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Thakurji And Another Pltfs. v. Raghveshsurendra Sahi Deft. Resp.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ray, J.; concurring: Manohar Lall, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff appealed against an order which rejected the plaint for non-payment of ad valorem Court-fees. For jurisdiction the plaintiff valued the relief at Rs. 1,400 and paid a fixed Court-fee of Rs. 15 under Schedule 2, Article 17, Part 6 of the Court-fees Act, on the ground that the subject-matter of the suit was not capable of being valued in money.
The trial Court (Order No. 52 in Title Suit No. 14 of 1942, Court of the Second Subordinate Judge, Gaya, dated 29-3-44) concluded that the actual value of the right claimed could not be less than the market value of the lands. Using the actual income of the villages (stated to be about Rs. 14,700) the trial Judge derived a market value of Rs. 147,550, directed the plaintiff to correct the valuation and to pay Court-fees accordingly; the plaint was rejected when the plaintiff did not pay the additional Court-fees.
Substantively, the dispute concerns endowed properties at Ajodhya, vested in Sri Thakurji (plaintiff 1). There was a contest over the office of mutwalli (shebait) between plaintiff 2 and the defendant. Following a Section 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding and attachment under Section 146, both plaintiff 2 and the defendant sued to establish title as mutwalli and for possession. The defendant's suit was decreed and plaintiff's suit dismissed by a compromise; the defendant obtained possession from the receiver. In the present suit the plaintiff impugns that compromise as fraudulent and seeks declarations and directions concerning the office of mutwalliship and charge of the trust estate.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a suit for declaration that the plaintiff is the mutwalli (shebait) and for an order placing the plaintiff in charge of the trust estate is a subject-matter "capable of being valued in money" for the purpose of fixing ad valorem Court-fees.
- Whether the plaintiff's initial election to pay a fixed fee of Rs. 15 under Schedule 2, Article 17, Part 6 of the Court-fees Act was sufficient, or whether the trial Court rightly revalued the relief and required payment of ad valorem Court-fees based on the (market) value of the properties.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Plaintiff
- The subject-matter of the suit (the office of mutwalliship / shebait-ship and being placed in charge of the trust estate) is not capable of monetary valuation because, according to the plaint, the office carries no emoluments or material enjoyment; therefore the correct Court-fee was the fixed fee of Rs. 15 under Sch. 2, Article 17, Para 6.
- The plaintiff relied on the decision in Maulavi Sayeed v. Shah Tafazul Hussain (AIR 1934 Pat 647) in support of the proposition that where an office (mutwalliship) does not carry salary or material enjoyment the suit is not monetarily valu-able and the fixed fee is proper.
Respondent / Crown (Mr. S.K. Mitra)
- Urged that the facts of Maulavi Sayeed's case differ from the present facts, and therefore that decision should not apply here.
- Relied upon other decisions (Mohammad Ghouse, In re, AIR 1925 Mad 804; and Parshottamanand/Parsottamanand Giri v. Mayanand Giri, AIR 1932 All 593) to support the view that the suit ought to be treated as involving the value of immovable property and hence attract ad valorem Court-fees.
- Attempted to distinguish Maulavi Sayeed on factual differences such as arrears of rent being claimed in that case and the actual occupation of the house by a third person.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Maulavi Sayeed v. Shah Tafazul Hussain, AIR (21) 1934 Pat 647 | Where the subject-matter of the suit is the right to mutwalliship and the office carries no salary or material enjoyment, the right is not capable of monetary valuation; therefore the proper Court-fee is the fixed fee under Sch. 2, Art. 17, Para 6. | The Court treated this Division Bench Patna decision as binding and applicable to the facts: it held that the present suit is for recovery of the office (shebait/mutwalliship) which, on the plaintiff's own pleadings, carries no emoluments and therefore is not monetarily valu-able; accordingly the fixed fee paid was sufficient. |
| Mohammad Ghouse, In re, AIR (12) 1925 Mad 804 | Illustrates a suit where the plaintiff sought declaration and possession of religious properties (Sajjadanashin) and was treated as a suit for recovery of possession. | The Court recognised this case as one where the facts made the suit one for recovery of possession; it was relied on by the respondent but the Court found it distinguishable from the present case and not decisive against the application of Maulavi Sayeed. |
| Parshottamanand / Parsottamanand Giri v. Mayanand Giri, AIR (19) 1932 All 593 | Held that the suit was for possession of immovable property and the Court-fee should be governed by the appropriate ad valorem provision (S. 7, Cl. (5) in that case); the mode of relief (possession) controlled fee treatment. | The Court distinguished this case on the ground that it involved a claim for recovery of possession of immovable property; the present suit was characterised as one for charge of an office rather than straightforward recovery of possession, so the All-India decision did not mandate a contrary result. |
| Girdhari Lal v. Ram Lal, 21 All 200 | Discussed in Parshottamanand Giri; concerned a suit under S. 539 where the plaintiffs sought appointment of new superintendents and did not claim possession for themselves. | The Court quoted the distinction made in Parshottamanand Giri between a suit seeking possession of trust property and a suit seeking appointment/management that does not claim possession for the plaintiffs; used as background to explain why Parshottamanand Giri did not control the present case. |
| Swaminath Iyer v. A. Ramier, AIR (12) 1925 Mad 421 | Held that plaintiffs suing for declaration that they are lawfully appointed trustees and for restoration of the office need not sue for possession of temple properties (i.e., relief for office/management differs from possession). | The Court noted this authority as illustrating that actions for restoration of office or trustee-ship may not require suing for possession; used to support the distinction between relief for office and relief for possession. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by characterising the nature of the relief claimed as the primary determinant of the correct Court-fee. The key analytical steps were:
- The Court examined the plaint's allegations and the reliefs sought (declaration of mutwalliship, declaration that the defendant is not entitled to remain in charge, and a direction to make over charge to plaintiff 2) and held that these define the nature of the suit for fee purposes; what the defendant pleads in defence is irrelevant to that classification.
