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Madkami Baja v. The State .
Judgment Summary — Behera, J. (with D.P. Mohapatra, J. agreeing)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment for the alleged murder of Padiami Ganga ("the deceased") on June 11, 1980 at village Pujariguda, Koraput district. The prosecution alleged that the appellant shot the deceased with an arrow when the deceased challenged the appellant about cultivating land belonging to Padiami Sanu (P.W. 1), the deceased's uncle. Nine prosecution witnesses were examined. P.W. 1 testified about a dying declaration in which the deceased named the appellant as his assailant. P.Ws. 4 and 6 were said to be eyewitnesses to the occurrence; P.W. 4 did not support the prosecution and was subject to leading questions under Section 154 of the Evidence Act. P.W. 6 deposed that he saw the appellant shoot an arrow at the deceased. P.W. 5 (doctor) gave autopsy evidence that death was homicidal. The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant primarily on the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 6. The appellant appealed against conviction and sentence; the present opinion disposes of that appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the evidence of P.W. 6 (an eyewitness who claimed to have seen the appellant shoot an arrow) was clear, cogent and trustworthy such that it could sustain a conviction.
- Whether the dying declaration attributed to the deceased (as recounted by P.W. 1) was reliable and, after strict scrutiny, safe to act upon to support conviction.
- Whether other evidentiary features relied upon by the prosecution — e.g., medical evidence, recovery of bow and arrow, and the prosecution's version of events — together established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- What effect, if any, did the inordinate delay in lodging the first information report (FIR) and other inconsistencies have on the trustworthiness of the prosecution case?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Panda)
- The evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 6 was not worthy of credence and should be rejected.
- P.Ws. 2 and 3, rather than corroborating P.W. 1's account of the dying declaration, would demolish it.
- Accordingly, the conviction based on those witnesses cannot be sustained.
State / Respondent's Arguments (Mr. Panigrahi, Additional Government Advocate)
- There was no reason to discard the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 6; the conviction was well-founded on their testimony.
- The prosecution case was supported by medical evidence (P.W. 5), by P.Ws. 2 and 3, and by the falsity of the defence version (the appellant's claim that the arrow of the deceased accidentally pierced the appellant's chest).
- The nature of external and internal injuries and the doctor's evidence showed death was homicidal and caused by shooting of an arrow, making the defence theory of accident improbable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rana Partap v. State of Haryana, (1983) 3 SCC 327 (AIR 1983 SC 680) | Illustration that different persons react differently on seeing a murderous assault; solitary witness evidence can be accepted in appropriate cases. | The Court acknowledged the principle but found inherent weaknesses and improbabilities in P.W.6's testimony and therefore did not accept it despite the general rule permitting acceptance of solitary witnesses in some circumstances. |
| Babuli Alias Narayan Bahera v. State Of Orissa, (1974) 3 SCC 562 (AIR 1974 SC 775) | Authority used concerning the effect of non-disclosure by an eyewitness on credibility. | The Court relied on this authority to support the view that P.W.6's failure to disclose the occurrence until the police arrived undermined his credibility. |
| Sonia Behera v. State of Orissa, 1983 SCC (Cri) 444 | Authority cited alongside Babuli to demonstrate that non-disclosure affects witness credibility. | Reinforced the Court's conclusion that P.W.6's unexplained non-disclosure was a serious credibility defect. |
| Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State Of Maharashtra, (1981) 2 SCC 35 (AIR 1981 SC 765) | Observation that it is not always possible to explain why witnesses may conspire or why false accusations are made; human motives vary. | Used to reject the argument that absence of explanation for possible motive or collusion necessarily invalidates prosecution witnesses; acknowledged limits on accused's ability to explain why witnesses implicate him. |
| K. Ramchandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 (AIR 1976 SC 1994) | Principle that dying declarations must be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and closest circumspection. | The Court applied this principle in testing P.W.1's account of the dying declaration and required clear assurance and corroboration before acting upon it. |
| Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 (AIR 1984 SC 1622) | General principles concerning the treatment of testimonial statements and dying declarations (reliability, necessity exception under S.32 Evidence Act). | Invoked to underscore that dying declarations are untested evidence admitted on the principle of necessity and must satisfy the court as to their trustworthiness. |
| Purna Chandra Singh v. State of Orissa, 1984 (2) Crimes 361 : 1984 (1) OLR 756 : (1985 Cri LJ 248 | Discussion of S.32 Evidence Act and the evidentiary value of dying declarations; reiteration that such statements are untested and need to be safe to act upon. | The Court quoted this decision to emphasise that dying declarations, being testimonial statements made out of court, are open to discredit and must satisfy the Court as unalloyed truth before reliance. |
| Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114 (AIR 1973 SC 1) | Authority on the importance of prompt lodging of the first information report (FIR) to avoid embellishment or afterthought. | The Court applied this authority to regard the inordinate delay (FIR lodged more than a day after occurrence) as a suspicious feature undermining the prosecution case, noting no reasonable explanation was given. |
| Thulia Kali v. State Of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 SCC 393 (AIR 1973 SC 501) | Emphasis on the vital evidentiary value of the FIR and that delay should be satisfactorily explained because delay invites suspicion of embellishment. | The Court relied on this principle to treat the prosecution's inordinate delay in lodging the FIR as a factor diminishing the trustworthiness of the prosecution version. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a focused credibility analysis of the key prosecution witnesses and procedural features relied upon to sustain conviction. The principal strands of reasoning were:
-
Assessment of P.W.6 (eyewitness): Although the law permits conviction on the testimony of a solitary witness if that testimony is clear, cogent and trustworthy, the Court found "inherent weaknesses and improbabilities" in P.W.6's account. Specific concerns included:
- P.W.6 had not disclosed what he purportedly saw to anyone in the village, including P.W.1, until the Investigating Officer arrived two days after the occurrence.
