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N.P Singh Deo v. State Of Orissa And Others Opposite Parties.

Orissa High Court
Sep 23, 1982
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Annotated Summary of the Opinion (R.N. Misra, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed an application dated 29-6-73 under Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (the "Act") seeking settlement of approximately 30.39 acres in mouza Jatannagar, Dhenkanal — the claimed land comprising tanks, homestead with building, road and orchards. The claim was published under Section 8-A pursuant to an order dated 4-1-74. Initially the Collector dropped the claim (order dated 24-4-75) relying on a Government clarification (letter No. 81272.R dated 8-12-73) that the lands did not form an estate and the applicant could not be an intermediary.

The Collector later revived the claim by order dated 21-7-76 (referencing Notification No. 17804.R dated 13-3-73 and the Government circular) and directed local enquiry. Following field enquiry and spot verification (Amin's report and Collector's inspection), the Collector passed a final order on 9-9-76 granting settlement to the petitioner of 29.75 acres but disallowing the petitioner's claim to 0.56 acres (plot No. 177) on the ground that the double-storeyed building thereon was deserted, not in the ex-intermediary's possession, and therefore did not fall within Section 6(1) of the Act.

The petitioner appealed under Section 9 of the Act; the appellate authority dismissed the appeal on 27-8-77. The petitioner then moved under Article 226 of the Constitution (writ jurisdiction), challenging the appellate decision upholding rejection of the claim for settlement of the 0.56-acre portion of plot No. 177.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the authorities under the Act applied the correct legal standard for a claim under Section 6 (possession) as distinct from Section 7 (khas possession), and whether the Collector's and appellate authority's enquiries and findings were vitiated by applying an incorrect test.
  2. Whether, in the factual context of a vesting notification and prior settlement of other lands with rent assessment under the Orissa Rent (Assessment of Rent) Act, 1958, the petitioner could contend that the property in question was not an estate (i.e., whether earlier acceptance of vesting and settlement precluded the petitioner's challenge to vesting in relation to the 0.56-acre claim).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The authorities failed to keep the requirements of Section 6 of the Act in view and were therefore misled in their decision regarding the 0.56 acres in plot No. 177.
  • Because the lands had been settled with the petitioner and rent had been assessed under Orissa Act 13 of 1958 (the O.P.L.R. (Assessment of Rent) Act, 1958), the petitioner was already a tenant of the State (relying on Pratap Kesari Deo v. State of Orissa, 26 Cut LT 652 : AIR 1961 Ori 131). On that basis, there could be no vesting — an issue the petitioner sought to support from the Supreme Court decision in Bimal Chandra Sinha v. State of Orissa (AIR 1962 SC 1912) — and hence the rejection of the claim could not be sustained.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pratap Kesari Deo v. State of Orissa, 26 Cut LT 652 : AIR 1961 Ori 131 Petitioner's reliance: that settlement of lands with rent assessment under the Orissa Rent Act establishes the petitioner as a tenant under the State. The Court noted the petitioner's reliance but declined to entertain this contention because the petitioner had accepted the vesting notification and had treated himself as ex-intermediary by applying under Sections 6 and 7 and accepting settlement for 29.75 acres; thus he could not, for the first time in this writ, repudiate his earlier conduct.
Bimal Chandra Sinha v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1912 Petitioner's reliance: that the Supreme Court decision precludes vesting in certain circumstances (as invoked by the petitioner to argue against vesting). The Court rejected the petitioner's invocation of this precedent for the same reason as above — the petitioner had accepted the vesting notification and prior settlement and therefore could not now contend that vesting had not occurred in relation to the disputed area.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the two pressed contentions separately and applied distinct reasoning to each:

  1. On the second contention (challenge to vesting based on prior settlement and rent assessment):

    The Court observed that there was in fact a vesting notification in 1973 and that the petitioner, by accepting that notification, treating himself as the ex-intermediary and making the application under Sections 6 and 7, and by accepting settlement of 29.75 acres, had acted inconsistently with the position he sought to adopt in the writ — namely, that there was no vesting. The Court held it would be inappropriate to allow the petitioner to repudiate his earlier conduct; accordingly the second contention was not entertained and was rejected.

