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Narayan Chandra Jena v. State Transport Authority And Others

Orissa High Court
Oct 1, 1986
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (L. Rath, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner applied for renewal of his All Orissa Contract Carriage Permit before its expiry. No external representations were filed opposing the renewal application. The Chairman, State Transport Authority, Orissa, by order dated 27-05-1985 rejected the renewal application relying on Vehicle Check Report (V.C.R.) statements which stated that the petitioner's vehicle had on three occasions been used as a stage carriage and on several occasions was found carrying passengers in excess of the prescribed seating capacity. The petitioner appealed to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Orissa, which upheld the Chairman's decision, reasoning that the vehicle had repeatedly contravened permit conditions, that the offences had been compounded by payment of penalties, and that there was no necessity to observe the principles of natural justice because, in the Tribunal's view, no explanation by the petitioner could have altered the outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application for renewal of a contract carriage permit can be refused on the basis of the past conduct of the permit holder.
  2. Whether, before passing an order refusing renewal of a contract carriage permit, the applicant is entitled to an opportunity of hearing (application of the audi alteram partem rule).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioner contended that the renewal order was passed without affording him an opportunity to be heard.
  • Implicit in the petitioner's position (as advanced by his counsel Mr. Pal) is that denial of hearing was prejudicial and rendered the Chairman's order invalid.

Respondent / State's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The learned Standing Counsel (Transport) argued that the Supreme Court's reference to "overweighing reasons of public interest" should be read to mean that public interest in a general sense may weigh with authorities in granting or refusing permits.
  • The Standing Counsel further argued that references in Supreme Court observations to refusing permits where an "operator is otherwise disqualified" justified refusal on account of the petitioner's past conduct.
  • The Tribunal argued (in its order) that there was no necessity to observe principles of natural justice because the petitioner could not have offered any explanation that would have altered the decision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1971) 1 Cut WR 115 — Bibhutibhusan Mukherjee v. Regional Transport Authority, Puri Sets out the factors for consideration by the R.T.A. in contract carriage applications: (a) inadequacy of existing service and (b) necessity for grant of additional permits in public interest. The Court relied on this earlier Bench decision to support the conclusion that the R.T.A.'s considerations are confined to need/necessity and public-interest related to the number of contract carriages, not past conduct of an applicant.
O.J.C. No. 2395/84 — Shyam Sundar Agarwala v. Chairman, R.T.A., Koraput (unreported, disposed 17-12-1984) Interpreted S.50 to mean the R.T.A. must confine itself to whether the number of contract carriages already granted is sufficient or excessive; prohibits consideration of irrelevant matters. Used to reinforce that S.50 restricts relevant considerations to adequacy of numbers and public interest defined in that context; supports the view that past conduct is an irrelevant consideration under S.50.
AIR 1979 SC 114 — D. Nataraja Mudaliar v. State Transport Authority, Madras Affirms that running a contract carriage is a fundamental right and that renewal is ordinarily an ordinary right unless outweighed by reasons of public interest; guidelines for grant/renewal follow statutory criteria. The Court cited this decision to emphasize that a permit-holder ordinarily has a right of renewal unless outweighing public-interest reasons (as defined under S.50) justify refusal; used to show the limited scope for denying renewal.
AIR 1981 SC 136 — S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan Affirms the universal application of audi alteram partem and that exclusion of natural justice must be clearly shown by statute or exceptional circumstances. The Court relied on this authority to hold that even where a statute is silent, principles of natural justice must be read into the procedure and that denial of hearing is itself prejudicial.
AIR 1981 SC 818 — Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India Supports the proposition that principles of natural justice are fundamental and cannot be excluded except where statute clearly does so or in exceptional circumstances. Used as additional Supreme Court authority to support the conclusion that absence of hearing invalidates administrative action affecting rights or interests unless exclusion is demonstrably intended.
AIR 1986 SC 180 — Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation Explains that power to act without notice is to be exercised sparingly and that ordinary rule requires those affected to be heard; burden lies on those asserting exclusion of audi alteram partem. Quoted at length to show that a statutory silence does not permit routine exclusion of hearing; applied to conclude that the Chairman's denial of hearing was unlawful absent statutory exclusion or proven exigency.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first examining the relevant statutory framework under the Motor Vehicles Act and the Orissa Rules: applications for contract carriage permits (S.49), grant of permits (S.51), timing and treatment of renewals (S.57(1), S.58(2)) and the specific criteria in S.50 which direct the Regional Transport Authority (R.T.A.) to consider whether additional contract carriages are necessary or desirable in the public interest and to take into account representations relating to whether the number of contract carriages already granted is sufficient or excessive.

