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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Biju Patnaik
Structured Summary of the Opinion (R.N. Misra, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from an application by the revenue under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, directing the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Cuttack Bench) to state a case and refer a question of law to this Court. The referred question asked whether, on the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not liable to penalty under section 271(1)(c) for (a) Rs. 14,050 (income from house property), (b) Rs. 51,000 (income from undisclosed sources said to be cash credit), and (c) Rs. 30,400 (capital gains).
The relevant assessment year was 1964-65 (previous year ending March 31, 1964). The Income-tax Officer included several items as the assessee's income though they had not been returned, including salary, income from property (Rs. 14,050), dividends in the names of the assessee's wife and minor son, cash credit (Rs. 51,000), personal expenses (Rs. 20,300), and capital gains (Rs. 30,400). Penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) were initiated; the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner imposed a penalty of Rs. 60,000. The assessee appealed to the Appellate Tribunal, which vacated the imposition of penalty in respect of several items. The revenue sought review under section 256(1); after rejection, it applied under section 256(2) for a statement covering all items. The High Court at a preliminary stage excluded certain items from the statement of case and confined the reference to the three items noted above. The present reference concerns whether the Tribunal was correct in holding that no penalty was exigible for those three specific omissions.
Legal Issues Presented
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Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not liable to penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for:
- Rs. 14,050 representing income from house property;
- Rs. 51,000 said to be income from undisclosed sources (cash credit); and
- Rs. 30,400 as capital gains.
- Whether the High Court should permit the revenue to revive/exclude items previously not entertained at the preliminary hearing and require the Tribunal to state an additional case in respect of items that had earlier been excluded (i.e., whether the final bench was bound by the preliminary-stage view and whether the excluded items could now be reopened).
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- Salary: The assessee had surrendered salary to the National Defence Fund and believed it was not necessary to disclose that salary in the return.
- Income from property: The New Delhi residential house was not permanently occupied; annual value required ascertainment; the assessee believed notional income from the house was not includible and therefore did not show it.
- Dividends in the names of wife and minor son: The assessee contended he was not legally bound to disclose those dividends and therefore there was no concealment.
- Cash credit (Rs. 51,000): The assessee explained that a cheque from F.C. Mehra was endorsed to the vendor for the house advance and Mehra was repaid; challenged imposition of penalty merely because the assessee's explanation was found false at one stage.
- Capital gains (Rs. 30,400): The assessment of capital gain arose only after the Income-tax Officer treated the amount received on termination of a lease as capital gain; the assessee claimed he had been advised there was no element of income and had no mala fide intention.
- Personal expenses addition: The assessee relied on the Tribunal's earlier order for a previous year.
Revenue's (Appellant's) Arguments
- Challenged the Tribunal's vacation of penalty and contended that questions of law had arisen in respect of the items; sought that the Tribunal be required to state a case in respect of those items.
- At the final stage, the standing counsel argued that the bench hearing the matter is not bound by the preliminary hearing view and, accordingly, the Court should require the Tribunal to draw up an additional statement in regard to the items previously excluded. He relied on a number of precedents to support this procedural contention.
