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Sailendra Kishore Patnaik v. Harekrushna Satpathy And Others
Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff claimed that he orally purchased the suit land from Laxmi Bewa on 25-10-1954 for Rs. 95, took delivery and was in peaceful possession; he obtained municipal permission to construct after Laxmi's death (alleged 2-2-55) and later discovered in 1962 that defendant no. 1 was attempting to construct on the site. The plaintiff initiated proceedings under section 145 CrPC, which were decided in favour of defendant no. 1, prompting the instant suit.
Defendant no. 1 asserted he had orally purchased the land from Laxmi Dei on 30-5-1941 for Rs. 60, obtained delivery of possession, and constructed a house after municipal permission in November 1950. He denied the plaintiff's purchase and alleged the plaintiff obtained mutation fraudulently. Defendant no. 2, impleaded on his own application, claimed to be Laxmi's nephew and nearest heir and denied any sale by Laxmi to either party.
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit, finding that Laxmi had died in 1946 (thus could not have sold the land to the plaintiff in 1954), that Laxmi had delivered possession to defendant no. 1 though the sale to defendant no. 1 lacked required State permission, and that defendant no. 1's possession entitled him to remain until legally evicted. Defendant no. 2's claim was disbelieved by the trial court.
The plaintiff and defendant no. 2 appealed the trial court's decision. The first appellate court, by a common judgment dated 3 January 1970, allowed the plaintiff's appeal and dismissed defendant no. 2's. Defendant no. 1 then filed a second appeal (No. 74/70) to this Court. This Court remanded the plaintiff's appeal to the first appellate court for fresh disposal. On remand the appellate court reached findings that (i) Laxmi had not sold the property to the plaintiff in 1954 and had died before 11-3-46, (ii) Laxmi had not sold the land to defendant no. 1, (iii) defendant no. 1 had come into and continued possession, defeating the plaintiff's 1962 attempt to exercise possession (including the section 145 CrPC proceeding), and (iv) defendant no. 1 had acquired title by adverse possession after more than 12 years of possession.
The plaintiff has preferred the present second appeal against those findings and conclusions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the documentary entry Ext. 5 (an entry in the Municipal Death Register) is genuine and, accordingly, whether Laxmi Bewa died after 1954 (as claimed by the plaintiff) or prior to 1946 (as found by the courts below).
- Whether the plaintiff's asserted oral purchase from Laxmi on 25-10-1954 is legally effective in light of the established date of Laxmi’s death.
- Whether defendant no. 1 had acquired possession and title (including by adverse possession) of the suit land such that the plaintiff, having never been in possession, could not evict him.
- Whether documentary material produced after 1960 (including various municipal permissions, receipts and mutation-related papers) undermines the courts' findings as to possession and title.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- Ext. 5 (Municipal Death Register entry) was admitted in evidence without objection from defendant no. 1 and therefore the courts below should have accepted its contents showing that Laxmi Bewa died on 2-2-1955 (noting the opinion records the date with the parenthetical “(sic)”).
- Admission of Ext. 5 as an exhibit without objection meant formal proof was not insisted on; nevertheless, the document's genuineness and contents could still be impeached, but the appellant contended the courts should have relied on Ext. 5 rather than rejecting it as spurious.
- The appellant challenged the finding of defendant no. 1's long possession by pointing to documentary evidence on record (Ext. 2 series; Exts. 4 and 4.a; 10, 11, 12, 13, 19 and 20) which, the appellant argued, should have been considered to show his interest or possession.
Defendant No. 1's Arguments (as presented in the record)
- He orally purchased the suit land from Laxmi Dei on 30-5-1941 for Rs. 60, obtained delivery of possession, built a house in November 1950 after municipal permission, and thus was in possession and asserted title since at least the 1940s/1950s.
- He denied the plaintiff's alleged purchase and asserted the plaintiff obtained mutation fraudulently (as part of his defence to the plaintiff's claim).