From a textual reading of S.50 and related provisions, the court concluded that the R.T.A.'s permissible considerations are strictly confined to the adequacy of the number of contract carriages in the region and the question whether an additional permit is necessary in the public interest defined in that narrow sense. The court contrasted these statutory considerations with those relevant to stage carriage permits (S.47), where the public interest in a broader sense may be relevant, and emphasized that contract carriage is essentially a contractual arrangement between parties and that statutory control over it is limited to matters specifically enumerated by the statute.

Applying these principles, the court held that the past conduct of the permit-holder (including instances of the vehicle being used as a stage carriage or overloading, which had been compounded by payment of penalties) was not a relevant consideration under S.50 for refusing renewal of a contract carriage permit. The court relied on earlier Bench decisions of this Court (including Bibhutibhusan Mukherjee and the unreported Shyam Sundar Agarwala decision) and on Supreme Court authority (D. Nataraja Mudaliar) to reinforce that renewal is ordinarily a right and rejection must rest on the statutory public-interest grounds connected to numerical adequacy.

The court rejected the State's argument that references to "overweighing reasons of public interest" or to an "operator otherwise disqualified" permitted consideration of past conduct. It held that the Supreme Court's references to public interest were made in the context of S.50 and do not expand the concept of public interest beyond the statutory compass; and that "disqualification" contemplated by the Supreme Court means disqualification arising from law (statutory disqualification) and not informal or unlegislated disqualifications based on past conduct unless prescribed by law.

On the question of procedural fairness, the court held that although S.50 does not expressly provide for an opportunity of hearing, the audi alteram partem principle is a universal rule of administrative law which must be read into statutes that are silent on procedure. Citing S.L. Kapoor, Swadeshi Cotton Mills and Olga Tellis, the court observed that exclusion of natural justice can be presumed only in exceptional circumstances or where the statute clearly excludes it; mere assertion that hearing would be futile is not a basis for dispensing with the rule. Because the Chairman's order was passed without affording the petitioner an opportunity to be heard, the order was liable to be struck down on that ground alone.

Consequently, the court combined its conclusions on substance (past conduct not a relevant ground under S.50) and on procedure (denial of hearing fatal) to determine that the impugned orders must be quashed and the matter remitted for fresh consideration in conformity with the statutory criteria and with observance of natural justice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was allowed. The orders of the Chairman, State Transport Authority, Orissa refusing to renew the petitioner's contract carriage permit and the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal confirming that refusal were quashed. The Chairman, State Transport Authority was directed to dispose of the petitioner's renewal application afresh within three months in accordance with the observations of the Court. A writ of certiorari was issued and the hearing fee was assessed at Rs. 200/-.

Implications:

  • The Court reaffirmed that under S.50 the relevant considerations for grant or renewal of a contract carriage permit are confined to whether additional contract carriages are necessary or desirable in the public interest in the specific sense of numerical adequacy; past conduct of the permit-holder (especially where offences have been compounded by payment of penalty) is not a permissible ground to refuse renewal under that provision.
  • The Court held that the audi alteram partem rule applies where a decision affects a person's rights or interests and must be read into statutory schemes that are silent on procedure; administrative orders affecting rights passed without affording an opportunity to be heard are vulnerable to being set aside.
  • Direct effect on parties: The petitioner obtains a fresh consideration of his renewal application within three months; the previous refusal and the Tribunal confirmation are set aside. The opinion applies established statutory interpretation and administrative-law principles rather than announcing a novel precedent.

