- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Purna Chandra Singh v. State Of Orissa .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Behera, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant was charged under Sections 302 and 397 of the Penal Code for allegedly committing robbery of gold ornaments from Dhani Bewa (the deceased) and attacking her with a knife, causing death on 14 March 1980 at Bolgarh, district Puri. The prosecution examined nineteen witnesses and principally relied upon a verbal dying declaration (Ext. 11) said to have been made by the deceased and recorded by a doctor (P.W.7) in the presence of two attesting witnesses (including P.W.11 and another). Recoveries of ornaments and the weapon were also in issue in the trial.
At the trial the Sessions Judge found that recoveries were not shown to be consequent upon statements by the appellant and acquitted him of the robbery charge. However, the trial court accepted the dying declaration (Ext. 11) as true and trustworthy and, relying solely on it, convicted the appellant under Section 302 and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
On appeal, the court examined the probative value and reliability of the dying declaration (Ext. 11) and the attendant evidence about its recording and the deceased's capacity to make it.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the dying declaration (Ext. 11) recorded by P.W.7 was sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to form the sole basis of a conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code.
- Whether, on the totality of the evidence about how Ext. 11 was recorded (including the medical and attesting witnesses' evidence), the trial court was justified in convicting the appellant solely on that declaration.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Counsel for the appellant contended that the dying declaration (Ext. 11) was riddled with discrepancies and suspicious features and could not safely be relied upon to convict the appellant.
Respondent's (State's) Arguments
- The learned Standing Counsel supported the conviction and submitted that it is a settled principle of law that a conviction may lawfully be based solely on a dying declaration; Section 32 of the Evidence Act makes such statements relevant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Khushal Rao v. State Of Bombay (AIR 1958 SC 22 / 1958 Cri LJ 106) | Laid down multifaceted principles on dying declarations: no absolute rule requiring corroboration; each case decided on its facts; dying declaration stands as other evidence; higher weight if recorded by a magistrate in Q&A; factors to test reliability (opportunity of observation, clarity of memory, consistency, earliest opportunity, absence of tutoring). | The court reproduced and relied on these principles as foundational guidance for testing Ext. 11's reliability and for explaining the approach to dying declarations. |
| Lallubhai Devchand Shah v. State of Gujarat ((1971) 3 SCC 767 / AIR 1972 SC 1776) | Cited among authorities on the probative value of dying declarations. | Cited as part of the body of Supreme Court decisions outlining rules governing dying declarations and their scrutiny. |
| K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor ((1976) 3 SCC 618 / AIR 1976 SC 1994) | Authority emphasising strict scrutiny of dying declarations and conditions for acting upon them. | Used to reinforce the need for closest circumspection before acting on a dying declaration and to support the court's approach to testing Ext. 11. |
| State of Haryana v. Harpal Singh ((1978) 4 SCC 465 / AIR 1978 SC 1530) | Cited as authority on dying declarations. | Referenced among the Supreme Court decisions the court relied on to set out the governing principles for evaluating Ext. 11. |
| Tehal Singh v. State of Punjab (1980 Supp SCC 400 / AIR 1979 SC 1347) | Section 32 does not require that a statement be made in expectation of death; great weight attaches to declarations recorded shortly after occurrence; presence of friends/relatives does not automatically show tutoring. | Quoted to explain that proximity in time and circumstances weigh in favour of reliability, but that each case must still be scrutinised. |
| Habib Usman v. State Of Gujarat ((1979) 3 SCC 358 / AIR 1979 SC 1181) | Presence of relatives/friends before recording does not automatically render a dying declaration tutored. | Cited to show that presence of others is not by itself a ground for discarding a dying declaration; court nonetheless examined whether tutoring was shown on facts here. |
| Tarachand Damu Sutar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC 130 / 1962 (1) Cri LJ 196) | Cited as authority on dying declarations and related evidentiary principles. | Included among the earlier decisions relied upon to state general principles governing dying declarations. |
| Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1962 SC 439) | Cited as authority on the law concerning dying declarations. | Referenced as part of the body of precedents guiding assessment of Ext. 11. |
| Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab ((1970) 2 SCC 113 / AIR 1970 SC 1566) | Cited among authorities on dying declarations. | Used to support the statement of settled law on dying declarations. |
| Gopal Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((1972) 3 SCC 268 / AIR 1972 SC 1557) | Authority cited regarding the proper scrutiny and weight to be given to dying declarations. | Relied on for the proposition that dying declarations require scrutiny but can be sufficient if true and voluntary. |
| Kusa v. State of Orissa ((1980) 2 SCC 207 / AIR 1980 SC 559) | Listed among cases on dying declaration principles. | Cited as part of the jurisprudential background the court used to assess Ext. 11. |
| Ramawati Devi v. State Of Bihar ((1983) 1 SCC 11 / AIR 1983 SC 64) | Included among authorities on dying declarations and their evidentiary value. | Referenced in the catalogue of authorities the court considered when testing Ext. 11. |
| State Of Assam v. Mafizuddin Ahmed ((1983) 2 SCC 14 / AIR 1983 SC 274) | Cited among decisions about dying declarations. | Part of the authority list invoked by the court to outline applicable principles. |
| Darahan Singh v. State of Punjab ((1983) 2 SCC 411 / AIR 1983 SC 554) | Authority on dying declaration jurisprudence. | Referred to as further supporting precedent on the probative value of dying statements. |
| Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. (1981 SCC (Cri) 581) | Held that a dying declaration suffering from infirmity cannot form basis of conviction. | Cited to support the proposition that infirm dying declarations must be rejected and cannot sustain conviction. |
| State Of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu (1980 Supp SCC 455 / AIR 1981 SC 617) | Authority that omission of narrative detail does not require discarding a dying declaration. | Cited to underline that brevity or lack of detail is not ipso facto fatal to a dying declaration's admissibility. |
| Kake Sing v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1981 Supp SCC 25 / AIR 1982 SC 1021) | If cumulative circumstances show the deceased was unconscious and could not have made the statement, such dying declaration must be rejected. | Invoked to explain that absence of capacity to speak or consciousness mandates rejection of a dying declaration; applied in assessing medical evidence here. |
| Abdul Majid Abdul Rahman v. State Of Gujarat ((1976) 4 SCC 351 / AIR 1976 SC 1782) | Recognised a doctor's duty and justification to record a dying declaration when life is ebbing and there is no time to call police or magistrate; doctor as best person to opine on fitness to make the statement. | Cited by the trial court and considered by the appellate court when analysing P.W.7's role and propriety of recording Ext. 11. |
| Mayur Panabhai Shah v. State Of Gujarat ((1982) 2 SCC 396 / AIR 1983 SC 66) | Doctor's evidence is to be appreciated like any other witness; no presumption that a doctor is always witness of truth. | Relied on to emphasise that P.W.7's testimony must be scrutinised like any other witness and not accepted uncritically. |
| Jayaraj v. State Of Tamil Nadu ((1976) 2 SCC 788 / AIR 1976 SC 1519) | Where a dying person is in severe pain, brevity of words may indicate truthfulness rather than tutoring; brevity can be an index of truth. | Cited to explain that shortness of declaration is not by itself a ground for rejection; considered in relation to Ext. 11's brevity. |
| Som Nath v. State of Haryana ((1980) 3 SCC 301 / AIR 1980 SC 1226) | A dying person's groaning or brief utterances in agony cannot be judged by standards of fuller testimony; brevity may be natural. | Invoked to support the point that a brief dying declaration made in severe agony can nonetheless be true. |
| Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar (1980 Supp SCC 769 / AIR 1979 SC 1505) | Shortness of the statement itself can be a guarantee of truth. | Cited to show that shortness is not necessarily a flaw; the court nevertheless examined whether other infirmities undermined Ext. 11. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The appellate court conducted a structured legal and factual analysis focused on whether Ext. 11 (the dying declaration) could safely sustain a conviction.
- Framework of law: The court set out Supreme Court authorities and Section 32 of the Evidence Act establishing that dying declarations are admissible and may, in appropriate circumstances, form the sole basis for conviction, but that each dying declaration must be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and circumstantial testing (opportunity to observe, mental capacity, consistency, earliest opportunity, absence of tutoring).
