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Madan Mohan Sahoo And Another v. State Of Orissa .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (A. Pasayat, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns an application under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (anticipatory bail). A First Information Report was lodged by Shri Suman Rao, Inspector of Police, D.E.B. Midnapore, P.S., and P.S. Case No. 103 of 1994 was registered. The petitioners, along with five others, were arraigned as accused for offences alleged to be punishable under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and Section 426 of the Indian Penal Code for violation of a West Bengal dealers' licence order. The petitioners claimed they were legally transporting ground-nuts from Orissa to West Bengal and contended the case was instituted on erroneous premises. Facing attempts at arrest, they applied for protection under Section 438 CrPC.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a High Court (or a Court of Session) can exercise the power conferred by Section 438 CrPC in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed outside the State to which that Court relates (i.e., whether territorial limits prohibit exercise of Section 438 extra‑territorially).
- Whether a Court can pass an interim order restraining arrest (i.e., whether, in proceedings under Section 438 CrPC, a court may grant an order preventing arrest until final disposal of the anticipatory bail application).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners asserted factual innocence: they claimed to be transporting ground-nuts lawfully from Orissa to West Bengal and that the case was instituted under erroneous premises.
- They sought protection under Section 438 CrPC because an attempt was being made to arrest them.
- Counsel for petitioners and the amicus emphasized authoritative observations by certain High Courts (Calcutta, Delhi, Karnataka, Bombay) holding that the place of the applicant's residence (or presence) is relevant and that the court where the applicant resides can entertain Section 438 applications irrespective of the place of alleged commission of the offence. They urged that the power could be exercised at least for an interim period, with notice to the Public Prosecutor or investigating agency to be given subsequently.
The opinion does not set out detailed opposing submissions by the prosecution or investigating agency in direct, point-by-point form.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| B.R. Sinha v. The State, 1982 Cri LJ 61 (Calcutta High Court) | Held that a High Court can exercise Section 438 CrPC even if the alleged offence was committed outside the State to which that High Court relates (affirmative view). | The court noted this case as part of a group of High Court decisions taking the affirmative position but expressly disagreed with this view and declined to follow it. |
| Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 Cri LJ 1174 (Delhi High Court) | Held that the applicant's place (residence/presence) is relevant, permitting courts outside the place of alleged offence to entertain Section 438 applications (affirmative view). | The judgment was considered but the court found that it did not resolve the territorial controversy and did not follow its approach in the present case. |
| Dr. L.R. Naidu v. State of Karnataka, 1984 Cri LJ 757 (Karnataka High Court) | Adopted the view that Section 438 relief can be granted by a High Court irrespective of the place of alleged commission; permitted limited duration orders without full notice to the prosecuting agency in some circumstances. | The court observed the decision and the manner in which it addressed objections (including notice to Public Prosecutor), but did not follow it and found its consideration insufficiently deep for the territoriality issue. |
| N.K. Nayar v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 Cri LJ 1887 (Bombay High Court) | Affirmative High Court view that territoriality of the alleged offence does not bar exercise of Section 438 by that High Court. | Noted as part of the group of courts taking the affirmative view; the present court rejected that approach. |
| Syed Zafrul Hussen v. State, 1986 Cri LJ 605 : AIR 1986 Pat 194 (Full Bench, Patna High Court) | Full Bench concluded that a High Court cannot assume jurisdiction under Section 438 for offences alleged to have been committed outside the State to which the High Court relates (negative view on extra‑territorial exercise). | The court expressly agreed with the Patna Full Bench view and followed it in this opinion. |
| C.T. Mathew v. Govt. of India, Home Deptt., 1985 Cri LJ 1316 (Kerala High Court) | Kerala High Court took the view that Section 438 should not be exercisable extra‑territorially (negative view). | Referenced among High Courts adopting the contrary (negative) position; the present court aligned with this line of authority. |
