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Khatuna And Another v. Ramsewak Kashinath, A Partnership Firm And Another Opposite Parties.

Orissa High Court
Jan 2, 1985
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Factual and Procedural Background

The revision challenges an order by the learned Subordinate Judge, Rourkela, permitting the plaintiffs to withdraw Title Suit No. 12 of 1979 with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The dispute concerns a valuable land measuring Ac. 0.18 in Rourkela town, which belonged to the petitioners (defendants). The plaintiffs alleged that in 1955 the petitioners leased the land to them on an annual rent of Rs. 1800 for establishing a petrol delivery station, depot, office, and godown. The plaintiffs claimed a permanent lease based on assurances and substantial investment in buildings, asserting possession for over 12 years, thereby acquiring a valid leasehold title and protection against eviction. The petitioners denied granting a permanent lease, asserting the arrangement was a license subject to vacation on demand, and contended that the plaintiffs did not acquire valid title. They counterclaimed for possession recovery and damages.

During the suit, it was revealed that the plaintiff was a partnership firm not registered at the time of suit institution but registered later. The plaintiffs petitioned under Order 23, Rule 1, CPC, to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit due to formal defects including non-registration of the firm at suit institution and non-joinder of necessary parties. The trial court allowed the withdrawal with liberty to institute a fresh suit, subject to payment of costs and continuation of the defendants' counterclaim. The petitioners challenged this order in the present revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether non-registration of the partnership firm at the time of instituting the suit constitutes a formal defect permitting withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit under Order 23, Rule 1(3), CPC.
  2. Whether non-joinder of necessary parties to the suit is a formal defect allowing withdrawal with liberty to file a fresh suit under the same provision.
  3. Whether the trial court erred in permitting withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action in the circumstances of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The partnership firm was not registered under Section 59 of the Indian Partnership Act at the time of suit institution, violating the mandatory provision of Section 69(2) of the Act, thus the suit was not maintainable.
  • The defects alleged by the plaintiffs were not merely formal but substantive, affecting the merits of the case.
  • Non-joinder of necessary parties was a material defect, not a formal one, and therefore the trial court erred in permitting withdrawal with liberty to refile.

Opposite Parties' Arguments

  • Non-registration of the partnership firm at suit institution and non-joinder of necessary parties were formal or technical defects.
  • Such defects justified withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit under Order 23, Rule 1(3), CPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramrao Bhagwantrao Inamdar v. Babu Appanna Samage, AIR 1940 Bom 121 Wide and liberal meaning of ‘formal defect’ under Order 23, Rule 1, CPC Established that formal defects do not affect the merits of the case and can justify withdrawal.
Dwaraka Agarwalla v. Mst. Sashi Prabha Gountiani, (1966) 32 Cut LT 864 ‘Formal defect’ excludes defects affecting merits or root of the plaintiff's case Clarified that defects striking at the merits are not formal defects.
Harikrishna Agarwalla v. State of Orissa, (1976) 42 Cut LT 339 Formal defects must not affect the merits of the case Reinforced the principle that formal defects exclude those affecting the case's root.
K.K.A Ponnuchami Gounder v. Mathusami, AIR 1942 Mad 252 Mandatory nature of registration under Section 69(2) Indian Partnership Act Held that suit cannot be instituted by an unregistered firm; registration after suit filing does not cure defect.
Jammu Cold Storage and General Mills Ltd. v. Khairati Lal and Sons, AIR 1960 J & K 101 Registration of firm is condition precedent to instituting suit under Section 69(2) Confirmed that non-registration at suit institution renders suit not maintainable.
Loonkaran Sethia v. Ivan E. John, AIR 1977 SC 336 Effect of Section 69 Indian Partnership Act on suits by unregistered firms Declared suits by unregistered firms void and not maintainable.
Shankar Housing Corporation v. Smt. Mohan Devi, AIR 1978 Delhi 255 Non-registration of firm bars suit; decision on merits not res judicata Distinguished res judicata from maintainability; reaffirmed non-registration bars suit.
Sri Baba Commercial Syndicate v. Channamasetti Dasu, AIR 1968 Andh Pra 378 Non-registration bars suit but does not operate as res judicata Clarified that a fresh suit can be instituted post registration.
Haridas Sadhu Khan v. Giridhari Sadhu Khan, AIR 1934 Cal 59 Non-joinder of necessary parties is not a formal defect under O. 23, R. 1 CPC Held that non-joinder affects merits and is not a mere formal defect.
Ram Padarath Misir v. Data Din Misir, AIR 1941 Oudh 417 Non-joinder of necessary parties is a material defect Supported view that such defects affect the root of the suit.
Muktanath Tiwari v. Vidyashanker Dube, AIR 1943 All 67 Merits affected by non-joinder of necessary parties Confirmed non-joinder is not a formal defect.
Asian Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Madholal Sindhu, AIR 1950 Bom 378 Non-joinder is not a formal defect under O. 23, R. 1 CPC Held such defect strikes at root of the suit.
Tarachand Bapuchand v. Gaibihaji Ahamed Bagwan, AIR 1956 Bom 632 Non-joinder does not constitute a formal defect Reinforced non-joinder as a material defect.
Trinath Parida v. Sobha Bholaini, AIR 1973 Orissa 37 Non-joinder of necessary parties affects root of suit Relied on Bombay High Court decisions to hold non-joinder is not formal defect.
Smt. Savitri Devi v. Hira Lal, AIR 1977 Him Pra 91 Omission to implead necessary party is a material defect Held non-joinder cannot be basis for withdrawal under O. 23, R. 1(2) CPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature of the defects alleged by the plaintiffs for withdrawing the suit. It examined the mandatory provisions of Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, which prohibits an unregistered firm from instituting a suit to enforce contractual rights. The Court relied on authoritative precedents establishing that registration of the firm is a condition precedent and non-registration at suit institution renders the suit void and not maintainable. Registration after suit institution does not cure the defect.