- Medical and timing evidence: Ext. 11 was recorded at 3:10 p.m. The doctor who performed the autopsy (P.W.6) testified that the right internal and external carotid and jugular vein had been cut and the trachea severed below the thyroid; his evidence indicated severe neck injuries that ordinarily preclude speech unless the wound had been closed (e.g., by a finger or bandage) allowing whispering. P.W.7 (the doctor who recorded Ext. 11) stated that at about 2:20 p.m. the deceased vomited profuse blood, became hoarse and restless, and that he recorded the declaration because the patient's condition was sinking; after recording she vomited again at 4:05 p.m. and died at 4:10 p.m.
- Capacity to speak and audibility: P.W.7 admitted that the deceased's voice was "very feeble and inaudible." P.W.11 similarly said the answers were given in a very feeble voice and not audible to him. These pieces of evidence raise questions about the deceased's capacity to make a clear and coherent verbal statement.
- Inconsistencies among attesting witnesses: P.W.11 signed Ext. 11 but later stated he had not read it and could not assert it was the deceased's statement; he also said he could not hear the words. P.W.16, by contrast, later claimed he heard each word, but the court noted potential bias (family litigation) and found P.W.16 not an entirely credible witness. The court highlighted that the evidence of P.Ws.7, 11 and 16 about how the declaration was recorded and whether it was audible was not consistent.
- Defects in form and recording: The doctor did not certify (a) that the deceased, an old and illiterate lady with multiple injuries, was in a position to make the declaration; or (b) that the declaration was read over to her after being recorded. The presence of inverted commas and the separate ink used for the portion "Today date 14-3-1980" suggested that parts of the document might not have been recorded contemporaneously or verbatim in the manner claimed. The doctor stated the portion in inverted commas represented the deceased's words, while other prefatory parts might not have been spoken by her; the court found this inconsistent with the deceased's illiteracy and unlikely.
- Credibility and tutoring concerns: Given the feeble audibility, the attesting witness's inability to confirm hearing or reading the statement, the variance in accounts, and the unexplained recording irregularities, the court concluded there were suspicious features and infirmities in the evidence about Ext. 11 that made reliance on it unsafe.
- Application of legal principles to facts: Using the authorities it had outlined, the court tested Ext. 11 against the established criteria for reliability (capacity to observe and speak, voluntary nature, earliest opportunity, absence of tutoring, consistency). On these tests the court found Ext. 11 "far short of the mark" and concluded it was unsafe and hazardous to accept the declaration as a truthful, standalone basis for conviction.
- Conclusion of analysis: Because the dying declaration could not be accepted as reliable, and there was no other acceptable corroborative evidence that named the appellant as the assailant, the prosecution had failed to establish the charge under Section 302 beyond reasonable doubt.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence imposed under Section 302 of the Penal Code. The court directed that the appellant be set at liberty forthwith.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The appellant's conviction under S.302 and the life sentence based solely on the dying declaration (Ext. 11) were quashed, and the appellant was ordered to be released. The earlier acquittal on the robbery charge by the trial court remained part of the record.
- On precedent and law: The court applied established Supreme Court principles regarding dying declarations (as summarized in the opinion) and emphasised that a dying declaration that suffers from infirmities cannot be the basis of a conviction unless the court is satisfied of its reliability. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal rule; it applied existing authorities to the facts and found the dying declaration in this case unreliable.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal allowed." (G.B. Patnaik, J. agreed.)
Behera, J.:— The appellant stood charged under Ss. 302 and 397, Penal Code, for committing robbery in respect of gold ornaments from the person of Dhani Bewa (hereinafter described as the deceased) by attacking and assaulting her to death by means of a knife on Mar. 14, 1980, at Bolgarh in the district of Puri. To bring home. The charges, the prosecution had examined nineteen witnesses and had relied on the verbal dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased before. The first informant Lokanath Das (P.W 1) and before P.Ws 2 to 5, the recoveries of ornaments of the deceased and the weapon of attack at the is face of the appellant and the dying declaration (Ext. 11) recorded by the doctor (P.W 7) in the presence of two persons, namely Rabindra Kumar Parida (P.W 11) and Bhaskar Chandra Mohapatra (P.W 12) who had attested it on the day of the occurrence itself. The trial Court did not place reliance on the evidence of P.W 1 with regard to the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased naming. The appellant as the author of the crime P.Ws 2 to 5, who were said to have made some incriminating statements against the appellant in the course of investigation in this regard did not support. The case of the prosecution and were put leading questions by it. The learned Sessions Judge found that the evidence did not warrant a conclusion that the ornaments of the deceased and the weapon of attack had been recovered consequent upon. The statements made by the appellant. The appellant was acquitted of the charge of robbery framed against him Accepting. The dying declaration (Ext. 11) as true and trustworthy, the learned Sessions Judge has based. The order of conviction of the appellant under S. 302 Penal Code, solely thereon and has sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life.
