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Omprakash Sahu v. Manmohan Mohanty & Another Opp. Parties.

Orissa High Court
Mar 21, 1984
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (B.K. Behera, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

On July 10, 1981 the opposite party no. 1 filed a complaint before the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate, Baripada, against the petitioner, opposite party no. 2 and Smt. Ginidevi Saha, alleging offences punishable under sections 341, 366 and 498 of the Indian Penal Code. The Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate recorded the initial statement of opposite party no. 1 and fixed August 11, 1981 as the date of inquiry under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, directing the complainant to produce all his witnesses.

On the date fixed, the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate directed that copies of the complaint and the initial statement be sent to the court of Mr. G.P. Rao, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, to hold the inquiry under section 202 and submit a report. On October 24, 1981, relying on the Judicial Magistrate's report of inquiry, the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate dismissed the complaint against Smt. Ginidevi Saha, took cognisance of offences under sections 341, 365 and 498 of the IPC (as to the petitioner and opposite party no. 2) and issued processes against them.

The petitioner filed an application under section 482 Cr.P.C., challenging the order taking cognisance and the order issuing processes as illegal and invalid, and sought quashing of the criminal proceedings by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an inquiry under section 202 Cr.P.C. can be entrusted to another Judicial Magistrate (i.e., whether a Magistrate may direct that a Judicial Magistrate conduct the inquiry).
  2. Whether the phrase “such other person” in sub‑section (1) of section 202 Cr.P.C., to whom a direction for investigation may be issued, includes a Judicial Magistrate.
  3. Whether the orders taking cognisance and directing issuance of processes against the petitioner and opposite party no. 2 (issued on the basis of a report by another Judicial Magistrate) are illegal and liable to be quashed under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court (section 482 Cr.P.C.).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Panigrahi)

  • Relying on section 202 Cr.P.C. and judicial authorities from the Patna and Calcutta High Courts (Jitan Tiwari, Srimati Janki Devi, and Asoke Chatterjee v. Manisha Mukherjee), the petitioner submitted that after the Code came into force no direction for investigation can be issued to a Judicial Magistrate.
  • Consequently, the order taking cognisance and issuing processes on the basis of a report made by another Judicial Magistrate was argued to be illegal and invalid.

Opposite Party no. 1

Opposite party no. 1 did not enter an appearance despite personal service of notice.

Opposite Party no. 2 (as represented by Mr. Nayak)

  • Opposite party no. 2 supported the petitioner's stand challenging the impugned orders.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Jitan Tiwari v. The State of Bihar (I.L.R. LVII 1978 Pat. 903) Held that under the scheme of section 202 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate who decides to hold an inquiry must adopt and conduct that inquiry himself and cannot get it enquired into by any other Magistrate (a change from the old Code). The Court relied on and adopted this holding to support the conclusion that a Judicial Magistrate cannot be entrusted with the inquiry under section 202 of the present Code.
Shrimati Janki Devi v. The State of Bihar (I.L.R. LVIII 1979 Pat. 79) Held that after the Code came into force an order under section 202 cannot be passed entrusting a Judicial Magistrate to conduct an inquiry; any inquiry report by another Magistrate on such an order would be invalid for the purposes of summoning accused persons. The Court agreed with and adopted this view, treating the impugned orders (based on a Judicial Magistrate's inquiry) as illegal under section 202.
Asoke Chatterjee v. Sm. Manisha Mukherjee (1976 Crl. Law Journal 876) Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court decision referenced for the proposition that, after the Code, no direction for investigation may be issued to a Judicial Magistrate. The Court adopted the view recorded in this Calcutta High Court decision to support the conclusion that a Judicial Magistrate cannot be entrusted under section 202 to make an investigation/inquiry.
Umakant Dubey v. Bhunnu Bhuyan (1975 B.L.J.R. 288) Earlier Single Judge decision of the Patna High Court referred to in the context of the scope of inquiry under section 202. Referred to in the discussion of the Patna High Court precedents and legislative change; used as antecedent authority in the Court's review of the legal position under section 202.
Gokulananda Mohanty v. Muralidhar Mallik (47 1979 C.L.T. 244) Cited in relation to the mandatory procedure where an offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session and the Magistrate's duty to examine witnesses. The Court referenced this case when finding that the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate erred by not calling and examining all witnesses where an offence (section 366 IPC) triable exclusively by the Court of Session was initially complained of.
Guljar Hussain v. Krishna Loila (1983 C.L.R. Crl. 383) Cited similarly in relation to the duty of a Magistrate under section 202(2) when an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session is involved. The Court relied on this authority to reinforce the view that the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate had violated mandatory procedure by not calling and examining witnesses in respect of an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and purposive analysis of section 202 Cr.P.C., the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure (1973), and the relevant definitions in sections 2(g) and 2(h) and section 3 of the Code, as follows:

  1. The Court compared the present section 202 with the corresponding provision in the old Code and reviewed the Law Commission's Forty‑first Report recommendations. The Law Commission had recommended, among other things, deletion of the power to have an inquiry made by a subordinate Magistrate because the evidence taken by such a subordinate Magistrate was to be finally weighed by the Magistrate who sent the case for inquiry.
  2. The Court emphasized the deliberate legislative change: the present section 202 permits the Magistrate, upon postponement of issue of process, either to inquire into the case himself or to direct an investigation "to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit." The Court noted that the word "inquiry" (previously usable by subordinate Magistrates) was deleted in favour of "investigation."
  3. The Court relied on the definition of "investigation" in section 2(h) which expressly limits an investigation to proceedings conducted by a police officer or by any person "other than a Magistrate" authorised by the Magistrate. The definition of "inquiry" in section 2(g) confirms that an inquiry is one conducted by a Magistrate or Court.
  4. Given the separation of Judiciary and Executive and the statutory language, the Court concluded that the statute contemplates that investigations under section 202 may be carried out by police officers or other persons who are not Judicial Magistrates; it does not permit the Magistrate to entrust an inquiry to another Judicial Magistrate.
  5. The Court therefore held that the impugned orders (taking cognisance and issuing processes on the basis of a report by another Judicial Magistrate) were illegal because they violated the clear terms of section 202 of the Code. The Court expressly adopted and agreed with the views recorded in the cited Patna and Calcutta High Court authorities to this effect.
  6. Separately, the Court identified another illegality: the original complaint included an offence under section 366 IPC which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. Section 202(2) Cr.P.C. requires that if it appears that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the Magistrate must call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. The Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate failed to do so. The Court treated this omission as a further violation of mandatory procedure.
  7. Considering these procedural defects together, the Court found that the criminal proceedings against the petitioner and opposite party no. 2 had not been started in accordance with law and that the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under section 482 ought to be exercised to prevent abuse of process and to secure justice in this exceptional case.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned orders. The relevant operative direction in the opinion is recorded as:

Application allowed.

More specifically, the Court set aside the orders taking cognisance of the offences and directing issuance of processes against the petitioner and opposite party no. 2 which were based on a report of inquiry made by a Judicial Magistrate, and quashed the criminal proceedings against them. The Court further observed that the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate may proceed thereafter in accordance with law.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the impugned orders and the criminal proceedings founded upon the report of another Judicial Magistrate were quashed; the accused (petitioner and opposite party no. 2) are thereby relieved of those processes that were irregularly issued.
  • The Court relied upon and adopted existing High Court authorities (Patna and Calcutta) interpreting section 202 of the Code; the opinion does not claim to lay down a new precedent beyond adopting those authorities nor does it state broader policy consequences beyond directing that future procedure must conform to the statutory requirements discussed.

The summary above is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or assume facts or holdings beyond what is expressly stated in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

B.K Behera, J.:— On July 10, 1981, a petition of complaint was made in the court of the learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate, Baripada, by the opposite patty no. 1, as the complainant, against the petitioner, the opposite party no. 2 and Smt. Ginidevi Saha for commission of offences punishable under sections 341, 366 and 498 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate recorded the initial statement of the opposite party no. 1 and fixed August 11. 1981 as the date of inquiry under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974), to be referred to hereinafter as the Code, with a direction to the opposite party no. 1 to produce all his witnesses. On the date fixed for inquiry, the learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate made a direction to send copies of the complaint and the initial statement of the opposite party no. 1 to the court of Mr. G.P Rao, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, to hold the inquiry under section 202 of the Code and submit his report. On October 24, 1981 the learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate, on the basis of the report of inquiry of the Judicial Magistrate, dismissed the complaint against the accused Smt. Ginidevi Saha, took cognisance of the offences punishable under section 341, 365 and 498 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 and issued processes against him. By making an application under section 482 of the Code, the petitioner assails the order taking cognisance and the order directing issue of processes against the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 as being illegal and invalid in law and invokes the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to quash the criminal proceeding.