  2. On the first contention (misapplication of Section 6 requirements):

    The Court found that the authorities had lost sight of the statutory distinction between claims under Section 6 and Section 7 of the Act. It explained the distinction in statutory terms as follows:

    • Section 7 requires "khas possession" (defined in Section 2(j)) and is confined to lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes.
    • Section 6 requires merely "possession" which is broader and need not be personal occupation by the owner; possession may be established by control through lessees, licensees, permissive occupants and even by the presence of others (including trespassers) until such time as adverse possession is perfected.

    The Court scrutinised the Collector's findings regarding the double-storied building on plot No. 177. While the Collector emphasized the building's deserted condition and the apparent absence of active control by the ex-intermediary, the Court noted that:

    • The record shows a completed construction on the plot (despite deterioration and removal of fixtures).
    • Section 6 covers settlement of homestead (not limited to habitability) as well as buildings; hence the legal inquiry must focus on possession rather than the narrower test of khas possession or personal occupation.
    • Some statements recorded during spot verification suggested permissive occupation and other materials were collected but were not tested against the petitioner, indicating a potentially flawed enquiry process.

    Concluding from these points, the Court found the enquiry to have been vitiated because the basic legal test (possession under Section 6) had not been properly applied and certain materials had not been subjected to appropriate enquiry or testing. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Collector's and appellate authority's orders insofar as they related to the petitioner's claim to the 0.56 acres in plot No. 177 and remanded that part of the claim to the Estates Abolition Collector for fresh disposal by instituting appropriate enquiries and granting the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to support his claim.

The Court explicitly stated that it would not interfere with that part of the settlement which had become final (i.e., the 29.75 acres already settled in the petitioner's favour). The Court also observed that there would be no order as to costs. The order records that J.K. Mohanty, J. agreed and the petition was allowed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was allowed in part. The Court vacated the Collector's and appellate authority's orders only insofar as they denied the petitioner's claim to the 0.56 acre portion of plot No. 177 and remanded that portion for fresh enquiry and disposal by the Estates Abolition Collector with reasonable opportunity to the petitioner. The Court confirmed the settlement as to the remainder of the lands (29.75 acres) and made no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's claim to the disputed 0.56 acres is to be re-examined afresh; the previously finalized settlement of 29.75 acres remains undisturbed. The petitioner obtains a procedural remedy (remand) to have possession-related facts re-investigated and properly tested.
  • Precedential or doctrinal effect: The Court reiterated and applied the statutory distinction between Section 6 (possession) and Section 7 (khas possession) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act and emphasized that enquiries under Section 6 must focus on possession (which can be established by non-personal forms of control). The opinion did not purport to lay down a new broad principle of law beyond application of these statutory distinctions to the facts; the decision primarily corrects the application of the existing statutory test by the authorities and orders a fresh, proper enquiry.

Disposition summary: Petition allowed in part; orders of Collector and appellate authority vacated only with respect to the 0.56 acre claim in plot No. 177; remand for proper enquiry; remainder of settlement left intact; no costs.

Show all summary ...

R.N Misra, C.J:— The petitioner in this application under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the appellate decision of the Additional District Magistrate, opposite party No. 3, dated 27-8-77 upholding the rejection of a claim for settlement under Section 6 of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).

2. The petitioner made an application on 29-6-73 purporting to be under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act for settlement of 30.39 acres of land covering tanks, homestead with building, road and orchards, all located within mouza Jatannagar of Sadar Police Station of District Dhenkanal. The claim was duly published under Section 8-A of the Act in compliance of order dated 4-1-74. No objection was, however, filed on 28-4-75 the Collector under the Act recorded the following order:—

“The claim petition relates to the lands held under Nijchas of the applicant in respect of which rent has been assessed under the O.P.L.R (Assessment of Rent) Act, 1958. As per Revenue Department clarification issued in letter No. 81272.R. dated 8-12-73 the lands held by the applicant in his khas possession do not form an estate and as such he cannot be taken as an intermediary as defined in the O.E.A Act. Consequently, the case is dropped.”