2. It is not disputed at the Bar that the deceased had died a homicidal death Inviting our attention to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in AIR 1958 SC 22 : 1958 Cri LJ 106 Khushal Rao v. State Of Bombay , (1971) 3 SCC 767 : AIR 1972 SC 1776 : (1972 Cri LJ 828) Lallubhai Devchand Shah v. State of Gujarat, (1976) 3 SCC 618 : AIR 1976 SC 1994 : 1976 Cri LJ 1548 K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor and (1978) 4 SCC 465 : AIR 1978 SC 1530 : (1978 Cri LJ 1603) State of Haryana v. Harpal Singh Mr. Ram has contended on behalf of the appellant that the evidence with regard to the dying declaration not only bristled with discrepancies, but was also fraught with suspicious features and it could not be said on the evidence that the deceased made a dying declaration which could form the basis of an order of conviction. The learned Standing Counsel has supported. The order of conviction as well-founded on the basis of the dying declaration and has submitted that it has been a settled principle of law that an order of conviction can be based solely on a dying declaration. Section 32, Evidence Act, provides that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead are themselves relevant facts when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death in cases in which. The cause of the person's death comes into question such statements are admitted on the principle of necessity. Being a testimonial statement made out of Court. The declaration is open to discredit in the same way as any other witness. The dying declaration is a piece of untested evidence and must, like any other evidence, satisfy. The Court that what had been stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it.
3. The law laid down by the Supreme Court from time to time with regard to the probative value of a dying declaration may be kept in mind S. 32, Evidence Act, does not require that a statement should be made in expectation of death See 1980 Supp SCC 400 : AIR 1979 SC 1347 : (1979 Cri LJ 1031) Tehal Singh v. State of Punjab. Great weight must naturally and necessarily be attached to a dying declaration recorded very shortly after the occurrence. Merely because some friends and relatives happen to be with the deceased before the statement in recorded, the statement cannot be thrown out as tutored, (vide (1979) 3 SCC 358 : AIR 1979 SC 1181 : (1979 Cri LJ 708) Habib Usman v. State Of Gujarat). in the welt known case of Khushal Rao v. State Of Bombay (1958 Cri LJ 106) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down:
“16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view of circumstances in which. The dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing. The weighing of evidence, (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like. The opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember. The facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not. The result of tutoring by interested parties.
17. Hence, in order to pass the test of reliability, a dying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny, keeping in view the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused who had no opportunity of testing. The veracity of the statement by cross-examination. But once, the Court has come to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to the circumstances of the death and the assailants of the victim there is no question of further corroboration.
If, on the other hand, the Court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the reported cases, but from the fact that the Court, in a given case has come to the conclusion that particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities, referred to above or from such there infirmities as may be disclosed in evidence in that case.”
4. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in AIR 1962 SC 130 : 1962 (1) Cri LJ 196 Tarachand Damu Sutar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 439 : (1962 (1) Cri LJ 479) Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab, (1970) 2 SCC 113 : AIR 1970 SC 1566 : (1970 Cri LJ 1415) Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1972) 3 SCC 268 : AIR 1972 SC 1557 : 1972 Cri LJ 1045) Gopal Singh v. State of vladhya Pradesh, (1980) 2 SCC 207 : AIR 1980 SC 559 : 1980 Cri LJ 408 Kusa v. State of Orissa, (1983) 1 SCC 11 : AIR 1983 SC 64 : 1983 Cri LJ 221 Ramawati Devi v. State Of Bihar, (1983) 2 SCC 14 : AIR 1983 SC 274 : 1983 Cri LJ 426 State Of Assam v. Mafizuddin Ahmed and (1983) 2 SCC 411 : AIR 1983 SC 554 : 1983 Cri LJ 985 Darahan Singh v. State of Punjab.