Accordingly, the Court held that non-registration of the partnership firm at suit institution was not a mere formal defect but a substantive defect affecting the root of the plaintiffs' case. Similarly, the Court reviewed numerous precedents on non-joinder of necessary parties and concluded that such non-joinder is a material defect, not a formal one, as it affects the merits and correctness of adjudication.

Given these findings, the Court concluded that the defects cited by the plaintiffs did not fall within the ambit of 'formal defects' under Order 23, Rule 1(3)(a), CPC, which would justify withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute a fresh one. Therefore, the trial court erred in permitting the withdrawal of the suit with liberty to refile on the same cause of action. The Court emphasized that allowing the impugned order to stand would result in failure of justice.

Holding and Implications

The Civil Revision is allowed and the impugned order permitting withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit is set aside.

The petition for withdrawal under Order 23, Rule 1, CPC is rejected. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Subordinate Judge, Rourkela, for further directions. The decision directly affects the parties by preventing the plaintiffs from withdrawing and refiling the suit on the same cause of action based on defects that are substantive rather than formal. No new precedent is established beyond the reaffirmation of existing legal principles regarding registration of partnership firms and joinder of necessary parties.

Show all summary ...

1. This revision is directed against the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge. Rourkela permitting the plaintiffs to withdraw Title Suit No. 12 of 1979 with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action.

2. It is necessary to narrate the essential facts in order to appreciate the contentions raised by the rival parties. The dispute between them centered around valuable land measuring Ac. O. 18 in Rourkela town which admittedly belonged to the petitioners (Defendants). The opposite parties (plaintiffs) instituted the suit and averred in the plaint that in or about the year 1955, the petitioners leased out the suit land in their favour on annual rent of Rs. 1800/- which they required for the purpose of installation of a petrol delivery station, depot, office and godown. After obtaining the lease and on receiving assurance from the petitioners that the lease was on permanent basis and they shall not be evicted in future, the opposite parties spent a huge amount by constructing buildings for installing the petrol delivery station. They commenced their business in right earnest and continued the same till the year 1979 when petitioner No. 2 being a rich and influential man of the locality attempted in various ways to evict them by force. They asserted that having remained in possession of the suit land for over 12 years they acquired a valid lease hold tide and are unevictable. Accordingly, in the suit, they sought for the relief of confirmation of their possession, and for permanent and mandatory injunction against the petitioners. In their written statement, the petitioners denied that they had granted permanent lease of the suit land in favour of the opposite parties in the year 1955. They asserted that in or about the year 1955 they permitted opposite party No. 2, a family friend, to install a petrol delivery station on the suit land as a licensee on condition that he shall vacate the same on demand. Later, opposite party No. 1 without their consent, transferred the suit land in favour of opposite party No. 1. It has not been known to them that opposite party No. 2 was carrying on business in petrol on the suit land in partnership with opposite party No. 1. Therefore, the opposite parties did not acquire valid title as permanent lessees in respect of the suit land and were not entitled to the reliefs claimed. On the other hand, the petitioners made a counter claim on the strength of their own title and sought for declaration that the opposite parties were not lessees but, opposite party No. 2 was only a licensee, for recovery of possession after their eviction and for damages at the rate of Rs. 1500/- per month.

