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Naran Behera (Died) And Another v. Mohan Jethi And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs (appellants) challenged the judgment and decree of the 4th Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack, in Title Suit No. 67 of 1970. The plaintiffs sought declaration of right, title and possession in respect of lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Schedule A (total Ac. 0.282) and recovery of possession of the house standing on plot No. 2098 included in Lot No. 2.
Relevant factual matrix as pleaded: One Ananda purchased Ac. 0.808 of land (Ext. 3, sale deed dated 21-9-1934) from defendant No. 1, who had earlier mortgaged land to Ananda (Ext. 2). Ananda died in 1939; Alekh died in 1944. Plaintiffs claim exclusive possession of the lands purchased under Ext. 3 after Ananda's death. Defendant No. 1 remained the recorded owner of certain lands and litigated repeatedly against the sale (multiple suits and appeals detailed in the record, including O.S. No. 86 of 1942 (Ext. 6) and Title Appeal No. 161 of 1943 (Ext. 7)). Portions of the land were subject to land acquisition proceedings in 1960s with compensation issues noted (Exts. 15, 16). Defendant No. 5 (Haramani) obtained a maintenance decree in 1967 and was permitted to stay separately in the house on plot No. 2098.
Defendants 1 to 5 filed a common written statement denying plaintiffs' allegations, characterizing Ext. 3 as a sham/benami transaction, pleading adverse possession (para 8) and limitation. At trial, the Additional Subordinate Judge framed nine issues, held that prior decrees (Ext. 6 and Ext. 7) operated as res judicata on the validity of Ext. 3, found plaintiffs were not in possession for twelve years prior to the suit, concluded defendants had perfected title by adverse possession, and dismissed the suit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether earlier decrees (notably O.S. No. 86 of 1942 and Title Appeal No. 161 of 1943 — Exts. 6 & 7) operate as res judicata with respect to the validity of the sale deed dated 21-9-1934 (Ext. 3).
- Whether defendants pleaded and proved adverse possession sufficient to extinguish the plaintiffs' title in respect of the suit properties.
- How Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (corresponding to Arts. 142 and 144 of the old Act) apply to suits for possession based on proprietary title versus suits based on prior possession — specifically the point whether plaintiffs must show possession within twelve years or whether the defendant must show his possession was adverse for twelve years.
- Whether payment of rent by a defendant in the name of the original owner amounts to an acknowledgment of the owner's title that would prevent perfection of adverse possession (raised by counsel; the court noted conflicting authorities).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiffs') Arguments — Mr. Mukherjee
- The defendants did not take a specific pleading point in the written statement as to the date from which they possessed the suit properties with hostile animus; therefore the court should not have accepted evidence supporting adverse possession.
- On the evidence adduced by the defendants, a court could not reasonably conclude that defendants had perfected title by adverse possession.
- The learned Additional Subordinate Judge erred legally by holding that if plaintiffs did not prove possession within twelve years of the suit date, plaintiffs must lose; that legal conception vitiated later findings.
- On the specific point of rent receipts (1961–1968), payment of rent in the name of the original owner amounted to an acknowledgment of plaintiffs' title (relied on two single‑judge decisions: (1954) 20 Cut LT 586 and (1977) 44 Cut LT 552).
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments — Mr. S. Misra
- Conceded that the Additional Subordinate Judge was wrong in treating plaintiffs' failure to prove possession within twelve years as fatal; however, defendants did plead adverse possession (para 8 of the written statement) and the court was competent to receive evidence on that plea.
- Submitted that defendants had taken and proved adverse possession sufficient to defeat plaintiffs' suit (so the trial court's ultimate dismissal should be sustained as an alternative basis).