2. Inviting my attention to the provision contained in section 202 of the Code and the principles laid down by two Division Benches of the Patna High Court in Jitan Tiwari v. The State of Bihar, and Srimati Janki Devi v. The State of Bihar . I.L.R LVIII 1979 Pat. 79. and by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Asoke Chatterjee… v. Sm. Manisha Mukherjee…Opposite Party. . 1976 Crl. Law Journal. 876., to the effect that after coming into force of the Code, no direction for investigation can be issued to a Judicial Magistrate, it has been submitted by Mr. Panigrahi for the petitioner that the impugned order taking cognisance on the basis of a report of inquiry made by a Judicial Magistrate is illegal and invalid. The opposite party no 1 has not entered appearance in spite of service of notice personally on him. Mr. Nayak, appearing on behalf of the opposite party no. 2, has supported the stand taken by the petitioner. No decision of the Supreme Court or of this Court has been cited at the Bar.

3. Section 202 of the Code provides:

“ 202 Postponement of issue of process—

(1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under Sec. 192, may, if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding:

Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made,—

(a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session; or

(b) where the complaint has not been made by a court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under Sec. 200.

(2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath:

Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.

(3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant.”

4. The questions for consideration are as to whether the inquiry could be entrusted to another Judicial Magistrate and as to whether the expression “such other person” occuring in sub-section (1) of section 202 of the Code to whom a direction can be issued for investigation includes a Judicial Magistrate.

5. In Jitan Tiwari v. The State of Bihar . I.L.R LVII 1978 Pat. 903., (supra), it has been held that according to the scheme of section 202 of the Code, if a Magistrate does not feel persuaded to issue process against an accused on receipt of the complaint and on complainant's examination on solemn affirmation and wants to remove his doubt as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and decides to hold an inquiry into the matter and not to get it investigated, that inquiry has got to be adopted by the said Magistrate and he cannot get it enquired into by any other Magistrate as he could under the old Code. Reference has been made in this reported case to an earlier decision of a learned Single Judge of the same High Court in the case of Umakant Dubey v. Bhunnu Bhuyan . 1975 B.L.J.R 288., and to the decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Asoke Chatterjee… v. Sm. Manisha Mukherjee…Opposite Party., (supra). The same High Court has held in Shrimati Janki Devi v. The State of Bihar, (supra) that after coming into force of the Code on and from the 1st April 1974. an order under section 202 cannot be passed entrusting a Judicial Magistrate to conduct an inquiry and such an inquiry report made by another Magistrate on the basis of an order passed by the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate would be invalid and the accused persons cannot be summoned on the basis thereof and as such, the order summoning the accused persons is illegal and against the provisions of the Code.

6. It would be useful to go into the legislative history of this new provision. Under the old Code, a Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the third class could direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by an Magistrate subordinate to him or by a police officer or by such other personas he thought fit for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. In its Forty-first Report, the Law Commission of India suggested the following changes in the corresponding section 202 of the old Code:

“(1) The requirement of recording reasons for postponement of the summoning of the accused should be done away with as no real purpose can be served by any expression of opinion at that stage and the Magistrates find it difficult at that stage to record their reasons.

(2) The real purpose of enquiry under Sec. 202 being to ascertain whether the grounds exist for ‘proceeding further’ which expression is used in Sec. 203, verbal alteration should be made in Sec. 202 so that language of Sec. 202 should correspond to the language of Sec. 203.

(3) As the evidence taken by a Subordinate Magistrate making inquiry is to be finally weighed by the Magistrate who sent the case for such inquiry the power to have an inquiry made by a Subordinate Magistrate should be deleted.

(4) Proposed abolition of commitment inquiries necessitates amendments in the procedure to be followed in an inquiry into complaint where the offence complained of is exclusively triable by the Court of Session. The Magistrate who takes cognizance of such offence on complaint must himself make an inquiry into the complaint and call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.”

