Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Saudamini Dei v. Bhagirathi Raj Opp. Party.

Orissa High Court
Nov 18, 1981
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — R.C. Patnaik, J. (Revision under Section 125 CrPC)

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision arises from an application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which the Magistrate granted maintenance of Rs. 30 per month to the petitioner (wife). The parties were alleged to have been married in Falguna 1974 in gandharba form by exchange of garlands. After some period of cohabitation, dissension occurred; the petitioner alleged ill-treatment and was driven out, subsequently taking shelter with her father. A Panchayati was convened at the instance of her father and produced a Panchayati Patra (Ext. 2) in which the opposite party agreed to take back and maintain the petitioner. The petitioner lived with the opposite party again for about three months but was driven out a second time and then filed the maintenance application.

The opposite party denied that any marriage had ever taken place and alleged the application was instituted at the instance of villagers. The Magistrate, after hearing evidence (including eight witnesses and Ext. 2), found that the petitioner was the wife of the opposite party and ordered maintenance of Rs. 30 per month. The opposite party carried the matter in revision to the Sessions Judge, who reversed the Magistrate's decision on the ground that the petitioner had "failed to prove that she is the legally married wife of the opposite party," testing the evidence against the Hindu Marriage Act (section 7). The present judgment is the revisional hearing by the High Court of that reversal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the limited and summary purposes of an application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate must require the strict legal formalities prescribed by the Hindu Marriage Act (specifically section 7) to be proved before awarding maintenance.
  2. Whether the Sessions Judge erred in reversing the Magistrate's maintenance order by subjecting the summary proceeding under section 125 CrPC to the standards of proof and legal scrutiny appropriate to civil proceedings or prosecutions for bigamy.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (appearing party: Shri B.K. Biswal)

  • Chapter IX of the CrPC provides a speedy and summary remedy to compel moral obligations of maintenance and to prevent vagrancy; therefore, the Magistrate's summary order should not be subjected to the stricter legal niceties appropriate to civil suits.
  • The decision of a criminal court in a summary maintenance proceeding is not decisive for civil rights; the husband remains free to institute civil proceedings if he seeks a final adjudication on marital status.
  • Authorities (cited later in the judgment) support the proposition that the standard of proof of marriage required in maintenance proceedings is not so high as in divorce or bigamy proceedings.

Opposite Party's Arguments (appearing party: Mr. Murty)