| Ravinder Mohan v. State of Punjab, 1984 Cri LJ 714 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) | Another High Court decision adopting the negative view on extra‑territorial exercise of Section 438. | Noted among the High Courts supporting territorial limits; the present court concurred with this approach. |
| Dr. Pradeep Kumar Soni v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1990 Cri LJ 2055 (Madhya Pradesh High Court) | Adopted the view that Section 438 cannot be used by courts beyond the territorial jurisdiction where the offence is alleged to have occurred. | Included as authority taking the negative view; the present court agreed with the principle of territoriality reflected in this line of cases. |
| Mohan Singh Parihar v. Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, 1983 Cri LJ 1182 (Jammu & Kashmir High Court) | Held against extra‑territorial exercise of Section 438 by courts for offences outside their territorial jurisdiction. | Cited among judgments expressing the contrary (negative) view; the present court supported that approach. |
| Balachand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 4 SCC 572 : AIR 1977 SC 366 : (1977 Cri LJ 225) | Described the expression "anticipatory bail" as a misnomer and explained that an order under Section 438 is operative only upon arrest; clarifies nature of anticipatory bail. | The court relied on this exposition to explain the character of Section 438 relief and to support the view that the order becomes effective only on arrest. |
| Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. The State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : AIR 1980 SC 1632 : (1980 Cri LJ 1125) | Discussed constitutional vulnerabilities and emphasised legal limits: applicant must show "reason to believe" on reasonable grounds; requirements and safeguards in anticipatory bail jurisprudence. | The court cited Sibbia for principles limiting Section 438 relief — that "reason to believe" must be grounded and that blanket orders should be avoided. |
| Samarias Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Samuel, (1984) 4 SCC 666 : AIR 1985 SC 61 | Criticised courts attempting to assume extra‑territorial jurisdiction beyond their geographical limits. | The court relied on Samarias Trading to support the proposition that courts should not assume jurisdiction extra‑territorially and that territoriality is a basic rule. |
| State of Haryana v. Shajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 Cri LJ 527 | Affirmed the general reluctance of courts to interfere with investigation processes; though power exists under Article 226, courts ordinarily do not interfere with arrests/investigation at the preliminary stage. | Invoked to support the conclusion that an interim order restraining arrest would amount to impermissible interference with investigation and therefore cannot be passed under Section 438. |
| Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury, (1992) 4 SCC 719 : AIR 1993 SC 392 : 1993 Cri LJ 600 | Reiterated principles limiting judicial interference in ongoing investigations; cautioned against pre‑emptive intervention. | Used similarly to State of Haryana v. Shajan Lal to show the court's reluctance to interfere with investigation by restraining arrest proactively. |
| Shri Durga Prasad v. The State of Bihar…Opp. Party., 1987 Cri LJ 1200 (Patna High Court) | Patna High Court decision applying the view that courts should not pass orders restraining arrest (similar approach). | Cited as being in line with the conclusion that interim restraining orders are not permissible; used as supporting authority. |
| Mrs. Neeli Mazumdar v. State of Assam…Opp. Party., (1991) 3 Crimes 797 (Guwahati High Court) | Adopted the view that courts should not pass interim orders restraining arrest in the context of anticipatory bail applications. | Referenced as supporting authority for the proposition that courts ought not to restrain arrests prior to investigation. |
| Surendra Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1995 Cri LJ 1517 | Decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court consistent with the view that restraining arrest by interim order is not appropriate in anticipatory bail proceedings. | Noted as additional authority supporting the court's conclusion on the inadmissibility of interim restraining orders. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in two linked strands corresponding to the two issues framed.
1. Scope and character of Section 438 CrPC (anticipatory bail):
- The court began by explaining the nature of Section 438 as a procedural provision concerned with personal liberty, commonly labelled "anticipatory bail" though that description is a misnomer (citing Balachand Jain).
- It emphasized that Section 438 relief is an extraordinary power exercisable only by higher courts (High Court or Court of Session), and that the order operates only upon arrest; it is conditional immunity from the physical touch or confinement envisaged by Section 46(1) CrPC.