- On the rent issue, contended that payment of rent in the original owner's name does not necessarily amount to acknowledgment of title and relied on two single‑judge decisions to that effect ((1974) 40 Cut LT 294 and (1982) 53 Cut LT 214).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| (1954) 20 Cut LT 586 — Endumuru Nagaya Boitharu v. Potaju Raghunath Boitharu | Cited by appellants' counsel to support the proposition that payment of rent in the name of the original owner amounts to acknowledgment of the original owner's title (relevant to defeating adverse possession). | The court noted the decision as one of two authorities relied upon for that proposition but recorded that conflicting single‑judge decisions exist and concluded it was unnecessary to resolve the conflict for deciding the present appeal. |
| (1977) 44 Cut LT 552 (AIR 1977 NOC 301) — Ushamani Dei v. Gandharba Barik | Cited by appellants' counsel in support of the same proposition (acknowledgment by payment of rent). | The court acknowledged this authority as supporting the appellants' position but declined to adjudicate the conflict between authorities because the factual evidence made resolution of that legal dispute unnecessary in this case. |
| (1974) 40 Cut LT 294 — Arjun Samal v. Kailash Chandra Kanungo | Cited by respondents' counsel for the contrary proposition that payment of rent in the name of the original owner does not necessarily amount to an acknowledgment of title preventing adverse possession. | The court recorded this decision as part of the conflicting authorities on the rent‑receipt point, but did not decide between the competing views because the court reached its conclusions on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence. |
| (1982) 53 Cut LT 214 (AIR 1982 Orissa 73) — Hadibandhu Ho v. Luchia Ho | Cited by respondents' counsel to support that rent payment in owner’s name is not necessarily an acknowledgment of title. | The court noted the authority but did not resolve the conflict among single‑judge authorities; it proceeded to determine possession issues on the evidence instead. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a series of focused legal and evidentiary steps:
- Legal framework — Limitation Act: The court observed that Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (corresponding to Arts. 142 and 144 of the old Act) materially changed the law regarding suits for possession. The Act categorises suits for possession into two types: (a) suits based only on the right of previous possession (not proprietary title) and (b) suits based on proprietary title. For suits under category (b) governed by Art. 65, time runs when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff; thus, in title-based possession suits the defendant succeeds only if he proves his possession had become adverse for over twelve years. Consequently, the plaintiff need only prove title and need not show possession within twelve years of the suit. The court held that the trial judge erred in treating plaintiffs' failure to prove possession within twelve years as fatal to their claim.
- Pleading of adverse possession: The court examined the written statement and found that para 8 expressly pleaded adverse possession (stating defendants had possessed the disputed land "for more than 12 years" and had acquired title by adverse possession). Therefore, the trial court was justified in entertaining evidence on that plea; Mr. Mukherjee's submission that adverse possession was not pleaded was rejected.
- Burden of proof and approach: Since plaintiffs' proprietary title was accepted, the burden rested upon defendants to prove extinguishment of that title by adverse possession. The court set out the required ingredients of adverse possession — continuity, hostility (hostile animus), openness, and knowledge by the true owner — and stated it would scrutinise the evidence plot by plot.
-
Plot-specific evidentiary analysis:
- Plots 1193, 2613 & 2648: These plots were the subject-matter of O.S. No. 86 of 1942 (Ext. 6) and Title Appeal No. 161 of 1943 (Ext. 7), where plaintiffs' possession was found. The court found no specific evidence that defendants entered into hostile possession after those decrees; therefore defendants failed to establish adverse possession for these plots and plaintiffs succeed in respect of them.
- Plots 2322, 2302 and 2178: These plots did not appear (or could not be shown to appear) in Ext. 6; the court treated them as not litigated earlier and examined evidence afresh. The court noted plaintiffs led no evidence to show that any omission in Ext. 6 was a typographical error as to plot numbers; therefore these plots required independent proof of adverse possession by defendants.
- General documentary evidence: There were rent receipts (1961–1968) showing payments by defendant No. 1 on behalf of Naran. Counsel disputed the legal effect of such receipts; the court recognised conflicting single‑judge decisions on whether such rent payments constitute acknowledgment of plaintiffs' title but held it unnecessary to decide that legal conflict because the oral evidence resolved the factual issues.
- Oral evidence for defendants: The court reviewed the defendant witnesses (D.W.1 to D.W.5). It found most testimony vague, non‑specific about plot numbers, areas, dates, or detailed particulars of possession; D.W.3 (defendant No.1) could not recall earlier litigation details. On balance, the court concluded defendants failed to establish adverse possession over the suit properties except in relation to the house on plot No. 2098.
- House on plot No. 2098: The evidence on this plot was distinct. Defendants consistently and categorically stated open and hostile possession since their forefathers. Plaintiffs admitted the defendants' possession of the house but pleaded it was permissive. The court found plaintiffs produced no evidence to substantiate permissive occupation beyond making allegations in the plaint; therefore the court rejected plaintiffs' claim of permissive possession and held that defendants had established adverse possession in respect of the house.