  • The form of marriage alleged (gandharba) has no legal sanction unless it satisfies the requirements of section 7(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, and those statutory requirements were not shown to have been complied with.
  • Because the alleged marriage was not solemnized in accordance with sub‑section (1) of section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the petitioner is not entitled to claim to be the wife of the opposite party and therefore the application under section 125 CrPC was not maintainable.
  • Reliance was placed on decisions dealing with prosecutions for bigamy (e.g., Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande; Priya Bala Ghosh) to support the contention that the marriage must be proved strictly.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhagawan Dutt's case (1975 2 SCC 386) Chapter XXXVI of the old Code provides a summary machinery to prevent vagrancy; orders under this chapter are preventive and not intended to finally determine status and personal rights; orders are subject to final adjudication by Civil Courts. The court relied on this principle to emphasize that section 125 CrPC proceedings are summary and preventive: they need not finally determine the legality of the marriage and civil remedies remain available for final adjudication.
Sethurathinam's case (1970 1 S.C.W.R 589) An order passed under section 488 (older numbering) is a summary order and does not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties; criminal court decisions do not operate as decisive in civil proceedings. Used to support the proposition that the Magistrate's finding in a maintenance proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of marital status for all purposes; summary nature justifies a lower standard of proof.
Thompson's case (6 NWP 205) Referenced to show that the scope of Chapter XXXVI is limited and Magistrates cannot usurp matrimonial jurisdiction of Civil Courts. Cited to reinforce that Magistrates exercise a limited, preventive jurisdiction in maintenance matters and should not proceed as if trying full matrimonial disputes.
K.J.B. David v. Nilamoni Devi (1953 C.L.T. 34) The standard of proof for marriage in a proceeding under section 488 (older numbering) need not be so high as in proceedings under the Divorce Act or prosecutions under bigamy provisions of the IPC. Applied by the court to justify accepting less formal or strict proof of marriage (e.g., conduct, community treatment, Panchayati Patra) in a section 125 proceeding.
Govind Nadar's case (1978 Crl. L.J. 1213) It is settled that the standard of proof required for a marriage in a maintenance proceeding under the Code is not as high as in divorce proceedings or bigamy prosecutions. Reinforced the court's view that a lower standard of proof suffices in summary maintenance proceedings under section 125.
Jalandar Gorakh Kirtikar v. Smt. Sobha (1973 Crl. L.J. 1501) Circumstantial evidence and community conduct (cohabitation, children, living arrangements) may establish that a marriage existed even if documentary/formal proof is not strong; standard of proof is lower in summary proceedings. The court relied on this reasoning to treat the circumstances and conduct of the parties (including cohabitation and community recognition) as adequate proof for section 125 purposes.
Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. The State of Maharashtra (1965 S.C.D. 543) Decisions concerned prosecutions for bigamy (section 494 IPC) and required strict proof that marriage had been duly solemnized. The court distinguished these bigamy prosecution authorities from maintenance proceedings, holding they were not directly applicable to the summary inquiry under section 125.
Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh (1971 S.C.D. 439) Also a bigamy prosecution decision requiring strict proof of solemnization in that context. Distinguished on the same basis as Bhaurao Lokhande: the strict standard for prosecutions does not control summary maintenance proceedings.
Vanajakshamma's case (A.I.R. 1970 Mys. 305) Proceedings for bigamy require proof that a marriage was duly solemnized; by contrast summary proceedings under section 488 (older numbering) are intended to prevent vagrancy and need a lower standard of proof of marriage. Adopted to support the distinction between the strict proof required in bigamy prosecutions and the relaxed standard in maintenance proceedings under the Criminal Procedure Code.
David v. Nilamoni (1962 1 Crl. L.J. 812) An opinion or conduct expressed by persons with special means of knowledge may suffice to prove marriage in a summary proceeding. Quoted to justify reliance on community recognition and conduct (including the Panchayati Patra and witnesses) as sufficient proof of marriage for the limited purposes of section 125.
Baidhyanath Ghose v. Sm. Shefali Ghose (Amaresh Roy, J.) To decide whether a husband-wife relationship exists for section 488 purposes, strict proof of all formalities of legal marriage is not necessary as in civil proceedings where legality of marriage is a primary issue. Used to buttress the conclusion that formal legal ceremonies need not be shown in full detail in summary maintenance proceedings.
Kunhiroman Nair v. Annokutty (1967 K.L.R. 24; 1972 K.L.R. 73411) Under the relevant section it is sufficient if the wife proves that she was treated as wife by the person from whom maintenance is claimed; it is not material how the marriage was solemnized; evidence need not be as strong as in bigamy prosecution. Relied upon to conclude that proof of being treated as wife and community recognition supports an inference of marriage for section 125 and justifies the Magistrate's order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court framed the central task as determining the nature and scope of the inquiry under section 125 CrPC (Chapter IX). The court emphasized that provisions in this Chapter provide a speedy, summary and preventive remedy to compel maintenance and prevent vagrancy, and therefore the proceedings are not intended to finally determine the full legal status and civil rights of the parties.

Relying on the precedents cited in the judgment, the court repeatedly stated the principle that the standard of proof of marriage in summary maintenance proceedings is lower than that required in civil proceedings (e.g., divorce) or criminal prosecutions for bigamy. The court distinguished cases involving prosecutions under section 494 IPC on the ground that those cases required proof that a marriage was duly solemnized — a stricter test not applicable to summary maintenance proceedings.

Applying these principles to the present facts, the court reviewed the evidentiary material before the Magistrate: the petitioner's testimony (that she married in the gandharba form with exchange of garlands and certain rites), the Panchayati Patra (Ext. 2) signed by both parties, witness testimony supporting the existence of a Panchayati and the fact of cohabitation, admission by the opposite party in Ext. 2, and community treatment of the parties as husband and wife. The court concluded that these facts and admissions justified an inference of marriage for the limited purpose of section 125.