Defendant No. 2's Arguments (as presented in the record)
- He claimed to be Laxmi's nephew and nearest heir who acquired right, title and interest in the suit land on Laxmi's death and that Laxmi had not sold the property to either the plaintiff or defendant no. 1.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through factual and evidentiary analysis rather than addressing novel points of law. Its principal steps and reasoning were these:
- The Court examined Ext. 5 (entry in the Municipal Death Register) and the lower courts' discussion of the material surrounding that entry. Although Ext. 5 had been exhibited without objection, the Court acknowledged that absence of an objection to marking a document as an exhibit does not preclude impeachment of its genuineness. Both lower courts had concluded, after detailed consideration and a physical examination of Ext. 5, that the entry was spurious and fabricated. The Court stated it carefully examined Ext. 5 and the impugned judgment and agreed that the finding of spuriousness was "perfectly correct and justified".
- Because the courts below consistently found that Laxmi died in 1946 (or before 11-3-46), the plaintiff's asserted oral purchase dated 25-10-1954 could not have occurred. The Court accepted this dispositive factual finding and confirmed the lower courts' conclusion that the plaintiff had not purchased from Laxmi Bewa.
- The Court considered the lower courts' findings regarding possession. Both courts found that defendant no. 1 had been in possession of the suit property for more than 12 years and had asserted title since Laxmi's death, thereby acquiring title by adverse possession. The appellant's challenge to that possession finding relied on certain documents (Ext. 2 series; Exts. 4, 4.a; 10–13; 19; 20), but the Court observed that these documents came into existence only after disputes started in 1960 and, on closer inspection, did not convincingly identify or connect to the suit land (for example, municipal permissions and plans lacked plot numbers or specific identification, rent receipts did not clearly relate to the suit land, and a nakal khatian lacked issuing authority or plot details).
- The Court noted the first appellate court had not specifically discussed each of these later documents in its judgment. The Court said that if a trial court or first appellate court chooses not to discuss certain relevant evidence in detail, it should briefly indicate the reasons so that a higher court need not probe as if it were a first appellate court. Nonetheless, after independently reviewing the documents and the impugned judgment with counsel, the Court was satisfied that consideration of those documents would not have altered the possession finding in favour of defendant no. 1.
- On balance, the Court found the lower courts' factual conclusions — that Laxmi had died before 1954 and that defendant no. 1 had long-standing possession culminating in title by adverse possession — to be supported by the record and not susceptible to reversal in this second appeal. The Court therefore declined to interfere with those findings.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed. The Court affirmed the findings of the courts below that (a) the municipal death entry (Ext. 5) is spurious and Laxmi had died prior to 1954 (found to have died in 1946), (b) the plaintiff did not purchase the suit land from Laxmi on 25-10-1954, and (c) defendant no. 1 had been in possession for more than 12 years and had acquired title by adverse possession. The dismissal was ordered without costs of this Court.
Implications:
- Direct practical effect: The plaintiff's claim to title and right to evict defendant no. 1 is rejected; defendant no. 1's possession and title by adverse possession are upheld by the courts, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
- Defendant no. 2's earlier claim had been dismissed by the first appellate court and he did not appeal that dismissal to this Court; that dismissal therefore stands.
- The opinion does not announce or restate any new legal principle or precedent; it affirms the lower courts' factual findings and applies established concepts (for example, the effect of adverse possession and the permissible impeachment of documents), without purporting to create new law.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed.