- The statutory requirement that an applicant must have "reason to believe" that he may be arrested was construed to mean the belief must be founded on reasonable and examinable grounds — mere vague fear is insufficient (drawing on Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia).
- The court warned against blanket or omnibus orders releasing an applicant "whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever," because such orders would inappropriately shield unlawful activity and impede investigation; Section 438 is a safeguard for individual liberty, not a license to commit crime.
2. Territoriality — whether Section 438 can be exercised extra‑territorially:
- The court examined the statutory definition of "High Court" in Section 2 of the Code and constitutional provisions (Articles 214 and 225) and noted that references to courts in statutes ordinarily import courts having territorial jurisdiction over the subject matter.
- It reviewed the legislative and general‑clauses materials (including General Clauses Act and an Orissa General Clauses Act example) to show that the jurisdiction of a High Court is rooted in the territorial limits of the State for which it is constituted.
- Given the ordinary place of inquiry and trial provisions in Chapter XIII of the Code and the language used in Sections 437–439 (which refer to "the High Court" or "the Court of Session"), the court reasoned the same expression in adjacent provisions should be given a consistent territorial meaning. To interpret them differently in Sections 438 and 439 would be absurd.
- The court identified practical dangers of permitting extra‑territorial exercise: forum‑shopping by accused persons, multiple conflicting orders from different High Courts or Sessions Courts, and general disruption to investigative processes.
- After reviewing the divergent High Court decisions, the court expressly aligned with the Full Bench of the Patna High Court (Syed Zafrul Hussen) and other High Courts that held Section 438 cannot be exercised by a court beyond its territorial jurisdiction, and recorded inability to follow the contrary view taken by some other High Courts (e.g., Calcutta).
3. Interim orders restraining arrest:
- The court held that the power conferred by Section 438 is to direct release on bail upon arrest and is exercisable only at the pre‑arrest stage by applicants who have not yet been arrested; the operative effect is triggered by arrest.
- Consequently, the court concluded that an application under Section 438 cannot be used to restrain arrest by an interim order. Such restraint would constitute interference with the process of investigation, which courts are ordinarily reluctant to undertake at that stage (citing State of Haryana v. Shajan Lal and Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury).
- The court noted the proviso to Section 439(1) (notice to the Public Prosecutor in serious crimes) as evidence that notice to the prosecuting agency has a clear role where the area's prosecuting authority is concerned; this reinforced the territorial nexus of jurisdiction and practical necessity of involving the prosecuting agency for the jurisdictional area.
- Thus, an interim order preventing arrest until disposal of the anticipatory bail application would be impermissible under Section 438 and contrary to the proper limits on judicial intervention in investigation.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court disposed of the application by rejecting the petitioners' prayer. In particular: (a) A High Court or Court of Session cannot exercise jurisdiction under Section 438 CrPC in respect of offences alleged to have been committed outside the territorial limits of the State for which that High Court is constituted; (b) a court cannot pass an interim order restraining arrest in proceedings under Section 438 CrPC.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The petitioners' application under Section 438 CrPC was dismissed and the protection sought (anticipatory bail or restraint of arrest) was denied.
- Territoriality reaffirmed: The decision reinforces that the jurisdiction to entertain Section 438 applications is territorially limited to the High Court or Court of Session having jurisdiction over the place where the offence is alleged to have been committed; courts should not assume extra‑territorial jurisdiction for such relief.
- Limits on interim relief: The ruling clarifies that Section 438 does not empower courts to grant interim orders restraining arrest prior to determination of the anticipatory bail application; any such restraint would amount to inappropriate interference with investigation.
- Restriction on blanket orders and forum‑shopping: The judgment warns against omnibus anticipatory bail orders and judicial forum‑shopping by applicants, and stresses that "reason to believe" must be founded on examinable and reasonable grounds, not mere apprehension.
Order: The application was disposed of by rejecting the petitioners' prayer and the formal order passed accordingly.
