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Satyanarayan Mohapatra & Others Petitioners. v. State Of Orissa Opp. Party.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.C. Jagadeb Roy, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners are accused persons in G.R. Case No. 21/85 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Banpur. They face prosecution under sections 452/34 of the Indian Penal Code; petitioner No. 15 additionally faced charges under sections 4(viii) and 7(d) of the P.C.R. Act by an order of the trial Court dated 25-1-1988. The revision was filed under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking to set aside the trial Court's order framing charges dated 25-1-1988. The criminal investigation began on the basis of an F.I.R. lodged by Suryanarayan Sethi of Tumuraput Sasan on 29-9-1985. A charge-sheet was filed on 5-5-1986. On 8-10-1985 the informant filed an affidavit seeking exclusion of petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 12 and 15 from the F.I.R., alleging their names were inserted by the Sub-Inspector and that the contents were neither read over nor explained to him. At the revision hearing, petitioners' counsel confined his argument to petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 12 and 15 and did not press the application for the remaining petitioners.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial Court's order dated 25-1-1988 framing charges is an interlocutory order and therefore not revisable under section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- Whether this High Court can exercise revisional jurisdiction under section 401 Cr.P.C. to challenge the framing of charges despite the bar in section 397(2).
- Whether the petition originally filed under section 401 Cr.P.C. can be treated as filed under section 482 Cr.P.C. and, in the exercise of inherent powers under section 482, the High Court can quash the interlocutory order framing charges notwithstanding the statutory bar in section 397(2).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners sought to set aside the trial Court's order framing charges dated 25-1-1988 (the revision was filed under section 401 Cr.P.C.).
- Counsel confined oral argument to petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 12 and 15, relying on the informant's affidavit that their names were not part of the original F.I.R. and were inserted by the Sub-Inspector.
- Counsel relied on a Rajasthan Full Bench decision (Jarnail Singh v. State of Rajasthan) holding that an order framing charge is an order of moment and argued the order should be amenable to revision.
- As an alternative, counsel argued that the petition filed under section 401 Cr.P.C. should be treated as if filed under section 482 Cr.P.C., and that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers should quash the impugned interlocutory order.
The opinion does not set out any detailed or distinct arguments advanced on behalf of the State or the prosecution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. (1980 Supp SCC 92; A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 962) | Defines and explains the concept of an "interlocutory order" in criminal proceedings; enumerates propositions showing that orders which do not finally determine rights are interlocutory and that framing of charges is generally an interlocutory order. | The Court relied on the propositions in V.C. Shukla to support the view that an order framing charges is, in the ordinary sense, an interlocutory order and thus falls within the bar in section 397(2) Cr.P.C. against revisional jurisdiction. |
| Jarnail Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Vol. I (1992) C.C.R. 290) — Rajasthan Full Bench | Held that an order framing charge is an order of moment, deprives liberty, and in some contexts should not be treated as merely interlocutory (especially where jurisdiction or sanction to prosecute is in question). | The Court distinguished Jarnail Singh on the facts: that Full Bench dealt with cases in which the Court's jurisdiction or sanction to prosecute was challenged and, in those circumstances, framing of charge was treated differently. The Court held that Jarnail Singh was not applicable to the present facts. |
| Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra ((1977) 4 SCC 551; A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 47) | Explains that "interlocutory" is ordinarily the converse of "final," but some orders may be intermediate (neither strictly final nor purely interlocutory); sets out principles governing exercise of inherent powers by High Courts (not to be used if specific code remedy exists, to be used sparingly, and not against an express bar). | The Court invoked Madhu Limaye to (a) explain the nuanced distinction between interlocutory, intermediate and final orders; and (b) apply the principles limiting exercise of inherent powers, concluding that inherent power under section 482 cannot be used to circumvent the express bar in section 397(2) Cr.P.C. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a sequential analytical manner grounded in statutory text and the authorities cited:
- Characterization of the order framing charges: The Court observed that an order framing charges is an intermediate/interlocutory order because it does not terminate proceedings and the trial continues until acquittal or conviction. The Court relied on the V.C. Shukla authority summarizing accepted propositions on the meaning of "interlocutory order" in criminal procedure.
