33 where there is no necessity to interfere with rights of parties who did not appeal.
Mohan Bikram v. Deonarain, A.I.R. (32) 1945 Pat. 453 (24 Pat. 379) Expressed a similar view to Maharaja Bahadur Kesho Prasad Singh regarding the limited scope of R.33. Referred to as supporting the proposition that R.33 should not be used to disturb parts of decrees where it is unnecessary to effect justice between the parties.
Sant Prasad Singh v. Charitar Singh, 30 P.L.T. 359 Observed that R.33's language is wide and, in principle, could permit making proper decrees in favour of parties who did not file appeals or objections; not a definitive ruling on R.33's scope. Noted by the Court but treated as not decisive on the general scope of R.33; used to show there are decisions taking a broad view of the rule.
Nobin Chandra v. Chandra Madhab, 44 Cal. 1 (A.I.R. (3) 1916 P.C. 148) Privy Council noted that in absence of cross-appeal or memorandum under corresponding rule, it was not competent for appellant to obtain relief beyond restoration of the Subordinate Judge's order. Cited to emphasize that absence of cross-appeal limits the appellate relief available and that R.33 cannot be read so as to permit greater remedy without appropriate procedural steps.
Muhammad Khaleef Shirazi & Sons v. Les Tanneries Lyonnaises, A.I.R. (13) 1926 P.C. 34 (49 Mad. 435) Privy Council held O. 41, R. 33 was not intended to apply to cases where appeal lay directly to His Majesty in Council in a way not allowable under the Code or Letters Patent. Referred to as limiting contexts in which wide language of R.33 can be invoked.
Anath Nath v. Dwarha Nath, A.I.R. (26) 1939 P.C. 86 (I.L.R. (1939) Kar. 149) Privy Council indicated R.33 could not be rightly used to abrogate the condition that prevents an independent appeal being brought without notice of grounds to parties who succeeded below. Used to support the view that procedural safeguards (notice of grounds) and the requirement of appeals/cross-objections cannot be circumvented by an expansive reading of R.33.
Subrammian Chettiar v. Sinnammal, 53 Mad. 881 (A.I.R. (17) 1930 Mad. 801 (F.B.)) Madras Full Bench held that O. 41, R. 33 confers wide powers that could, in a proper case, be exercised in favour of a respondent who had neither appealed nor filed a cross-objection; exercise is discretionary and fact-specific. Respondents relied on this as supporting wide discretionary power under R.33; the Court acknowledged it but treated it as an example of discretionary exercise rather than a rule that must be followed in all cases.
Dayal Ram v. Ladha Ram, A.I.R. (20) 1933 Lah. 40 (140 I.C. 22) Decision of Lahore that purportedly follows the Madras Full Bench on the wide discretionary power under R.33. Noted by the Court as an allied decision relied upon by respondents; treated as part of authorities taking a broad view of R.33's scope.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the central inquiry narrowly: whether the Subordinate Judge was justified in modifying that part of the Munsif's decree favourable to the plaintiffs (directing removal of structures) when the plaintiffs had not appealed or filed a cross-objection.

The Court proceeded in two analytical strands:

  1. Principle of finality and procedural requirements: The Court emphasized the general principle that a decree is binding on the parties unless set aside in appropriate proceedings; parties who wish to have a decree against them modified must comply with procedural requirements (appeals, cross-objections). Although O. 41, R. 33 CPC is expressed in wide terms and contains an illustration showing circumstances in which an appellate Court may pass a different decree, that provision must not be interpreted so broadly as to abrogate the Code's other provisions about appeals and cross-objections. As an ordinary rule, an appellate Court should not reverse or vary a decree in favour of a party who has not filed any appeal or cross-objection.
  2. Scope and proper exercise of O. 41, R. 33: The Court reviewed authorities ranging from decisions that read R.33 narrowly to those that read it widely. It observed: R.33 can be invoked in exceptional cases where, because of interference in favour of the appellant, further interference with the lower Court's decree is necessary to adjust parties' rights according to justice, equity and good conscience. But that power is exceptional and must be exercised cautiously; it should not be used to deprive a party of rights accepted without challenge in the absence of a compelling necessity to do so.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found no material showing that the Munsif's decree with respect to the land on which the structures stood could not be given effect. The respondents had apparently accepted that part of the decree and made no complaint. The Court rejected the contention that intervening to avoid multiplicity of suits justified the Subordinate Judge's unilateral modification: while the Munsif may have been mistaken in thinking notice to quit was necessary, a party who accepts a wrong decision without appealing cannot later be heard to argue that justice requires altering that decision in his favour absent an appeal or cross-objection. To allow otherwise would abrogate the procedural scheme for appeals and cross-objections.