- There was no explanation as to why P.W.6 remained silent, and he did not attend an afternoon Panchayat meeting at which the incident was discussed.
- On these grounds the Court concluded non-disclosure without reasonable explanation fatally affected P.W.6's credibility and made it unsafe to rely on his testimony.
-
Scrutiny of P.W.1's account of the dying declaration: The Court applied the established principle that dying declarations merit "the strictest scrutiny and the closest circumspection" because they are untested statements and the accused cannot cross-examine the declarant. The Court found:
- P.W.1 was a highly interested witness with a land dispute against the appellant.
- There were material inconsistencies between P.W.1's claim about the dying declaration and the accounts of P.Ws.2 and 3: P.W.2's evidence indicated that P.W.1 only told villagers at a Panchayat meeting (about five hours after the occurrence) that the deceased had stated the appellant shot him; P.W.3 did not speak of any dying declaration being communicated to him by P.W.1.
- Thus the dying declaration as recounted by P.W.1 lacked independent, reliable corroboration and did not satisfy the Court that it was safe to act upon.
-
Other evidentiary and procedural considerations:
- There was no evidence regarding ownership of the material object of injury (M.O.I.).
- Recovery of a bow and arrow from the appellant's house (M.Os II and III) were deemed of no consequence on the record presented.
- The first information report was lodged more than a day after the incident (at 4 P.M. on June 12, 1980), and the prosecution offered no satisfactory explanation for this inordinate delay. The Court treated this delay as a further suspicious feature that undermined the prosecution version.
- Cumulative conclusion: Given the rejection of P.W.6's testimony and the inadequacy of P.W.1's dying declaration (when strictly scrutinised and in light of inconsistent supporting evidence), together with the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and absence of material corroboration, the Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge beyond reasonable doubt.
Holding and Implications
FINAL HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is set aside and the appellant is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith.
Implications:
- The direct effect is the reversal of conviction and the release of the appellant.
- The opinion does not discuss broader legal reforms or purport to lay down new precedent; it resolves the appeal on the facts and established principles relating to witness credibility, dying declarations, and delay in lodging FIRs.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; D.P. Mohapatra, J., concurred.
Behera, J.:— The appellant stands convicted under S. 302 of the I.P.C and sentenced thereunder to undergo imprisonment for life for having committed the murder of Padiami Ganga (to be described hereinafter as ‘the deceased’) on June 11, 1980 in village Pujariguda in the district of Koraput by shooting the deceased by means of an arrow (M.O.I) when the latter challenged him as to why he had cultivated the land of Padiami Sanu (P.W 1), his uncle, which had already been redeemed. To bring home the charge, the prosecution had examined nine witnesses of whom P.W 1 had testified about the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased naming the appellant as his assailant and P.Ws 4 and 6 were said to be the witnesses to the occurrence. Of them, P.W 4, did not support the case of the prosecution and he was put leading questions by it under S. 154 of the Evidence Act. P.W 6 had deposed that he had seen the appellant shooting an arrow at the deceased. There was the evidence of the doctor (P.W 5) who had conducted the autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and his evidence was that death was homicidal in nature. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution case mainly on the basis of the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 6 and recorded an order of conviction.
