Collector, Cuttack v. Bhima Sahu And Others

1. The short question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the decree-holder-opposite parties are entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,00,741.50 in Execution Case No. 191 of 1983 pending in the court of Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Cuttack (Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Cuttack). The Collector, Cuttack, the judgment-debtor has filed this revision petition assailing the order dated 19-6-89 dismissing the Misc. Case No. 262 of 1989, filed by the Collector, Cuttack under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the petitioner is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1,09,741.50 as claimed by the opposite parties towards higher rate of solatium interest and additional market value under the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (for short ‘L.A Act’).

2. The relevant facts of the case leading to the present proceeding may be stated thus:

Ac. 0.64 decimals of land in village Pandara was acquired by the notification dated 20-5-1964 issued under Section 4(1) of the L.A Act for the purpose of construction of Engineering Research Institute at Pandara. On 1-9-70 and 26-8-71 the Land Acquisition Collector, Civil, Cuttack made two separate awards in L.A Misc. Case No. 151 of 1965-1966 for Rs. 7,360.00 and Rs. 2,288.95 in favour of the opposite parties. The amount under the awards included 6% interest and 15% solatium over and above the market value of the acquired land. On a reference under Section 18 of the L.A Act the learned Subordinate Judge by his judgment dated 25-4-77 in L.A Case No. 55 of 1977 enhanced the market value of the acquired land from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 43,000/- per acre. Against the said judgment the Collector, Cuttack filed First Appeal No. 261 of 1977 in this Court which was disposed of on 2-4-79 by an order of remand. During the pendency of the aforesaid First Appeal the opposite parties filed Execution Case No. 147 of 1977 for execution of the award. In pursuance of the order passed by this Court in the First Appeal, the petitioner deposited the entire claim amount of Rs. 42,846.00 in the said execution case vide Treasury Challan No. 306 dated 16-12-77. After remand the Subordinate Judge again awarded compensation and the First Appeal No. 357/1980 filed by the Collector, Cuttack against the said award was disposed of by this Court along with a batch of similar cases by a common judgment rendered on 26-2-1982 in which the market value of the acquired land was reduced. The operative portion of the judgment reads as follows:

“Keeping the pattern of the evidence in view and the several aspects taken note of above, we are inclined to think that the valuation of Rs. 45,000/- and Rs. 50,000/- per acre for the two classifications of land made by the learned Subordinate Judge should be set aside and as against Rs. 43,000/- per acre the value of Rs. 40,000/- per acre should be fixed and in respect of other lands for which compensation has been fixed at Rs. 50,000/- per acre, the earlier determination of Rs. 40,000/- per acre should be adequate. Over and above this amount, the claimants should be entitled to statutory solatium of 15% and interest of 6% on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date of dispossession till payment. In many cases, a part of the compensation amount has already been paid. The said payment should be deducted. The learned Subordinate Judge is directed to revise his decree on the aforesaid principle.”

After disposal of first appeal on 25-2-1982, opposite parties filed Execution Case No. 191 of 1983 claiming a further sum of Rs. 6610/- and by a subsequent amendment added further a claim of interest and solatium at the enhanced rate as provided in L.A Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. The petitioner has already deposited a sum of Rs. 6610/- in the said execution case.

3. In the Execution Case No. 191 of 1982, the petitioner judgment-debtor filed an application contending inter alia that since First Appeal No. 357 of 1980 was finally decided on 25-2-1982, i.e prior to the introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the Parliament and since the amount under execution has already been paid the execution case is liable to be dismissed on full satisfaction. The said application was rejected by the order dated 19-6-1989 and liability for additional further amount of Rs. 1,09,741.50 was saddled on the petitioner. Hence the grievance.

4. The thrust of submission of the learned Govt. Advocate appearing for the petitioner was that in this case the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer as well as by the Subordinate Judge was prior to 30-4-1982 and therefore the claimant decree-holders were not entitled to the benefit of extra higher rate of solatium and interest under the provisions of L.A (Amendment) Act, 68 of 1984. Even so, submitted the learned Govt. Advocate, a sum of Rs. 6610/- claimed by the decree-holders has already been deposited in the execution case. In the circumstances, the petitioner is not liable to pay any further sum to the opposite parties and the execution case should have been dismissed on full satisfaction.

Sri D.K Das, appearing for the opposite parties on the other hand submitted that the learned Subordinate Judge rightly negatived the plea of the petitioner for dismissal of the execution case and rightly held that further sum of Rs. 1,09,741.50 should be paid by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holders under the provision of the Amendment Act.

