- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Sreedhar Pani Alias Samantray & Others v. State Of Orissa And 15 Others Opp. Parties.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs filed Title Suit No. 7 of 1977 against opposite parties 1 to 3 seeking declaration of title to certain land and a permanent injunction against interference with their possession. They claimed accretion of 17 acres to their raiyati holding due to alluvial action of the river Paika. Opposite parties 4 to 16 applied under Order 1, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to be impleaded as defendants, asserting they held temporary leases granted by the Tahasildar, Kujang, and continued possession after lease expiry, including constructing a house on the land. The plaintiffs opposed this application. The learned Munsif allowed the application, holding that opposite parties 4 to 16 were necessary parties to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and directed their impleadment. The petitioners challenged this order by way of revision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether opposite parties 4 to 16 are necessary or proper parties to be impleaded under Order 1, rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- Whether the court below had jurisdiction to order impleadment of opposite parties 4 to 16 against the plaintiffs’ opposition.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Opposite parties 4 to 16 have no title or interest in the suit land.
- They are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit.
- The dispute regarding possession with opposite parties 4 to 16 need not be adjudicated before granting relief against opposite parties 1 to 3.
Opposite Parties 4 to 16's Arguments
- They had taken temporary lease of the suit land from the Tahasildar, Kujang.
- After expiry of the lease, they continued possession and constructed a house on the land.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narahari v. Ghanashyam, I.L.R 1963 Cutt. 841 | Tests for necessary party under Order 1, rule 10(2) CPC: (i) right to relief against absentee party; (ii) necessity of presence for effective adjudication. | The court applied these tests to determine that opposite parties 4 to 16 were not necessary parties as the suit could be adjudicated without them. |
| Banarasi Dass v. Panna Lal, A.I.R 1969 P.&H. 57 | Principle that a plaintiff is the dominus litis and should not be compelled to litigate against a party he does not wish to fight or claim relief against. | The court relied on this principle to hold that the plaintiffs should not be compelled to include opposite parties 4 to 16 as defendants against their opposition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the scope of Order 1, rule 10(2) CPC, emphasizing that impleadment requires a direct or tangible interest of the proposed party in the subject matter. It noted that the plaintiffs’ possession was declared in a prior proceeding under section 145 CrPC, undermining opposite parties 4 to 16’s claim of continued possession. The court found that the dispute between petitioners and opposite parties 4 to 16 regarding possession was not essential for adjudicating the plaintiffs’ suit against opposite parties 1 to 3. It held that the decree could be effectively passed without impleading opposite parties 4 to 16 and that their presence was not necessary to avoid an infructuous or inexecutable decree. The court further observed that the plaintiffs, as dominus litis, should not be compelled to litigate against parties they do not claim relief against, citing established precedent. Consequently, the court concluded that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to order impleadment of opposite parties 4 to 16.
Holding and Implications
The revisional application is allowed and the order directing impleadment of opposite parties 4 to 16 as defendants is set aside.
The decision directly affects the parties by removing opposite parties 4 to 16 from the suit, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed without them. No broader legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles regarding necessary parties and the dominus litis doctrine.
P.K Mohanti, J.:— This revisional application is directed against an order allowing an application under Order 1, rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure filed by opposite parties 4 to 16 for being impleaded as defendants in the suit.
2. The petitioners as plaintiffs brought Title Suit No. 7 of 1977 against opposite parties 1 to 3 for declaration of title to the suit land and for a permanent injunction restraining them from interfering with their possession. It was alleged that by the alluvial action of the river Paika there was accretion to the rayati holding of the plaintiffs to an extent of 17 acres and the plaintiffs are entitled to the accreted land as an increment to their tenure. Opposite parties 4 to 16 filed an application under Order 1, rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure for being impleaded as parties to the suit alleging that they had taken temporary lease of the suit land from the Tahasildar, Kujang and after expiry of the lease they have been continuing in possession of the land and have also constructed a house thereon. The application was opposed by the plaintiffs. They denied the allegation that the opposite parties 4 to 16 were continuing possession of the lands after expiry of the annual lease in their favour.