2. Mr. Panda, appearing for the appellant, has submitted that the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 6 was not worthy of credence and that of P.Ws 2 and 3, far from supporting the evidence of P.W 1 with regard to the dying declaration, would demolish it and therefore, the order of conviction cannot be sustained. Mr. Panigrahi, the learned Additional Government Advocate, has, however, submitted that there was no reason to discard the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 6 and the order of conviction is well-founded on the basis of their evidence supported by the medical evidence and the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3 apart from the falsity of the defence case put forward by the appellant in his statement at the trial that the arrow of the deceased had pierced into his chest when he fell down under a Salap tree. It is not disputed that the deceased had died a homicidal death. Regard being had to the nature of the external and internal injuries and the evidence of the doctor, it would be reasonable to hold that the shooting of an arrow had caused his death and the theory of the defence that the arrow had pierced into the chest of the deceased accidentally could not be accepted. Falsity of the defence version, however, would not establish the prosecution case and can only be an additional link if there be other evidence pointing to. The guilt of an accused person/)
3. There was, no doubt, some evidence that all was not well between P.W 1 on the one hand and the appellant on the other with regard to the possession of a piece of land. This could not constitute a motive for the appellant to commit the murder of the deceased. Even assuming and accepting the case of the prosecution that the intervention of the deceased by challenging the appellant as to why he had cultivated the land of P.W 1 could constitute some motive, it could be of no assistance to the prosecution in the absence of guilt-pointing evidence against the appellant. Motive, however adequate, cannot sustain a criminal charge. It may lend assurance to the other evidence on which the conclusion of guilt can be rested.
4. Coming to the evidence of P.W 6, he had stated thus:
“I know the accused and the deceased. In last Jesta on a Wednesday at about 11 A.M the deceased came to a place in between the house of the accused and his brother Pandu and enquired from Pandu as to why they cultivated the land of Sonu. This accused was then standing under the salap tree nearby. The salap tree is at a distance of 15 cubits from the spot. The accused was then armed with a bow and arrows. He shot an arrow at the deceased which hit just below the left armpit of the deceased. After the arrow shot the deceased ran away from the spot and after running some distance he fell on the ground near the threshing-floor of Dasarath Pujari.”
5. In order that the evidence of a solitary witness to the occurrence can be acted upon, such evidence must be clear, cogent and trustworthy and above reproach. The evidence of P.W 6 is not to be discarded merely because he had neither raised a cry nor had he intervened at the time of the occurrence as different persons react differently when they see a murderous assault. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in (1983) 3 SCC 327 : AIR 1983 SC 680 : (1983 Cri LJ 1272) Rana Partap v. State of Haryana. We, however, find that there are inherent weaknesses and improbabilities in the evidence of P.W 6 and it would not be safe, reasonable and proper to accept his evidence.
6. It would appear from the materials placed before the trial Court that until the Investigating Officer came to the scene two days after the occurrence, P.W 6 had not disclosed about what he had claimed to have seen to anyone in the village and not even to P.W 1. He had offered no explanation far less a reasonable one as to how and why he, kept quiet and did not disclose the occurrence to anyone if he had, in fact, seen the appellant shooting an arrow at the deceased. It would be seen from the evidence of P.Ws 1 to 3 that at about 4 P.M on the day of occurrence, a meeting of the Panchay at took place over this incident. There was no evidence that P.W 6 went to that meeting and told anyone about the occurrence. Non-disclosure of the occurrence to anyone until the police officer came to the scene without any reasonable explanation would certainly affect the credibility of the testimony of P.W 6 and it would not be reasonable and proper to accept his testimony. We are fortified in this conclusion by the observations made in the cases of Babuli Alias Narayan Bahera v. State Of Orissa , (1974) 3 SCC 562 : AIR 1974 SC 775 : (1974 Cri LJ 510) and Sonia Behera v. State of Orissa, 1983 SCC (Cri) 444 : (1983 Cri LJ 829).
7. It had not been brought out by the defence as to how and why this witness would be hands-in-glove with the prosecution and depose falsely against the appellant. But mysterious is the working of the human mind and it is not always possible for an accused person to say as to how and why a case has 1 been foisted against him and some witnesses have come forward to depose against him. In this connection, it would not be out of place to quote an extract from the decision of the Supreme Court in (1981) 2 SCC 35 : AIR 1981 SC 765 : (1981 Cri LJ 325) Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State Of Maharashtra .. The Supreme Court has observed (Para 33):
“Our judgment will raise a legitimate query: If the appellant was not present in his house at the material time, why then did so many people conspire to involve him falsely? The answer to such question is not always easy to give in criminal cases. Different motives operate on the minds of different persons in the making of unfounded accusations. Besides, human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicions.”
8. The evidence of a witness to the occurrence in a criminal case is not to be accepted merely because the defence has not been able to say as to why the accused has been involved or as to why a witness has come forward to depose against him or because the witness is a disinterested person. Disinterested evidence is not necessarily true and interested evidence is not necessarily false. In a criminal trial, a person accused of commission of an offence is not to answer the question: If not he, who?
9. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not pregared to place implicit reliance on the evidence of P.W 6 and hold that he had seen the appellant shooting an arrow at the deceased.