- Statutory barrier to revision: Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. provides that the High Court's revisional power shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Applying that provision, and the understanding of "interlocutory" drawn from the authorities, the Court concluded that the order framing charges fell within the ambit of an interlocutory order and is therefore not amenable to revision under the revisional jurisdiction relied upon (section 401 Cr.P.C.).
- Distinguishing conflicting authority: The petitioners relied on the Rajasthan Full Bench decision in Jarnail Singh which treated framing of charge as an order of moment. The Court distinguished that decision on its facts — Jarnail Singh addressed situations where jurisdiction to proceed or sanction to prosecute was lacking and charges had nonetheless been framed; in such a factual matrix the Full Bench treated the framing order differently. The present case was found distinguishable.
- Consideration of intermediate orders and inherent jurisdiction: The Court examined Madhu Limaye which recognizes that some orders fall between "final" and "interlocutory" and articulated constraints on the High Court's inherent powers. The Court noted the established principles that the inherent power (section 482 Cr.P.C.) should not be invoked where a specific remedy exists, should be used sparingly, and must not be exercised against an express statutory bar.
- Application to the present case: Given the express statutory bar in section 397(2) Cr.P.C. against revisional interference with interlocutory orders, and in light of the Madhu Limaye constraints on inherent jurisdiction, the Court held that it could not exercise inherent power to quash the interlocutory order framing charges. Although the Court observed that framing of charges ignoring absence of necessary sanction or jurisdiction may constitute an order requiring revision in some circumstances, it concluded that, on the tests applied, the instant order was an interlocutory one and thereby not revisable under section 397(2).
Holding and Implications
REVISION DISMISSED.
Direct effect: The High Court dismissed the Criminal Revision filed under section 401 Cr.P.C., thereby leaving intact the trial Court's order dated 25-1-1988 framing charges against the accused (for those petitioners as to whom the revision was pressed). The interlocutory order framing charges was held to be non-revisable by the High Court under section 397(2) Cr.P.C., and the High Court refused to invoke its inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. to achieve the same result because of the express statutory bar and the governing principles from Madhu Limaye.
Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle; it applies established authorities to the facts and notes the limits of revisional and inherent jurisdiction where a statutory bar exists. No new precedent was announced beyond the application of the cited authorities to the facts of this case.
Note: This summary is prepared solely from the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what appears in that opinion.
K.C Jagadeb Roy, J.:— The petitioners are the accused persons who are proceeded under sections 452/34 of the Indian Penal Code in the G.R Case No. 21/85 pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Banpur. Charges were framed against petitioner No. 15 under sections 4 (viii), 7 (d) of the P.C.R Act by order of the trial Court dated 25-1-1988. In the present revision application, the petitioners pray that this order of framing charges against the accused persons be set aside. At the time of argument, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners confines his argument to petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 12 and 15 and does not press the application for the rest. This Criminal Revision has been filed under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The investigation was initiated at the instance of one Suryanarayan Sethi of village Tumuraput Sasan. He lodged the F.I.R on 29-9-1985. Pursuant to the investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 5-5-1986 against the present petitioners. On 8-10-1985 an affidavit was filed by the informant to exclude the names of the petitioners 1, 2, 12 and 15 on the ground that he bad not stated the names of these four petitioners in his F.I.R. According to the informant, the F.I.R was made orally by him which was reduced to writing by the Sub-Inspector of Police, the contents of which were neither read over nor explained to him and he had inserted the names of these four petitioners in the said F.I.R. On the basis of the F.I.R and the investigation report submitted by the police, the trial Court passed his order dated 25-1-1988 framing charges against the accused persons.