5. As has been held by the Supreme Court in (1971) 3 SCC 767 : AIR 1972 SC 1776 : (1972 Cri LJ 828) (supra), dying declaration must be closely scrutinised to its truthfulness like any other important piece of evidence in the light of the surrounding acts and circumstances of the case, bearing mind, on the one hand, that the statement is by a person who has not been examined in court on oath and, on the other, that the lying man is normally not likely to implicate innocent persons falsely. When a dying declaration is recorded, the person who records the statement must be satisfied that the person making the statement is consciously making it understanding the implications of the words used and the responsibility of the Court is greater in holding that it was so made.
6. In (1976) 3 SCC 618 : AIR 1976 SC 1994 : (1976 Cri LJ 1548) (supra), it has been laid down.
(Para 6) “……. The dying declaration is undoubtedly admissible under S. 32 Evidence Act and not being a statement on oath so that its truth could be tested by cross-examination, the Courts have to apply the strictest scrutiny and the closest circumspection to the statement before acting upon it While great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words of a dying man because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lies or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person yet the Court has to be on guard against the statement of the deceased being a result of either tutoring prompting or a product of his imagination the Court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement after the deceased had a clear opportunity to observe and identify his assailants and that he was making the statement without any influence or rancour. Once the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can be sufficient to found the conviction even without any further corroboration……”
7. It has been held therein that it is extremely unsafe to place any reliance on the dying declaration in view of the conduct of the deceased in not making any disclosure regarding the occurrence on previous occasions when he had full and complete opportunity to name his assailants.
8. Dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot be the basis of a conviction, as held in 1981 SCC (Cri) 581 Ram Manorath v. State of UP.
9. A dying declaration is not to be discarded because it does not contain. The details as to the occurrence. (See 1980 Supp SCC 455 : AIR 1981 SC 617 : 1981 Cri LJ 9 State Of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu).
10. The evidence with regard to the recorded dying declaration is to be analysed and tested keeping the aforesaid principles in mind. The relevant evidence in this regard is that of P.W 7 the doctor who had recorded the dying declaration (Ext. 11) and that of P.Ws 11 and 16, who had attested it of some relevance is the evidence of the doctor (P.W 6) who had conducted the autopsy and this is with regard to the capacity of the deceased to make one.
11. The dying declaration had been recorded in the Oriya language the English rendering of Ext. 11 would read:
Dying declaration
I Shrimati Dhani Bewa wife of Chanda Das Village/P.O/P.S.Q Bolgarh District Puri, here by state that “Today dt/- 14-3-80 in the morning while putting the not on the oven for cooking rice Puma Singh son of Hadu Singh of our village after entering our house assaulted on my face and hand and cut my throat by knife and removed 4 gold necklaces from my neck.”
12. The right thumb impression of the deceased has been taken thereon this would evidently mean that the deceased was an illiterate lady.
13. Ext. 11 had been recorded at 3.10 p.m the doctor (P.W 6) who had held the post mortem examination had while describing. The internal injuries testified that the right internal and external carotid and jugular vein had been cut and the trachea had been cut below the thyroid gland. He has opined that in case the trachea is cut and the cut portion is left open, the injured cannot talk but if the opening is closed by putting a finger or by putting a bandage, the injured can talk with difficulty. When an extract from Modi's Medical Jurisprudence 13th Edition at page 268, regarding the neck injuries was brought to his notice he stated in his cross-examination:
“In a wound of the larynx below the vocal cord and that of the trachea, no speech is possible I do not dispute the said proposition of Modi, but that is possible only if the wound is allowed to be kept in open Modi has also said, in the said paragraph that in case the opening is closed. The injured can whisper.”
14. Whether a person is in a position to make a dying declaration is to be judged on the basis of the evidence of the doctor who had recorded it See (1978) 4 SCC 465 : AIR 1978 SC 1530 : (1978 Cri LJ 1603) (supra).