- With regard to the cash credit, the revenue's tax officer suspected that the deposit in Mehra's account might have been the assessee's money and therefore treated the sum as cash credit; the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner described the party in whose name the cash credit appeared as "not a credit-worthy party" in his order (a finding which the Court later considered unwarranted on the record).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commissioner Of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, [1970] 76 ITR 696 (SC) | The Tribunal referred to this Supreme Court decision in dealing with cash credit and held that penalty should not have been levied (as cited by the Tribunal). The present opinion notes the decision in connection with the cash credit issue. | The Court held that Anwar Ali's decision had no application to the peculiar facts of this case and called the Tribunal's reference to Anwar Ali "unfortunate." Nonetheless, the Court agreed with the Tribunal's ultimate conclusion (that penalty was not made out) on the totality of facts, even though Anwar Ali did not apply. |
| Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, [1972] 83 ITR 26 (SC) | Principle that penalty is not to be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so; where there is no deliberate defiance of law and conduct is not contumacious or dishonest, the authority may waive imposition of penalty even if a minimum penalty is prescribed. | The Court relied on this principle to support the proposition that the Tribunal could legitimately decline to impose penalty on the assessee given bona fide explanations and absence of mala fide conduct; this principle helped justify upholding the Tribunal's decision to vacate penalty. |
| Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Biju Patnaik, [1976] 103 ITR 713 (Orissa) | Referred to as an earlier disposal (S.J.C No. 222 of 1974) between the same parties in which common questions were dealt with and certain items were excluded from the statement of case. | The Court relied on that earlier decision in determining that some questions had already been considered and excluded at the preliminary stage, and therefore confined the present reference to the remaining three items. |
| Seth Gurmukh Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1944] 12 ITR 393 (Lahore Full Bench) | Placed before the Court by the standing counsel to support the contention that a bench at final hearing is not bound by the view expressed at the preliminary hearing. | The Court found nothing in this decision (and the others relied upon by standing counsel) that supported the submission to reopen matters already closed at the preliminary stage and therefore declined to reopen those items. |
| Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Hyderabad v. G.M. Chennabasappa, [1959] 35 ITR 261 (Andhra Pradesh HC) | Cited by the standing counsel as supporting the proposition that a final bench is not bound by the preliminary hearing view. | The Court held that this decision did not support the present attempt to revive matters which the preliminary hearing had closed and therefore it did not permit reopening excluded items. |
| Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1969] 73 ITR 634 (SC) | Cited by the standing counsel in the same context as the other authorities (on the proposition about preliminary vs final hearing views). | The Court stated there was "no dispute about the proposition" discussed in these authorities but observed that none of them supported the specific submission to reopen items; the Court therefore refused the request to require an additional statement in respect of excluded items. |
| Jethabhai Hirji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1949] 17 ITR 533 (Bombay HC; Chagla C.J.) | The quoted passage explains the roles of the High Court and the Tribunal when a case is to be stated under the relevant statutory provision: the High Court should indicate the question(s) of law which arise out of the Tribunal's order and the Tribunal should formulate proper questions and state a case germane to those questions; the High Court may reframe or modify questions if required. | The Court regarded the passage as illuminating the procedural dispute and used it to explain why it would not reopen matters excluded at the preliminary hearing: the High Court had already declined to entertain certain questions and the Court would confine the present reference to the questions indicated to the Tribunal. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by first dealing with the preliminary procedural contention and then with the merits of each of the three items referred.
Procedural aspect: The standing counsel for the revenue asked the Court to require the Tribunal to state an additional case in respect of items excluded at the preliminary hearing. The Court reviewed the authorities relied upon and concluded that none justified reviving matters already closed at the preliminary stage. The Court cited the reasoning in Jethabhai Hirji and Co. about the division of functions between the High Court and the Tribunal: the High Court indicates what questions of law arise and the Tribunal formulates the questions when stating a case. The High Court had already held at the preliminary hearing that no question of law arose regarding the omitted items; that determination meant the application to state a case on those items was not entertained. Reviving matters closed at preliminary stage could not be treated as reframing or modifying questions and was therefore declined. Consequently, the reference was confined to the three items the Tribunal had been required to state a case about.
Merits — item-by-item analysis (as applied by the Court to the facts and Tribunal's findings):
- Income from house property (Rs. 14,050): The assessee had purchased a residential house in New Delhi and had mentioned the purchase in the return but shown no income from it. The Income-tax Officer computed net income on rental value at Rs. 14,050. In penalty proceedings, the assessee explained that the house had just been purchased, he was residing at Bhubaneswar as Chief Minister, the house produced no rental and he believed no notional income needed to be shown. The Tribunal found that the assessee's conduct was beyond reproach and there was no mala fide intention. The Court held that the Tribunal's conclusion was not erroneous or one that no prudent man versed in law would reach; therefore the Tribunal's view was upheld.
- Capital gains (Rs. 30,400): The assessee received Rs. 30,400 on termination of a lease and, advised that there was no element of income, did not show it as capital gain though it appeared in accounts. The Income-tax Officer treated the lease as an asset and the payment as capital gain; the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner rejected the assessee's explanation but the Tribunal accepted it. The Court accepted the Tribunal's approach, finding that the assessee's bona fide belief and lack of mala fide intention supported the Tribunal's conclusion that penalty was not exigible.