On 21-7-76 the Collector recorded another order to the following effect:—

“Sri J. Mohapatra, Authorised Agent of Sri N.P Singh, Dhenkanal is present.

This is a claim filed by Sri N.P Singh Deo under Sections 6 and 7 of the O.E.A Act in respect of the Holding Nos. 1, 7, 12, 13, 20, 24, 25, 26, 32, 33 and 34 of the village Jatannagar consequent on abolition of his estate in Revenue Department Notification No. 17804.R dated 13-3-73.

This case was dropped on 24-4-75 for wrong interpretation of Government letter No. 81272.R dated 8-12-73 in which Government have issued certain clarification regarding estate. I have gone through the said Circular of the Government which says that the private lands of Ruler in occupation of permanent tenant or an occupancy tenant is subject to abolition as the Ruler comes in between the State and tenant. Since Government order is clear and there are occupancy tenants in his estate. I revive the claim of the petitioner.

General notice inviting objection was issued. The notice was served on 27-1-74 and period of 90 days for filing objection has been over. No objection petition has been filed.

The Authorised Agent filed one supplementary memo today.

Amin to conduct field enquiry and report by 5-8-76.”

The Amin furnished a report after spot verification. Thereafter the Collector visited the spot. He appears to have recorded statements of some persons said to be occupying the premises. On 9-9-76 he passed the final order in the proceeding. He took the view that the petitioner was entitled to settlement of 29.75 acres of land. He found that one of the items of claim was 56 decimals relating to plot No. 177 which had a double-storied building. In regard to the claim for this plot, he held:—

“So far as the area of Ac. O. 56 out of plot No. 177 in Khata No. 1 is concerned, it stands recorded as ‘Jungle’ in the Settlement records. However, now a building stands on this plot. As revealed from my spot enquiry report dated 27-8-76, the building is a completely deserted one and has been abandoned since long. Though the plot on which the building, stands is recorded in the name of ex-intermediary, he has never used or occupied it in any manner. The building is a very big one. It is not in a fit state for occupation. Therefore, in the strict sense it cannot be called a dwelling house. It has never been used by the ex-intermediary. Therefore, it can at best marginally come within the definition of the term “homestead” as defined in S. 2(i).

It is clear that the building or the structure has been never used or occupied by the ex-intermediary. He has employed a part-time worker to look to his Khamar house but he has not engaged anybody to watch this massive structure. There is no evidence of any effective physical or manual control over the premises on which the structure stands. There is no outward act to support any such contention. The fact that nobody is engaged to keep a casual watch over such a structure also indicate that there is no intention to use or occupy it. Trespassers and even animals like cows etc. have freely used the premises and have spoiled the walls, roofs at many places.

The above finds corroboration from the District Gazetteer of Dhenkanal by Sri N. Senapati, I.C.S and Sri P. Tripathy, I.A.S, 1972 Edition. It has been mentioned in the said District Gazetteer that this building was constructed by forced labour during Durbar administration. It stands as a ghostly monument of the past and remains deserted and uncared for. The owner, a former prince of the ruling family, was banished for certain misdeeds during war period. He had named the palace after his wife. He never returned to Dhenkanal. While living at Cuttack, he sold the doors and windows and other fixtures of the palace. The forsaken walls now stand like a haunted house.

It is revealed from the report of the Amin that the following portions of plot No. 177 is in possession of the ex-intermediary.

Pokhari Adi …… Ac. 1.86 Taila …… Ac. 4.31 Bagayat …… Ac. 1.56 Homestead …… Ac. 0.56 Ac. 8.29

The above area does not include the entire hillock which immediately surrounds the Ac. 0-56 area of land on which the structure stands. It is significant that though the entire area stands recorded in the name of the ex-intermediary, he has not preferred any claim for any area immediately surrounding the structure. This also goes to show that he is not in possession of this surrounding area. It is difficult to concede that he is in possession of the structure without being in possession of the surrounding area.

