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Anant Ram Agrawal Pe... v. Nagarmal Nagarmal Ag...
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (B.N. Sinha, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
These two revision applications arise from a common judgment and order dated 29th May 1985 of the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram in a Criminal Appeal confirming convictions and sentences under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (the Act) passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bhabhua in G.R. Case No. 567 of 1973, Tr. No. 1079 of 1984. Each petitioner had been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years.
The principal factual matrix as stated in the opinion:
- Petitioner Anant Ram Agrawal was a wholesale dealer in foodgrain under license No. 66 of 1971 issued under the Bihar Food-Grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1967.
- The Government of Bihar issued the Bihar Wheat Monopoly Purchase-cum-Levy Procurement Order, 1973 (Order 1973) which, by Clause 4(a), purported to restrict wholesale dealing in wheat to the Government and its agents.
- On 7–8 August 1983, Sri T. Kuzur (A.D.S.O, Bhabhua), Sri G.P. Sharma (P.W.1), the Deputy Magistrate and the Officer-in-charge, Bhabhua Police Station inspected the accused’s premises and seized 145 bags of wheat (about 190 quintals and 50 kg) in the presence of Ramlal Singh (P.W.3) and another person (not examined). A seizure list (Ext-4) was prepared and the bags were left in the accused's custody on obtaining a receipt; a prosecution report (Ext-2) and thereafter an FIR (Ext-3) were lodged and investigation followed.
- Accused Nagarmal Agrawal applied for release of the bags, claiming he had purchased them at an auction (Byapar Mandal Sahyog Samiti, Chenari) and kept them at Anant Ram Agrawal's premises for cleaning as cattle feed.
- Charge-sheet was filed; charges were framed—Anant Ram under section 7 of the Act and Nagarmal under section 8. Both pleaded not guilty and stood trial. They did not deny the recovery of the bags but asserted ownership by Nagarmal and that the wheat was rotten and unfit for human consumption.
- Prosecution examined four witnesses (P.W.1 G.P. Sharma, P.W.3 Ramlal Singh, P.W.2 Krishna Narayan Sharma as a formal witness, and P.W.4 S.I. Paramhans Singh who submitted the charge-sheet).
- The trial court and the appellate court found the charges proved beyond reasonable doubt and convicted/sentenced the petitioners; these convictions were the subject of the present revision applications heard together.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether cognizance and prosecution founded on the Bihar Wheat Monopoly Purchase-cum-Levy Procurement Order, 1973 (Order 1973) could lawfully be taken after the Order had been rescinded by notification S.O. 487 (the opinion references the rescission date as 18th April 1974 and later refers to a notification made on 18th April 1975; the text contains both references).
- Whether Order 1973 qualifies as an "enactment" or "Regulation" within the meaning of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917 (so as to attract the non-obstante saving in section 8 of that Act), or whether it was an executive act not covered by section 8.
- Whether the wheat seized was of the variety defined under Clause 2(3) and Schedule-I of Order 1973, i.e., whether the seized wheat met the specification required to attract the regulatory offence.
- Whether mere discovery/possession of the seized bags in a premises or their belonging to one or the other accused establishes that either accused was carrying on business as a wholesale or retail dealer (i.e., whether evidence of continuity of business existed).
Arguments of the Parties
Accused/Petitioners' Arguments
- The Order 1973 had been rescinded by notification S.O. 487 dated 18th April 1974 (and the opinion also refers to a notification on 18th April 1975 rescinding the Order) and there was no saving clause; cognizance taken on 10.12.1975 was therefore improper as the Order had ceased to be in force.
- The wheat seized was rotten/deteriorated and therefore not of the variety defined in Clause 2(3) and Schedule-I of Order 1973; hence the substantive offence was not made out.
- The seized bags belonged to Nagarmal Agrawal and were kept for cleaning for use as cattle feed; ownership and purpose negate unlawful wholesale dealing by Anant Ram.
- Mere single/solitary transaction or storage of wheat on one occasion does not make a person a dealer; absence of evidence of continuity of sale/purchase/storage meant they could not be held to be dealers.