Additional note: Justice G.B. Patnaik concurred with the opinion ("I agree").

Show all summary ...

L. Rath, J.:— The issues whether an application for renewal of the contract carriage permit can be refused on the consideration of past conduct of the permit holder and whether before such order of refusal is passed, the applicant is entitled to a hearing are questions which fall for decision in this application made under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

2. The facts adumbrated are that the petitioner, before expiry of his All Orissa Contract Carriage Permit, had applied for renewal of the permit. No representations had been filed against such renewal application, but the Chairman, State Transport Authority, Orissa, by his order dt. 27-5-1985 (Annexure 1) rejected the application on basis of the V.C.R (Vehicle check report) statements showing that the vehicle had been found on three occasions being utilised as stage carriage and on few occasions it has been found plying with passengers in excess of the prescribed seating capacity. An appeal was carried by the petitioner before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Orissa which was also rejected holding that on several previous occasions the petitioner's vehicle had been found to be plying in contravention of the permit conditions by either being used as a stage carriage vehicle or overloading the same, which offences he had compounded by paying penalty and hence the application had been rightly rejected. Besides the Tribunal also held there was no necessity of observance of the principles of natural justice since in view of the established facts, there was no explanation which could have been submitted by the petitioner against the allegations.

3. So far as the first contention is concerned, it would be useful to refer to some of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (briefly, the Act) and the Orissa Rules framed thereunder. An application for permit to use a vehicle as a contract carriage is made under S. 49 of the Act. The Regional Transport Authority grants the permit under S. 51 of the Act and in so granting, may burden the permit with any one or more of the conditions set out in the section. Section 57(1) states that an application for contract carriage permit may be made at any time and S. 58(2) directs that an application for renewal of a permit has to be made not less than sixty days before the expiry of the permit and has to be disposed of as if it were an application of a permit. The renewal applications are entitled preference over new applications. Section 57(6) stipulates that:—

“57(6) When any representation has been made by the persons or authorities referred to in S. 50 to the effect that the number of contract carriages for which permits have already been granted in any region or any area within a region is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or of such area, whether such representation is made in connection with a particular application for the grant of a contract carriage permit or otherwise, the Regional Transport Authority may take any such steps as it considers appropriate for the hearing of the representation in the presence of any persons likely to be affected thereby.”

Section 50 of the Act runs as follows:—

“50. Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for contract carriage permit:— A Regional Transport Authority shall, (in considering an application for) a contract carriage permit, have regard to the extent to which additional contract carriages may be necessary or desirable in the public interest; and shall also take into consideration any representations which may then be made or which may previously have been made by persons already holding contract carriage permits in the region or by any local authority or police authority in the region to the effect that the number of contract carriages for which permits have already been granted is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or any area within the region.”

A bare perusal of sections shows that considerations available to weigh with the Regional Transport Authority in dealing with an application for contract carriage permit is only regarding the extent to which additional contract carriage is necessary or desirable in public interest and in so considering he is to take into consideration any representation which might have been made by the persons who are already holding contract carriage permits in the region or similar representations by any local authority or police authority. However, the consideration by the Regional Transport Authority as well as the representations objecting to the application are to be confined only to the adequacy of the number of the contract carriages running in the region and the consideration of public interest to weigh with the Regional Transport Authority is also in relation to the number of the vehicles plying in the region as satisfying the public interest. Thus the only factor which is to be considered in granting a contract carriage permit is the number of the contract carriage vehicles plying in the region. The public interest is also not public interest in general but is the decision as to whether any additional contract carriage is necessary in public interest. All other considerations are extraneous and outside the ambit of S. 50. The factors to weigh in grant of a contract carriage permit are different than the factors to be taken into consideration under S. 47 for grant of a stage carriage permit where interest of the public generally is also a relevant consideration unlike that of contract carriages. Contract carriage is defined in S. 2(3) to mean only a vehicle which carries a passenger or passengers for hire or reward under a contract expressed or implied for the use of the vehicle as a whole either on a time basis whether or not with reference to any route or distance or from one point to another with a further prohibition that it shall not stop to pick up or set down, along with the line of route, passengers not included in the contract. The contract carriage thus, as the very name signifies, is a vehicle taken on contract for a specific purpose. It is primarily a matter of contract between the two parties. Such a contract between the two parties can be controlled by a statutory authority only to the extent as specified in the statute which, so far as grant of permit is concerned, extends under S. 50 only to consider the interest of the public as to whether the existing number of permits justify grant of any other permit. No other limitations can be read into the independent contract between the two parties. In this view of the matter, the past conduct of the applicant is not a relevant factor to be considered for renewal of a permit. Besides such conduct of the petitioner had been compounded by payment of penalty as assessed. It cannot again form the basis for refusal of the renewal of permit to him.