On the merits of title and possession the Court noted concurrent findings below: the appellant's story of 1928 settlement was found false; he did not hold as an under-raiyat nor acquire occupancy rights under Section 48-A of the Bihar Tenancy Act; his possession of the structures was permissive. Thus, on merits, appellant had no case to remain on the land against the owners' wishes.

The Court therefore concluded that the Subordinate Judge wrongly exercised his jurisdiction under O. 41, R. 33 CPC in interfering with that part of the Munsif's decree which the respondents had neither appealed against nor cross-objected to.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court partly allowed the appeal. Specifically, the Court set aside the Subordinate Judge's modification of the Munsif's decree insofar as it directed removal of the structures and restored the Munsif's original decree with respect to the land on which the structures stand.

Consequential orders and immediate implications:

  • The decree of the learned Munsif (trial Court) is restored in respect of the land on which the structures stand.
  • The plaintiff-respondents are entitled to the costs of the first Court and to the mesne profits decreed by the learned Munsif and affirmed by the Subordinate Judge.
  • There will be no order as to costs in the Court of appeal below nor in this Court.
  • The appeal is allowed only in part to the extent described above.

The opinion does not assert that it establishes a new broad precedent; rather it applies established principles about the proper and cautious exercise of Order 41, Rule 33 CPC and the importance of procedural safeguards (appeals and cross-objections) in protecting parties' accepted rights.

Show all summary ...

Das, J.:— The main question for decision in this second appeal is if the Court of appeal below was justified under the provisions of O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC, in modifying a part of the decree passed by the Court of first instance, on an appeal by the defendant-appellant, but with out any appeal or cross-objection having been preferred by the plaintiffs-respondents against that part of the decree which was against them.

2. The facts relevant to the aforesaid question are the following. The plaintiffs-respondents brought a suit for a declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of 14 kathas and 17 dhurs of land comprised in plot No. 390 situated in village Banuchapra. They alleged that the fruits of some trees on the land were settled with the defendant-appellant for five years. After the expiry of the period of the lease in 1939, the plaintiffs-respondents got back possession. It was further alleged that there were some structures on the land, namely, a pacca house, a hut, a latrine and a mad. According to the plaintiffs-respondents they constructed the aforesaid structures except the mad, which was made by the appellant with the permission of the respondents. In 1943, the appellant again wanted to take settlement of the fruits, but the respondents refused. This led to a proceeding under Section 144 of the Cr PC as a result of which the respondents were dispossessed by the appellant on 15th September 1944. The case of the appellant was that he had taken settlement of the land in batai from the father of plaintiff-respondent 1 in the year 1928. The appellant alleged that by reason of the said settlement and his continued possession since then, he had acquired a right of occupancy in the land. It was alleged by the appellant that he constructed the pacca house, the hut, the latrine and the nad. The latrine and the nad were alleged to have been constructed some 8 or 9 years ago but the other structures were alleged to have been constructed more than 12 years ago. It may be stated here that no question of adverse possession arose in the case because the appellant himself admitted that the structures were constructed with the permission of the respondents. The questions which were considered and decided by the Courts below were (1) whether the story of batai settlement in 1928, set up by the present appellant, was true; (2) whether the appellant had acquired any right of occupancy as an under-raiyat under the provisions of Section 48-A of the Bihar Tenancy Act, and (3) whether the structures in question were built and constructed by the appellant or the respondents. The first two questions were answered against the present appellant, and the third in his favour. The Court of first instance held that there was no settlement of the land, and the appellant was a trespasser in respect of the land, but a licensee or tenant at will in respect of the structures, he having made those structures with the permission of the respondents for temporary occupation. On these findings, the first Court, that is, the learned Munsif, passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff-respondents with regard to the land, but ground (found?) that the respondents were not entitled to recover possession of the land on which the structures stood without asking the appellant to quit the structures or remove them. In other words, the learned Munsif passed a modified decree in favour of the respondents giving them possession of the land other than the land on which the structures stood, as also mesne profits, etc. An appeal was preferred by the present appellant, who was defendant in the action, against that part of the decree of the learned Munsif which allowed possession of the land minus the structures. This appeal was heard by the learned Subordinate Judge of Motihari. He affirmed the three main findings of the learned Munsif, but he held that the learned Munsif was wrong in thinking that a notice to quit or a demand was necessary before the respondents could succeed in respect of the land on which the structures stood. This part of the decree of the learned Munsif was against the respondents. The respondents had not preferred any appeal or cross-objection. The learned Subordinate Judge then expressed himself as follows:

“No doubt, there is no cross-appeal or objection on the side of the plaintiffs, but under O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC. I think the appellate Court has power to pass proper order on the facts of the case.”