State's Arguments
- Even after the rescinding notification dated 18th April 1974, action under the Order 1973 survived by virtue of section 8 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917 (relying on clauses (c) and (e) of section 8), which preserves rights, liabilities and legal proceedings despite repeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohanlal Chhapolia v. The State of Bihar (unreported Division Bench, Cr. Misc. No. 1170 of 1968) | Authority holding that a procurement/levy order rescinded by subsequent notification does not continue to operate for initiation of prosecution after rescission (as applied by analogy to the Order 1973). | The court relied on this decision to reinforce its view that Order 1973, being of similar nature to the rescinded Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, did not survive rescission for purposes of initiating cognizance/prosecution after rescission. |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v. Seth Jagmander Das, A.I.R. 1954 683 | When a statute is repealed or comes to an automatic end, prosecutions for acts done during its continuance cannot be commenced after the date of its repeal or expiry because that would amount to enforcement of a repealed or dead act. | The court invoked this Supreme Court principle to support the proposition that taking cognizance after the rescission of Order 1973 would be illegal and would amount to enforcement of a repealed instrument. |
| Manipur Administration v. M. Nila Chandra Singh, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1533 | Principle that a single casual or solitary transaction of sale, purchase or storage does not make a person a dealer; the concept of "business" requires continuity of transactions. | The court applied this principle to conclude that there was no evidence of continuity of business or repeated transactions to classify either accused as a dealer; the isolated instance was insufficient to sustain conviction on that basis. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's legal analysis proceeded in distinct, closely related steps. Each step is summarized below, reflecting only the reasoning contained in the opinion:
-
Applicability of section 8, Bihar & Orissa General Clauses Act, 1917:
- The State argued that rescission did not defeat proceedings because section 8 preserves actions/rights accrued under a repealed enactment (relying on clauses (c) and (e)).
- The court examined statutory definitions in the Act 1917: section 8 applies in the case of an "enactment" (section 4(18) defines "enactment"); "Regulation" is defined under section 4(45) as a Regulation made by the Governor under specific constitutional provisions or by the Central Government under specified pre-Constitution Acts.
- The court found that Order 1973 was issued by the Governor under Section 3 of the (relevant) Act read with Government of India G.S.R. notifications and with prior concurrence of the Central Government. However, the court concluded that the Order was an executive act—not a legislative exercise—and therefore did not attain the status of an "Act" or a "Regulation" as defined in the Act 1917.
- Because Order 1973 was not an enactment within the meaning of the General Clauses Act, section 8 could not operate to save prosecutions initiated after rescission.
- The court reinforced its conclusion by reference to an unreported Division Bench decision (Mohanlal Chhapolia) where a similar procurement order that had been rescinded was treated as not surviving rescission for purposes of prosecution.
-
Legality of cognizance taken after rescission:
- Applying the above statutory analysis, the court held that taking cognizance of the case after the Order had been rescinded was illegal.
- The court invoked the Supreme Court principle from State of Uttar Pradesh v. Seth Jagmander Das (A.I.R.1954 683) that prosecutions begun after repeal/enactment's expiry would amount to enforcing a repealed or dead Act.
-
Whether seized wheat fell within the defined variety/Specification in Order 1973 (Clause 2(3) and Schedule-I):
- The Schedule-I specification requires wheat to be dried, mature grains of particular varieties and to be sweet, clean, wholesome and merchantable, among other particulars.
- Seizure-list (Ext-4) and the evidence of P.W.s 1 and 3 indicated the wheat was deteriorated, damaged and rotten; P.W.3 admitted it was not fit for human consumption.
- The appellate court had discounted P.W.3's statement on the ground that he was not an expert and that his view was personal. The revisional court rejected that approach, observing that no expert evidence was necessary to determine whether the wheat was rotten or damaged and noting that there was no evidence that the wheat was of the variety defined in the Order.
- On the evidence (seizure-list and P.W. admissions), the only permissible conclusion was that the seized wheat was not of the variety required by Order 1973; therefore the substantive ingredient of the regulatory offence under that Order was not established.
-
Ownership and dealer status:
- The seizure-list indicated at the initial stage that the bags of wheat belonged to Nagarmal Agrawal and were being kept for cleaning; the revisional court accepted this statement and saw no reason to disbelieve it.