A. Pasayat, J.:— Two points which have arisen in this case for consideration are of seminal importance. First is whether the High Court can act in terms of Sec. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, ‘the Code’) in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed outside the State to which it relates. In other words, can such power be exercised by any High Court or any Court of Session within the country irrespective of the locale of the commission of offence. There is divergence of opinion on this aspect by several High Courts. Calcutta High Court, Delhi High Court, Karnataka High Court and Bombay High Court have taken the view in the affirmative [See B.R Sinha v. The State, 1982 Cri LJ 61 (Cal); Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 Cri LJ 1174 (Delhi); Dr. Dr. L.R Naidu v. State Of Karnataka, 1984 Cri LJ 757 and N.K Nayar v. State of Maharashtra, 1983 Cri LJ 1887, respectively). The contrary view has been expressed by Patna High Court, Kerala High Court, Punjab and Haryana High Court, Madhya Pradesh High Court and Jammu and Kashmir High Court. (See Syed Zafrul Hussen v. State, 1986 Cri LJ 605 : (AIR 1986 Pat 194) (FB); C.T Mathew v. Govt. of India. Home Deptt., 1985 Cri LJ 1316 (Ker): Ravinder Mohan v. State of Punjab, 1984 Cri LJ 714 (Pun & Har); Dr. Dr. Pradeep Kumar Soni…Applicant; v. State Of Madhya Pradesh…Non-Applicant., 1990 Cri LJ 2055 (Madh Pra) and Mohan Singh Parihar v. Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, 1983 Cri LJ 1182 (J & K). Second question is whether an interim order restraining arrest can be passed.
2. Petitioner's case, so far as factual aspects are concerned, runs as follows. On the basis of first information report lodged by Shri Suman Rao, Inspector of Police, D.E.B Midnapore, P.S Case No. 103 of 1994 was registered. Petitioners along with five others have been arraigned as accused for offences punishable under Sec. 7 (1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (in short, ‘the Act’). Sec. 426 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, ‘the IPC) for violation of para 3 of West Bengal Pulses. Edible Oil Seeds and Edible Oil (Dealers Licence) Order, 1978. Petitioners claim that they were transporting ground-nuts legally from Orissa to West Bengal and under erroneous premises the case has been instituted. Since attempt is being made to arrest them, they seek protection under S. 438 of the Code.
3. It is necessary to set out the scope and ambit of S. 438 of the Code before I grapple with the problem at hand. The facility which S. 438 of the Code gives is generally referred to as ‘anticipatory bail’. This expression which was used by the Law Commission in its 41 st Report is neither used in the section nor its marginal note. But the expression ‘anticipatory bail’ is a convenient mode of indication that it is possible to apply for bail in anticipation of arrest. Any order of bail can be effective only from the time of arrest of the accused. Wharton's Law Lexicon explains ‘bail’ as ‘to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance’. Thus, bail is basically release from restraint, more particularly the custody of Police. The distinction between an ordinary order of bail and an order under S. 439 of the Code is that whereas the former is granted after arrest, and therefore means release from custody of the Police, the latter is granted in anticipation of arrest and is therefore effective at the very moment of arrest. Sec. 46 (1) of the Code, which deals with how arrests are to be made, provides that in making an arrest the Police Officer or other person making the same “shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word or action”. The order under Sec. 438 of the Code is intended to confer conditional immunity from the touch as envisaged by Sec. 46 (1) of the Code or any confinement. The apex Court in Balachand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 4 SCC 572 : AIR 1977 SC 366 : (1977 Cri LJ 225) has described the expression ‘anticipatory bail’ as misnomer. It is well-known that bail is ordinary manifestation of arrest, that the Court thinks first to make an order is that in the event of arrest a person shall be released on bail. Manifestly there is no question of release on bail unless the accused is arrested, and therefore, it is only on an arrest being effected the order becomes operative. The power exercisable under Sec. 438 is somewhat extraordinary in character and it is only in exceptional cases where it appears that the person may be falsely implicated or where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to otherwise misuse his liberty then power is to be exercised under Sec. 438. The power being of important nature it is entrusted only to the higher echelons of judicial forums, i.e the Court of Session or the High Court. It is the power exercisable in case of an anticipated accusation of non-bailable offence. The object which is sought to be achieved by Sec. 438 of the Code is that the moment a person is arrested, if he has already obtained an order from the Court of Session or High Court, he shall be released immediately on bail without being sent to jail.
4. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who is entitled to plead, innocence, since he is not on the date of application for exercise of power under Sec. 438 of the Code convicted for the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. Any other interpretation of Sec. 438 would make the provision constitutionally vulnerable. It has to be borne in mind that an over-generous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Sec. 438 can make it so vulnerable. (See Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. The State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : AIR 1980 SC 1632 : (1980 Cri LJ 1125). Sub-sec; (1) of Sec. 438 lays down a condition which has to be satisfied before power can be exercised. The applicant must show that he has ‘reason to believe’ that he may be arrested in a non-bailable offence. Use of the eepression ‘reason to believe’ shows that the applicant may be arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere “fear” is not ‘belief for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of vague apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him in pursuance of which he may be arrested. Grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested in non-bailable offence must be capable of being examined. If an application is made to the High Court or the Court of Session, it is for the Court concerned to decide whether a case has been made out of for granting the relief sought. The provisions cannot be invoked after arrest of the accused. A blanket order should not be generally passed. It flows from the very language of the section which requires the applicant to show that he has reason to believe that he may be arrested. A belief cannot be vague, indefinite. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. Normally a direction should not issue to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail “whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever”. Such ‘blanket order’ should not be passed as it would serve as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity. An order under Sec. 438 is a device to secure the individual's liberty; it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations likely or unlikely.
5. Whenever in statute a reference is made to the High Court, the Court of Session or that of the Magistrate, it is inherent in such language that it is a Court having territorial jurisdiction over the offence. In that context, reference to the ‘Court’ is in terms to the Court having territorial jurisdiction. Sec. 438 refers to “the High Court” or ‘the Court of Session’. “High Court” is defined in Sec. 2 of the Code. It means (i) in relation to any State, the High Court for that State; (ii) in relation to a Union territory to which the jurisdiction of the High Court for a State has been extended by law, that High Court; (iii) in relation to any other Union territory, the highest Court of criminal appeal for that territory other than the Supreme Court of India. Art. 214 of the Constitution of India throws sufficient light on the concept of territoriality in the justice system and more so in the realm of criminal jurisprudence. Art. 225 states that subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the “appropriate legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on that legislature by the Constitution, the jurisdiction of and the law administered in, any existing High Court shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. Jurisdiction of the High Courts was clearly rooted to the Provinces prior to it. In the General Clauses Act. 1897. Sec. 3 (25) provides that the “High Court’ used with reference to civil proceedings, shall mean the highest Civil Court of Appeal (not including the Supreme Court) in the part of India in which the Act or Regulation containing the expression operates. In the Orissa General Clauses Act. 1937. “High Court” has been defined as follows:
“2. Definitions — In this Act and in all Orissa Acts unless there is anything repugnant in the sub ject or context—
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(19) ‘High Court’ — “High Court’ used with reference to civil proceedings shall mean the highest Civil Court of Appeal in the part of Orissa in which the Act containing the expression operates.”
In view of the aforesaid provisions, the jurisdiction of Orissa High Court will extend to the State of Orissa and not beyond it. What would be true for civil proceedings would be indeed more true in the context of criminal jurisprudence. It is manifest from the aforesaid provisions that territoriality of the Courts is the basic rules and extra-territoriality is an exception which is not to be easily assumed.
