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Akshaya Kumar Parida... v. Union Of India & Oth...
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Larger Bench Reference)
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter was placed before a Larger Bench because two coordinate Division Benches of the same High Court expressed divergent views in the cases of Smt. Kanchana Badaseth v. Union of India (2007 (II) OLR 365) and Basantilata Dash v. Union of India (2007 (II) OLR 297). The reference did not formulate a detailed question in express terms, but it was implicit that the Larger Bench had to decide whether the Central Administrative Tribunal (constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985) has jurisdiction to condone delay where an application for review is filed after the thirty-day period prescribed by the Tribunal's procedure.
A Division Bench referred the matter to the Larger Bench. The Larger Bench heard Mr. K. Mohanty for the petitioners and Mr. A.K. Bose, the learned Assistant Solicitor General, for the opposite parties. After considering statutory provisions, rules and precedents, the Larger Bench answered the reference, overruled earlier Division Bench decisions (Smt. Kanchana Badaseth and Rajayya Bisoi), and directed that the matter be placed before the assigned Bench.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal, constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, has jurisdiction to condone the delay in entertaining an application for review that is filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by its rules (Rule 17(1) — thirty days)?
- Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (which permits extension of prescribed periods where the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause), is applicable to an application for condonation of delay before the Tribunal and thus can be invoked despite Rule 17(1) of the Tribunal's Rules prescribing a thirty-day limit?
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Smt. Kanchana Badaseth v. Union of India, 2007 (II) OLR 365 | Held that in the absence of any provision empowering the Tribunal to condone delay, review applications filed beyond thirty days should be rejected (relied on K. Ajit Babu and Rajayya Bisoi). | The Larger Bench examined and concluded that this decision was not the correct enunciation of law and overruled it (paras 1, 21, 23, 48). |
| Basantilata Dash v. Union of India, 2007 (II) OLR 297 | A contrary view to Smt. Kanchana Badaseth (i.e., a view permitting condonation in some form). | Noted as the contrary Division Bench decision which, along with the other, led to the reference (para 1). The Larger Bench's ultimate holding aligns with permitting condonation under Section 5. |
| K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 | Discussed availability of review — right of review ordinarily available only to parties and within period and grounds mentioned in Order 47 CPC. | The Larger Bench observed that K. Ajit Babu dealt with maintainability and the availability of review to parties and the grounds under Order 47; it clarified that K. Ajit Babu cannot be read as excluding the Tribunal's power to entertain review applications filed beyond time when accompanied by an application under Section 5 Limitation Act (para 46). |
| Rajayya Bisoi v. Union of India, 96 (2003) CLT 230 | Division Bench relied upon in Smt. Kanchana Badaseth as supporting rejection of late review applications. | The Larger Bench held that Rajayya Bisoi was not the correct law and overruled it along with Smt. Kanchana Badaseth (para 23). |
| Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 1975 | Interpreted Section 22 of Recovery of Debts Act (pari materia with Section 22(3) of the Administrative Tribunals Act): tribunal can go beyond Code of Civil Procedure subject only to principles of natural justice. | Used as persuasive authority to show that where statute confers court-like powers, the Tribunal can act beyond strict CPC procedure and exercise ancillary powers necessary to make statutory powers efficacious (para 11). |
| Union of India v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd., 1991 SCC (L&S) 208 | Principle that a tribunal functions as a court within its jurisdiction and possesses incidental and ancillary powers necessary to make statutory powers effective. | Cited to support the proposition that a tribunal has implied/incidental powers necessary to effectuate its statutory functions (para 27–28). |
| Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation Of Delhi, AIR 1976 SC 105 | Interpreted Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 29(2) makes Sections 4 to 24 (including Section 5) applicable to special/local laws unless expressly excluded. | Relied upon to demonstrate that the 1963 Limitation Act specifically made Section 5 available to applications governed by special/local laws unless such laws explicitly exclude it (para 31–32). |
| Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5 | Held that where an appellate authority acts as a court and the special law prescribes a period of limitation different from the Limitation Act Schedule, Sections 4–24 of the Limitation Act apply (absent express exclusion). | The Larger Bench relied on Mukri Gopalan to conclude Rule 17 (a special provision prescribing a thirty-day period) attracts Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and therefore Section 5 can be invoked before the Tribunal (paras 16, 20). |
| Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd (cited in Mukri Gopalan) | Test for whether an authority constitutes a court (attributes and trappings of a court). | Cited within Mukri Gopalan (as reproduced in the opinion) to show the criteria for treating an authority as a court; used to support applying Sections 4–24 of the Limitation Act (para 34–37). |
| Brajnandan Singh v. Jyoti Narain (cited in Mukri Gopalan) | Observed characteristics that distinguish a court from other tribunals (finality, authoritativeness of decision). | Referenced in the Mukri Gopalan exposition reproduced by the Larger Bench to explain when an authority is a court for Limitation Act purposes (para 34–35). |
| Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State Of Punjab (cited in Mukri Gopalan) | Described attributes distinguishing a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal (duty to decide in judicial manner, right to be heard). | Referred to in the Mukri Gopalan discussion to reinforce the conclusion that certain authorities function as courts and thus attract Limitation Act machinery (para 36–37). |
| Kaushalya Rani's case, AIR 1964 SC 260 (1964 (1) Crl. LJ 152) | Earlier decision under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 where Section 5 was held excluded by prior Section 29(2) under the old Act. | Cited in the discussion of Mangu Ram to explain the change in law under the Limitation Act, 1963 (para 31–32). The Larger Bench noted the 1963 Act differs and now makes Section 5 generally available unless expressly excluded. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeds in a sequence of statutory interpretation and precedent application. The principal steps of analysis, as stated in the opinion, are:
- Identify the core statutory provisions: the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Sections 19, 21(3) and 22) and the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 (Rule 17(1) prescribing a thirty-day limit for review applications) (paras 5–6).
- Pose the controlling question: whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (which permits extension of prescribed periods where sufficient cause is shown) is available to the Tribunal to condone delay in review applications filed beyond thirty days (paras 7–9).
- Examine Section 22(3) of the Administrative Tribunals Act and conclude that the Tribunal, for discharging its functions, has the same powers as a civil court in respect of matters including reviewing its decisions (clause (f)); therefore, while entertaining an application for review the Tribunal "acts as a Civil Court" and is conferred powers akin to a civil court (para 10).
- Rely on precedent (Industrial Credit & Investment Corp. v. Grapco) to support the proposition that where a statute confers court-like powers on a tribunal, the tribunal may travel beyond strict CPC procedure subject only to principles of natural justice (para 11).
- Interpret Section 5 of the Limitation Act to mean that prescribed periods can be extended where sufficient cause is shown (para 12).
- Apply Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act (savings clause): where a special/local law prescribes a different period of limitation, Sections 4–24 of the Limitation Act (which include Section 5) apply unless expressly excluded by the special/local law (paras 19–23, 29–33). The Court relied particularly on Mukri Gopalan and Mangu Ram as authoritative expositions that, under the 1963 Limitation Act, Section 5 is generally applicable to special/local laws unless there is express exclusion (paras 15–16, 31–34).
- Confront the textual force of Rule 17 (the thirty-day requirement). The Court acknowledges the mandatory language of Rule 17, but reasons that peremptory time limits in a special law do not, by themselves, suffice to exclude Section 5. In the absence of an express exclusion of Section 5 from either Section 22 of the Act or Rule 17 of the Rules, the Limitation Act's Section 5 remains available (paras 14, 29–31, 42–45).
- Distinguish and reconcile prior decisions: while K. Ajit Babu addressed the maintainability of a Section 19 application and the availability of review only to parties and on Order 47 grounds, it did not hold that the Tribunal cannot entertain a review filed beyond the prescribed period if accompanied by a Section 5 condonation application (para 46).
- Conclude that where a review application is filed after thirty days but is accompanied by a Section 5 application and the applicant satisfies the Tribunal of sufficient cause, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to condone the delay (paras 22, 45–47).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court held that the Central Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction to condone the delay in entertaining an application for review filed beyond the period prescribed by Rule 17(1) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987, if such review application is accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the prescribed period. Accordingly, the Court overruled the decisions in Smt. Kanchana Badaseth and Rajayya Bisoi as incorrect enunciations of law (paras 22–23, 45).