1. The unsuccessful plaintiff in both the courts below has preferred this appeal.
2. The plaintiff's case in short is that he purchased the suit land by oral sale on 25-10-54, from Laxmi Bewa, the original owner thereof, for Rs. 95/- and took delivery of possession of the same. Thereafter he continued in peaceful possession of the property and got the same mutated in his name. After the death of Laxmi Bewa on 2-2-55, the plaintiff obtained permission from the municipality for constructing a house on the suit land. The plaintiff remained absent from Baripada for a long time and in 1962 he came to learn that defendant no. 1 was trying to construct a house forcibly on the suit site. So the plaintiff initiated a proceeding u/section 145 of the Cr PC which ultimately was decided in favour of defendant no. 1. Hence this suit. Defendant no. 1's case is that he orally purchased the suit land from Laxmi Dei for Rs. 60/- on 30-5-41 and got delivery of possession of the same. Laxmi died in the year 1943. Defendant no. 1 thereafter built a house on that land in November, 1950 after obtaining the necessary permission from the Municipality. The plaintiff's case of purchase of the suit land by him has been denied by this defendant and he asserts that the plaintiff by fraudulent means got the suit property mutated in his name without the knowledge of this defendant.
3. Defendant no. 2 on his own application was impleaded as a party in the suit. His case was that he being the nephew of Laxmi was her nearest heir and accordingly after Laxmi's death he acquired right, title and interest in the suit land and he was in possession of the same. He further asserted that Laxmi never sold the suit property either to the plaintiff or defendant no. 1.
4. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the finding that Laxmi died on 11-4-46, and so she could not have sold the suit land to the plaintiff on 25-10-54, as alleged by the plaintiff and hence the plaintiff has no right, title and interest in the suit property. It found that Laxmi orally sold the suit property to defendant No. 1 but the said sale was not in accordance with law as the required permission of the State for making the said sale had not been obtained. It however held that Laxmi had delivered possession of the suit propetry to defendant No. 1 in the year 1941 and he was in possession of the same. On the said findings it concluded that defendant No. 1, being in possession of the suit property, was entitled to continue in possession of the same till he was evicted, if at all, by the State in accordance with law. The case of defendant no. 2 was disbelieved and his claim on the suit land was dismissed.
5. The plaintiff as well as defendant no. 2 filed two appeals against the said findings and decision of the trial court and the first appellate court by its common judgment dated 3rd January, 1970 allowed the plaintiff's appeal and dismissed that of defendant no. 2. Thereupon defendant no. 1 only preferred second appeal no. 74/70 in this Court. Defendant no. 2 did not prefer any appeal against the decision of the first appellate court. So the decision dismissing his claim on the suit land stands confirmed. This Court remanded the entire appeal preferred by the plaintiff to the first appellate court for fresh disposal according to law. The appellate court has thereafter arrived at the following findings:
(i) Laxmi had not sold the property to the plaintiff in 1964 and she having died long before 11-3-46, the case of sale by Laxmi to the plaintiff on 25-10-54, is false;
(ii) Laxmi had not also sold the suit land to defendant no. 1;
(iii) Defendant no. 1 somehow or other came to possess the property and effectively continued in possession of the same all through. The plaintiff attempted to exercise possession on that land in 1962 but he failed, and the proceeding u/section 145 of the Cr PC also ended in favour of defendant no. 1; and
(iv) The plaintiff was never in possession of the suit property. As defendant no. 1 has been in possession of the suit property for more than 12 years by asserting his title to the same since the death of Laxmi he has acquired title to the same by adverse possession.
6. On the above findings the court below concludes that though Laxmi had not sold the property either to the plaintiff or defendant no. 1, the latter being in possession of the same since before the year 1950, he cannot be evicted by the plaintiff who has never been in possession of the said property and can have no remedy against the defendant no. 1.
