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Khageswar Pujari v. State Of Orissa .

Orissa High Court
Dec 6, 1983
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Khageswar Pujari, was convicted by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhawanipatna under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for allegedly murdering his daughter Basanti, aged about two and a half years, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. The evidence established that the appellant inflicted the fatal injury on the child on the morning of the occurrence while she was eating soaked rice. The appellant was originally without counsel, and the court engaged Mr. Krutibas Kar, Advocate, to represent him at State expense. On appeal the primary contention raised was that the appellant was suffering from unsoundness of mind covered by Section 84 IPC at the time of the offence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, at the time of the occurrence, the appellant was labouring under mental unsoundness falling within Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code and therefore incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law.
  2. Whether the Trial Court properly appreciated the evidence on record with respect to the plea of insanity and discharged the duty to consider the exceptions in the chapter on General Exceptions (in light of Section 6 IPC and Section 106 of the Evidence Act).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (through engaged counsel) argued that at the time of the occurrence he was labouring under mental insanity covered by Section 84 IPC and therefore lacked the requisite criminal capacity to form mens rea.
  • It was submitted that the Trial Court did not properly appreciate and consider all relevant evidence and factors to determine whether Section 84 applied in this case.

State's / Prosecution's Position

  • The learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. Ajit Rath, candidly submitted that given the state of evidence on record, the Trial Court should have considered the question of the appellant's mental state at the time of the commission of the offence on the basis of the prosecution evidence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 : 1964 (2) Cri LJ 472 Statement of the doctrine of burden of proof in the context of a plea of insanity: (1) prosecution must prove commission of offence with requisite mens rea beyond reasonable doubt; (2) rebuttable presumption that accused was not insane; accused may rebut by placing relevant evidence; (3) evidence may raise reasonable doubt as to ingredients of offence including mens rea. The court relied on the principles in Dahyabhai to frame the burden-of-proof analysis: although prosecution must prove mens rea, evidence before the court (including that led by prosecution witnesses) could raise reasonable doubt regarding the appellant's mental condition and mens rea; this supported the conclusion that conviction was not sustainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by stating the legal test under Section 84 IPC: an act is not an offence if, by reason of unsoundness of mind, the person was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law. The court noted that Section 84 places the burden on the accused to adduce evidence proving such unsoundness, but that Section 6 IPC (read with Section 106 of the Evidence Act) obliges the court itself to consider exceptions in the General Exceptions chapter and to examine the materials on record to determine whether doubt arises regarding the accused's mental condition.

The court summarized the burden-of-proof principles from Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat: the prosecution must prove mens rea beyond reasonable doubt; there is a rebuttable presumption of sanity; the accused may rebut but the burden upon him is heavy; and evidence (from either side) may raise a reasonable doubt as to mens rea that warrants acquittal.

The court then examined the prosecution evidence relevant to insanity:

  • P.W.2 (Umasankar Pujari, cousin) stated in cross-examination that 5–6 months prior to the occurrence the appellant was behaving like an insane man; on the previous day the appellant was lying in dust in the hot sun and foaming in the street; two years prior he had been brought to hospital for treatment; the appellant was also seen moving about in the street at night; the F.I.R. indicated 8–10 days of mad-like behaviour.
  • P.W.3 (Nanda Pujari, father) stated he did not see the actual assault but thought his son, being insane, would be the one who killed the victim.
  • P.W.5 (Rama Pujari, wife) was an eyewitness who deposed that the appellant came with an axe and struck Basanti on the head causing instantaneous death; she also stated that 8–10 days prior the appellant had been behaving like a madman and had taken little food, for which they sought astrological treatment.
  • P.W.8 (Harahari Naik, co-villager and independent witness) stated in cross-examination that the appellant was insane prior to the occurrence.

The court observed that while the physical act of inflicting the fatal injury was conclusively established by the evidence, there was significant and consistent material suggesting abnormal behaviour and prior episodes of insanity. The court noted the absence of motive and that the sudden, unexpected nature of the assault on the appellant's own child was of such a character that it supported the possibility of mental abnormality.