7. In the instant case, this Court is concerned with the third suggestion made by the Law Commission. Section 202 of the old Code authorised a Magistrate to have an inquiry made by a Magistrate subordinate to him. Such a course is not open to him under section 202 of the present Code. The provision in the old Code to hold an inquiry by any Magistrate subordinate to the Magistrate making the direction has been omitted and the present section does not envisage any inquiry by a ‘Magistrate’ which expression, as provided in section 3 of the Code, would mean a Judicial Magistrate.

8. As now provided, an investigation can be made by a police officer or by such other person as the Magistrate directing investigation thinks fit. The term ‘investigation’ has been defined in section 2(h) of the Code thus:

“‘investigation’ includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf;”

9. Thus investigation can be conducted either by a police officer or by any person other than a Magistrate who is authorised in that behalf.

10. Section 2(g) of the Code defines ‘inquiry’ and it reads:

“ ‘inquiry’ means every inquiry, other than trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court’ f The Legislature has deleted the word ‘inquiry’ in section 202 which could previously be conducted by a Subordinate Judicial Magistrate and has kept the word ‘investigation’ which can only be conducted by a police officer or by any person other than a Magistrate.

11. With the separation of the Judiciary from the Executive, the power to take cognisance has been assigned to a Magistrate. The reference to a Magistrate in section 202 is to be construed as reference to a Judicial Magistrate. On receipt of a complaint, if the Judicial Magistrate thinks fit to postpone the issue of process, he may himself inquire into the complaint. If a case has been made over to him under section 192, he may also inquire into the case himself. As provided in section 202 the Magistrate may direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or such other person as he thinks fit to find out as to whether there is a prima facie case against an accused person before the issue of process against him. Section 202 thus provides that investigation can be made by a police officer or by any other person, not being a Judicial Magistrate, who is thought fit and is so authorised by a Magistrate in that behalf. In view of the express intention of the Legislature in the present Code by making substantial changes in section 202 as provided in the old Code on the basis of the recommendation of the Law Commission and the scheme of the Code providing for taking of cognisance of an offence by a Magistrate and conducting of investigation by a police officer or “such other person” as a Magistrate thinks fit, no Judicial Magistrate can be entrusted with an inquiry into a complaint under the direction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate or any other Judicial Magistrate who is empowered to take cognisance of the offence.

12. For the aforesaid reasons, I must hold that the impugned orders taking cognisance and directing the issue of processes to the accused persons on the basis of a report of inquiry by a Judicial Magistrate are illegal, having been passed in violation of section 202 of the Code. I would, with respect, agree with the Honourable Judges of the Calcutta and Patna High Courts and adopt the views recorded in the reported cases, referred to above.

13. The inherent jurisdiction of this Court is to be exercised in rare and exceptional cases and in the interests of justice to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. As the criminal proceeding against the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 has not been started in accordance with law in view of what has been recorded by me, it is necessary in the interests of justice that the impugned orders taking cognisance and issuing processes against the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 are quashed.

14. At the hearing, another illegality committed by the learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate has come to my notice. Initially, the petition of complaint had been made for commission of offences punishable under sections 341, 366 and 498 of the Indian Penal Code. Of the three offences, the offence punishable under section 366 is triable exclusively by the Court of Session. While directing the inquiry, it had not been recorded by the learned Magistrate that the offences complained of were not triable exclusively by the Court of Session. As provided in section 202(2) of the Code, no investigation shall be ordered if it appears to the Magistrate that an offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session and the Magistrate shall have to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. Although the Magistrate inquiring into the matter had found that there was a prima facie case under sections 341, 365 (not exclusively triable by the Court of Session) and 498 of the Indian Penal Code, initially an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session had been complained of. It was, therefore, the duty of the learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate to call upon the complaint to produce all his witnesses and to examine them. This the learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate did not do. This is yet another violation of the mandatory provision of law. In this connection, reference may be made to the cases of Gokulananda Mohanty v. Muralidhar Mallik . 47 1979 C.L.T 244. and Guljar Hussain v. Krishna Loila . 1983 C.L.R Crl. 383.. It was for the learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate to have taken up the inquiry himself and then find out as to whether any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session complained of had been committed.

15. In the result, I would allow the application, set aside the impugned orders taking cognisance of the offences on the basis of a report of inquiry made by a Judicial Magistrate and directing issue of processes against the petitioner and the opposite party no. 2 and quash the criminal proceeding against them. The learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate may proceed in accordance with law.

Application allowed.