- Conclusion of fact and law: The court disagreed with the trial judge's overall finding that defendants had perfected title by adverse possession as to all properties. Instead, on the evidence, the court held that adverse possession was proved only for the house on plot No. 2098; for all other properties defendants failed to prove the elements of adverse possession and plaintiffs' title must be declared and possession confirmed.
- Precedent conflict on rent‑receipt point: The court recorded the existence of conflicting single‑judge authorities on whether payment of rent in the owner's name constitutes acknowledgment of title preventing adverse possession. It declined to resolve that conflict because it was unnecessary to do so for the disposition of the appeal; factual findings on oral evidence decided the issues.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The First Appeal is PARTLY ALLOWED.
Direct consequences and specific directives:
- The judgment and decree of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge are confirmed in respect of the house on plot No. 2098: defendants' title by adverse possession to that house is declared.
- The judgment and decree of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge are set aside insofar as they related to all other properties included in the suit: the plaintiffs' title to those properties is declared and their possession is confirmed.
- There is no order as to costs.
Broader implications: The court clarified the correct legal approach under the Limitation Act, 1963 (Arts. 64 & 65) that in suits based on proprietary title the defendant must prove adverse possession for the requisite period; the plaintiff need not show possession within twelve years. The decision does not purport to resolve the conflicting authorities on whether rent payments constitute an acknowledgment of title; the court expressly left that conflict open as it was unnecessary for deciding the appeal.
G.B Patnaik, J.:— Plaintiffs are appellants against the judgment and decree of the 4th Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack, in Title Suit No. 67 of 1970. Plaintiffs' suit is one for declaration of right title and possession in respect of lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Sch.-A properties and recovery of possession with respect to the house standing on plot No. 2098 included in Lot No. 2 of the Schedule. The total extent of the suit land is Ac. 0.282
2. According to the plaint case, one Ananda had two sons — Naran and Alekha. Alekh's son is Ratha (plaintiff No. 2) and Alekh's widow is Saria (defendant No. 6). Naran is plaintiff No. 1 and his son Srikanta is plaintiff No. 3. Naran's first wife is Haramani (defendant No. 5). The further case of the plaintiffs is that after death of Alekh Naran married Alekh's widow Saria. Haramani's father is defendant No. 1 and defendants 2 and 3 are sons and defendant No. 4 is the wife of defendant No. 1. Admittedly, Sch. A properties belong to defendant No. 1 who had mortgaged Ac. 1.021 of land to Anand on 7-3-1933 under the mortgage deed (Ext. 2). Thereafter, defendant No. 1 in order to pay the mortgage dues sold Ac. 0.808 of land out of the mortgaged property to said Ananda for a consideration of Rs. 300/- under the sale deed dt. 21-9-1934 (Ext. 3). Ananda died in the year 1939 and Alekh died in the year 1944. According to the plaint case, after Anand's death plaintiffs are in exclusive possession of the land which Anand had purchased under Ext 3. One China Jagula Raju had levied an execution case bearing Execution Case No. 245 of 1934 for satisfaction of the decree against defendant No. 1 and put the entire properties under Seh. A, but the properties were released from execution on an objection being filed by plaintiff No. 1 and Alekh under O. 21, R. 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure bearing Claim Case No. 50 of 1940.
2. After Anand's death defendant No. 1 filed Title Suit No. 84 of 1942 in the Court of the Munsif, Second Court, Cut tack, for a declaration that Ext. 3, the sale deed, was benami and for declaration of his title and possession. This suit was dismissed under Ext. 6. Against the said judgment. Title Appeal No. 161 of 1943 had been filed which was also dismissed under Ext. 7. Father having lost the suit, sons (defendants 2 and 3) fought a second round of litigation by filing a suit for a declaration that the sale deed (Ext. 3) was invalid as there was no legal necessity for the sale in question. This suit was numbered as Title Suit No. 304 of 1944 which was dismissed under Ext. 9 and an appeal against the same was also dismissed in Title Appeal No. 359 of 1945, as would appear from the certified copy of the decree in the said appeal (Ext. 12). A third round of litigation was initiated with respect to the self same properties by the wife of defendant No. 1, namely defendant No. 4, in T.S No. 218 of 1948 for a declaration that the suit properties were her self-acquired properties and therefore, defendant No. 1 had no authority to execute the sale deed on 21-9-1934. This suit was dismissed for default on 27-4-1949 (Ext. 10). An application for restoration was filed in Misc. Case No. 61 of 1949 which was dismissed on contest by order dt. 25-8-1949 (Ext. 11). Against the said order of dismissal the matter was carried in Misc. Appeal No. 130 of 1949 which was dismissed on 23-12-1950 (Ext. 13). Civil Revision No. 75 of 1951 was carried to the High Court, but the same was also dismissed on 13-7-1951 (Ext. 14).