The court criticized the Sessions Judge for testing the evidence as if trying a civil suit or requiring the strict statutory formalities of section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act to be established in the summary maintenance proceeding. The High Court held that the Sessions Judge failed to keep in view the object and nature of section 125 proceedings and erred in substituting a civil standard of proof in a summary, preventive jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

The High Court allowed the revision: the judgment of the Sessions Judge is reversed and the Magistrate's order granting maintenance is restored.

Direct effect on the parties: The Magistrate's earlier order granting maintenance to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 30 per month (from the date of the Magistrate's order) is restored. The court affirmed that, for the limited purposes of section 125 CrPC, marriage may be inferred from conduct, admissions (such as the Panchayati Patra), cohabitation and community recognition.

Broader implication (as articulated in the opinion): The judgment reinforces the settled principle that summary maintenance proceedings under the Criminal Procedure Code require a lower standard of proof of marriage than civil proceedings or prosecutions for bigamy. Magistrates in section 125 proceedings are not expected to resolve complex questions of legal validity of marriages that properly belong to civil courts.

Revision allowed. Judgment of the learned Sessions Judge reversed; judgment of the Magistrate restored.

Show all summary ...

R.C Patnaik, J.:— This revision by the wife is directed against the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge in revision reversing the decision of the Magistrate granting maintenance to the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month in a proceeding under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

2. Facts shortly stated: The parties were married in Falguna 1974 in gandharba form by exchange of garlands. After some time the initial warmth vanished and there was dissension, and it is alleged by the petitioner, she was Illtreated and later on driven out. The petitioner took shelter under the care of her father. At the instance of her father a Panchayati was convened and at the said Panchayati, the decision was that the opposite party would take back the petitioner and look after her properly. A Panchayati Patra (Ext. 2) was prepared. The gentlemen as well as the parties signed the same. In pursuance of the said settlement, the petitioner was taken back by the opposite party. However, amity did not long prevail and the petitioner was driven out again at the end of about three months. As the opposite party neglected refused to maintain the petitioner, the petitioner was compelled to file the application.

3. The opposite party while traversing the allegations stated that there was never any marriage and the case had been filed at the instance of the villagers who had combined against him.

4. The petitioner examined eight witnesses and proved the Panchayati Patra (Ext. 2). On a consideration of the evidence, the learned Magistrate found that the petitioner was the wife of the opposite party and granted maintenance at the rate of Rs. 30/- per month from the date of the order. The opposite party carried a revision and the learned Sessions Judge reversed the decision of the learned Magistrate holding that the petitioner “failed to prove that she is the legally married wife of the opposite party”.

5. Shri B.K Biswal, appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the provisions contained in Chapter IX provide a speedy and summary remedy for providing maintenance and for preventing vagrancy. The decision of the Criminal Court not being decisive and it being always open to the husband to institute appropriate civil proceeding for a decisive decision, the learned Sessions Judge should not have gone into the niceties of questions of law to find if there was a valid marriage. He drew my attention to authorities reference to which have been made in a latter part.

6. Mr. Murty, learned counsel appearing for the husband, submitted that the form of marriage alleged to have been gone through had no sanction in law and so, there being no marriage, the application of the petitioner was not maintainable and in that context, he referred me to the provisions contained in section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act which provided that “a Hindu marriage might be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party thereto”. He contended that the alleged marriage having not been solemnized according to the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 7, the petitioner could not claim to be the wife of the opposite party and the learned Sessions Judge rightly dismissed the application of the wife.