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties and practice before the Tribunal: Review applications filed beyond thirty days will not be automatically rejected if accompanied by a Section 5 Limitation Act application and the applicant can demonstrate sufficient cause; the Tribunal may condone the delay and entertain the review.
- Precedential consequence within the High Court: Two earlier Division Bench decisions (Smt. Kanchana Badaseth and Rajayya Bisoi) were expressly overruled by this Larger Bench, clarifying that Rule 17 does not, by itself and in the absence of express exclusion, displace Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
- Statutory interpretation: The decision affirms the application of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and the principle that Sections 4–24 (including Section 5) apply to special/local laws prescribing different limitation periods unless those laws expressly exclude them.
- Administrative Tribunals' powers: The opinion reinforces that the Tribunal, acting under Section 22, possesses powers akin to a civil court (including review) and may invoke ancillary or incidental powers to make its statutory jurisdiction effective (paras 10–11, 27–29).
Disposition and Formal Orders
The reference was answered in the terms set out above. The Registry was directed to place the matter before the assigned Bench. The opinion records that the Chief Justice and C.R. Dash, J., agreed with the judgment (paras 49–53).
Dr. A.K Rath, J. Divergent views expressed by two coordinate Benches of this Court in the cases of Smt. Kanchana Badaseth v. Union of India, 2007 (II) OLR 365 and Basantilata Dash v. Union of India, 2007 (II) OLR 297 necessitated another Division Bench to refer the matter to the larger Bench. Therefore, the matter has been placed before the Larger Bench.
2. In Smt. Kanchana Badaseth (supra), a Division Bench of this Court held that in absence of any provision empowering the Tribunal to condone the delay, review application filed beyond thirty days should be rejected. While arriving at the conclusion, the Bench relied upon a decision of the apex Court in the case of K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 473 and another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajayya Bisoi v. Union of India, 96 (2003) CLT 230. But then, a contrary view was taken in Basantilata Dash (supra).
3. The order of reference made in the instant case by the Division Bench does not formulate the question, but it is implicit in that, we have to answer whether the Central Administrative Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has jurisdiction to condone the delay in the event an application for review is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation?
4. We have heard Mr. K. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. A.K Bose, learned Asst. Solicitor General for the opposite parties.
5. Before we proceed, we deem it necessary to note the relevant provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) with regard to the jurisdiction, power and authority of the Tribunal. Section 19 of the Act postulates that subject to the other provisions of the Act, a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal may make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievance. Section 21 of the Act deals with limitation in filing the original application. Sub-section (3) of Section 21 confers power on the Tribunal to condone the delay in filing the original application, if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he was prevented by sufficient cause in not filing the application within the period of limitation prescribed in the Act. Section 22 of the Act has a direct bearing on the issue in question. The same is quoted hereunder;
“22. Procedure and powers of Tribunals.-(1) A Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules made by the Central Government, the Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure including the fixing of places and times of its inquiry and deciding whether to sit in public or in private.
(2) A Tribunal shall decide every application made to it as expeditiously as possible and ordinarily every application shall be decided on a perusal of documents and written representations and [after hearing such oral arguments as may be advanced].
3. A Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of [discharging its functions under this Act], the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:-
a. summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
b. requiring the discovery and production of documents;
c. receiving evidence of affidavits;
d. subject to the provisions of sections 123 and 124 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) requisitioning any public record or document or copy of such record or document from any office;
e. issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;
f. reviewing its decisions;
g. dismissing a representation for default or deciding it ex parte;
h. setting aside any order of dismissal of any representation for default or any order passed by it ex parte; and i. any other matter which may be prescribed by the Central Government.”
6. Rule 17(1) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) provides that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed.
7. The question thus arises whether by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Tribunal can condone the delay, if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he was prevented by sufficient cause in not preferring the application for review within the prescribed period of limitation?