10. P.W 1 was undoubtedly a highly interested witness who would look for a successful termination of the trial against the appellant having dispute with him over the possession of a piece of land. According to him, after the deceased proceeded towards the house of the appellant, he followed and saw on the way that the deceased had fallen down with an arrow (M.O.I) sticking to his chest below his left arm-pit and on his query, the deceased gave out that the appellant had shot that arrow at him. The learned Sessions Judge has heavily relied on this evidence in support of the order of conviction. As has been held by the Supreme Court in (1976) 3 SCC 618 : AIR 1976 SC 1994 : (1976 Cri LJ 1548) (K. Ramchandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor), the Court has to apply the strictest scrutiny and the closest circumspection to a dying declaration made by the deceased. While great sanctity is attached to the words of a dying man because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lies or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person, the Court has to be on guard against the statement of the deceased being a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of his imagination. In this connection, reference may also be made to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in (1984) 4 SCC 116 : AIR 1984 SC 1622 : (1984 Cri LJ 1738) Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra. In the case of Purna Chandra Singh v. State of Orissa, 1984 (2) Crimes 361 : 1984 (1) OLR 756 : (1985 Cri LJ 248), this Court has referred to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court with regard to the concept of dying declaration and its evidentiary value. It has been observed and held (at p. 250 of Cri LJ):
“S. 32 of the Evidence Act provides that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead are themselves relevant facts when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are admitted on the principle of necessity. Being a testimonial statement made out of Court, the declarant is open to discredit in the same way as any other witness. The dying declaration is a piece of untested evidence and must, like any other evidence, satisfy the Court that what had been stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it.”
11. The evidence with regard to a dying declaration must be very carefully and critically scrutinised as the accused has no opportunity to challenge such statement by way of cross-examination.
12. The evidence of P.W 1 must be tested keeping in mind the aforesaid settled principles of law. P.W 1 had stated that after the dying declaration was made and the deceased succumbed to the injuries, he informed the villagers about it where after a meeting of the Panchayat was held. This had not been supported by P.W 2 who had given evidence that at about 4 P.M on the day, that is, about five hours after the occurrence which allegedly had taken place at about 11 A.M, P.W 1 went to him and told him that the appellant had shot an arrow at the deceased and that the deceased was lying dead. It would be seen from his evidence that thereafter a meeting of the Panchayat was convened. Thus P.W 2 had not, in terms, stated that at the first point of time when P.W 1 met P.W 2, he had stated about the statement said to have been made by the deceased. On the other hand, his evidence was that in the meeting of the Panchayat, the villagers learnt from P.W 1 that the deceased had stated that the appellant had shot an arrow at the deceased.
13. This was not the evidence of P.W 1 as he had not stated that he had made any such statement in the meeting of the Panchayat. The evidence of P.W 3 was that P.W 1 called him saying that the deceased had been shot by an arrow by the appellant and accordingly he went to the place where the dead body was lying. He had not spoken anything about the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased and his evidence would give an indication that no statement in this regard had been made by P.W 1 to him. Thus the evidence of P.W 1 regarding the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased had not found assurance from any other evidence of a reliable character.
14. There was no evidence about the ownership of M.O.I The recoveries of a bow and an arrow (M.Os II and III) from the house of the appellant were of no consequence.
15. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the first information report in this case had been lodged as late as at 4 P.M on June 12, 1980, i.e, more than a day after the occurrence. No reasonable explanation had been offered by the prosecution for this inordinate delay in lodging the first information report. The criticism of the defence that this would indicate that the report had been made after due deliberation is legitimate and cannot lightly be brushed aside. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114 : AIR 1973 SC 1 : (1973 Cri LJ 185) it is very useful if the first information report is recorded before there is time and opportunity to embellish or before the informants memory fades. Undue or unreasonable delay in lodging the first information report inevitably gives rise to suspicion which puts the Court on guard to look for the possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version. In (1972) 3 SCC 393 : AIR 1973 SC 501 : (1972 Cri LJ 1269) Thulia Kali v. State Of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court has observed and held (Para 12):
“The first information report in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The importance of the above report can hardly be overestimated from the standpoint of the accused. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of the eye-witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in lodging the first information report quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of afterthought. On account of delay the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account of concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential that the delay in the lodging of the first information report should be satisfactorily explained.”
16. In the instant case, no explanation had been given for the inordinate delay in lodging the first information report. This was yet another highly suspicious feature of which due notice had not been taken by the trial Court.
17. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the charge had not been established by the prosecution and the appellant was entitled to an acquittal.
18. The appeal is allowed. The order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is set aside. The appellant be set at liberty forthwith.
19. D.P Mohapatra, J.:— I agree.
20. Appeal allowed.
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