3. During the pendency of the suit, petitioner No. 2, on 18-8-1979 made a petition to the Court to direct opposite party No. 1 to disclose the names and addresses of persons who constituted the firm. Opposite party No. 1 on 6-9-1979 disclosed the names and addresses of the partners of the firm, such as, Abdul Gafur, Mahavir Prasad Agarwala and Smt. Shiv Kumari Devi. Thereafter the opposite parties on 28-10-1981 made a petition to the trial Court under O. 23, R. 1, C.P.C for leave to withdraw the suit and institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The grounds set forth in the petition were as follows:—

a) Opposite party No. 1 is a partnership firm which was registered under S. 59 of the Indian Partnership Act on 21-8-1979 after the suit was instituted on 22-6-1979. Because the partnership firm was not registered on the date of institution of the suit, it was likely to fail.

b) The legal heirs of late Rama Chandra Agarwala and late Ramasewak Pandey who took the suit land on rent and started business in the name and style of ‘Ramsewak Kasinath’ in partnership are necessary parties to the suit and in their absence the same was likely to fail.

According to them, the aforesaid defects in the constitution of the suit were formal in nature and so they should be permitted to withdraw the same with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action as contemplated in O. 23, R. 1(3), C.P.C In a counter, the petitioners opposed the petition on various grounds the details of which are unnecessary to repeat. Suffice it to mention that according to them, the grounds stated in the withdrawal petition were not at all adequate so as to permit withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action to their utter prejudice. The learned Subordinate Judge in the impugned order found as follows—

“Keeping the above legal principles in view it is to be determined if the plaintiff can be allowed to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit for want of any formal defect or other sufficient grounds. No doubt, the plaintiff No. 1 is a partnership firm and it has not been registered at the time of institution of the suit but it has been registered after the institution of the suit. So, the suit is bound to fail for non-registration of the firm under S. 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. It does not affect the merits of the suit and does not go to the root of the plaintiff's claim. So, it is a formal defect and it comes within the expression “other sufficient grounds” so as to attract the provision of O. 23, R. 1, C.P.C Hence, on a consideration of the materials on record, I am inclined to hold that it is necessary for the ends of justice that the plaintiff should be allowed to withdraw the suit with opportunity to file a fresh suit, but the plaintiff must pay the defendant's cost to the defendants or deposit the same in the Court before the institution of the fresh suit. It is also made clear that the defendant's counter-claim will proceed in the suit as a suit and the defendants cannot be thereby prejudiced.”

Accordingly, he allowed the opposite parties to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The petitioners are aggrieved with this order.

4. Mrs. A.K Padhi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners urged that on the date of institution of the suit opposite party No. 1, a partnership firm, was not registered under S. 59 and so that suit could not be instituted by the firm against the petitioners as required in S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act (referred to as the ‘Act’). Further, necessary parties to the suit were not impleaded. The defects in the suit at the time of its institution as referred to above were not formal defects. Therefore, the trial Court committed a serious error of law in permitting withdrawal of the suit under O. 23, R. 1(3), C.P.C Mr. R.C Misra, appearing for the opposite parties on the other hand contended that non-registration of opposite party No. 1 firm under S. 59 of the Act and non-joinder of necessary parties were defects of technical and formal nature and so the trial Court did not commit any error of law or jurisdiction by directing withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter. The contentions raised required careful examination.

5. At the outset it would be useful to delineate the principles with regard to withdrawal of a suit according to the provisions of O. 23, R. 1, C.P.C A Full Bench of Bombay High Court in a decision reported in AIR 1940 Bom 121 (Ramrao Bhagwantrao Inamdar v. Babu Appanna Samage) laid down that the expression ‘formal defect’ occurring in R. 1 of O. 23, C.P.C must be given a wide and liberal meaning and must be deemed to connote every kind of defect which does not affect the merit of the case, whether that defect is fatal to the suit or not. In (1966) 32 Cut LT 864 (Dwaraka Agarwalla v. Mst. Sashi Prabha Gountiani), Misra, J. (as he then was) relying upon a decision of the Privy Council reported in 13 MIA 160 (Watson v. Collector of Rajashahye) held that the expression ‘formal defect’ does not cover any defect pertaining to the merits of the case. The defect affecting the root of the plaintiffs case is not a formal defect. In a case reported in (1976) 42 Cut LT 339 (Harikrishna Agarwalla v. State of Orissa), S.K Ray, A.C.J (as he then was) held that the expression ‘formal defect’, even given a wide and liberal meaning, can connote only every kind of defect which does not affect the merits of the case. In view of the principle laid down in the aforesaid decisions, law is well settled that the expression ‘formal defect’ occurring in O. 23. R. 1(3)(a), C.P.C even if given a wide and liberal meaning must be deemed to connote every kind of defect which does not affect the merits of the case or does not strike at the root of the plaintiff's case.