15. If the cumulative effect of the circumstances of the case would lead to the irresistible conclusion that the deceased was unconscious and could never have made any statement, the evidence with regard to the dying declaration is to be rejected. See 1981 Supp SCC 25 : AIR 1982 SC 1021 : (1982 Cri LJ 986) Kake Sing v. State of Madhya Pradesh.
16. The Doctor (P.W 7) who had recorded. The dying declaration in the instant case had testified that he had dressed all the injuries noticed on the deceased and had got them stitched. It would, however, be noticed from his evidence that at 2.20 p.m the deceased vomited profuse blood the hoarseness of her voice was noticed and she became restless this doctor then took steps for recording the dying declaration as the condition of the patient was sinking and after issuing a requisitior (Ext. 15) to the Police Officer, who came and requested him to record the dying declaration he recorded it his evidence was that after the dying declaration was recorded the deceased again vomited blood at 4.05 p.m profuse and in spite of best attempts on his part she succumbed to the injuries at 4.10 p.m All this would show that the dying declaration had been recorded when the deceased aged about seventy five years was in utter agony and would be in a position to speak a few words with great difficulty.
17. With regard to the appreciation of the evidence of a doctor who had recorded, dying declaration, the learned Sessions Judge has referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in (1976) 4 SCC 351 : AIR 1976 SC 1782 : (1976 Cri LJ 1382) Abdul Majid Abdul Rahman v. State Of Gujarat to the following effect:
“…… There was absolutely no basis for doubting the integrity and veracity of Dr. Sha ………There is absolutely nothing in the statement which could raise a suspicion that the deponent was biased in favour of the prosecution or ill-disposed towards the accused the Doctor was the best person to opine about the fitness of the deceased make the statement he did the Doctor found that life was ebbing fast in the patient the was no time to call the police or a Magistrate in such a situation. The Doctor was justified indeed he was duty bound — to record to dying declaration of the deceased. He was disinterested respectable witness. The Trial Judge was therefore wholly unjustified in rejecting the evidence of the Medical Officer.”
18. It has been held by the learned trial Judge that there was nothing to disbelieve the evidence of the doctor the Supreme Court has observed in (1982) 2 SCC 396 : AIR 1983 SC 66 : (1982 Cri LJ 1972) Mayur Panabhai Shah v. State Of Gujarat that a doctor's evidence is to be appreciated like that of any other witness and there is no presumption that a doctor is always a witness of truth. The evidence of P.Ws 7, 11 and 16 needs careful scrutiny.
19. The learned Sessions Judge has observed that a dying declaration can be taken to be a true version and accepted even if it is recorded without details and in this connection, reference has been made to the observations of the Supreme Court in (1976) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1976 SC 1519 : (1976 Cri LJ 1186) Jayaraj v. State Of Tamil Nadu as follows:
“…… When the deponent was in severe bodily pain, and words were scarce, his natural impulse would be to tell the Magistrate, without wasting his breath on details as to who had stabbed him the very brevity of dying declaration, in the circumstances of the case far from being a suspicious circumstance, was an index of its being true and free from the taint of tutoring the substratum of the dying declaration was fully consistent in the ocular account given by the eye-witnesses.
20. Brevity of a dying declaration containing a few words would not warrant its rejection on that ground. A dying person with fatal injuries must be in severe agony. The groaning utterances of a dying person in the grip of dreadful agony cannot be judged by standard of fulness of particulars which witnesses may give in other situations, as observed by the Supreme Court in (1980) 3 SCC 301 : AIR 1980 SC 1226 : 1980 Cri LJ 925 Som Nath v. State of Haryana.
21. Shortness of the statement itself appears to be the guarantee of truth (See 1980 Supp SCC 769 : AIR 1979 SC 1505 : (1979 Cri LJ 1122) Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar.
22. The dying declaration in the instant case, is not to be discarded merely because it was a brief statement as the deceased was in great agony then.