4. This view is also supported by the earlier Bench decisions of this Court reported in (1971) 1 Cut WR 115, (Bibhutibhusan Mukherjee v. Regional Transport Authority, Puri) in which it was held:

“So far as applications for contract carriage permits are concerned, S. 60 contains factors for consideration by the R.T.A in disposal of the application. They are:

(a) inadequacy of the existing service and

(b) necessity for grant of additional permits in public interest.”

In another unreported decision in O.J.C No. 2395/84, (Shyam Sundar Agarwala v. Chairman, R.T.A, Koraput) disposed of on 17-12-1984 discussing S. 50, it was observed:

“x x x A bare reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that the Regional Transport Authority while considering an application for contract carriage permit shall have regard to the fact that whether the addition of the contract carriage would be necessary or desirable in the public interest and further they shall take into consideration any representation which may be made by persons already holding contract carriage permits in the region or by any local authority or police authority in the region. But all these representations must relate to one fact, namely, whether the number of contract carriages for which permits have already been granted is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or any area within the region. It is well-known that when a statute confers power on an authority and also provides as to what are the relevant considerations for exercise of that power, it is not open to such authority to exercise power on considerations other than those provided for in the statute. Section 50 of the Act prohibits all irrelevant considerations or consideration of all irrelevant matters in the matter of granting a permit for contract carriage and what is relevant is whether the number of contract carriages already on the route is sufficient and whether the permit applied for would be in the larger interest of the public.”

To run a contract carriage is unquestionably a fundamental right. As was expounded in AIR 1979 SC 114, (D. Nataraja Mudaliar v. State Transport Authority, Madras, Madras) such fundamental right can only be restricted reasonably for which the provisions have been made in the Motor Vehicles Act wherein S. 50 of the Act specifies the guidelines. As regards renewal of permit the Hon'ble Court observed as follows

“The Authority must remember that a permit holder has an ordinary right of renewal unless it is shown that outweighing reasons of public interest lead to a contrary result, permits are not bounty but right, restricted reasonably by the Motor Vehicles Act.”

The Hon'ble Court further observed, as regards the guidelines for grant of the permit, as follows:—

“The key criterion when a contract carriage permit is sought, is to ask oneself whether an extra vehicle is unnecessary or undesirable in the public interest, and whether, further, the permits already granted are sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region. After all, a few hundred vehicles admittedly ply and one contract carriage operator is asking for a single permit. What makes it unnecessary or undesirable in the public interest? Ordinarily, having regard to the explosive increase in traffic in our country, more vehicles are needed. Of course, if the roads are in a precarious condition or competitive racing or reckless driving on the roads make for hazards or if the operator is otherwise disqualified, one may reduce the number of vehicles and refuse permit or renewal Nothing of the sort is mentioned in any of the orders rejecting the permit. Assuming there are around 300 or 400 motor vehicles, how does I one more become too many? It is a preposterous proposition to say so, in the absence of some evidence. If there is no evidence to warrant such a conclusion the right to the permit must prevail.”