5. On the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties the question formulated earlier arises for determination. The Five Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by L.Rs, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1933 ruled that the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given, is confined to an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30 April, 1982 (date of introduction of Bill) and 24 September, 1984 (date of its passing). The Five Judge Bench while overruling its earlier decisions of the Court reported in AIR 1985 SC 576 (K. Kamalajammanniavaru (dead) by L.Rs v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer) and AIR 1987 SC 768, State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh ruled (at pp. 1947-48 of AIR):

“The question is: What is the meaning of the words ‘or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court on appeal against any such award’? Are they limited, as contended by the appellants, to appeals against an award of the Collector or the Court made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984, or do they include also, as contended by the respondents, appeals disposed of between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 even though arising out of awards of the Collector or the Court made before 30 April, 1982. We are of opinion that the interpretation placed by the appellants should be preferred over that suggested by the respondents. Parliament has identified the appeal before the High Court and the appeal before the Supreme Court by describing it as an appeal against ‘any such award’. The submission on behalf of the respondents is that the words ‘any such award’ mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and carry no greater limiting sense; and that in this context, upon the language of S. 20(2), the order in appeal is an appellate order made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 — in which case the related award of the Collector or of the Court may have been made before 30 April, 1982. To our mind, the words ‘any such award’ cannot bear the broad meaning suggested by learned Counsel for the respondents. No such words of description by way of identifying the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court were necessary. Plainly, having regard to the existing hierarchical structure of fora (forum?) contemplated in the parent. At these appellate orders could only be orders arising in appeal against the award of the Collector or of the Court. The words ‘any such award’ are intended to have deeper significance, and in the context in which those words appear in S. 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or Court between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. In other words S. 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the benefits of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984 or to appeals against such award decided by the High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September, 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the award by the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984. We find ourselves in agreements with the conclusion reached by this Court in K. Kavalajammannivaru (dead) by L.Rs v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1985 SC 576 (supra), and find ourselves unable to agree with the view taken in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 1985 SC 1576 (supra). The expanded meaning given to S. 30(2) in the latter case does not, in our opinion, flow reasonably from the language of that sub-section. It seems to us that the learned Judges in that case missed the significance of the word ‘such’ in the collocation ‘any such award’ in S. 30(2). Due significance must be attached to that word, and to our mind it must necessarily intend that the appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court or the Supreme Court, in which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be given, must be confined to an appeal against an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984……………….. We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of S. 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word ‘or’ is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under S. 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made between the aforesaid two dates, if the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of S. 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984.”

A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Collector, Cuttack v. Saraswati Jena, reported in (1991) 72 Cut LT 21 : (AIR 1991 Orissa 274), held inter alia that the Legislature expressly identified the awards to which the benefit of higher solatium would apply by stating that the awards must have been passed during the period 30-4-1982 to 24-9-1984; if it had meant that the words would apply not only to the awards as were originally passed during that period but also to awards which were passed on remand from the higher Courts, nothing prevented it to specifically say so; on the contrary such an interpretation would frustrate the very intention of the limited retrospectivity and would otherwise lead to unworkability as also violation of the constitutional guarantee of equality before the law. Elucidating the point this Court overserved that an order of remand may be passed by the High Court after lapse of many number of years and hence if the argument as advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties is accepted, it would mean that an award which had been passed twenty years back but is taken up by the appellate Court at a belated period and sent on remand and on such remand the matter fortuitously falls to be decided by the Civil Court during the period 30-4-1982 to 24-9-1984, the enhanced compensation becomes payable. The Court held that this could not be the intention of the legislature. After giving other instances to explain the weakness of the argument advanced on behalf of the claimant-opposite parties it was observed (at p. 278 of AIR):

“I have hence no hesitation to hold that the claimants in each of the revisions were not entitled to higher solatium merely because the Subordinate Judge drew up awards in accordance with the direction of this Court on 25-2-1982.”

A similar view was taken by me in the case of Collector, Cuttack v. Uchhab Pati, reported in (1990) 2 Orissa LR 31.

6. Considering the case at hand in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court in the decisions noted above, the position is manifest that the decree-holders are not entitled to the benefit of higher solatium interest and additional market value under the provisions of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. Since the award by the Land Acquisition Collector and the Subordinate Judge was passed prior to the specified period, 25-2-82 to 30-4-82. This factual position has not been disputed by the decree-holders as appears from the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, even then the petitioner-judgment-debtor has deposited the sum of Rs. 6610/- as claimed by the judgment-debtor. In the circumstances, no further liability can be saddled on the judgment-debtor under law. The learned Subordinate Judge erred in holding that further sum of Rs. 1,09,741.50 is to be paid by the judgment-debtor to the decree-holder.

7. Accordingly the Civil Revision is allowed. The order dated 19-6-1989 in Misc. Case No. 252 of 1989 is set aside. The said Misc. Case is allowed. The learned Subordinate Judge 1st Court, Cuttack (Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Cuttack) is directed to pass appropriate order in the Execution Case. There will be however no order for cost.

Petition allowed.