Applying the Dahyabhai burden-of-proof framework and having regard to Section 6 IPC and Section 106 Evidence Act, the court concluded that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the appellant possessed the requisite mens rea for murder at the time of the incident and whether he was of sound mind. The Public Prosecutor's concession that the Trial Court should have considered the appellant's mental state at the time of the offence was noted by the court.

Based on this analysis the court held that the appellant was not in a fit mental condition at the crucial time and was therefore incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that it was wrong or contrary to law. Consequently, the conviction could not be sustained. However, the court also proceeded to address the immediate post-acquittal dispositional issue under the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912.

Relying on Sections 334 and 335 CrPC (as cited in the opinion), the court stated that it was not in a position to direct immediate release. The court ordered detention in safe custody in jail until the Civil Surgeon certified fitness for release, compliance with the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912 and rules, and provided for possible personal custody by relatives subject to furnishing proper security to the satisfaction of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dharamgarh. The State was directed to inform the relatives forthwith.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: APPEAL ALLOWED; the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court under Section 302 IPC are set aside.

Direct consequences ordered by the court:

  • The appellant shall be detained in safe custody in jail until the Civil Surgeon certifies that he is fit to live in society and is no longer a security hazard.
  • The jail authority shall comply with the provisions of the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912 and the rules framed thereunder.
  • The appellant may be handed over to relatives or a friend if an application is made and proper security is furnished to the satisfaction of the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dharamgarh.
  • The State shall take necessary steps to inform the appellant's relatives of the order forthwith.

The opinion bases its ruling on the evidence as to the appellant's mental condition and the legal framework governing the burden of proof for insanity pleas; it does not purport to announce a new legal principle beyond applying established doctrines (as summarized from Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat) and the applicable statutory provisions referenced in the judgment.

Show all summary ...

D. Pathak, C.J:— The appellant Khageswar Pujari has been convicted by Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhawanipatna under Section 302 I.P.C and sentenced to undergo R.I for life for murdering his daughter Basanti aged about 2½ years.

2. The facts of this case are telling and stand almost uncontroverted. The evidence on record as to the factum of infliction of injury by the appellant on the victim while she was feasting on some soaked rice in the morning of the date of occurrence is conclusive and of clinching nature. As the appellant was not represented by any Counsel we engaged Mr. Krutibas Kar, Advocate to represent him at the State expense.

3. The only point that has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant at the time of the occurrence was labouring under mental insanity covered by the general exception engrafted under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned counsel further submits that the Trial Court did not properly appreciate the evidence on record although it was the duty of the Court to have considered all the factors and the relevant evidence attending the case in order to find out as to whether the provision of Section 84 was attracted or not.

4. In order to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, it is better to have a look at the provision of Section 84, I.P.C which reads:—

“84. Act of a person of unsound mind: Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law”.

5. Section 84 I.P.C, casts the burden on the accused to adduce evidence and prove that at the time of the occurrence his mental condition was such that he did not know what he was doing. In such a case, a duty is also cast on the Court itself to find out from the materials on record viz., the conduct of the accused, as to whether any doubt arises in the mind of the Court that at the time of the occurrence the accused was not in a fit mental condition to have the requisite mens rea for the commission of the offence and that he did not have the element of mens rea required under Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. In this context, we may also refer to Sec. 6 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 6 so far as relevant, reads as follows:—

“6. Definitions in the Code to be understood subject to exceptions:—

Throughout this Code, every definition of an offence, every penal provision and every illustration of every such definition or penal provision shall be understood subject to the exceptions contained in the chapter entitled “General Exceptions” though those exceptions are not repeated in such definition, penal provision and illustration.

ILLUSTRATION

xxxxxx”

6. Section 6 I.P.C carves out or stands in the nature of a proviso to Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act and imposes an obligation on the Court as well to consider the case of exceptions on its own in so far as it relates to the burden of proving legal insanity as the essential element of special knowledge as envisaged in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. If the case of the appellant comes within; the purview of Sec. 84, I.P.C which, is one of the provisions in Chapter IV of the General Exceptions of the Indian Penal Code, the Court is to give due consideration and find out as to whether at the time of the occurrence the appellant had any mental disability jo as not to know what he was doing. In Dahyabhai v. State of Gujrat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 : (1964 (2) Cri LJ 472) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have summarised the principle of law in the following succinct and felicitous language in dealing with the doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity:—

“The doctrine of burden of proof in the context of the plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions:—

(1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial.