- Counsel relied on the Supreme Court authority (Manipur Administration v. M. Nila Chandra Singh) for the proposition that a single casual or solitary transaction does not convert a person into a dealer; business implies continuity. The revisional court found there was no evidence of continuity of purchase/sale/storage in the instant case.
- Accordingly, simply because the bags were found in the premises or belonged to one accused, that fact alone did not establish that either accused was carrying on business as a wholesale or retail dealer.
-
Net conclusion drawn from the above strands:
- Because the Order 1973, being an executive instrument, did not survive rescission for the purpose of taking cognizance, and because there was insufficient evidence that the wheat met the Order's defined specification or that either accused was carrying on business as a dealer by way of continuity, the convictions could not be sustained.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
THE TWO REVISION APPLICATIONS ARE ALLOWED; THE JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF THE TWO COURTS BELOW ARE SET ASIDE; THE TWO ACCUSED PETITIONERS ARE ACQUITTED AND THEIR BAIL BONDS ARE DISCHARGED.
Implications / Consequences:
- Direct effect on the parties: The convictions and sentences previously confirmed are quashed; both petitioners are acquitted and discharged from liability under their bail bonds.
- On the legal questions addressed: The court held (within the facts and reasoning set out) that an executive procurement order such as Order 1973 does not qualify as an "Act" or "Regulation" within the meaning of the General Clauses Act for the purpose of section 8's savings; consequently, prosecutions commenced after rescission could not be sustained on that basis.
- The court also concluded, on the evidence in this record, that the wheat seized was not of the variety specified by the Order and that there was no proof of continuity of business to render either accused a dealer—facts decisive in overturning the convictions.
- The opinion does not state that it is creating a new precedent; it relies on statutory interpretation and on existing authority to reach its conclusions. The decision's broader precedential effect is not discussed in the opinion beyond the use of cited authorities.
Note: This summary strictly adheres to, and only reflects, the reasoning and facts set out in the provided opinion. No additional facts or inferences have been introduced.
B.N Sinha, J.:—These two revision applications arise out of a common judgment and order dated 29th of May 1985 passed by the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram in Criminal Appeal confirming the conviction and sentence of chess petitioners under section 7 of the Essential Commodity Act (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act’) passed by the Sub-Divisional magistrate, Bhabhua in G.R Case No. 567 of 1973, Tr. No. 1079 of 1984 by which these two petitioners have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years each. As these two applications arise out of a common judgment, they have been heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment.
2. The petitioner Anant Ram Agrawal admittedly was a wholesale dealer in foodgrain on the alleged date of occurrence under license No. 66 of 1971 issued under Bihar Food-Grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1967 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Licensing Order 1967’). The Government of Bihar issued Bihar Wheat Monopoly Purchase-cum-Levy Procurement Order, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Order 1973) and by Clause 4(a) of that Order, the Government itself assumed the trade of wholesale dealer in wheat and to that extent the provisions of the licensing Order 1967 was modified and no person other than the Government and the Govt. Agents was to act as a wholesale dealer in respect of wheat. On the 7th and 8th of August 1983 Sri T. Kuzur, A.D.S.O, Bhabhua alongwith Sri G.P Sharma (P.W 1), Deputy Magistrate, Bhabhua and the Officer in-charge, Bhabhua Police Station inspected the business premises of the accused petitioners and he recovered 145 bags of wheat weighing about 190 quintals and 50 Kg. in presence of Ramlal Singh (P.W 3) and one Rajeshwar Prasad Dwivedi (not examined) and prepared a seizure-list (ext-4) as it was found that he has violated the provisions of Licensing Order 1967. These seized bags were left in the custody of this accused petitioner on obtaining a proper receipt from him and Sri T. Kuzur submitted prosecution report (Ext. 2) against this petitioner to the Sub-divisional Officer, Bhabhua who referred the same to the Police for institution of a case against this petitioner.
3. A formal first information report (Ext. 3) was drawn on the basis of the prosecution report (Ext. 2) at Bhabhua Police Station and the investigation proceeded.
4. During the course of investigation, the accused petitioner Nagarmal Agrawal filed application before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bhabhua for the release of those bags of wheat on the ground that he had purchased those bags from Byapar Mandal Sahyog Samiti, Chenari situated in the district of Rohtas in auction sale and kept the same in the premises of the accused petitioner for the purpose of cleaning the impurity thereof so as to use it as cattle feed.