- The Court observed that plaintiff 2 did not claim beneficial ownership and appeared to be a nominal party; the real dispute concerned who should hold the office of mutwalli (shebait) and charge of the endowed properties.
- On the facts as pleaded the office, according to the plaint, carried no emoluments or material enjoyment. Where an office confers no monetary benefit, the relief to recover the office is not capable of money valuation.
- The Court emphasised that when a suit seeks a declaration of legal character and consequential relief, valuation for Court-fee is ordinarily the valuation stated by the plaintiff in the plaint and the plaintiff has some liberty to fix that valuation; the Court will interfere only if the valuation is arbitrary.
- Distinguishing between a suit to recover an office (or be put in charge of an office/trust) and a suit for actual possession of immovable property, the Court found that a claim for possession of property (or rents/profits) would attract ad valorem valuation, whereas the present claim for an office without emoluments did not.
- The Court considered contrary authorities relied on by the Crown (including Mohammad Ghouse and Parshottamanand Giri) but found them distinguishable on facts (those concerned suits for possession or rents). Crucially, the Court held itself bound by the Division Bench decision in Maulavi Sayeed which it regarded as directly applicable and laying down the correct principle.
- Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the fixed fee paid (Rs. 15) was sufficient and that the trial Judge's revaluation and rejection of the plaint for non-payment were incorrect.
- The concurring Judge (Manohar Lall, J.) reiterated that Court-fees must be assessed on the allegations in the plaint (not on what transpires later), that the suit was one for restoration of an office and not for possession, and that the plaintiff's valuation (referred to as Rs. 4,100 in the concurring judgment) was not arbitrary and therefore acceptable for fee purposes.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed; the trial Judge's order rejecting the plaint for non-payment of ad valorem Court-fees is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the trial Court for hearing in accordance with law.
Additional procedural consequences explicitly stated by the Court:
- The appellant is entitled to costs of the appeal.
- Hearing fee was assessed at three gold mohurs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the plaint is reinstated and the suit will proceed to hearing on the merits in the trial Court; the plaintiff's payment of the fixed fee (Rs. 15) is held sufficient in the circumstances pleaded.
- Precedential effect: the Court treated the Division Bench decision in Maulavi Sayeed v. Tafazul Hussain as binding and applied its principle; the present decision applies that existing authority rather than announcing a new rule. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel precedent beyond applying and following the Patna Division Bench authority.
This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information has been added that does not appear in the opinion text.
Ray, J.:— This is a plff's appeal against an order rejecting the plaint for non-payment of ad valorem Court-fees. The plff. valued the relief in the suit at Rs. 1400/- for the purpose of jurisdiction & paid a fixed fee of Rs. 15/- provided by Sch. 2, Article 17 part 6, Court-fees Act, as the subject-matter of the suit is not capable of being valued in money. The trial Court by its Order No. 52 in title suit No. 14 of 1942 (in the Court of the second Subordinate Judge, Gaya) dated 29-3-44 came to the conclusion that the actual value of the right claimed in the properties can hardly be less than the market value of the lands & any other valuation would be arbitrary. In this view, in consideration of the actual income of the villages in the suit being Rs. 14700/- & odd, he rived the market value of the properties at Rs. 147550/-. Accordingly the plff. was directed to correct the valuation stated in the plaint & to pay court-fees thereon by a fixed date. As no court-fees were paid, the plaint was rejected.