6. Chapter XXXIII deals with provisions as to bail and bonds. Sees. 436 and 437 provide for the granting of bail to accused persons before trial and conviction. In the case of a person accused of a bailable offence, where bail has been granted to him under Sec. 436. it can be cancelled in a proper case by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Sec. 482. Section 439(1) confers on the High Court or the Court of Session power to direct admission to bail or reduction of bail in all cases where bail is admissible under Sees. 436 and 437. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 439 empowers the High Court or the Court of Session to cause any person who has been admitted to bail under this Chapter to be arrested and committed to custody. Sec. 438 empowers the High Court or the Court of Session to direct release on bail on the event of arrest. The remaining sections of the Chapter deal with mailers ancillary or subsidiary to the granting of bail.
7. Sec. 437 provides as to when a bail can be granted in case of a non-bailable offence by Courts other than High Court or the Court of Session. It is. therefore, manifest that the said provision pertains to and provides for the grant of bail by Magistrate having territorial jurisdiction in non-bailable offences. Sec. 439 deals with the special power of the High Court or the Court of Session regarding bail in non-bailable offences. It is undeniable that this section refers to the High Court or the Court of Session having jurisdiction over the area of the commission of the crime, and not any High Court or any Court of Session. It is to be noticed that identical expression ‘the High Court’ or ‘the Court of Session’ appears both in Sees. 438 and 439. It would be apparently resulting in absurd results if the same expression appearing in both Sees. 438 and 439 is interpreted differently for the purpose of exercising power under Sees. 438 and 439. Chapter XIII deals with jurisdiction of Criminal Courts in inquiries and trials. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial is dealt with in Sec. 177. Reference can also be made to Sees. 76 and 167 (2), Former refers to production of person arrested before the Court before which he is required in law to be produced. Sec. 167(2) inter alia deals with cases when an accused person is forwarded to a Magistrate who finds that he has no jurisdiction to try the case, or commit it for trial and is of the view that further detention is unnecessary. In such an event, he may order that the accused be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction.
8. Great emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel appearing amicus curiae on certain observations made by the Calcutta High Court, the Delhi High Court, the Karnataka High Court and the Bombay High Court referred to above. In all those cases, the Hon'ble Judges were of the view that it is place of residence of the applicant which is relevant and not the alleged place of commission of offence. Acceptance of the view is bound to present innumerable practical applications. In a given case there may be large number of accused persons belonging to different locales or States. It would be an absurd situation that there would be different High Courts or Sessions Judges exercising power and possibility of conflicting and contradictory orders being passed cannot be ruled out. For the purpose of Section 438 an applicant is not required to meet prerequisite of surrender to custody. Therefore, an unscrupulous person may embark upon a merry ‘Court hunting’ ad infinitum.
9. In Pritam Singh's case (1980 Cri LJ 1174)(supra), the Delhi High Court referred to Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia'scase (1980 Cri LJ 1125)(SC) (supra). In my view no part of the judgment throws any light on the controversy at hand. In Dr. L.R Naidu's case (1983 Cri LJ 757) (supra) the Karnalaka High Court made reference to Pritam Singh's case (1980 Cri LJ 1174) (Delhi) (supra) and B.R Sinha's case (1982 Cri LJ 61) (Cal) (supra). In the said cases there is no deep-seated consideration of the issues involved. In the latter case the learned Judges have referred to some of the earlier unreported single Judge and Division Bench judgments of that Court, and also relied on Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia's ease (supra). Though reference was made by that Court to the argument of the Public Prosecutor, particularly with reference to Arts. 214 and 225. of the Constitution, same was brushed aside without much discussion. It was held that an order under Section 438 can be granted without notice to the Public Prosecutor or affording any opportunity to him to get necessary information from the investigating agency. Such view was taken even though substance was found in the plea that it would cause inconvenience, and no serious note was taken thereof. In Dr. L.R Naidu's case (supra) also this aspect was noticed, but without specifically dealing with this objection it was held that an order of limited duration can be passed. The venue of jurisdiction to try an accused for an offence alleged derives from the statute, either from the statutes which creates the Court or from the statute which defines the offence, and where the Court is specified in particular enactment by which venue is created having jurisdiction to try the offence, it is only such Court that can try the offence and a trial by any other Court becomes corum non-judice.