5. The Police, after completing investigation, submitted charge-sheet against both the accused petitioners on the basis of which cognizance of the case was taken against these accused petitioners and thereafter the trial proceeded.
6. At the trial charge under section 7 of the Act was framed against the accused-petitioner Anant Ram Agrawal and under section 8 of the Act against accused-petitioner Nagarmal Agrawal.
7. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. The accused did not deny the recovery of those bags of wheat from the business premises of the accused-petitioner Anant Ram Agrawal. Their defence was that those bags belong to the accused-petitioner Nagarmal @ Nagarmal Agrawal and they contained rotten wheat not fit for human consumption which had been purchased by the accused petitioner Nagarmal Agrawal in auction sale at Chenari for cattle feed.
8. The prosecution examined altogether 4 witnesses to prove its case. P.W 1 G.P Sharma had accompanied the raiding party at the time of inspection of the business premises of accused-petitioner Anant Ram Agrawal and in his presence those bags of wheat had been recovered from and seized and a seizure list was prepared in respect thereof. P.W 3 Ramlal Singh is a witness on search and seizure, P.W 2 Krishna Narayan Sharma, is a formal witness and P.W 4 S.I Paramhans Singh had simply submitted charge-sheet in the case.
9. The two courts below, after taking into consideration the oral as well as documentary evidence produced on behalf of the prosecution and the facts and circumstances of the case found that the charges framed against the petitioners were established beyond reasosnable doubt.
10. The learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the judgment of the courts below firstly on the ground that the Order 1973 was rescinded by the State Government by notification S.O 487 dated 18th of April 1974 and the cognizance of the case against these accused petitioners was taken on 10.12.1975 i.e much after the Order 1973 had ceased to be in force because in notification made on 18th of April, 1975 rescinding the Order 1973 there was no saving clause.
11. The learned State Counsel on the other hand has submitted that even after notification dated 18th of April 1974, the action taken under the Order 1973 survived under section 8 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act 1917 (hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Act 1917’) and he has placed reliance on Clauses (c) & (e) of that section.
12. Section 8 of the Act 1917 reads as follows:
“Effect of repeal.—Where any Bihar and Orissa Act ‘(or Bihar Act) repeals any enactment hitherto made, or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not,—
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the court at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been passed.”
13. Section 8 of the Act 1917 is applicable in case of enactment. Section 4(18) of the Act 1917 defines enactment as follows:
14. Section 4(18):
“‘enactment’ shall include a Regulation (as hereinafter defined) any Regulation of the Bengal Code, and shall also include any provision contained in any Act or in any such Regulation as aforesaid.”
15. The Order 1973 with no stretch of imagination can be said to be either an Act or Regulation which has been defined under section 4(45) of the Act 1917 which reads as follows:
16. Section 4(45):
“‘Regulation’ shall mean a Regulation made by the Governor under Sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 5 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution and shall include a Regulation made by the Central Government under the Government of India Act 1870 or the Government of India Act 1915 or the Government of India Act 1935 or by the President under article 243 of the Constitution;”
17. The Order 1973 was issued by the Governor of Bihar in exercise of the powers conferred on him by Section 3 of the Act read with orders of the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture (Deptt. of Food) No. G.S.R 316(E) dated 20th of June 1972, G.S.R 152(E) dated 25th of October 1972 and G.S.R 168(E) dated 13th of March 1973 and with prior concurrence of the Central Government. The Order was not issued by the Governor in exercise of his legislative powers but was an executive act and hence it cannot have the status of an Act or Regulation. Hence the provisions of Order 1973 cannot be said to continue even after it was rescinded.
18. I am fortified in my view by unreported Division Bench decision of this Court in Cr. Miscellaneous No. 1170 of 1968 (Mohanlal Chhapolia v. The State of Bihar) in which similar view has been taken with regard to the Bihar Rice Procurement (Levy) Order which was rescinded by a subsequent notification.