7. Against the background of the submissions made and the nature of the issues raised, it is necessary to determine the nature and scope of an enquiry under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held:—

“Sections 488, 489 and 490 constitute one family. They have been grouped together in Chapter XXXVI the Code of 1898 under the caption “Of the maintenance of wives and children”. This chapter, in the words of Sir James Fitz Stephen, provides “a mode of preventing vagrancy, or at least of preventing its consequences”. These provisions are intended to fulfil a special purpose. Their object is to compel a man to perform the moral obligations which he owes to society in respect of his wife and children. By providing a simple, speedy but limited relief, they seek to ensure that the neglected wife and children are not left beggared and destituted on the scrap-heap of society and thereby driven to a life of vagrancy, immorality and crime for their subsistence. Thus, section 488 is not intended to provide for a full and final determination of the status and personal rights of the parties. The jurisdiction conferred by the section on the Magistrate is more in the nature of a preventive, rather than a remedial jurisdiction; it is certainly not punitive. As pointed out in Thompson's case, 6 NWP 205 the scope of the Chapter XXXVI is limited and the Magistrate cannot, except as thereunder provided, usurp the jurisdiction in matrimonial disputes possessed by the Civil Courts. Sub-sect ion (2) of section 489 expressly makes orders passed under Chapter XXXVI of the Code subject to any final adjudication that may be made by a Civil Court between the parties regarding their status and civil rights”.

8. They further observed:

“……………It provides a machinery for summary enforcement of the moral obligation of a man towards his wife and children so that they may not, out of sheer destitution become a hazard to the wellbeing of a orderly society……………”

9. See Bhagawan Dutt's case . 1975 2 SCC 386. In Sethurathinam's case . 1970 1 S.C.W.R 589. the Supreme Court observed

“We do not think it necessary in this case to decide the case on merits. The order passed in an application filed under section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a summary order which does not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties thereto.………… The decision of the Criminal Court that there was a marriage between Barbara and Sethura thinam and that it was a valid marriage will not operate as decisive in any civil proceeding between the parties for determining those questions……………”

10. In K.J.B David… v. Nilamoni Devi…Opposite Party. . 19 1953 C.L.T 34. this Court opined:—

“One may reasonably infer that for proof of marriage in a proceeding under section 488 of marriage in a proceeding under section 488, Criminal Procedure Cede the standard of proof need not be so high as required either in a proceeding under the Indian Divorce Act or in prosecutions under sections 494, 495, 497 or 458 of the Indian Penal Code…………………”

11. Janaki Amma, J. observed in Govind Nadar's case . 1978 Crl. L.J 1213..

“………… It is now settled, law that the standard of proof required for a marriage in a proceeding for maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure is not so high as is required in connection with proceedings under the Indian Divorce Act or in a prosecution for bigamy under the Indian Penal Code.”

12. In Jalandar Gorakh Kirtikar v. Smt. Sobha . 1973 Crl. L.J 1501., Ehole, J. took into consideration the circumstances and held that if there was no marriage, the circumstances could not exist. The learned Judge observed:—

“……………She was living with the parents of the petitioner. She has also two children one of whom is 7 years old and the other is younger. She could not have had children and she could not have lived in the same chawl where the parents of both the parties stay, with the parents of the petitioner unless she was married. Both are respectable parties. In the ordinary course therefore such things could never have happened if there was no marriage. All the circumstances, therefore, in my view clearly show that the petitioner had married the respondent. Now it may be that the evidence led by her is not as adequate as it should be for a prosecution under sections 494, 495, 497 or 498, Indian Penal Code or for a proceeding under the Indian Divorce Act. In a proceeding under section 488, Criminal Procedure Code the standard of proof need not be so high as in other proceedings ……………”

13. Mr. Murty for the husband relief on the cases of Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. The State of Maharashtra . 1965 S.C.D 543. and Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh . 1971 S.C.D 439.. In both the cases, their Lordships were considering a case of prosecution for bigamy under section 494, Indian Penal Code and those decisions can be distinguished.

14. In the words of Santosh, J. in Vanajakshamma's case . A.I.R 1970 Mys. 305.

“their Lordships were considering a case of prosecution for bigamy under section 494, Indian Penal Code and in that context their Lordships held that the prosecution should prove that the marriage has been duly solemnized. It has to be remembered that proceedings under section 488, Criminal Procedure Code are summary in nature, meant to prevent vagrancy. The standard of proof of marriage in proceedings under section 488, Criminal Procedure Code need not be so high as required in prosecution for bigamy or proceedings under the Divorce Act.