- Cash credit (Rs. 51,000): The factual matrix was that the assessee purchased a house for which Rs. 51,000 was paid as advance to the vendor. A cheque for Rs. 51,000 was received by the assessee from F.C. Mehra and that cheque was endorsed to the vendor. Mehra had a deposit in his bank account; he was repaid Rs. 51,000 by cheque. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner required the assessee to show the source of Mehra's deposit because the Income-tax Officer suspected the deposit may have been made by the assessee himself. The Court noted, however, that there was no material linking the assessee to the deposit and at most there was suspicion. The Court emphasized that bare suspicion cannot found a quasi-judicial act. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner's observation that Mehra was "not a credit-worthy party" was held to be unwarranted on the recorded material. Given that the advance and repayment to Mehra passed through a bank and there was no evidence that Mehra lacked means or that his deposits derived from the assessee, the Court agreed with the Tribunal that the revenue had not made out a case for imposition of penalty.
The Court further observed that although the Tribunal had referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Anwar Ali, that decision did not apply to the peculiar facts here; nevertheless, taking a total view of the matter and applying the principle from Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa — that penalty need not be imposed merely because it can lawfully be imposed and that waiver is permissible where there is no deliberate defiance of law — the Tribunal's exercise of discretion to vacate penalty was within permissible bounds. The Court recognized that the Tribunal was competent to exercise the same power as the penalty-imposing authority; where the Tribunal, considering the broad features and bona fide nature of the default, concludes that no penalty should be imposed, no question of law arises for the High Court to decide.
Holding and Implications
Holding: On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not liable to be visited with penalty in respect of:
- Rs. 14,050 representing income from house property;
- Rs. 51,000 said to be income from undisclosed sources (cash credit); and
- Rs. 30,400 said to be capital gains.
The Court therefore upheld the Tribunal's decision vacating the imposition of the penalty for those three items. The Court directed that both parties bear their own costs.
Implications: The direct consequence is that no penalty is imposed on the assessee in respect of the three specified items and both parties bear their own costs. The opinion does not purport to establish a broader new precedent beyond applying the established discretionary principle (as discussed in Hindustan Steel Ltd.) that authorities may refrain from imposing penalty where the default arises from bona fide belief and there is no contumacious or dishonest conduct. The Court also reaffirmed the procedural position that matters closed at a preliminary hearing will not ordinarily be reopened without proper basis.
Costs: Each party to bear their own costs (as directed by the Court).
R.N Misra, J.:— On an application made by the revenue under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), this court directed the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, to state a case and refer the following question of law for its opinion and the Tribunal pursuant to the said direction has now stated the case and referred the said question:
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in holding that the assessee was not liable to be visited with penalty for having concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income in respect of:
(a) a sum of Rs. 14,050 representing income from house property;
(b) income from undisclosed sources of Rs. 51,000 said to be cash credit; and
(c) capital gains of Rs. 30,400 on the head of capital gains, and was, therefore, liable to penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act?”
2. The relevant assessment year is 1964-65 corresponding to the previous year ending on March 31, 1964. The Income-tax Officer included the following items as the assessee's income though the same had not been returned:
Rs. (i) Salary 8,500 (ii) Income from property 14,050 (iii) Dividend on shares in the name of the assessee's wife 22,650 (iv) Dividend on shares in the name of the assessee's minor son 2,484 (v) Income from undisclosed sources as cash credit 51,000 (vi) Income from undisclosed sources used for personal expenses 20,300 (vii) Capital gains (Rs. 30,400) 30,400
3. Penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) of the Act were initiated and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, after hearing the assessee's explanation, imposed a penalty of Rs. 60,000. Assessee appealed to the Appellate Tribunal and contended that there was no deliberate concealment of income. It was further mainfained on behalf of the assessee that in regard to salary income the assessee had surrendered it to the National Defence Fund and was, therefore, under the belief that it was not necessary to disclose the salary in the return. With regard to the income from property the assessee submitted that the residential house purchased in New Delhi was not permanently occupied and the annual value remained to be ascertained and that the assessee, under the bona fide belief that the notional income from the house was not includible in the income, had not shown it. With regard to the dividend from shares standing in the name of the wife and minor son, it was submitted that the assessee was not bound under law to disclose the same and, therefore, there was no concealment. With regard to cash credit added as income from undisclosed sources, it was submitted that the penalty should not have been imposed merely because the explanation of the assessee about the cash credit was found to be false. With regard to capital gains, the assessee's contention was that there was no capital gain at all. It was only on the assessment being made on break-up value basis that the Income-tax Officer came to hold that the assessee had earned a capital gain. With regard to the addition on account of personal expenses, the assessee relied upon the Tribunal's order for a previous year.