It is thus no longer res integra that nothing but the necessity in public interest of adding a new contract carriage to the already existing ones is relevant for grant or renewal of contract carriage permit. The consideration is not a vague surmise, but is liable to be based on objective considerations itself founded on relevant data and materials as to whether the increase in the number of permits would affect public interest.

5. It is however contended by the learned Standing Counsel (Transport) that since the aforesaid observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court refers to “Overweighing reasons of public interest” it should be construed as if it has been held that public interest in general should weigh with the authorities in granting or refusing the permit. The argument though ingenious, yet must be rejected forthwith. It is without ambiguity that their Lordships have used ‘public interest’ only in the background of use of the words in S. 50 of the Act and not otherwise. It was also further contended by the learned Standing Counsel that since in the aforesaid observations, it was stated that the number of vehicles may be reduced and permit may be refused if the ‘operator’ is otherwise disqualified”, it should be held that the refusal or renewal of the permit is justified. The submission is wholly misconceived. It is not the case of the State that the petitioner was in any way otherwise disqualified. ‘Disqualification’ as contemplated by their Lordships in the passage quoted above is one which emanates from any law. Such a disqualification must be prescribed either by a legislation or through subordinate legislation wherever permissible. No such prescription of law is pointed out that a person, whose past conduct is such as that of the petitioner, suffers from a disqualification to renew his permit the contention thus merits rejection.

6. The next question which has been urged by Mr. Pal, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that the order by the Chairman, Regional Transport Authority was passed behind his back without affording him any opportunity to be heard and in the appeal the Tribunal rejected his contention holding that lack of opportunity to be heard did not cause any prejudice to the petitioner since even if he would have been heard, yet it would not have improved the matters in any manner. The objection raised by Mr. Pal is well founded. It is true that S. 50 in terms does not provide for granting an opportunity to be heard. But the audi alteram partem rule is of universal application and law is well settled that when a statute is silent regarding observance of the principles of natural justice, the rule shall be read into the statute as an inbuilt provision. The rule must be held to be a necessary postulate in all cases where a decision is to be taken affecting a person's rights or interest unless such rule is specifically excluded by the relevant statute. It is also well settled that failure to observe natural justice cannot be justified merely because the authority vested with the powers to decide is of the opinion that granting of such opportunity would be an exercise in futility since the person to be condemned can have nothing more to add. Non-observance of natural justice is itself a prejudice and independent proof of prejudice due to denial of natural justice is unnecessary. The principle has been upheld again and again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide AIR 1981 SC 136, (S.L Kapoor v. Jagmohan) and AIR 1981 SC 818, (Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India) and recently in AIR 1986 SC 180, (Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation) wherein Hon'ble Chief Justice Chandrachud spoke as follows:—

“It must further be presumed that, while vesting in the Commissioner the power to act without notice, the Legislature intended that the power should be exercised sparingly and in cases of urgency which brook no delay. In all other cases, no departure from audi alteram partem rule (Hear the other side’) could be presumed to have been intended. Sec. 314 is so designed as to exclude the principles of natural justice by way of exception and not as a general rule. There are situations which demand the exclusion of the rules of natural justice by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on. The ordinary rule which regulates all procedure is that persons who are likely to be affected by the proposed action must be afforded an opportunity of being heard as to why that action should not be taken. The hearing may be given individually or collectively, depending upon the facts of each situation. A departure from this fundamental rule of natural justice may be presumed to have been intended by the Legislature only in circumstances which warrant it. Such circumstances must be shown to exist. When so required, the burden being upon those who affirm their existence.”

Since admittedly, the order of the Chairman was passed behind the back of the petitioner, the order is also liable to be struck down on such count.

7. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the petition must succeed and the orders passed by the Chairman, State Transport Authority, Orissa, Cuttack refusing to renew the permit of the petitioner and the order of the Tribunal confirming the same must be quashed. The Chairman, State Transport Authority must dispose of the renewal application of the petitioner afresh within a period of three months keeping in view the observations made above. Let a writ of certiorari be issued accordingly. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 200/-.

G.B Patnaik, J.:— 8. I agree.

Petition allowed.