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Satyanarayan Verma Sharma v. Krushna Chandra Sahu Opp. Party.

Orissa High Court
Apr 9, 1986
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.C. Mohapatra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner (judgment-debtor) brought this Civil Revision against an order of the executing court that rejected his application to stay execution proceedings under Order 21, Rule 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure pending a pending civil suit. The factual matrix as stated in the opinion is as follows:

  • The petitioner was a tenant of a house in Cuttack town.
  • The decree-holder applied for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of bona fide requirement; the House Rent Controller passed an eviction order which was confirmed in appeal.
  • The petitioner filed Title Suit No. 150 of 1985 seeking a declaration that the eviction order under the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1947 was without jurisdiction and void, and sought a permanent injunction to restrain eviction; that suit is pending trial.
  • The decree-holder instituted Execution Case No. 3 of 1984 in the Munsif, First Court, Cuttack under section 15 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act for eviction.
  • An objection under section 47, C.P.C. challenging executability of the decree as a nullity was filed but was "not entertained on merits" in the execution proceeding.
  • The petitioner subsequently applied for a stay of execution under Order 21, Rule 29 C.P.C.; the executing court rejected that application, leading to the present revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the executing court properly exercised its discretion under Order 21, Rule 29, C.P.C. in refusing to stay execution pending the petitioner’s Title Suit.
  2. Whether the petitioner was acting mala fide or merely prolonging litigation such that a stay ought to be refused.
  3. Whether the executing court erred by going into the merits of the validity of the decree (the eviction order) when deciding the stay application.
  4. Whether the vagueness of the petitioner’s stay application (absence of specific facts showing irreparable injury and balance of convenience) precludes revisional interference despite flaws in the executing court’s reasoning.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (learned counsel M.N. Das)

  • The executing court exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity by placing undue importance on the fact that the petitioner had earlier had his plea negatived in other forums; this was a wrongful emphasis in refusing stay.
  • The executing court failed to consider the balance of convenience and the nature of injury that the petitioner would sustain if evicted during the pendency of the suit.
  • On the substantive side, counsel relied on earlier decisions (including Dukhishyam Das v. Satyabadi Sahu and others) to contend that the House Rent Control Act did not apply to the house because section 20 excludes houses owned by the State Government; he argued there were legal grounds to challenge the jurisdiction/validity of the eviction order.

Decree-holder's Arguments (learned counsel S.P. Misra)

  • The executing court applied the correct legal principle in rejecting the stay application.
  • The discretionary refusal to stay execution by the executing court ought not to be interfered with in revision, as it was a judicial exercise of discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dukhishyam Das v. Satyabadi Sahu (1972 2 C.W.R. 1252) Relied on by petitioner to argue that the House Rent Control Act is not applicable as section 20 excludes State-owned houses. The decision was cited by petitioner in support of his contention about non-applicability of the Act; the court noted the contention but declined to decide that factual/legal issue so as not to prejudice the suit.
Abhimanyu Jee v. Dr. Gaya Prasad (54 1982 C.L.T. 67) Holds that House Rent Control authorities have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the relationship of landlord and tenant and that such determination is res judicata in civil adjudication. Referenced as authority showing that House Rent Control findings on landlord-tenant relationship carry significant preclusive effect; used by the court in summarising competing authorities but not determinatively decided for the suit.
Ghasi Sahu v. Himachal Sahu (1986 61 CLT 125) Same principle as Abhimanyu Jee: exclusive jurisdiction of House Rent Control authorities to determine landlord-tenant relationship. Noted by the court as part of the body of authority; the court refrained from adjudicating the underlying dispute of authority between forums in the revision.
Yallalaka Apanna v. Bhagirathi Padhy (28 1982 C.L.T. 311) Holds that civil courts have jurisdiction to determine the relationship of landlord and tenant. Cited by petitioner to support a contrary view to exclusive finality of House Rent Controller determinations; the court recorded these competing authorities but did not resolve the conflict in this revision.
Beharilal Neparam (firm) v. Urdhaba Charan Sahu (I.L.R. 1965 Cutt. 539) Holds that decisions by House Rent Controllers on preliminary or jurisdictional facts are not final or conclusive, and civil court jurisdiction is not barred to that extent. Relied upon by the petitioner to argue that the civil court retains jurisdiction on certain issues; the court noted this authority in summarising the legal landscape but did not decide the underlying dispute.
Judhistir Jena v. Surendra Mohanty (I.L.R. 1970 Cutt. 320) Explains scope of discretion under Order 21, Rule 29 C.P.C.: fundamental consideration is that the decree-holder should not be deprived of the fruits of the decree except for good reasons; no hard and fast rules. The court relied on this decision to emphasise that stay of execution is a wide but carefully restrained discretion and that the decree-holder's enjoyment of the decree is a primary consideration.
Rauf Khan v. Sara Bibi (61 1986 C.L.T 114) Applied the principle that a judgment-debtor (tenant) should not, on the off-chance of success, deprive the decree-holder of the fruits of an eviction decree. Used to illustrate that where the executing court's order effects deprivation of the decree-holder's rights, stay should generally be refused; formed part of the court's assessment of the discretionary framework.
Pheli Dibya v. Idan Bibi (1986 1 O.L.R 183) States that courts must examine whether there would be irreparable injury unless stay is granted and in whose favour the balance of convenience lies. Adopted by the court to stress that the balance of convenience and irreparable injury are essential considerations when exercising discretion under Order 21, Rule 29.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first reproducing Order 21, Rule 29, C.P.C. and observing that the provision vests a wide discretion in the executing court to stay execution when a suit is pending; however, the wider the discretion the greater the restraint in its exercise. The court's reasoning unfolded along these main lines:

  1. Interpretation of the statutory discretion: The court emphasised that stay power under Order 21, Rule 29 is wide but must be exercised judicially and cautiously because a decree, until set aside, is valid and the decree-holder should not be lightly deprived of its fruits.
  2. Assessment of bona fides: The court considered the petitioner’s bona fide contentions (including reliance on several precedents and a contention that the Act did not apply) but declined to decide the substantive legal issue in the revision so as not to prejudice the pending suit. On the record, the court found no material to conclude the petitioner acted mala fide or merely to prolong litigation.
  3. Applicability of precedent on discretion: The court summarised authorities (notably Judhistir Jena, Rauf Khan and Pheli Dibya) emphasising that the essential considerations for granting a stay are whether the decree-holder would be deprived of the fruits of the decree, whether irreparable injury would result, and where the balance of convenience lies.
  4. Error by the executing court: The court found that the executing court erred by considering the merits of validity of the decree (i.e., going into the substantive challenge to the eviction order) instead of confining itself to the proper discretionary assessment. For that reason, the executing court’s order was "vitiated" on that ground.
  5. Practical restraint on revisional interference: Despite concluding that the executing court’s order was not sustainable in law, the court nevertheless declined to exercise revisional power to set aside and remit the matter because the petitioner’s application for stay (placed before the executing court and before the revisional court) was vague. The application did not supply specific facts or circumstances to allow a judicial determination of irreparable injury or a sensible balancing of convenience. Setting aside the order and sending the matter back for reconsideration on a similarly vague application would serve no useful purpose.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision is dismissed. The court concluded that although the executing court ought not to have considered the merits of the decree when rejecting the stay application (and that that aspect rendered the order unsustainable in law), the revisional court would not interfere because the petitioner’s stay application was vague and did not present necessary material for judicial determination of irreparable injury or balance of convenience. The dismissal was made without any order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the executing court’s order rejecting the stay stands and the execution proceedings may continue.
  • The decision emphasises that applications for stay under Order 21, Rule 29 must present concrete facts relevant to irreparable injury and balance of convenience; mere assertion of vague irreparable injury will not justify revisional interference even where the executing court erred in addressing merits.
  • No new legal rule or broader precedent is purportedly established by this opinion beyond the court’s application of existing principles; the court expressly avoided deciding the substantive issues raised in the petitioner’s Title Suit to prevent prejudice to the parties.

Disposition: Revision dismissed.

Show all summary ...