It is therefore, clear that the ex-intermediary was not in possession of the building or structure in any manner on or immediately before the date of vesting. The Amin's report on this part of the claim has not taken into account all these aspects and therefore this part of the Amin's report cannot be accepted. I, therefore hold that the area of Ac. 0.56 in plot No. 177 on which the double-storeyed building stands does not come within the purview of S. 6(1) of O.E.A Act for settlement with the ex-intermediary. In the result, his claim for this area is disallowed.”

The settlement in favour of the petitioner of 29.75 acres of land became final. The petitioner preferred an appeal under S. 9 of the Act challenging the rejection of his claim under S. 6 of the Act in regard to settlement of the 56 decimals of land. The appellate authority has dismissed the appeal on 27-8-1977.

3. Several contentions were raised in the writ application. At the hearing, however, two contentions were pressed by the petitioner's counsel, namely:—

(1) The authorities under the Act have not kept the requirements of Sec. 6 in view and have, therefore been misled and

(2) In view of the fact that the lands had been settled with the petitioner and rent had been assessed under Orissa Act 13 of 1958, the petitioner was already a tenant under the State Government as has been held by this Court in Pratap Kesari Deo v. State of Orissa, 26 Cut LT 652 : (AIR 1961 Ori 131). There could, therefore be no vesting of the property as decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Bimal Chandra Sinha v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1912 and the rejection of the claim cannot be sustained.

4. So far as the second aspect is concerned, admittedly there was a vesting notification in 1973. The petitioner by accepting the said notification and by treating himself as the ex-intermediary made the application under Ss. 6 and 7 of the Act. He has received settlement in regard to 29.75 acres of land. In this background, it would not at all be appropriate to allow him for the first time to go back upon his own actions and permit him to contend that the property in regard to which claim is confined in the writ application was not an estate. We shall therefore, not permit him to raise this point and the second contention would not be entertained.

5. So far as the first contention is concerned, we must hold that the distinction maintained by the Act in regard to a claim for settlement under S. 6 from a claim u/s. 7 of the Act has been completely lost sight of. This Court on several occasions has emphasised on this distinction. Section 7 requires Khas possession while Sec. 6 requires possession. Khas possession has been defined in S. 2(j) and the definition clearly confines it to lands used for agricultural or horticultural purposes. In regard to a claim under S. 6, all that is necessary to be established is possession. Such possession need not be personal occupation. Law is settled that an owner would be deemed to be in possession if the property is in possession of his lessees, licensees permissive occupants and even trespassers until they have perfected their title by adverse possession. That being the position, the approach to the matter by the Collector as also the appellate authority has not been proper. Some statements were recorded by the Collector during spot verification and such statements which were recorded in the absence of the petitioner indicated permissive occupation. Admittedly, there is a construction. The materials on the record show that the construction was complete though at present the door leaves have been removed and the structure does not seem to be very much habitable. Section 6 is not confined to a claim for settlement of a building only. It also refers to settlement of homestead. Admittedly, the area of 56 decimals, though once recorded as ‘Jungle’, has become homestead. Whether it is a building fit for human occupation or not the claim would certainly be covered only u/s. 6 of the Act and the enquiry has therefore, to be confined to possession and not khas possession. We are of the view that the enquiry has been vitiated as the basic requirement of law has not been kept in view and some materials appear to have been collected which have not been allowed to be tested. In these circumstances, we would vacate the orders of the Collector and the appellate authority in regard to the petitioner's claim relating to settlement of 56 decimals in Plot No. 177 and call upon the Estates Abolition Collector to dispose of this claim by instituting appropriate enquiries and giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of supporting his claim. We do not interfere with that part of the settlement which has become final.

There would be no order for costs.

J.K Mohanty, J.:— I agree.

Petition allowed.