19. Hence, cognizance of the case after the Order 1973 had been rescinded was illegal. Principle applicable in this case will be the same as observed in case of Statute which has been repealed or which comes to an automatic end by efflux of time. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Seth Jagmander Das, A.I.R 1954 page 683 that when a Statute is repealed or comes to an automatic end by efflux of time, do prosecution for acts done during the continuance of the repealed or expired Act can be commenced after the date of its repeal or expiry because that would amount to the enforcement of a repealed or a dead act.
20. Secondly, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioners that the prosecution against these accused-petitioners can be initiated when the wheat said to have been found in the business premises of the accused-petitioner Anant Ram Agrawal was of the variety as defined in Clause 2(3) of the Order 1973. The learned Counsel for the accused-petitioners has placed reliance on the definition Clause 2(3) of the Order 1973 according to which wheat means wheat of different varieties as described in Schedule-I.
21. Schedule-I of the Order 1973 reads as follows:
Schedule-I:
“Specification for Indigenous red, dara, other Mexican varieties and superior (Indigenous farm variety) of wheat
Wheat shall—
(a) be the dried mature grains of indigenous red, dara, other mexican and superior (indige nous farm variety) viz., Triticum compactum and Tritlcum Durum);
(b) have natural size, shape and colour;
(c) be sweet, clean, wholesome and free from moulds, weavils (living) obnoxious smell, discolouration, admixture of deleterious substance and all other impurities except to the extent indicated in table below;
(d) be an merchantable condition; and
(e) not have any admixture of pesticide, and any obnoxious deleterious-toxic material.”
22. In the present case the seizure-list (Ext-4) indicates that wheat which was recovered from the Arhat of the accused-petitioner Anant Ram Agrawal was deteriorated wheat. Both, P.Ws 1 and 3 have admitted in their cross-examination that wheat in question was damaged and rotten, P.W 3 further admits that it was not fit for human consumption.
23. This point was taken on behalf of accused petitioners before the appellate court but the appellate court did not accept this argument saying that P.W 3 was not an expert on the point and his evidence that it was not fit for human consumption was purely his personal opinion which may differ from person to person. But the learned appellate court lost sight of the fact that no expertised knowledge was required for saying if that wheat was rotten and damaged or not. Moreover, there is no evidence on the record that the wheat in question was of the variety as defined under Order 1978. On the basis of the seizure list and evidence of P.Ws 1 and 3 the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the wheat seized was not of the variety as required under the provisions of the Order 1973. Hence there is substance in the submission made on behalf of the accused-petitioners that the accused-petitioners did not commit any offence as the wheat in the stock of the accused-petitioner Anant Ram Agrawal was not of the variety as defined under Order 1973.
24. According to the defence taken on behalf of accused-petitioner Anant Ram Agrawal, the bags of wheat belonged to the other accused-petitioner, namely, Nagarmal Agrawal who had kept those bags of wheat in his business premises for being cleaned. This fact was stated as it appears from the seizure-list (Ext-4) at the very initial stage when his ‘business ??? was being searched and those bags of ??? were ???. Hence I see no reason to disbelieve this plea. In this view of the matter, the defence taken by Anant Ram Agrawal ought not to have been rejected by the two courts below.
25. Lastly, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the accused petitioners that simply on the ground that those bags of wheat were found in the business premises of the accused-petitioner Anant Ram Agrawal or that those bags of wheat belonged to accused-petitioner Nagarmal Agrawal, it cannot be said that either of them were carrying business either as a wholesale dealer or a retail dealer in absence of evidence that they were carrying on business of purchase, sale or storage.
26. The learned counsel for the accused-petitioners in support of his argument has placed reliance on the principles decided in A.I.R 1964 S.C 1533 (Manipur Administration v. M. Nila Chandra Singh) in which a similar point was for decision before the Supreme Court and it has been laid down that it is not single casual or solitary transaction of sale, purchase or storage that would make a person a dealer and that the concept of business in the context must necessarily postulate continuity of transaction.
27. I find substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioners. There is no evidence in the instant case that except for that single instance either of the accused petitioners were found carrying on business of storage of wheat.
28. It is apparent from the discussions made above that the conviction and sentence passed against the accused-petitioners cannot be sustained.
29. I accordingly allow the 2 revision applications and set aside the judgment and order of the two courts below. These two accused petitioners stand acquitted of the charges framed against them and they are discharged of the liability of their bail bonds.
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