On this view, the learned Subordinate Judge passed a decree directing the appellant to remove the structures and restore the land to its original condition within a month, failing which he directed, the structures would be removed at his cost. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the appeal of the appellant, but modified the decree in so far as it was against the respondents, though the latter had not preferred any appeal or cross-objection.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended before us that the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere with that part of the decree against which no appeal nor any cross objection had been preferred by the party aggrieved. Secondly, he has contended that even if the learned Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction under the provisions of O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC, this was not a proper case in which the jurisdiction should have been exercised. There is a large volume of case law on the purpose and scope of O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC with particular reference to the illustration given under the rule. Some decisions have held that the illustration is not meant to be exhaustive of the class of cases in which the rule applies; other decisions have held that the illustration indicates the principle underlying the purpose and scope of the rule. I do not think that it is necessary in this case to examine, in detail, the entire case law, on the subject, because the decision in this case need not be rested on the higher plane of absence of jurisdiction. It is, I think, beyond dispute that the general principle is that a decree is binding on the parties to it unless it is set aside in appropriate proceedings, if a party wishes to have a decree against him modified or reversed, he must comply with certain requirements as to filing of appeals, objections and so forth. Therefore, though O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC is in very wide terms, it must not be interpreted in such a way as to abrogate the other provisions in the Code with regard to the filing of appeals, cross objections, etc. It follows, therefore, that as an ordinary rule an appellate Court must not reverse or vary a decree in favour of a party who has not preferred any appeal or cross-objection against it and this general rule should hold good notwithstanding the enactment of R. 33 which enables an appellate Court, in exceptional cases, to pass such decree as ought to have been passed, or as the nature of the case may require, although the party in whose favour the decree is being made, may not have filed an appeal or cross-objection. The illustration gives some indication of the class of cases in which R. 33 will apply; for example, it applies to cases where, as a result of interference in favour of the appellant, further interference with the decree of the lower Court is rendered necessary in order to adjust the rights of the parties according to justice, equity and good conscience. Keeping the aforesaid general principles in mind, I propose to examine some of the decisions of this Court to which our attention has been drawn. The earliest decision of this Court, to which our attention has been drawn, is Ram Chander v. Dwarka Nath, 5 Pat L.W 213 : (A.I.R (4) 1917 Pat. 52), That was a case in which the first Court decreed the suit against one Ambika Charan on his confession, and as against another person Madho Prasad, he decreed the suit for Rs. 49, (the two suits being suits for rent). Against these decrees, the landlord appealed, but neither defendant filed any cross-appeal against the decree made against him. The learned Subordinate Judge, while upholding the findings of the learned Munsif, said that on those findings the suits must be dismissed in toto for they were each suits for rent for a partition of a holding and not for a whole holding. The landlord then came in second appeal to this Court, and one of the questions raised was whether the lower appellate Court had power to set aside decrees which were note appealed from. With regard to the decree against Ambia Chandra, it was held that the decree was obtained by consent, and no appeal lay; therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in interfering with that decree. In respect to the decree against Madho Prasad, the learnel Subordinate Judge was right in his interpretation of the rights of the parties; their Lordships then expressed themeselves as follows with regard to O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC:

“As we read that section it applies only to cases in which for the ends of justice and for the equitable execution of a decree the appellate Court considers it necessary to make a material variation in the decree. It does not seem to us that where there has been no cross-appeal the whole amount decreed should be wiped) off on considerations which may commend them-elves to the appellate Court. If it were so, there would be an end of all cross-appeals. A litigant has no desire to pay court fees upon a relief which he can obtain in the appellate Court without a fee. We are of opinion that the setting aside of the decree against Madbo Prasad was without jurisdiction and must be declared void.”