8. The Limitation Act, 1963 is the general legislation in the law of limitation. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides thus:
“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.-Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”
9. Section 29 of the Limitation Act is the savings clause. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act is quoted hereunder:
“29. Savings.- (1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act provides that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to any Act which prescribes a special period of limitation, unless they are expressly excluded by that special law.
10. On a cursory perusal of Section 22 of the Act it is vivid and luminescent that the Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. For the purpose of discharging its functions under the Act, the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure while trying a suit in respect of the matter enumerated in clause (f) of sub-section (3) of Section 22 of the Act. The Tribunal while entertaining an application for review, is conferred with the same power as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that is to say for the purpose of entertaining an application for review, the Tribunal in our view acts as a Civil Court and is conferred to exercise all powers as are vested in a Civil Court.
11. In Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Grapco Industries Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 1975, the apex Court, while dealing with Section 22 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 which is pari materia with the Section 22(3) of the Act, held that Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 also confers power on the Tribunal to travel beyond the Code of Civil Procedure and only fetter that is put on its power is to observe the principles of natural justice.
12. On a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it is evident that the prescribed period of limitation can be extended if Court is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the period of limitation.
13. The Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd., 1991 SCC (L&S) 208 while dealing with the power and function of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, held as follows:
“The Tribunal functions as a court within the limits of its jurisdiction. It has all the powers conferred expressly by the statute. Furthermore, being a judicial body, it has all those incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory powers. Certain powers are recognized as incidental and ancillary, not because they are inherent in the Tribunal, nor because its jurisdiction is plenary, but because it is the legislative intent that the power which is expressly granted in the assigned field of jurisdiction is efficaciously and meaningfully exercised. The powers of the Tribunal are no doubt limited. Its area of jurisdiction is clearly defined, but within the bounds of its jurisdiction, it has all the powers expressly and impliedly granted. The implied grant is, of course, limited by the express grant and, therefore, it can only be such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for doing all such acts or employing all such means as are reasonably necessary to make the grant effective. As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th edn.) “where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution”.
14. The provision regarding period of limitation provided in Rule 17 howsoever peremptory or imperative the language may be, is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
It is true that the language of Rule 17 is mandatory and compulsive, in that, it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for review shall be entertained unless it is filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of copy of the order sought to be reviewed. But the same is the language of every provision prescribing a period of limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of Section of the Act in order that the application may be entertained despite such bar.
15. While dealing with the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the application for special leave under Section 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the apex Court in the case of Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation Of Delhi, AIR 1976 SC 105, held as follows:
“7. There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963 in so far as the provision contained in Section 29, sub-section (2) is concerned. Whereas under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 Section 29, sub-section (2), cl.(b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than those contained in Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22, shall not apply and, therefore, the applicability of Section 5 was in clear and specific terms excluded. Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 enacts in so many terms that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, which would include Section 5, shall apply in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. S.29, sub-s (2), cl.(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 specifically excluded the applicability of Section 5, while Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in clear and unambiguous terms provides for the applicability of Section 5 and the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Rani's case can, therefore, have no application in cases governed by the Limitaton Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by reason of Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963 Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29, sub-section (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5, that it would stand displaced. Here, as pointed out by this Court in Kaushalya Rani's case AIR 1964 SC 260 = (1964 (1) Crl. LJ 152) the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-section (4) of Section 417 is a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5. It is true that the language of subsection (4) of Section 417 is mandatory and compulsive, in that it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal. But that would be the language of every provision prescribing a period of limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of Section 5 in order that, the application may be entertained despite such bar. Mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that in a case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 would be available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-section (4) of Section 417, the application would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it. The High Court, in the present case, did not, therefore, act without jurisdiction in holding that the application preferred by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi was not barred by the time limit of sixty days laid down in subsection (4) of Section 417 since the Municipal Corporation of Delhi had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within such time limit. The order granting special leave was in the circumstances not an order outside the power of the High Court.”