3. On 25-4-1960, some of the lands purchased by the plaintiffs and some of their ancestral lands were acquired and compensation in respect thereof was received by the plaintiffs in Land Acquisition Case No. 2 of 1957-1958 (Ext. 15). Another Land Acquisition Case No. 207 of 1962 in respect of portions of land purchased by the plaintiffs under Ext. 3 were acquired and defendant No. 1 being the recorded owner was noticed Defendant No. 1 contested and claimed compensation, but it was decided in favour of the plaintiffs by order dt. 14-11-1964 (Ext. 16).
4. The further case of the plaintiffs is that though plaintiff No. 1 had married defendant No. 5 who is the daughter of defendant No. 1, defendant No. 1 took away his daughter in 1941. After losing three rounds of litigations referred to above, defendant No. 5 started a suit (T.S 76 of 1966) for maintenance and separate residence. By decision dated 30th of June, 1967, (Ext. 18) the prayer for maintenance was decreed, but since there was no prayer for separate residence, that point was not considered, but notwithstanding the same, the plaintiffs permitted defendant No. 5 to stay separately in the house standing on plot No. 2098. Since defendants 1 to 5 made attempts to get their names recorded with respect to the suit house in the Settlement Record-of-Rights, plaintiffs being apprehensive, have filed the present suit for the reliefs as aforesaid.
5. Defendants 1 to 5 filed a common written statement wherein the allegations in the plaint were denied and it was asserted that the sale deed dated 21-9-1934 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of Anand was not for consideration but was a sham and benami transaction. So far as the earlier litigations referred to in the plaint are concerned it was averred that they were never decided on merits. In para 8 of the written statement a plea of adverse possession was taken and further it was pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation.
6. On these pleadings, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge framed as many as nine issues and on issue No. 6 relating to the validity of sale deed dated 21-9-1934 (Ext. 3) held that the findings in O.S No. 86 of 1942 (Ext. 6) as well as in Title Appeal No. 161 of 1943 (Ext. 7) operated as res judicata and therefore, the said issue did not arise for consideration any further. Issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 and 8 together and the learned Judge came to hold that the plaintiffs were considered were not in possession of any of the suit properties after 1951 and within twelve years before the filing of the suit and, therefore, the defendants having possessed the properties for more than the statutory period of twelve years had perfected their title by way of adverse possession. Issue No. 4 regarding non-joinder and misjoinder of party was not pressed. On these findings, the suit was dismissed.
7. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the appellants, has raised the following contentions in this appeal:—
(1) The defendants not having taken any specific plea in the written statement as to from which point of time they have been possessing the suit properties with hostile animus, it was not open for the Court to accept the evidence regarding adverse possession;
(2) On the evidence adduced by the defendants, it is not possible for a Court of law to come to a conclusion that the defendants have perfected title by way of adverse possession; and
(3) The learned Additional Subordinate Judge committed serious error in approaching the problem on a wrong legal conception inasmuch as he held that if the plaintiffs' possession was not proved within twelve years from the date of the suit, then the plaintiffs must lose the case and this erroneous approach has vitiated the subsequent findings and conclusions of possession and ultimately the judgment itself.
8. Mr. S. Misra 1, the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents, fairly conceded that the Additional Subordinate Judge was not right in holding that the plaintiffs' suit would fail if plaintiffs did not establish their possession within twelve years from the filing of the suit, but he submitted that defendants had taken the plea of adverse possession and the conclusion of the Additional Subordinate Judge on that plea was unassailable. Consequently, the plaintiffs' suit had been rightly dismissed on a finding that the defendants had perfected their title by way of adverse possession.
9. Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which correspond to Arts. 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act, 1908, have effected a material change in the law, with regard to suits for possession of immovable property. Under the present Act all suits for possession of immovable property have been brought under two categories; (a) suit based only on the right of previous possession and not on proprietary title; and (b) suit based on proprietary title. In case of suits coming under (b) which are governed by Art. 65 of the Limitation Act, time runs when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. In other words, in suits for possession based on title even if dispossession also is alleged, the defendant can succeed only if he proves that his possession had become adverse to the plaintiff beyond twelve years of the suit. The plaintiff need only prove his title and he need not show that he was in possession within twelve years of the suit in our opinion the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was in error and Mr. Misra's concession is wholly justified.
10. On examining the written statement, we find that in para 8 it has been averred thus:—
“…….. Defendant 4 is possessing her purchased lands a portion of which is included in the disputed land. The defendants 1 to 3 are possessing the rest of the disputed land as of right and for more than 12 years to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and all concerned and if their original title be found to have been lost yet by their such exclusive possession they have long acquired valid title by adverse possession which the plaintiffs are not now entitled to displace. The defendant No. 4 and her vendors have also acquired valid title to her lands even by adverse possession as she and her vendors were in exclusive possession of such land for more than 12 years.”
In the face of this averment Mr. Mukherjee is not right in his submission that the plea of adverse possession had not been taken in the written statement. The Additional Subordinate Judge, in our opinion, must be held to be justified in entertaining evidence in support of the plea of adverse possession and considering the same to come to his conclusion.
11. The only question which remains, therefore, for consideration is whether on the evidence adduced by the parties, the defendants have been able to prove the different ingredients of adverse possession with respect to the suit properties or not and since the plaintiffs' title to the land has been found, it is for the defendants to prove the extinguishment of such title by perfection of their title by way of adverse possession. Possession, in order to be adverse, must be continuous, hostile and open, to the knowledge of the true owner and, therefore, we will have to scrutinise the evidence to find out whether defendants have been able to prove all these ingredients in the evidence adduced in the case. In assessing the evidence. Mr. Misra for the respondents submits that the consideration should be different with respect to different plots. According to him so far as the house standing on plot No. 2098 is concerned, the plaintiffs admit possession of the defendants, but plead a case of permissive possession, and, therefore, the plaintiffs must establish that the possession of the defendants was permissive in nature and if they fail to prove that, then it must be held that the defendants have perfected their title by way of adverse possession. So far as plots Nos. 1193, 2613 and 2648 are concerned, these plots were the subject-matter of the earlier litigation in S.O 86 of 1942 wherein there is a finding of plaintiffs' possession and, therefore, with respect to these plots unless defendants prove that subsequent to the said decision, the defendants have again entered into possession with a hostile animus and thereby perfected their title by adverse possession, their case would fail. But so, far as plots Nos. 2322, 2302 and 2178 are concerned, these were not the subject-matter of the earlier suit and, therefore, the defendants' evidence of possession must be considered from a different angle to find out whether they have been able to establish their hostile possession for over a statutory period or not.
12. From a perusal of Ext. 6, the decree in O.S No. 86 of 1942, we find that plots 1193, 2613 and 2648 were the subject-matter of the said litigation apart from several other plots with which we are not concerned in the present suit and the said decree read with the judgment in Title Appeal No. 161 of 1943 (Ext. 7), shows that the present plaintiffs' possession with respect to the properties in question was found. From a scrutiny of defendants' evidence with regard to possession, we do not find any specific case to have been made out that the defendants did enter into possession of the said property subsequent to the decree in the earlier suit and, therefore, the defendants' case of adverse possession with respect to these three plots must be held not to have been established in the present case and the plaintiffs' suit must succeed in respect thereof.
13. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned counsel for the appellants, has submitted that it is true that plots 2302 and 2178 have not been mentioned as the disputed plots in Ext. 6, but this is an obvious error and a mistake in typing since the area has been correctly mentioned with respect to plot 2158, though he does not dispute that plot No. 2322 does not find place in Ext. 6. It is not possible for us to accept this explanation of Mr. Mukherjee, since no evidence has been led by the plaintiffs in this regard and, therefore, we must assume that plots 2302, 2322 and 2178 were not the subject-matter of dispute in O.S No. 86 of 1942. Accordingly, we must assess the evidence to find out whether their case of perfection of title by adverse possession has been established or not.