4. The Appellate Tribunal dealt with several items referred to above and as a fact found that there was no justification for imposition of penalty. While dealing with cash credit, the Tribunal referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Anwar Ali , [1970] 76 ITR 696 and held that penalty should not have been levied. It also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, [1972] 83 ITR 26 and vacated the imposition of penalty.
5. After the application of the revenue under section 256(1) of the Act was rejected, this court was moved by an application under section 256(2) to call for a statement covering all the items which were taken into account by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in framing the order of penalty. A Bench of this court noticed that five questions had been formulated by the revenue as questions of law arising out of the Appellate Tribunal's order. In S.J.C No. 222 of 1974, between the same parties and disposed of on November 19, 1975 (Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Biju Patnaik, [1976] 103 ITR 713 (Orissa)), some common questions had been dealt with and for reasons indicated in that decision, the court declined to direct the Appellate Tribunal to state a case with reference to alleged suppressions in the matter of salary income, dividend income and the alleged income from undisclosed sources relating to personal expenses and required the Appellate Tribunal to state a case with reference to the remaining three items as already indicated.
6. Learned standing counsel strenuously contended that the Bench hearing the matter at the final stage is not bound by the view expressed at the preliminary hearing and as a question of law did arise in regard to the other items, we should now require the Appellate Tribunal to draw up an additional statement in regard to the items which have been excluded. In support of his contention, he places reliance on the well known Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Seth Gurmukh Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1944] 12 ITR 393, on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Hyderabad…Applicant; v. G.M Chennabasappa…., [1959] 35 ITR 261 and a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Lakshmiratan Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1969] 73 ITR 634. There is no dispute about the proposition that correctness of an order of the High Court calling for a statement of the case may be challenged at the hearing of the reference and though the court may have directed a case to be stated, after hearing parties, the court may decline to answer the reference by holding that the dispute was concluded by a finding of fact or that the question that was raised was academic or that it could not be raised because it bad not been incorporated in the application under section 256(1) of the Act. What is now contended by the learned standing counsel is not what has been decided in the three cases referred to by him. Each of them was dealing with a matter connected with the proposition just stated. On the other hand, what was indicated by Chagla C.J in the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Jethabhai Hirji and Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1949] 17 ITR 533 seems to throw considerable light on the present dispute., The learned Chief Justice stated (at page 544);
“Obviously, once the Tribunal has come to the conclusion under section 66(1) that no question of law arises which can be referred to the High Court under section 66(2) it is for the High Court to indicate to the Tribunal what are the question or questions of law which arise out of their decision and in respect of which it should state a case and refer it to the High Court. Therefore, in my opinion, when the assessee or the Commissioner comes to the High Court under section 66(2), it would be for the High Court after hearing the other side to determine what are the question or questions of law which would arise out of the order made by the Tribunal, and when a requisition is made by the High Court to the Tribunal to state the case, that requisition should contain the question or questions of law which according to the High Court arise out of the Tribunal's order. That would be a clear indication to the Tribunal as to what case they should state and refer to the High Court. But I do not think it would be convenient for the High Court itself to formulate the questions which would arise for determination out of the questions of law in respect of which the Tribunal has to state the case. It would be much more convenient for the Tribunal itself to formulate the questions having in view what are the questions of law on which the High Court requires a case to be stated. But I wish to make it clear that it is for the High Court alone to indicate to the Tribunal what are the questions of law, and the only function of the Tribunal is, once a requisition is made upon it under section 66(2) to formulate proper questions which arise out of those questions of law and to state a case which is germane to the questions' of law indicated by the High Court. It would then be open to the High Court either to answer the questions as formulated by the Tribunal or, if the High Court feels that the questions are not properly raised, to reframe the questions or modify the questions, and answer those questions as reformulated or modified.” Learned standing counsel has not asked for reframing or modification of the question. At the preliminary hearing, this court came to hold that no question of law arose in regard to the items which were omitted. The effect of that order really is that the application by the revenue for stating a case with regard to those questions was not entertained. Reviving matters which are closed cannot come within the ambit of reframing the question or making a suitable modification so as to bring the true dispute into the picture. Dispute arose with regard to different items for the purpose of imposition of penalty and some of the items were excluded. We find nothing in the decisions relied upon by the learned standing counsel which would support his submission. Accordingly, we decline to reopen the matter at this stage and the present reference shall be confined to consideration of the question referred by the Tribunal for opinion of the court.