6. On the petition of the petitioner No. 2, the opposite parties disclosed the names of the partners constituting the partnership firm ‘opposite party No. 1’. They were, Abdul Gafur, Mahavir Prasad Agarwalla and Smt. Shiv Kumari Devi. Patently on 22-6-1979 when the suit was instituted, the firm was not registered under S. 59 of the Act. On the other hand, from the certified copy of the entries made in the Register of Firms which is in the trial Court record, it appears that the firm with the aforesaid partners was registered on 21-8-1979. This fact has been specifically stated by the opposite parties in the petition under O. 23, R. 1 C.P.C It is for consideration, whether, non-registration of the firm is a formal defect or a defect affecting the merits of the case.

7. Section 69(2) of the Act lays down as follows:—

“(2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.

8. Leach, C.J speaking for the Division Bench interpreted S. 69(2) of the Act in a case reported in AIR 1942 Mad 252 (K.K.A Ponnuchami Gounder v. Mathusami) and held that a suit is instituted when the plaint is filed in a Court of competent jurisdiction. S. 69 says that a suit by a firm shall not be instituted until the firm has been registered. The registration of the firm is a condition precedent to the right to institute the suit and the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial when the condition precedent has not been fulfilled. Registration after the filing of the suit cannot cure the defect. It is apt to quote the following from the judgment.—

“The Allahabad High Court in 58 All. 495, the Patna High Court in 18 Pat 114, the Lahore High Court in 17 Lah 275 and AIR 1938 Lah 767 have all held that subsequent registration of the firm will not allow the suit to proceed. All these cases except the second Lahore case were decided by Division Benches. The great weight of authority is in favour of the opinion that registration will not put the suit on a proper basis and that the Court's duty is to dismiss it. We consider that the majority opinion is correct.”

9. A Full Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in a case reported in AIR 1960 J and K 101 (Jammu Cold Storage and General Mills Ltd. v. Khairati Lal and Sons) held that the provisions of S. 69(2) are mandatory and the registration of the firm is a condition precedent to the right to institute the suit and if on the date of the institution of the suit the firm is not registered, the suit cannot proceed. In AIR 1977 SC 336 (Loonkaran Sethia v. Ivan E. John) interpreting the provisions of S. 69 of the Act. Jaswant Singh, J. speaking for the Court made the following pronouncement:—

“A bare glance at the section is enough to show that it is mandatory in character and its effect is to render a suit by a plaintiff in respect of a right vested in him or acquired by him under a contract which he entered into as a partner of an unregistered firm, whether existing or dissolved, void. In other words, a partner of an erstwhile unregistered partnership firm cannot bring a suit to enforce a right arising out of a contract falling within the ambit of Section 69 of the Partnership Act.”

10. A similar interpretation of S. 69(2) of the Act was handed down by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in a case reported in AIR 1978 Delhi 255 (Shankar Housing Corporation v. Smt. Mohan Devi). A Single Bench decision reported in AIR 1968 Andh Pra 378 (Sri Baba Commercial Syndicate v. Channamasetti Dasu) was cited by Shri Misra in which it was held that the firmly settled view of law is that the decision of a suit under S. 69 of the Act is not one on merits and no such decision can operate as res judicata. What must necessarily follow is that a fresh suit can be brought after the registration of a firm or after the name of the partners have been brought on the Register of Firms or after the firm is dissolved by the partners of a firm or any one authorised on behalf of the partners or the sole surviving partner. The learned Single Judge was obviously considering the question of res judicata and not a petition for withdrawal of the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter. Nevertheless in the same judgment interpreting S. 69(2) of the Act he held that on account of non-registration, a firm cannot maintain a suit against a third party. Therefore, the decision is distinguishable. In the premises of the principle enunciated in the aforesaid decisions it appears that law is well settled that a firm not registered under S. 59 suffers from the legal disability of enforcing a right arising from a contract by instituting a suit against a third party by operation of S. 69(2) of the Act. Non-registration of the firm, therefore, is not a formal defect, but a defect affecting the merits of the suit, in other words, the every root of plaintiffs' suit. In the instant case, indisputedly opposite party No. 1-firm was not registered under S. 59 of the date the suit was instituted and so by operation of S. 69(2) of the Act, the suit was initially not maintainable. The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that such a defect in the suit of the opposite parties was not a formal defect. The first contention of Mrs. Padhi is therefore upheld.