2. This order framing the charges against the accused persons is no doubt an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues but not a final decision or judgment on the matter in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. An order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely within the ordinary and natural meaning of term interlocutory order' as used in Code of Criminal Procedure. The order of framing the charges is, therefore, purely an interlocutory order as it does not terminate the proceedings and the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. This view finds support from the judgment reported in 1980 Supp SCC 92 : A.I.R 1980 S.C 962 (V.C Shukla v. State Through C.B.I .) in which case the Apex Court considering a large number of cases decided by the Supreme Court and in English Courts came to hold thus;
“Thus, on a consideration of the authorities, mentioned above, the following propositions emerge.
(1) that an order which does not determine the rights of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an interlocutory order',
(2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained in contradistinction to a final order. In other words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in another way, then the proceedings would continue; because, in our opinion, the term ‘interlocutory order’ in the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to include even intermediate or quasifinal orders;
(4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the controversy and thereby terminates the entire proceedings before the Court so that nothing is left to be done by the Court thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution even against an order framing charges against the accused. Thus, it can not be said that by not allowing an appeal against an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the accused.”
3. Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
“The power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding..
4. Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, however, relied on a Full Bench decision of the Rajsthan High Court reported in Vol. I (1992) C.C.R 290 (Jarnail Singh v. The State of Rajsthan) wherein it was held:
“To sum up, we find that an order framing charge is an order of moment; it deprives the liberty of a citizens and puts him to jeopardy of a trial. Such an order finally rejects the plea of the accused that he is entitled to a discharge or that he is not liable to be tried. Such an order concludes the enquiry and the pre-trial proceedings against the accused. The order framing charge takes away a very valuable right of the accused.”
5. This case is clearly distinguishable. The Full Bench was considering the cases where the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the criminal case was challenged on the ground of lack of jurisdiction; or for lack of sanction and the charges were already framed notwithstanding that This according to Full Bench case referred to, could not be treated as an interlocutory order so as to be hit by section 397(2) of the Cr. P.C and can be agitated in a revision.
6. In another case, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551 : A.I.R 1978 S.C 47 (Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra.), it was also held:
“Ordinarily and generally the expression ‘interlocutory order’ has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term ‘final order’.”
7. A paragraph in Vol. 22 of the Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition at page 742) is relevant for the purpose which reads thus:
xx xx that a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another or final as to part or interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words ‘final’ and ‘interlocutory’ has, therefore, to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required.”
8. In para 21 of the judgment in (Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra.) (supra) it is observed by the Apex Court that in general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed ‘final’.
9. It is further held by the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye's case thus:
“‘On the one hand, the legislature kept in tact the revisional power of the High Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression ‘interlocutory order’ as invariably being converse of the words ‘final order.’ There may be an order passed daring the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswamis case, but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order- pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-section (2) of section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purpose of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet, it would not be correct to characterise £hem as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of section 397(2).”
10. The framing of charges ignoring absence of necessary sanction for prosecution and absence of jurisdiction obviously fall in my opinion in such category of non-final order requiring revision by High Court. Accordingly, I have no hesitation to hold in this case that the order dated 25-1-1988 framing charges against the accused persons was an interlocutory order by the test indicated in the decision cited above and therefore, not revisable by this Court because of the impediment contained in section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urges that the petition which was earlier filed under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may now be treated to have been filed under section 482 of the Cr. P.C and the Court in exercise of its power under inherent power quash the proceedings. The question arises whether this Court in exercise of the inherent power can quash this impugned interlocutory order which it could not quash in exercise of the general powers of revision because of the bar contained in section 397(2) of the Cr. P.C, It is already held in the case reported in 1978 Crl. L.J 165 : (1977) 4 SCC 551 : A.I.R 1978 S.C 47 (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharastra) that the following principles have to be kept in mind in relation to the exercise of inherent power of the High Court.
(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
12. In the present case, a bar is already engrafted in the Code of Criminal Procedure by way of section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure barring the revisional power of this Court against the interlocutory order passed by the Court. As such, the inherent power of this Court cannot be exercised to achieve the same which it could not do under revisional power under section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision has no merit and is dismissed.
Revision dismissed.
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