14. There is a lot of controversy with respect to the rent receipts produced by defendant 1, and the evidence is that defendant 1 has paid the rent on behalf of Naran. These receipts range for the period from 1961 to 1968. According to Mr. Mukherjee therefore, defendant 1 acknowledges the title of the plaintiffs as late as 1961 and, therefore, the question of perfection of title by adverse possession would not arise since the present suit is of the year 1970. For this proposition, he relies on two decisions of this Court reported in (1954) 20 Cut LT 586 (Endumuru Nagaya Boitharu v. Potaju Raghunath Boitharu) and (1977) 44 Cut LT 552 : (AIR 1977 NOC 301) (Ushamani Dei v. Gandharba Barik). Mr. Misra for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that payment of rent in the name of the original owner does not amount to acknowledgment of title and for this, proposition he relies on two decisions of this Court reported in (1974) 40 Cut LT 294 (Arjun Samal v. Kailash Chandra Kanungo) and (1982) 53 Cut LT 214 : (AIR 1982 Orissa 73) (Hadibandhu Ho v. Luchia Ho). There is no doubt that there has been a conflict of views on this point and all the four decisions are single Judge decisions of this Court and Mr. Mukherjee, therefore, has pressed to decide as to which view is correct. It is not necessary for us to delve into the same in this case since on analysis of the oral evidence on record we come to a conclusion on the issue of possession.
15. There is no other documentary evidence clinching the issue of possession and, therefore, one has to depend upon the oral evidence in the case. D.W 1 who is supposed to be a neighbouring owner speaks of possession of defendant 1 and his family with respect to the suit house, obviously the one standing on plot No. 2098. So far as the possession of other properties is concerned, his evidence is rather vague and no specific evidence has been led by him though there is some sort of general statement that defendants possess the suit properties. In cross-examination he is not able to state the extent of land nor the plot numbers. D.W 2 is not a witness to prove possession of the defendants over the suit properties D.W 3 is defendant 1 himself. He also reiterates the possession with respect to the suit house since the time of his forefathers. In regard to other properties though he makes a general statement that “I have been possessing the suit properties all along” no data or detailed particulars have been given either with respect to the plot numbers or area or situation or from the date from which he is in possession. Even in cross-examination, he states:—
“I do not remember if I had filed T.S 86/42 in the Court of second Munsif, Cuttack, against Naran and Alekh for declaring the sale deed executed by me in favour of Anand to be one benami sale deed and also for confirmation of possession…………….”
D.W 4 also speaks of possession of defendants over the suit house and does not speak about the possession with respect to the other properties. D.W 5 speaks of possession with respect to the suit house.
16. This is all the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants. In our opinion, even if all the evidence is taken into consideration, yet the case of adverse possession with respect to the properties has not been made out excepting with respect to the house standing on plot No. 2098. In this view of the matter, we hold, disagreeing with the finding of the learned Addl. Sub. Judge, on the evidence adduced, that defendants have failed to establish their case of adverse possession with respect to any of the properties included in the suit excepting the house standing on plot No. 2098.
17. So far as the house on plot No. 2098 is concerned, it obviously stands on a different footing. All the defendants have categorically stated that they are in possession of the same openly and with hostile animus to the knowledge of the plaintiffs since their forefathers Plaintiffs also admit that the house is in possession of the defendants, but make out a case that plaintiffs had given permission and, therefore, the possession must be held to be permissive. We have scrutinized the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs, but we find that apart from making an averment in the plaint, this part of the plaintiffs' case has not been established through evidence on record and, therefore, we must reject the plaintiffs' plea of permissive possession with respect to the house standing on plot No. 2098 and hold that defendants have, been able to establish their title by way of adverse possession with respect to the same.
18. In the result therefore, the judgment and decree of the learned Addl. Sub-Judge with respect to the house on Plot No. 2098 are confirmed and defendants' title by adverse possession with respect to the same is declared. So far as all other properties in suit are concerned, the judgment and decree of the learned Addl. Sub-Judge are set aside and plaintiffs' title is declared with respect to those properties and their possession is confirmed.
19. The first appeal is allowed in part, but there would be no order for costs.
P.C Misra, J.:— I agree.
Appeal partly allowed.
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