23. The evidence of P.Ws 7, 11 and 16 with regard to the mode of recording the dying declaration and as to whether she was clear and audible was not quite consistent. No certificate has been recorded by P.W 7 that the deceased an old and illiterate lady with multiple injuries on her person was in a position to make the dying declaration. The doctor had not certified that after the dying declaration (Ext. 11) was recorded it was read over to the deceased. The inverted commas occurring before the words and figures. “Today date 14-3-1980” and at the end have undoubtedly been given in a separate ink and not simultaneously with the recording of the dying declaration. The doctor has explained in his evidence that the portion within inverted commas was the declaration made by the deceased and not the other portion in the beginning such as Shrimati Dhani Bewa wife of Chanda Das Village/P.O/P.S Bolgarh District Puri here by state that. If that was not a part of the dying declaration it is not understood as to why it was so recorded was highly unlikely because of the illiteracy of the deceased that she would not only utter the word today, but also give the date, month and year according to the calendar. According to P.W 7, he had questioned the deceased as to how she had sustained the injuries in the presence of P.Ws 11 and 16 and she gave the reply which he had recorded verbatim the evidence of P.W 11 was that in his presence, the doctor put questions to the deceased regarding the assault on her and “she was giving answers and the doctor was recording answers in verbatim”. The evidence of P.W 16 was that on being “interrogated”, the deceased gave out. The name of her assailant and the doctor recorded the statement according to this witness the doctor did not note the questions put but only noted. The replies given by the deceased his statement in cross-examination was that the doctor had in all, put eight to ten questions out of which he remembered only two to three if the doctor had put questions as had been deposed to by P.Ws 11 and 16, the questions put to and the answers given by the deceased ought to have been recorded in the form of questions and answers. This had not been done.
24. P.W 7 had admitted in his cross-examination that the voice of the deceased was “very feeble and inaudible”. This was also the evidence of P.W 11. He had deposed:
“……She was giving answers in a very feeble voice and it was not audible to me……”
“2. I could not follow the version of Dhani as her voice was feeble and it was not audible to ma by the time the statement was recorded Bhaskar Chandra Mohapatra of our village was also present Besides him, the police A & L and some female members of the village were present I have not gone through the statement recorded by the doctor. I have simply put my signature and left the place 4 or 5 others were present in the room. But I cannot name any one of them as I have not heard from the mouth of Dhani and as I have not read the statement Ext. 11 prior to putting my signature I now cannot assert that this is really the statement of Dhani recorded by the doctor.
For the statements made by P.W 11, the learned trial Judge held that his evidence was not worthy of credence. Because of the suspicious features in the evidence of P.W 7 and 11 as to whether what had been stated by the deceased was audible and because of the positive assertion made by P.W 11 that it was not P.W 16, as one can reasonably guess, was made to say on a later date when he was examined that he could hear each word spoken by the deceased when the doctor recorded. The dying declaration of the deceased verbatim. He had admitted in his cross-examination that the deceased was able to speak with difficulty. The suggestion of the defence was that Hadu Singh. The father of appellant was on litigating terms with his (P.W 16's) father. P.W 16 did not gave a straight forward answer and avoided by saying that he was not aware if there was any litigation between his father and father of the appellant P.W 16 does not appear to us to be a witness of truth.
25. Regard being had to the aforesaid suspicious features and infirmities in the evidence adduced at the trial with regard to the recorded dying declaration we find that it would be unsafe and hazardous to accept Ext. 11 and base a conviction thereon the deceased did have the opportunity of naming the appellant as the author of the crime before her co-villagers, but there was no acceptable evidence that she had made any such statement in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case we are not prepared to accept the finding recorded by the trial Court that Ext. 11 had properly been recorded and that it contained a true version as to how.
26. The deceased met with her death While solemnity and sanctity are to be attached to the words of a dying person who, on the verge of death, is not likely to tell lies, a dying declaration must be subjected to strictest scrutiny and closest circumspection before acting upon it as observed in (1976) 3 SCC 618 : AIR 1976 SC 1994 : (1976 Cri LJ 1548) (supra). Judged in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the reported cases referred to by us with regard to the probative value of a dying declaration, we find that the evidence on which reliance had been placed by the prosecution with regard to the dying declaration was far short of the mark. It is certainly not a fit case, in our view, to base a conviction of the appellant on the dying declaration said to have been made by the deceased naming. The appellant as the author of the crime unsupported and uncorroborated by any other evidence.
27. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge under S. 302, Penal Code, against the appellant.
28. We would allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant and direct that he be set at liberty forthwith.
29. G.B Patnaik, J.:— I agree.
30. Appeal allowed.
Alert