15. Following the ratio in David v. Nilamoni . 1962 1 Crl. L.J 812. the learned Judge said:—

“……………His Lordship observed that even an opinion expressed by conduct of persons who had special means of knowledge on the subject, may suffice to prove the fact of marriage in a proceeding under section 488, Criminal Procedure Code.”

16. Repelling the contention that the Orissa decision was no longer good law in view of Bhauraos case (supra), the learned Judge said:

“…………It therefore follows that the strict proof required for proving a marriage in a criminal prosecution or in proceedings under the Divorce Act, is not necessary in a summary proceeding under section 488, Criminal Procedure Code.”

17. In Baidhyanath Ghose v. Sm. Shefali Ghose, Amaresh Roy, J. observed:—

“To decide as to whether a relationship of husband and wife exists for the purposes of section 488, Criminal Procedure Code, it is not necessary to insist on the strict proof of all the formalities of a particular form of legal marriage as is necessary in civil proceedings where the question of the legality of marriage is a primary issue.”

(Emphasis supplied)

18. In this case the petitioner examined herself and stated that she married the opposite party in the gandharab form and in the presence of witnesses the marriage was solemnized and after the exchange of garlands, certain ceremonial rites were performed. Thereafter she was taken to the house of the opposite party where she lived until marital bliss was interrupted by misunderstanding and cruelty. She testified to the Panchayati and proved the Panchayati Patra (Ext. 2), signed by the petitioner and the opposite party. After the Panchayati, both the parties lived happily together for three months whereafter dissension arose followed by assault and illtreatment and she left her husband's place for good. Witnesses have lent testimony that there was a Panchayati and the petitioner lived with the opposite party; and the community accepted and treated the parties as husband and wife. Taking into consideration the evidence of the witnesses, the admission of the opposite party in Ext. 2 and the circumstances, the learned Magistrate held that the petitioner was the wife of the opposite party. The learned Sessions Judge upset the decision of the Magistrate testing the evidence analytically against the provisions contained in the Hindu Marriage Act. The learned Sessions Judge found that the evidence did not satisfy the requirements of marriage as contained in section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

19. In the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 125 provides a swift and summary remedy for providing maintenance to neglected wives, parents and children by compelling the man to perform his moral obligation. In such a summary proceeding, it is not necessary to go into intricacies of law. The facts and circumstances of this case indicate that the man and the woman lived together as husband and wife and were treated as such by the community and the man treated the woman as his wife. The Panchayati Patra is his unequivocal declaration. For the limited purpose of section 125, it may be inferred that there was marriage. I am emboldened to so hold on the authorities cited above and other authorities, e.g, Kunhiroman Nair v. Annokutty . 1967 K.L.R 24., and 1972 K.L.R 73411. In the former case, it has been held:—

“Under this section it is sufficient if the wife proves that she has been treated as wife by the person from whom maintenance is claimed. It is not material how the marriage was solemnized.”

20. In the latter case, it has been observed:—

“The nature of evidence in a proceeding under section 488, Criminal Procedure Code regarding proof of marriage need not be so strong or conclusive as in the case under section 494, Indian Penal Code.”

21. It has also been said that in maintenance proceedings “the magistrate is not expected to go into complicated questions relating to validity of the marriage. Living as husband and wife and being treated by the public as such, is quite sufficient for the award of maintenance.”

22. Having regard to the standard of proof in a proceeding under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the admission of the opposite party and the fact that the petitioner and the opposite party lived together as wife and husband on two occasions, though not for lengthy spells, and the decision of the Panchayati which went to indicate the recognition accorded by the community and the conduct of the husband. I am of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge should not have judged the case as if he was trying issues in a civil suit.

23. In my opinion, the learned Sessions Judge, did not keep in mind the object of the provisions and the nature of the proceeding.

24. For the reasons stated a love, the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge is reversed and that of the Magistrate restored.

25. Revision allowed.