11. The second contention of Mrs. Padhi, learned counsel for the petitioners relates to non-joinder of necessary parties which according to her was not a formal defect. In the petition under O. 23, R. 1, C.P.C it was stated that the legal heirs and representatives of late Rama Chandra Agarwalla and late Rama Sewak Pandey Kasinath which took the suit land on rent and started petrol business were not made parties to the suit According to Mr. Misra, appearing for the opposite parties, non-joinder of necessary parties was a formal defect. As early as 1934 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in a case reported in AIR 1934 Cal 59 (Haridas Sadhu Khan v. Giridhari Sadhu Khan) considering a petition under O. 23, R. 1 C.P.C held that the defects that certain necessary parties were not impleaded and certain debuttar properties were not included in the claim, were not formal defects. A similar view was also expressed in AIR 1941 Oudh 417 (Ram Padarath Misir v. Data Din Misir). In AIR 1943 All 67 (Muktanath Tiwari v. Vidyashanker Dube), it was held that the merits of the case are affected where the plaintiffs say that it would be necessary to have a stranger to the suit in the array of parties in order to obtain a correct adjudication of the controversy between the parties. Hence, the defect that certain necessary parties were not impleaded is not a formal defect within O. 23, R. 1. C.P.C In AIR 1950 Bom 378 (Asian Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Madholal Sindhu) Chagla, C.J speaking for the Division Bench held that a defect of non-joinder of some of the parties to the suit is not a formal defect contemplated in O. 23, R. 1. C.P.C In another case reported in AIR 1956 Bom 632 (Tarachand Bapuchand v. Gaibihaji Ahamed Bagwan) Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) held that non-joinder of parties does not constitute a formal defect within the meaning of O. 23, R. 1 C.P.C. B.K Patra, J. in a case reported in AIR 1973 Orissa 37 (Trinath Parida v. Sobha Bholaini) relied upon the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the cases of Asian Assurance Co. Ltd. and Tarachand Bapuchand (supra) and held that non-joinder of a necessary party is not a formal defect within the meaning of O. 23, R. 1 C.P.C It is a defect which affects the root of the plaintiff's case and cannot be said to be a mere formal defect. In AIR 1977 Him Pra 91 (Smt. Savitri Devi… v. Hira Lal…., C.J (As he then was) referred to the Bombay case of Tarachand Bapuchand and the Oudh decision of Ram Padarath Misir (AIR 1941 Oudh 417) (supra) and held that the omission to implead a necessary party cannot be described as formal defect. It is a material defect and so cannot be the basis for an order under O. 23, R. 1(2) C.P.C It is thus clear from the pronouncements made in a large number of decision of different High Courts that law is well settled that the non-joinder of necessary parties to a suit is not formal defect within the meaning of O. 23, R. 1 C.P.C, but the defect strikes at the root of the suit, because, an effective and necessary parties to the suit as rightly pointed out in (1966) 32 Cut LT 864 (supra). The second contention of Mrs. Padhi must also be upheld.

12. In the ultimate analysis, the defects stated in the petition of the opposite parties and discussed above were not formal defects within the meaning of O. 23, R. 1(3)(a) C.P.C Therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge committed an error of law and jurisdiction in permitting the opposite parties to withdraw Title Suit No. 12 of 1979 with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter. If his order impugned in this case is allowed to remain, it shall occasion failure of justice. So, in exercise of powers conferred under S. 115, C.P.C the impugned order must have to be vacated.

13. In the result, the Civil Revision is allowed and the impugned order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge is set aside. The petition under O. 23, R. 1 C.P.C stands rejected. The parties should appear before the learned Subordinate Judge, Rourkela on 1-2-1985 to receive directions. Advocate's fee is assessed at Rs. 100/-.

Revision allowed.