2. In order to determine the question at issue the nature of the reliefs sought or the class to which the present suit belongs has tr be scrutinised. The dispute properties are admittedly endowed to Sri Thakurji (plff. 1) at Ajodhya. There was a dispute as to possession of the said properties as between the plff. 2 & the deft. each claiming to be rightful mutwalli in possession. In a proceeding under Section 145 of the Cr PC, the criminal Court attached the properties under S. 146, of the Code. Thereupon, both the plff. 2 as well as the deft. instituted suits for establishment of their respective title as mutwalli & for possession of the properties. The deft's suit was decreed & the plff's suit was dismissed by virtue of a compromise. Accordingly, the deft, got possession of the properties from the receiver appointed by the criminal Court in pursuance of the order of attachment, already referred to. In the present suit the compromise is impugned as a fraudulent one the plff. claims the following reliefs, namely.
(1) declaration that the plff. is the mutwalli of the endowed properties;
(2) declaration that the plff. is & the deft, is not entitled to remain in charge of the trust estate &
(3) that the deft, be directed to make over charge of the said estate to the plff. 2.
3. It is obvious that plff. 2 does not claim any beneficial ownership in respect of the properties in suit. It is further quite plain that plff. 2 is nominally a party in order to meet the objection regarding what can be called a technical defect in it, as neither by virtue of the previous compromise nor under the decree obtained by the deft, in his suit, already referred to, title of the deity (plff. 1.) was at all challenged. The conflicting claims as between the parties are as to their respective rights to hold charge of the endowment, or, in other words, the endowed properties. In determining the nature of the suit for the purpose of fixation of Court-fees, the allegations made & the reliefs sought in the plaint are the only relevant materials. The defence set up by the deft, does not come into the picture at all in ascertaining the nature of the plff's suit. In substance, the plff's suit is for recovery of the office of shebaitship which, according to him, has been usurped by the deft, under a colourable compromise decree. As the scheme of the endowment, according to the plff's allegations in the plaint, does not provide for any emoluments being attached to the office of mutwalliship, the aforesaid reliefs are not capable of valuation. Reliance is placed by the appellants' learned Counsel on the decision in the case of ‘Maulavi Sayeed v. Shah Tafazul Hussain’, AIR (21) 1934 Patna 647 in which a Division Bench of this Court held:
“Where the subject-matter of the suit is the right to mutwalliship & the office does not carry any salary or any other material enjoyment, it is not capable of monetary valuation & therefore the proper Court-fee is the fixed fee of Rs. 15/- provided by Sch. 2, Article 17, Para 6”.
4. Mr. S.K Mitra appearing for the Crown strenuously urged that the facts of Maulavi Syeed's case are different from the facts of the present case, & therefore, the decision referred to does not apply. No doubt the facts are slightly different in so far as in that case the plff. claimed for recovery of a sum of Rs. 151/- being arrears of rent due from deft. 1 in respect of the house in dispute; but the dispute as between the plff. & deft. 2 each of whom were claiming the mutwalliship in rivalry against the other was of exactly the same description as here. Mr. Mitra wanted to distinguish that the house was in occupation of a third person. It is, however, clear that the dispute in that case was with regard to the right to receive rents & profits of the house which was the waqf property, & the occupier of the house pleaded that he had already been sued for the arrears of rent by deft. 2. At any rate, even if the facts are different, the principle laid down is a correct one, if I may say so with great respect. Reliance, however, is placed by Mr. Mitra on two cases, namely. ‘Mohammad Ghouse In re’, AIR (12) 1925 Mad 804, and ‘Parsottamanand Giri v. Mayanand Giri’, AIR (19) 1932 All 593. The ‘case of Parsottamanand Giri’ can be distinguished on the simple ground that the relief in that case was for recovery of possession of immoveable properties. It appears from the following quotation that the ratio of the decision consisted in the mode of relief, & the learned Judge made a distinction between the case before him & the case of Girdhari Lal referred to at the Bar. The quotation is as follows:
“The case of ‘Girdhari Lal v. Ram Lal’, 21 All 200, was also a suit under S. 539. The plffs. claimed that new superintendents should be appointed for the management of the endowed property & that the property should be taken from the deft. & placed in the possession of the new superintendents. Here again, it was held that the Court-fee was governed by S. 17, Cl. (vi), but the case is distinguishable because the plffs. claimed nothing for themselves personally; they only asked that the trust property should be placed in the possession of the new superintendents whoever they might be. It was not contended that it was a suit for possession of trust property.”