7. The plaintiff has preferred this second appeal against the aforesaid decision.
8. Mr. Das, the learned counsel for the appellant, contends that in view of the fact that Ext. 5 was admitted in evidence without any objection from defendant no. 1, the courts below were not justified in disbelieving the contents of the said exhibit which go to show that Laxmi Bewa died on 2-2-75. (sic) Ext. 5 is an entry in the Municipal Death Register. There are several corrections, erasures and overwritings in the said entry. The said entry was allowed to be exhibited without objection. That only means that formal proof of that entry was not insisted and it was allowed to be exhibited as a piece of documentary evidence in this case. Merely because of that it cannot be said that the opposite side cannot question the genuineness or credibility of that document or the contents thereof. When documents are marked as exhibits without objection of a particular party, that party cannot raise the objection that the said document has not been admitted in evidence, but that party can impeach that document and the contents thereof in all other possible manner. In this case both the courts on elaborate discussion and consideration of the relevant evidence and on a physical examination, of Ext. 5 itself have arrived at the finding that the said entry is a spurious and fabricated one. The said finding of fact, which is based on proper discussion and consideration of the relevant evidence on record, cannot ordinarily be allowed to be challenged in this second appeal. However I have myself carefully examined the entry Ext. 5 and have perused the discussion of the relevant evidence on this matter in the impugned judgment, and I am convinced that the said finding is perfectly correct and justified.
9. Both the courts below have arrived at the finding that Laxmi died in 1946. Mr. Das, the learned counsel for the appellant, is not able to assail the said finding of fact except stating that the courts should have placed reliance on the entry Ext. 5, which submission cannot be accepted for the good and convincing reasons on which that entry has been found by the courts below to be a spurious and fabricated entry. If Laxmi died in 1946, the plaintiff's case of oral purchase of the suit property from Laxmi on 25-10-54, is evidently false, and both the courts have rightly discarded the plaintiff's case to the said effect. Accordingly, the finding of the courts below, that the plaintiff has not purchased the suit property from Laxmi Bewa has to be and is hereby confirmed.
10. Both the courts below have arrived at the finding that defendant no. 1 has been in possession of the suit property for more than 12 years. Mr. Das challenged the correctness of the said finding of fact by saying that it was recorded without taking into consideration a number of documents which are on record, such as Ext. 2 series, Exts. 4 and 4.a, 10, 11, 12, 13, 19 and 20. Admittedly the dispute between the plaintiff and defendant no. 1 regarding the suit land started in the year 1960. All these documents came into existence only thereafter. Ext. 2 series are rent receipts. These rent receipts granted after 1960 do not also show that rent was paid in respect of the suit land. Ext. 10 is an application submitted by the plaintiff in the Municipality on 19-9-62. Ext. 11 is a plan attached to that application.
11. Ext. 12 is a report signed by some of the Municipal authorities allowing the plaintiff to construct a house. Ext. 13 is also dated 19-9-62, by which permission is accorded to construct the house. Both Exts. 12 and 13 do not show that they refer to the suit land, as the plot number of the suit land is not indicated therein. Ext. 19 is a tattered Nakal Khatian. This does not show the plot number of the suit land, nor does it show as to who actually issued the said document, as it does not bear the signature of any lawful authority. In the document there is reference to a mutation case of 1960–61. From that it appears that the entries therein, for whatever they are worth, were made only after 1961. Ext. 20 is dated 3-2-62. It is a permission to construct a house without any details of the land on which the said house was to be constructed. In the said document there is no reference about the suit land.
12. No doubt, the court below has not specifically referred to these documents, but on a perusal of these documents along with the counsel appearing for both the parties, I am satisfied that a consideration of these documents would not have persuaded the court below to change its decision and to give a finding on the question of possession in favour of the plaintiff.
13. Possibly because all these documents came into existence only after disputes regarding the suit land started between the parties in the year 1960 and because of the other unconvincing reasons stated above, the court below did not specifically deal with the said documents in the impugned judgment. If a trial court or a court of first appeal does not consider it necessary to discuss in detail any relevant evidence on record, it should better indicate its reasons in short to that effect so that comments as made above could not have been made requiring this Court to probe into the matter like a first court of appeal.
14. On a perusal of the discussion of the relevant evidence in the impugned judgment I am satisfied that the finding regarding possession in favour of defendant no. 1 is perfectly correct and justified and I do not see any reason to interfere with the same.
15. On the above findings and conclusions I do not see any merit in this appeal. Accordingly this appeal is dismissed but without costs of this Court.
16. Appeal dismissed.
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