P.C Misra, J.:— This revision arises out of a suit filed by the present opposite parties 1 and 2 praying for recovery of properties worth Rs. 15,000/- from the defendants and for maintenance of Rs. 300/- per month for opposite party No. 1 and Rs. 100/- per month for opposite party No. 2 from the present petitioner with other consequential reliefs. An application for interim maintenance was filed in the trial Court which was objected to by the present petitioner on the ground that there is no relationship of husband and wife between him and opposite party No. 1 and also for the reason that the Court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance u/s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned trial Court negatived both the contentions and allowed interim maintenance of Rs. 100/- and Rs. 50/- to opposite parties 1 and 2 respectively per month till the disposal of the suit. This revision was filed challenging the legality of the said order which on being placed before one of the Hon'ble Judges of this Court was referred to a Division Bench because of the reason that the learned Judge did not agree with the proposition of law that a mere denial of marital relationship would disentitle the plaintiff to claim interim maintenance in support of which two decisions of this Court, one reported in AIR 1977 Ori 96, Ram Chandra v. Snehalata Dei in AIR 1984 Ori 166 (Gajapati Naik v. Dukhnashini Naik) were cited before him. The matter was next placed before a Division Bench. But the Division Bench referred the matter to a larger Bench in view of the fact that one of the decisions, namely; AIR 1977 Orissa 96 (supra) was of a Division Bench. This matter has thus come to be decided by a Full Bench on the point as to whether mere denial of the marital relationship would disentitle the claim of the plaintiffs in this case for interim maintenance. The question whether the court would have jurisdiction to grant interim maintenance u/s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code in the absence of any provision in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, is interlinked with the point referred to the larger Bench for which both the points of law shall be dealt with.

2. Before I enter into a discussion on the questions of law, I would like to state the facts relevant for the purposes of this revision. The opposite parties 1 and 2, who filed the suit (O.S No. 40/1984-1) alleged that the marriage between the present petitioner and opposite party No. 1 was performed in the year 1973 and out of their lawful wedlock opposite party No. 2 was born. She further alleged that she was tortured and was driven out of the house of the petitioner whereafter she has been residing with her parents. Some of her ornaments are alleged to have been snatched away and she was deprived of her personal belongings worth Rs. 15,000/-, the recovery of which was prayed for in the suit. She also claimed maintenance of Rs. 300/- per month for herself and Rs. 100/- per month for her minor daughter. The present petitioner and his father and mother were arrayed as defendants 1, 2 and 3 respectively in the suit. All of them filed a joint written statement denying the plaint allegations. The specific case of the present petitioner is that opposite party No. 1 is not his legally married wife nor the opposite party No. 2 is the daughter of the petitioner. The further case of the petitioner is that opposite party No. 1 was of a questionable character and in furtherance of a rumour that there was a love affair between the petitioner and opposite party No. 1, the latter is trying to describe herself as his wife and opposite party No. 2 as his daughter, though there is no proof behind the alleged relationship. Since the marriage was disputed, it was further alleged that the question of any belonging being snatched away by the petitioner does not at all arise for consideration. During pendency of the said suit, an application was filed on behalf of the opposite parties 1 and 2 praying for interim maintenance of Rs. 200/- per month on the ground that after they were deserted by the petitioner without any reasonable cause, they are unable to maintain themselves. The present petitioner and the other defendants filed their objection against the said application. They alleged that the plaintiff No. 1 (opposite party No. 1) is not the married wife of the present petitioner nor the plaintiff No. 2 (opposite party No. 2) is his daughter. It was further stated that there being no provision in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act or in the Hindu Marriage Act for grant of interim maintenance, the court would have no jurisdiction whatsoever to grant a relief pending the decision of the suit. As already stated both the objections were overruled by the learned trial Court, who granted interim maintenance as stated earlier.

3. The main questions for consideration in this revision are: (i) whether the Court would be entitled to grant interim maintenance in a case where the marital relationship is denied; (ii) whether in the absence of any provision in either of the two Acts, namely: ‘The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act’ and ‘The Hindu Marriage Act’, the Court can exercise jurisdiction u/s. 151, C.P.C to grant the interim relief of awarding maintenance.