S.C Mohapatra, J.:— Judgment-debtor is the petitioner in this Civil Revision against the order rejecting his prayer for stay of the execution proceeding in exercise of the power under Order 21, Rule 29 Code of Civil Procedure during pendency of the suit seeking the relief to get rid of the effect of the decree.

2. Judgment-debtor was a tenant in respect of a house in Cuttack town. On the application of the decree-holder for evicting the judgment-debtor from the house on the ground of his bona fide requirement of the same the House Rent Controller passed the order of eviction which was confirmed in appeal. Judgment-debtor has filed Title Suit No. 150 of 1985 for a declaration that the order of eviction passed in the house rent control proceeding under the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) is without jurisdiction and is a nullity and for a permanent injunction restraining the decree-holder from evicting him from the disputed house under such a void order. The suit is now pending trial. The decree-holder filed Execution Case No. 3 of 1984 in the court of Munsif, First Court, Cuttack for evicting the judgment-debtor as provided under section 15 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1947. An objection under section 47, C.P.C was filed challenging the executability of the decree on the ground that the same is a nullity which has not been entertained on merits. Thereafter the application for stay of the Execution Case was filed giving rise to the impugned order.

3. The trial court rejected the application for stay on the ground that the plea in the suit was raised before the House Rent Control authorities to be negatived. The same plea was also raised in the execution proceeding not to be entertained on merits. That order has not been assailed and the suit has been filed on the self-same ground. On such finding, the trial court observed:

“…Law is fairly settled that the discretion to stay execution of the decree u/O. 21, rule 29, C.P.C pending a suit by the judgment-debtor should be exercised judicially and not mechanically as a matter of course and court should duly consider that the party who has obtained a valid decree is not deprived enjoying the fruits thereof. In this case the Jdr. after repeatedly agitating the same plea in different forums has come up with the present suit and hence simply because he has filed a suit the further proceedings of the execution case should not be stayed…”

4. Mr. M.N Das, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the executing court exercised the jurisdiction with material irregularity in giving undue importance to the point of attack of the eviction order being refused in the various forums and has not unduly given importance that the decree-holder would be deprived of enjoying the fruits of the decree obtained by him. It has not taken into consideration the question of balance of convenience and nature of injury that would be sustained by the petitioner if he is evicted during the pendency of the suit.

5. Mr. S.P Misra, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party-decree-holder, submitted that the executing court has rejected the application keeping the correct principle in view and in revision the discretionary power exercised keeping in view the correct principle ought not to be interfered with.

6. To appreciate the rival contentions, Order 21, rule 29, C.P.C is to be kept in view, which reads as follows:

“29. Stay of execution pending suit between decree-holder and judgment-debtor:—

Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court or of a decree which is being executed by such Court on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided:

Provided that if the decree is one for payment of money, the Court shall, if it grants stay without requiring security, record its reasons for so doing.”

7. A plain reading of the provision makes it clear that wide discretion has been vested in the Court. It is to be remembered that wider the discretion the greater is the restraint in exercise of the same.

8. Mr. M.N Das relied upon a Division Bench decision reported in Dukhishyam Das v. Satyabadi Sahu . 1972 2 C.W.R 1252., in support of the plea taken in the suit that the House Rent Control Act is not applicable to the house in question in view of section 20 thereof excluding the houses owned by the State Government from operation of the Act. He submitted that the Darpatadari right of the landlord having been extinguished the opposite party does not continue to be a landlord and the house belongs to the State Government to be excluded from operation of the House Rent Control Act. There are two decisions of this Court reported in Abhimanyu Jee v. Dr. Gaya Prasad . 54 1982 C.L.T 67. and Ghasi Sahu v. Himachal Sahu . 1986 61 CLT 125., where it has been held that the House Rent Control authorities have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the relationship of landlord and tenant which determination is a res judicata in any adjudication in a civil suit. Mr. M.N Das submitted that the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Rent Control authorities would be confined to the order of eviction as provided under section 6 of the Act and the finding relating to relationship of landlord and tenant is not expressly vested in the House Rent Control authorities under any of the provisions of the Act which would only be ancillary finding and in view of the Division Bench decision reported in Yallalaka Apanna v. Bhagirathi Padhy . 28 1982 C.L.T 311., the civil court has always the jurisdiction to determine the relationship of landlord and tenant. He also relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Beharilal Neparam (firm) v. Urdhaba Charan Sahu . I.L.R 1965 Cutt. 539., where it has been held that the jurisdiction of the House Rent Control authorities relating to determination of the question of relationship of landlord and tenant is not final. It has been observed:

“…It is, however, true that the decision given by the House Rent Controller on these preliminary or jurisdictional facts, as it appears from the terms and scheme of the Act is neither final nor conclusive and, therefore, to that extent the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred - as is the case thereunder in respect of decision given by him on the essential facts…”

9. In view of the aforesaid three Division Bench decisions of this Court, Mr. Das submitted that it cannot be said that the judgment-debtor-petitioner was not proceeding bona fide merely because his contentions could not be appreciated by the authorities earlier.

10. Although I was tempted to give a decision on this question, the same would have the effect of determining an issue in the suit itself. Therefore, not to prejudice either party I restrain myself from entering into the said question. Sufficient it is to say at this stage that there is no material to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was acting mala fide in filing the suit just to prolong the litigation. In case this would have been the only ground, I would have no hesitation to set aside the order of the trial court. However, mere bona fides in filing a suit are not sufficient for stay of the execution proceeding.

11. Scope of exercise of the discretion under Order 21, rule 29, C.P.C, has been well explained in a decision of this Court reported in Judhistir Jena v. Surendra Mohanty . I.L.R 1970 Cutt. 320., where it has been held that the fundamental consideration is that the party obtaining a decree should not be deprived of the fruits of the decree except for good reasons and until set aside it stands good and should not be lightly dealt with on the off chance that another suit to set aside the decree might succeed. While so observing, it was held:

“No hard and fast rule can be laid down in what cases stay would be granted or refused...”

12. Relying upon the aforesaid decision, this Court in a decision reported in Rauf Khan v. Sara Bibi . 61 1986 C.L.T 114., held that the judgment-debtor who was a tenant under the Orissa House Rent Control Act to be evicted in the execution case can recover possession of the house of the off chance of his success and the decree-holder-landlord cannot be deprived of enjoying the fruits of the order of eviction obtained by her.

13. In another decision of this Court reported in Pheli Dibya v. Idan Bibi . 1986 1 O.L.R 183., it has been observed:

“Courts are to examine whether there would be irreparable injury unless the stay is granted and in whose favour the balance of convenience would lie.”

14. In that case it was found out that the tenant to be evicted under the Act had a house of his own close to the disputed property and was not to become homeless and the decree-holder-landlord had been deprived of the fruits of the decree for long eighteen years. On the facts and in the circumstances of both those cases, it was held that no stay should be granted.

15. The net effect of the above three decisions is that the wide discretionary power of the executing court to stay the execution proceeding during the pendency of a suit in that Court is to be exercised keeping in view the fact that the grant of stay will have the effect of depriving the decree-holder of the enjoyment of the fruits of the decree obtained by him and therefrom the nature of the injury and the balance of convenience in granting or refusing the stay would be carefully considered on the facts and circumstances available in a case.

16. The. Executing Court has not considered this aspect of the matter excepting observing that the discretion is to be exercised judicially, as has been quoted earlier. The order on that ground is also vitiated.

17. In spite of the fact that I come to the conclusion that the impugned order is liable to be set aside, I find that no useful purpose would be served in setting aside the order since on reading the application under Order 21, rule 29, C.P.C. I find that except making a vague statement of irreparable injury no facts and circumstances have been indicated therein for judicial determination of the balance of convenience and irreparable injury by a Court. When no useful purpose would be served in setting aside the order and remitting back the matter for reconsideration on a vague application, the revisional power under section 115, C.P.C, need not be exercised in this case.

18. In conclusion while observing that the Executing Court ought not to have considered the merit of the validity of the decree as raised in the suit and the order was not sustainable in law, I am not able to interfere with the order of rejection on account of the vagueness of the assertions in the application for stay under Order 21, rule 29, C.P.C The Civil Revision is accordingly dismissed; but without any order as to costs.

19. Revision dismissed