10. It is submitted that there can be no difficulty as power can be exercised for an interim period, and after notice to the Public Prosecutor or the investigating agency of the concerned State, the matter can be taken up for final disposal. That is not certainly a workable arrangement, and would defeat the very purpose for seeking prayer under Section 438 of the Code. At this juncture it is to be noticed that the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 439 dealing with serious crimes expressly provides for giving notice to the Public Prosecutor before dealing with the prayer for bail, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, it is found that it is not possible to give such notice. The Public Prosecutor as referred to obviously has to be with regard to the jurisdiction within which the offence has been committed. It is necessary to notice the castigation of the apex Court to Courts attempting to assume jurisdiction extra-territorially over areas beyond the geographical limits of the State for which the High Court is constituted. (See Samarias Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Samuel: (1984) 4 SCC 666 : AIR 1985 SC 61).
11. I am therefore, in agreement with the view expressed by the Full Bench of Patna High Court in Syed Zafrul Hassan's case (1986 Cri LJ 605)(supra), But with deepest respect I record my inability to subscribe to the contrary view expressed by.the Calcutta High Court in B.R Sinha's case (1982 Cri LJ 61 ((supra).
12. The next question is whether a Court can pass an interim order not to arrest the applicant till the disposal of the application under Section 439. The direction which a Court can issue under Section 438 of the Code is that in the event of arrest of an accused on an accusation of committing an non-bailable offence, he shall be released on ball subject to such conditions as the Court may deem fit to impose. An application under Section 438 of the Code can be moved only by a person who has not already been arrested. Once he is arrested, his remedy is to move the Court either under Section 437 or Section 438 of the Code. In the very nature of the direction which the Court can issue under Section 438 of the Code, it is clear that the direction is to be issued only at the pre-arrest stage. The direction becomes operative only after arrest. The Court in issuing the direction exercises its jurisdiction protect him from the consequence of arrest leading to custody. The condition precedent for the operation of the direction issue is arrest of the accused. This being so. the irresistible 1 inference is that in an application under Section 438 of the Code the Court cannot restrain arrest.
13. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the process of investigation intended to secure several purposes. The accused may have to be questioned in detail regarding various facets of motive, preparation, commission and aftermath of the crime and the connection of other persons, if any in the crime. There may be circumstances in which the accused may provide information leading to discovery of material facts. It may be necessary to curtail his freedom in order to enable the investigation to proceed without hindrance and to protect witnesses and persons connected with the victim of the crime, to prevent his disappearance, to maintain law and order in the locality. For these or other reasons, arrest may become inevitable part of the process of investigation. The legality of the proposed arrest cannot be gone into in an application under Section 438 of the Code. The role” of the investigator is well-defined and the jurisdictional scope of interference by the Court in the process of investigation is limited. The Court ordinarily will not interfere with the investigation of a crime or with the arrest of accused in a cognizable offence. This is not because of lack of power in the Court since such a power exists under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India: but because of the reluctance of the Court to interfere at that stage. (See State of Han ana v. Shajan Lal: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 Cri LJ 527. and Janata Dal v. H.S Chowdhury: (1992) 4 SCC 719 : AIR 1993 SC 392 : 1993 Cri LJ 600). An interim order restraining arrest, which cannot be passed under Section 438 of the Code will amount to interference in the investigation, which cannot, at any rate, be done under Section 438 of the Code. The Supreme Court also opined that a blanket order of anticipatory bail should not be passed as it would be a serious encroachment into the power of investigation and against public interest. The position cannot be different in a case of an order restrain ing arrest.
14. Similar view has been taken by the Patna High Court, Guwahati High Court and Madhya Pradesh High Court. (See Shri Durga Prasad… v. The State Of Bihar…Opposite Party.: 1987 Cri LJ 1200; Mrs. Neeli Mazumdar… v. State Of Assam…Opp. Party.: (1991) 3 Crimes 797; and Surendra Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh: 1995 Cri LJ 1517).
15. The application is disposed of accordingly rejecting the petitioners' prayer.
16. Order accordingly.
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