4. In the aforesaid background, it is necessary to deal with the proposition of law discussed in the two decisions referred to above. The decision reported in AIR 1977 Ori 96 (supra) does not support the proposition that mere denial of marital relationship would disentitle the claim of the plaintiff for interim maintenance. In the said case, the wife filed a suit for declaration that the decree for judicial separation and the subsequent decree for divorce, which were obtained by her husband against her were fraudulent and she is not bound by the same. She sought for a further declaration that she continues to be the wife of her husband and not another lady, who was also impleaded as a party in the said suit. She further claimed maintenance. In the said suit, she applied for interim maintenance which the learned Subordinate Judge allowed. An appeal was carried against the said order to this Court which was dismissed when the matter was taken up for “admission and hearing” after notice to the respondents. A Letters Patent appeal was filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge in the aforesaid appeal which came to be decided by the Division Bench in that case. In the said appeal, it was contended that the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to make an order allowing interim maintenance because S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act in which specific provision in that behalf has been provided, has no application to the suit as it was not a proceeding under the said Act. It was further urged in the said appeal that until the decree for divorce, already obtained against the plaintiff No. 1, was vacated she was not entitled to any maintenance whatsoever. It was also contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to make an order in exercise of inherent powers to grant interim maintenance in such cases. During the course of argument, it was conceded by the learned counsel appearing for the wife, who was the plaintiff No. 1 in that suit, that the suit as framed was not one under the Hindu Marriage Act and S. 24 of the that Act had no application to her petition for maintenance. The Division Bench proceeded on the basis that the decrees of judicial separation and divorce are valid until the plaintiffs are able to obtain a decree of declaration that the decrees are bad in law and not binding on her. As regards the question whether the court can, in exercise of its inherent powers, pass an order of interim maintenance, the Division Bench after taking note of various decisions of different High Courts including one of our own, was inclined to agree with the ratio of the decision of the Madras High Court in AIR 1953 Mad 420, Mahomad Abdul Rahman v. Tajunnissa Begum, as laying down the ordinary acceptable rule. Elaborating the point, further their Lordships expressed that there may be cases where taking the extraordinary aspects into consideration, the Court may proceed to exercise inherent powers to grant interim relief. Their Lordships further observed that it is not appropriate to set limitations on the Court's inherent powers by indicating circumstances where it can be and where it cannot be exercised. In the case which was before their Lordships for consideration, there was a decree staring against the plaintiff by which the marital relationship had been judicially terminated. In the facts of that case their Lordships held that the burden lies on the plaintiff to extricate herself from the bar of res judicata by proving want of territorial jurisdiction of the Court passing the earlier decree, which was one of the points taken by the plaintiff and by establishing perpetration of fraud in the matter of obtaining the decree, and until she is able to establish the above the decree of divorce binds her and she cannot be taken any longer to be a wife. In these circumstances, their Lordships did not consider it appropriate to sustain the order of grant of interim maintenance. In the other decision reported in AIR 1984 Ori 166 (supra) the learned Judge referring to the aforesaid Division Bench case of this Court expressed the view that it cannot be said that S. 151, C.P.C has absolutely no application to a claim for payment of interim maintenance. His Lordship was dealing with a case where the marital relationship between the husband and wife was not disputed by the husband in the suit filed by the wife for realisation of arrears of maintenance; rather in the objections filed by the husband against the application of the wife praying for interim maintenance it was stated by him that he is ready and willing to take his wife and children to live with him and maintain them within the resources at his disposal. Thus, neither of the aforesaid decisions can be said to be authority for the proposition that mere denial of relationship by the husband would disentitle the wife from claiming interim maintenance.

5. From the ratio of the three decisions of this Court mentioned above, it is clear that this Court has been consistency taking the view that in a suit filed by the wife for recovery of maintenance from her husband, the Court has power under S. 151 of the Civil P.C to grant interim maintenance during pendency of the suit, but exercise of that power will depend upon facts and circumstances in each case. Some of the relevant matters to be considered are whether there are prima facie materials to establish marital relationship and whether the wife is able to make out a case for grant of interim maintenance. In taking this view, this Court has not accepted the extreme views taken by some other High Courts, one being that the Court has no power at all under S. 151 to grant interim maintenance in a suit for recovery of maintenance and the other that the wife has the right to get interim maintenance notwithstanding the denial of marital relationship between her and the defendant. At the hearing of this case, no good and convincing ground was advanced by the learned counsel for the parties that the principles laid down in the aforementioned decisions of this Court need re-consideration. On consideration, I am of the view that the principles of law have been correctly stated therein.

6. Evidently this is not a suit under any of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. This being a suit of civil nature, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit under S. 9 of the Civil P.C The prayer for interim maintenance cannot be one u/S. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act which provides for grant of pendente lite maintenance and expenses of the proceeding. No suit is contemplated u/s. 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act as the said section merely declares that a Hindu wife whether married before or after the commencement of the said Act shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime. In other words, the said section merely recognises the right of a Hindu wife to be maintained by her husband, which right was also recognised even under the texts of Hindu Law before enactment of the aforesaid Act. Her right to be maintained as declared and recognised by S. 18 of the said Act is an enforceable right which can be enforced in a suit in the Civil Court. In a decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 1348, Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate, Jaipur v. Commr. of I.T, New Delhi, their Lordships have indicated that every court is constituted for the purpose of doing justice according to law and must be deemed to possess as a necessary corollary and as inherent in its very constitution all or such powers as may be necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice. The limitation for exercise of inherent powers as has been pointed out in various decisions is that where there are express provisions in law dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or impliedly exhaust the scope of the powers of the Court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across such powers. There is no express provision in any law or in the C.P.C for grant of interim maintenance in a suit for maintenance. In such cases the court would have inherent powers to pass such order as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice.

7. I would thus answer the questions posed as follows:—

(i) That mere denial of marital relationship by the defendant would not disentitle the plaintiff from being entitled to interim maintenance;

(ii) That the Court would have jurisdiction u/s. 151, C.P.C to grant interim maintenance in such suits.

8. Coming to the facts of this case, it appears from the impugned order that the present petitioner had issued a notice through his lawyer to opposite party No. 1 wherein he had admitted the marriage. Besides, there was an agreement between the present petitioner and opposite party No. 1 on 2-9-1976 which was registered and wherein the marriage between them was admitted. These documents prima facie establish the marital relationship between the two and, therefore, the learned trial Court was justified in awarding interim maintenance. No other point has been urged in this revision far less within the scope of S. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

In the result, the revision is dismissed. No costs.

H.L Agrawal, C.J:— 9. I agree.

D.P Mohapatra, J.:— 10. I agree.

Revision dismissed.