5. On principle where a suit is for declaration of any legal character by the plff. & for consequential relief, the valuation for Court-fee would be the valuation at which the plff. valued the relief. The plff. in such cases has some amount of liberty to put his own valuation on the relief. This liberty cannot be curtailed or in any way diminished so long he does not value the relief arbitrarily. The value of the relief certainly depends upon the value of the benefit that is to be derived from it. Under the circumstances, it is only fundamental that the valuation should weigh according as the quantum of the benefit involved in the relief varies. In this view a relief for taking charge of an office or trust estate must be different from recovery of possession of properties though the latter relief is sought by a trustee. The deft, in this case holds the property by virtue of a compromise. There is no knowing that he would retain his wrongful possession of the properties even after the plff. is declared a mutwalli & is given charge of the trust. The necessity of recovery of actual possession of the properties may arise in case the deft, chooses to hold it adversely notwithstanding the plff's success in the present suit. As at present, however, the relief sought for by the plff. is one which is not capable of any money valuation. I am bound by the Division Bench decision of this Court which I consider, if I may say so with great respect, lays down the correct principle applicable to the facts of this case. I should, therefore, hold that the Court-fee paid is sufficient.
6. In the result, the appeal succeeds & is allowed, the order of the trial Judge rejecting the plaint is set aside & the case is remitted back to the Court below for hearing in accordance with law. The appellant is entitled to costs of this appeal. Hearing fee is assessed at three gold mohurs.
7. Manohar Lall, J.:— I am of the same view. The plff. is required to pay Court fees upon the allegations which he makes in the plaint & not on what transpires after the reading of the written statement. The plffs' case is, as is evident from a perusal of the plaint that the deft. erroneously styled himself as the shebait of the properties belonging to the deity, & that the compromise decree by which the right of the deft. to that office was acknowledged was fraudulent & not binding upon the plff. I am unable to hold that this suit is a suit for recovery of possession, it is merely a suit for being put in charge of an office. Therefore, the plffs. are entitled to put a reasonable valuation upon the relief which he claims in the plaint. I am unable to hold that Rs. 4,100/- is an arbitrary valuation. The plff. must pay Court fee on this valuation.
8. The two cases relied upon by the learned Govt. Advocate do not support him and in any case we are bound by the decision of this Court in ‘Maulavi Sayeed v. Tafazul Hussain, AIR (21) 1934 Pat 647, in which the facts are almost identical.
9. In the case reported in ‘Parshottamanand Giri v. Mayanand Giri’, AIR (19) 1932 All 593, the plff. as the duly elected mahant sought for recovery of possession of the properties which were in the possession of the deft, who was alleged to have lost his title to mahantship & to retain possession of the properties. The suit itself was valued for the purposes of jurisdiction at 2 lacs & odd & for the purposes of Court fee at 1 lac & 60 thousand & the Court fee of Rs. 1750 was paid. Having lost the suit in part he preferred an appeal to the High Court & valued at one lac & 60 thousand, & contended that it was by mistake that an ad valorem Court fee had been paid in the trial Court & the proper’ C.F payable was only Rs. 10/-. The Teamed Judge in overruling the contention of the appellant that he was only asking for such possession as pertains to the office of the mahant & therefore he was not claiming the possession of the property observed that “the suit is for possession of immovable property & that the C.F should be governed by S. 7, Cl. (5).” In this connection it was remarked that the Court fees Act does not make any distinction between a suit for possession as a beneficial owner & a suit for possession as a trustee or as the manager of a religious endowment. The learned Judge then considered the earlier Allahabad cases, Rangoon case & some Madras cases. He relied upon the case of ‘Mahomed Ghouse, In re’, AIR (12) 1925 Mad 804.
10. In that case the facts were that the plff. was suing for a declaration that he was the Sajjadanashin of two durgas & for the possession of the durgas & the properties attached thereto. He alleged in the plaint that he was appointed by the last Sajjada as his successor & he took possession of the durgas & the properties on the death of that Sajjada, but that he was subsequently dispossessed by deft. 1. It was obvious that this was a suit for recovery of possession. The learned Judge distinguished the case of ‘Swaminath Iyer v. A. Ramier’, AIR (12) 1925 Mad 421, in which the facts were that the plffs. had sued for a declaration that they & deft. 1 were the lawfully appointed trustees of a certain temple, & they prayed for a declaration that defts. 2 & 3 should be made to restore the office of the trustee to them & for an injunction restraining them from interfering with the exercise by the plffs. & deft. 1 of their duties as trustees. It was held that the plffs. were not bound to sue for the possession of the temple properties. In my opinion, both these cases relied upon by the learned Govt. Advocate did not take the view contrary to that taken in ‘Maulvi Sayeed v. Tafazul Hussain’, AIR (21) 1934 Pat 647, & even” if these cases took the contrary view, I am bound to follow the Patna decision. I have read the plaint carefully, & I am unable to hold that the plaint can be treated as a suit for restoration of the office of the shebait-ship of the plffs. For these reasons, I agree that the plaint should not have been rejected & the appeal must he allowed.
R.G.D
11. Appeal allowed.
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