The decision, no doubt, put the matter on the higher plane of jurisdiction; but as I have already said, it is not necessary to go to that extent. One can say, that, speaking generally it would be wrong for the appellate Court to interfere with that part of the decree against which the aggrieved party has neither come up in appeal nor by way of a cross-objection. In Panahu v. Anand Thakur, 2 Pat. 712 : (A.I.R (11) 1924 Pat. 160), the real question was one of limitation, but certain observations were made with regard to O. 41, R. 33. The observations were to the following effect:

“It is contended by the learned Vakil that the High Court had no such power under O. 41, R. 33. The question is not whether the High Court would have exercised the power; the question is whether there was a possibility of the High Court in the appeal of the plaintiff dismissing the plaintiff's entire suit. In my opinion, the case of the plaintiff being that all the defendants were joint tort-feasors and had jointly taken possession of the plaintiff's land. It was open to the High Court, under the provisions of O. 41, R. 33, to dismiss the plaintiff's entire suit if it came to the conclusion that his appeal, as against defendants 3, 7 and 15 could not succeed. I do not say that the High Court would, in the particular case, or in fact in any case, take that course, but the possibility was always there, and in my opinion, the plaintiff was entitled to wait till the appeal was disposed of in the High Court before proceeding with his execution as against those defendants against whom his suit had succeeded in the Court of first instance.”

It is clear that their Lordships were considering's, theoretical possibility only, and thought that O. 41, R. 33, was sufficiently wide in terms to admit of the theoretical possibility of interference, even though the party aggrieved had preferred no appeal or cross-objection. With regard to the theoretical possibility, their Lordships took a wide view. The next decision is Maharaja Bahadur Kesho Prasad Singh v. Narayan Dayal*, 4 Pat. 37 : (A.I.R (12) 1925 Pat. 286). There Dawson Miller C.J expressed himself as follows with regard to O. 41, R. 33:

“In my opinion, O. 41, R. 33 has no application to a case like this. The plaintiff succeeds in that suit in part, that is to say, although he claimed a higher rent, he in fact succeeded in obtaining the smaller rent. He obtained a part of that which he claimed and that was the result of certain findings of the Munsif that the holdings had in fact been split up and that the plaintiff was entitled to sue for rent in the one case in respect of a holding of 6.94 acres, and although he had claimed a greater rent than he was entitled to be was certainly entitled to the tent proportionate to that area. The defendants, after that decision was given and the decree passed against them, were content and remained satisfied with that decree. They made no attempt to appeal and even when the plaintiff appealed they entered no cross-appeal or cross-objection, and in my opinion, it was not competent to the learned Judge, when the only question before him was whether the plaintiff was entitled to the extra rent which had been refused him, to enter into the question whether or not he was entitled to any rent. This matter was not before the learned Judge and although the wording of O. 41, R. 33, may be very wide and give a large discretion to the Court, it is in my view, dearly not meant to apply to a case like the present. The object of that order is, speaking generally, to enable the appellate Court, where its decision interferes with or modifies or extends the decision of the lower Court, to give effect to that decision by interfering, if necessary, even with the rights and liabilities of those who are not in fact appealing from the decision of the trial Court. Unless it is necessary in the interest of justice to give effect to the appellate Court's decision by interfering in some way or other with the rights of those parties which are not the subject of appeal before us then it seems to me that the appellate Court has no right whatever to interfere.”

I think that the facts of this decision are the nearest approach to the facts of the case under our present consideration. In a much later decision in Mohan Bikram v. Deonarain, A.I.R (32) 1945 Pat. 453 : (24 Pat. 379), the same view was expressed. In a still more recent decision in Sant Prasad Singh v. Charitar Singh, 30 P.L.T 359, the main decision was whether it was open to a defendant respondent to file a cross objection against a co-respondent under the provisions of R. 22 of O. 41. Incidentally, it was observed that the language of R. 33 of O. 41 was very wide and under that rule, the Court had power to make a proper decree and such power could be exercised in favour of all or any of the parties, even though they might not have filed an appeal or objection. The decision can hardly be taken as a decision on the scope of R. 33 of O. 41.

4. Our attention has been drawn to some decisions of the Privy Council. In Nobin Chandra v. Chandra Madhab, 44 Cal. 1 : (A.I.R (3) 1916 P.C 148), their Lordships referred to Section 561 of the CPC, 1882, corresponding to O. 41, R. 22, and said that in the absence of any cross appeal or any memorandum of appeal under O. 41, R. 22, it was not competent for the appellant to get any further remedy than the restoration of the order of the Subordinate Judge. What happened was that in a suit for rendering accounts, the claim was for rendering accounts for a period of about eight years. The Subordinate Judge ordered an account for about five years only. On appeal, the High Court reduced the period to five months. It was against that order that an appeal was taken to the Privy Council by the plaintiff, and their Lordships observed that as the appellants had not preferred any cross-appeal or memorandum of appeal to the High Court, they could not ask that the accounts should be ordered for the whole period of the agency. In Muhammad Khaleef Shirazi & Sons v. Les Tanneries Lyonnaises, A.I.R (13) 1926 P.C 34 : (49 Mad. 435), their Lordships said that O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC, was not intended to apply to cases in which an appeal was being preferred direct to His Majesty in Council, which was not allowable under the Code of Civil Procedure, or under the Letters Patent of the High Court. In Anath Nath v. Dwarha Nath, A.I.R (26) 1939 P.C 86 : (I.L.R (1939) Kar. 149), their Lordships said as follows with regard to O. 41, R. 33:

“It was contended, however, that the language of R. 33 of the same order was wide enough to cover the case. Even if their Lordships assume that the High Court was not wholly without power to entertain this ground of appeal—an assumption to which they do not commit themselves—they are clearly of opinion that R. 33 could not rightly be used in the present case so as to abrogate the important condition which prevents an independent appeal from being in effect brought without any notice of the grounds of appeal being given to the parties who succeeded in the Court below.”.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed very great reliance on two decisions, Subrammian Chettiar v. Sinnammal, 53 Mad. 881 : (A.I.R (17) 1930 Mad. 801 (F.B)) and a single Judge decision of Lahore, Dayal Ram v. Ladha Ram, A.I.R (20) 1933 Lah. 40 : (140 I.C 22). In the Madras Full Bench decision, it was held that the powers given to an appellate Court by O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC, were very wide, and could be exercised in a proper case even in favour of a respondent who had neither appealed nor filed a memorandum of cross-objection. It was pointed out, however, that the exercise of such extraordinary power was a matter of discretion with the appellate Court on the circumstances of the case. In the Madras case, it appears that the defendant conceded that the plaintiff, an attaching decree-holder, had the right to redeem. The concession was made on the basis of a decision which was subsequently overruled. In those circumstances, it was held that the defendant could raise the point again. The Lahore decision purports to follow the Madras decision.

6. If we look at the case before us, not from the extreme point of view of absence of jurisdiction, but from the limited point of view of the proper exercise of the jurisdiction under O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC, it seems clear to me that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in modifying the decree of the learned Munsif with regard to the structures, when the respondents, the aggrieved party, had apparently accepted that decree and made no grievance of it. In the course of the argument before us, the question arose as to whether there would be any difficulty in giving effect to the decree of the learned Munsif for part of land. There are no materials before us from which it can be said that the decree of the learned Munsif for part of the land cannot be given effect to. Another question that has been canvassed before us on behalf of the respondents is that in order to avoid multiplicity of suits, the decree of the learned Munsif was properly modified by the learned Subordinate Judge. It is contended that the learned Munsif was wrong in thinking that a notice to quit was necessary; furthermore the respondents can easily bring another action after giving such notice, if necessary. Speaking for myself, I think the learned Munsif was wrong in thinking that a notice to quit was necessary; but if a party accepts a wrong decision, and does not file any appeal or cross-appeal, I doubt whether he can be heard to say that justice requires that the decision should be altered. To hold that he is so entitled without any exception, would be to abrogate the provisions as to the filing of appeals and cross-appeals.

7. For these reasons, I am of the view that the learned Subordinate Judge wrongly exercise ed his jurisdiction under O. 41, R. 33 of the CPC in interfering with that part of the decree of the learned Munsif against which the respondents had neither preferred any appeal nor any cross appeal.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant faintly contended before us that his client had taken settlement of the land in 1928 and acquired occupancy right by continued possession. The concurrent finding of the Courts below is that the story of settlement was false. The appellant did not, therefore, hold as an under-raiyat, nor did he acquire occupancy right. It was further admitted that the possession of the appellant was permissive possession so far as the structures were concerned. In that view of the matter, no question of adverse possession arose. On merits, I think, the appellant has no case of remaining on the land against the wish of the rightful owners.

9. I would accordingly allow this appeal only in part to the extent indicated below. The decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, so far as it modifies the decree of the learned Munsif with regard to the land on which the structures stand, will be set aside, and the decree of the learned Munsif restored. The plaintiff respondents will get their costs of the first Court, and, also mesne profits decreed by the learned Munsif and affirmed by the learned Subordinate Judge.

10. There will be no order for costs in the Court of appeal below nor of this Court.

11. Sarjoo Prasad, J.:— I entirely agree.

G.M.J

12. Appeal partly allowed.