16. The apex Court in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker., (1995) 5 SCC 5 examined the question, whether the provision of the Limitation Act will apply to the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The apex Court held that the appellate authority under the Kerala Act acts as a court and since the Act prescribes a period of limitation, which is different from the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, and there is no express exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, those sections shall be applicable to the Kerala Act. In paragraph-8 of the report, it is held as follows:
“8. Once it is held that the appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of the Rent Act is not a persona designata, it becomes obvious that it functions as a court. In the present case all the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Rent Act have been extended are constituted as appellate authorities under Section 18 by the Government notification noted earlier. These District Judges have been conferred the powers of the appellate authorities. It becomes therefore, obvious that while adjudicating upon the dispute between the landlord and tenant and while deciding the question whether the Rent Control Court's order is justified or not such appellate authorities would be functioning as courts. The test for determining whether the authority is functioning as a court or not has been laid down by a series of decisions of this Court. We may refer to one of them, in the case of Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd. In that case this Court was concerned with the question whether the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies functioning under Section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 was a court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. While answering the question in the affirmative, a Division Bench of this Court speaking through Mitter, J. placed reliance amongst others on the observations found in the case of Brajnandan Singh v. Jyoti Narain wherein it was observed as under.
“It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.”
Reliance was also placed on another decision of this Court in the case of Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State Of Punjab . Following observations found (at SCR p.1018) therein were pressed in service:
“It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a court.”
When the aforesaid well settled tests for deciding whether an authority is a court or not are applied to the powers and functions of the appellate authority constituted under Section 18 of the Rent Act, it becomes obvious that all the aforesaid essential trappings to constitute such an authority as a court are found to be present. In fact, Mr. Nariman, learned counsel for respondent also fairly stated that these appellate authorities would be courts and would not be persona designate. But in his submission as they are not civil courts constituted and functioning under the Civil Procedure Code as such, they are outside the sweep of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It is therefore, necessary for us to turn to the aforesaid provision of the Limitation Act. It reads as under:
“29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision.
(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application. (ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act.”
17. The Act is a special law. Rule 17 of the Rules provides for filing of review application, which is different from the period prescribed by the Schedule as the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The Schedule to the Limitation Act does not contemplate any period of limitation for filing a review application before the Tribunal.
18. Neither Section 22 of the Act nor Rule 17 of the Rules contain any express rider on the power of the Tribunal to entertain an application for review after the expiry of the prescribed period of thirty days. The legislature has not excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Rule 17 of the Rules.
19. In view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, we have to examine whether Rule 17 of the Rules satisfies the twin conditions enumerated above for attracting the application of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
20. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the apex Court in the case of Mukri Gopalan (supra), a situation wherein a period of limitation is prescribed by a special or local law for an application of review and for which no provision is made in the Schedule to the Act, the second condition for attracting Section 29(2) of the Act is attracted. From the enunciation of law laid down in Mukri Gopalan (supra), it must be held that in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain the application for condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Rule 17 of the Rules does not take away the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain and dispose of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, since applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been expressly excluded thereby.
21. Before parting with the case, we would like to observe that in Smt. Kanchana Badaseth (supra), the Bench relied upon a decision of the apex Court in the case of K. Ajit Babu (supra). In K. Ajit Babu (supra), the short question arose for consideration was whether the application filed by the appellants under Section 19 of the Act was maintainable. The apex Court held that often in service matters the judgments rendered either by the Tribunal or by the Court also affect other persons, who are not parties to the cases. In that context, the apex Court held that ordinarily, right of review is available only to those who are party to a case. It was further held that right of review is available if such an application is filed within the period of limitation on the grounds mentioned in Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus K. Ajit Babu (supra) cannot be understood as laying a law that the Tribunal is dehors of its power in entertaining an application for review filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, if the same is accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
22. The logical sequitur on the analysis made in the preceding paragraphs is that neither Section 22 of the Act nor Rule 17 of the Rules expressly excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the event an application for review is filed beyond the period of limitation along with an application for condonation of delay and the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not preferring an application within the time, the Tribunal can condone the delay.
23. Thus we hold that the decisions in Smt. Kanchana Badaseth (supra) and Rajayya Bisoi (supra) are not the correct enunciation of law. Accordingly, the same are overruled.
24. The reference is answered accordingly. The Registry is directed to place the matter before the assigned Bench.
Chief Justice:
I agree.
C.R Dash, J.
I agree.
Rule 17 of the RulesAlert