(2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Sec. 84 of the Indian Penal Code; the accused may rebut it by placing before the Court all the relevant evidence — oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings.

(3) Even if the accused was not able to establish consecutively that he was insane at, the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the Court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence including mens rea of the accused and in that case the Court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.”

7. Keeping the above principles in view, we may now scrutinise the evidence adduced by the prosecution on the aspect of insanity of the appellant.

8. P.W 2 Umasankar Pujari is a cousin of the appellant. In cross-examination this witness has stated that 5 to 6 months prior to the occurrence the appellant was behaving as an insane man. He has further stated that on the previous day of the Occurrence the appellant was lying on dust on the hot sun and was foaming about in the street and that two years prior to the occurrence the appellant was insane and, was brought to the hospital for treatment. It is further found from his evidence that the appellant was also moving about, in the street in the dead of night. This witness lodged the F.I.R where also he has indicated that since 8 to 10 days the appellant was behaving like a madman.

9. P.W 3 Nanda Pujari, is the father of the appellant. In cross-examination this witness has stated that he did not see the actual assault on the deceased, but he thought that as his son (the appellant) was insane, it would be he who killed the victim.

10. P.W 5, Rama Pujari, is the wife of the appellant. She has stated in her evidence that in the last Baisakh on a Monday her daughter Basanti (deceased) was taking soaked rice and the witness was bringing some cow dung from the cowshed. At that time, the appellant came with an axe (M.O I) and gave a stroke with that Axe on the head of Basanti as a result of which she died at the spot with bleeding injury. She has further stated that the father of the appellant came running to the place of occurrence and gave two to three slaps to him. Thereupon the appellant threw away the axe and ran away from the spot and he was subsequently caught. In her cross-examination she has stated that 8 to 10 days prior to the occurrence, the appellant, her husband, was behaving like a madman and was taking a little food and so they had taken astrological prosecution for his cure.

11. P.W 8 Harahari Naik is a co-villager of the appellant. It is a disinterested and independent witness. In cross-examination he has stated that the appellant was insane prior to the occurrence.

12. The evidence discussed above discloses that the appellant came suddenly and dealt an axe blow on the deceased. There is no motive to be found and unless the appellant was suffering from abnormality it was not expected of him to have behaved, like that and kill his own daughter.

13. On a proper scanning of the evidence, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that it was doubtful as to whether the appellant was in a fit men all condition and had the malice propense mens rea for the commission of the crime. The evidence adduced by the prosecution as scrutinised by me discloses that all probability the appellant did not have the proper balance of mind at the time of the occurrence.

14. Mr. Ajit Rath, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State, very candidly submits that in view of the state of evidence brought on record, the learned Trial Court should have considered the question of the mental state of the appellant not during the trial but at the time of commission of offence on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

15. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellant at the crucial point of time was not in a fit mental condition and was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. We are therefore of the firm opinion that the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant is not sustainable in law.

16. In the result we allow the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant. However in view of the provisions of Sections 334 and 335 of the Criminal Procedure Code, we are not in a position to direct his release forthwith. The appellant shall be detained in safe custody in Jail until the Civil Surgeon concerned certifies that he is fit enough to live in the society and is no longer a security hazard to the society. The Jail authority shall comply with the provisions of the Indian Lunacy Act, 1912 and the rules framed thereunder. The appellant may, however be handed over to his relatives or friend if an application is made to that effect by any such relative or friend, but he shall be so released only on proper security being furnished to the satisfaction of the sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dharamgarh. The State shall;take necessary steps to inform about this order to the relatives of the appellant forthwith.

17. Mohapatra, J.:— I agree.

18. Appeal allowed.