3. The learned Munsif came to hold that the petitioners and opposite parties 4 to 16 have been quarrelling over the possession of the suit lands since last few years; that it was just and proper to decide the suit in presence of opposite parties 4 to 16 so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and that prima facie the opposite parties 4 to 16 are necessary parties to the suit. Upon such findings, he directed the petitioners to implead opposite parties 4 to 16 as defendants in the suit.
4. It is urged on behalf of the petitioners that opposite parties 4 to 16 have no semblance of title or interest in respect of the suit lands and they are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit.
5. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1, Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows :—
“The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.”
6. The sub-rule is applicable to two types of cases :—
(i) where a person ought to have been joined as a plaintiff or defendant and is not so joined and
(ii) where without bis presence the question in the suit cannot be completely and effectually adjudicated upon.
7. The sine qua non for any person being impleaded as a party to a suit is that he should have a direct or tangible interest in the subject matter. If the questions involved in the suit can be decided without the proposed party, the judicial discretion vested in the Court to implead parties under Order 1, rule 10(2) Code of Civil Procedure should not be exercised. Before directing a patty to be impleaded, the Court must be satisfied about the genuineness of his interest in the litigation.
8. In the case of Narahari v. Ghanashyam . I.L.R 1963 Cutt. 841., it was laid down that two tests must be satisfied before a third party can be impleaded under Order 1, rule 10(2), Code of Civil Procedure. It was laid down as follows:—
“Two conditions must, however, be satisfied before a party is considered to be a necessary party. They are: (i) There must be a right to some relief against the party not joined. This means that no decree can be passed without affecting the rights of the absentee-parties; and (ii) the presence of the absentee-party should be necessary in order to enable the Court to effectually adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. This concept includes the idea that no decree should be passed by Court which would be rendered infructuous or would become ultimately in executable. If a case satisfies these tests, then the absentee-party is a necessary party and the suit cannot be effectually and completely adjudicated upon in respect of all questions involved without that party being impleaded in the suit.”
9. In the instant case, the question involved in the suit is whether the suit land is an accretion to the rayati holding of the plaintiffs and whether they are entitled to possess the same as an increment to their tenure. The plaintiff's contention is that they have been in continuous possession of the suit land as a part and parcel of their raiyati holding. The materials on the record show that there was a proceeding under section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure between the petitioners and the opposite parties 4 to 16 and by the final order of the criminal Court made on 26-7-1975, possession of the petitioner was declared. The petitioners have filed rent receipts and settlement parcha in proof of their possession of the suit lands. The opposite parties 4 to 16 contended that the suit land belongs to the Government and they cultivated the same on the basis of an annual lease granted in their favour by the Tahasildar, Kujang. It was also contended that after expiry of the annual lease they have been continuing possession of the lands.
10. As mentioned earlier, possession of the petitioners over the land in dispute was declared in a proceeding under section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure on 28-7-1975. The contention of the opposite parties 4 to 16 that they have been continuing possession of the suit lands could not, therefore, be believed. If the question at issue between the petitioner and the State of Orissa can be worked out without any one else being brought in, a stranger should not be added as a party.
11. The plaintiffs have not asked for recovery of possession. They claim to be in possession after termination of the proceeding under section 145 Code of Criminal Procedure. The dispute regarding possession, if any, between the petitioners and opposite party nos. 4 to 16 need not be gone into before any relief can be granted to the plaintiffs in the present suit filed against the State of Orissa and its officers. The decree that is to be passed against the defendants cannot be rendered infructuous or inexecutable if the opposite parties 4 to 16 are not added as parties. Merely because the opposite parties 4 to 16 allege that they are in possession of the land even after expiry of the annual lease, they cannot be considered to be proper or necessary parties. The Court had, therefore, no jurisdiction to add them as parties to the suit.
12. I am in respectful agreement with the observations made by Sarkaria. J, in Banarasi Dass v. Panna Lal . A.I.R 1969 P.&H. 57., that:—
“As a rule the Court should not add a person as a defendant in a suit when the plaintiff is opposed to such addition. The reason is that the plaintiff is the dominus litis. He is the master of the suit. He cannot be compelled to fight against a person against whom he does not wish to fight and against whom he does not claim any relief.”
13. In the result, the civil revision is allowed and the order of the Court below directing the plaintiffs to add opposite parties 4 to 16 as defendants in the suit is set aside. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.
Revision allowed.
Alert