7. The question now for consideration is whether the assessee was liable for being visited with penalty for the three omissions from his return. Assessee purchased a residential house in New Delhi during the assessment year. In his return for the year, assessee had mentioned about it in the appropriate place but no income was shown. The Income-tax Officer on the basis of rental value computed net income from this source at Rs. 14,050. Assessee did not challenge his liability on this aspect. In the penalty proceeding, assessee took the stand that the house had just been purchased and, as the assessee being the Chief Minister of this State at the relevant period was staying at Bhubaneswar and as the house did not bring any rental income, the assessee went under the impression that no notional income had to be shown. The Tribunal has taken the view that the assessee's conduct was beyond reproach and he had no mala fide intention behind non-disclosure of any income from this property. We do not think that the conclusion drawn by the Tribunal on the given set of facts can be branded as erroneous and a conclusion which no prudent man versed in law would reach.
8. The next item for consideration is non-disclosure of capital gain of Rs. 30,400. In the capital account, assessee showed a sum of Rs. 30,400 on August 3, 1963. On being questioned by the Income-tax Officer, assessee explained that the lease of his Calcutta property was terminated and assessee received this amount by way of compensation. Assessee had been advised that there was no element of income in it and as such it need not be shown in the return. The Income-tax Officer took the view that the lease was an asset and on termination of the same when assessee received money, it was an item of capital gain. Before the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, the assessee maintained that he had no mala fide intention and accepting the advice given to him, the amount had not been specifically shown as capital gain though it appeared in the accounts. That explanation was not accepted by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner but it appealed to the Appellate Tribunal.
9. The alleged cash credit is to the tune of Rs. 51,000. As already noted, the assessee purchased a house at Aurangazeb Road, New Delhi, and for that purpose Rs. 51,000 had been paid as advance to the owner. This payment of advance had not been debited in the assessee's books of account. It was stated that a cheque for Rs. 51,000 had been received from one F.C Mehra and that very cheque had been endorsed to the vendor. Mehra was paid back Rs. 51,000 also by cheque. There is no dispute that Mehra had issued a cheque which had been endorsed in favour of the vendor, nor is there any dispute that Mehra had been paid for through bank. A sum of Rs. 51,000 lay in deposit in the account of Mehra. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner required the assessee to establish the source of the cash deposit in Mehra's account, because the Income-tax Officer had taken the view that the deposit may have been made by the assessee himself. For the conclusion of the Income-tax Officer, admittedly, there was no material and at the most there could be scope for suspicion. A bare suspicion, however, is no foundation for any quasi-judicial act. The advance by Mehra and repayment to him having passed through a bank, in the absence of any material to link up the assessee with the deposit in Mehra's account to the tune of Rs. 51,000 there is no scope for imposition of penalty. We agree that Anwar All's decision [1970] 76 ITR 696 (SC) has no application and the assessee had to satisfy the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner why penalty was not to be imposed. Facts here are, however, very peculiar. As already indicated, the advance by Mehra and repayment to him are not open to doubt. From where Mehra had got Rs. 51,000 in his own account was certainly not a matter for the assessee to explain. There is no material on record at all that Mehra was a man of no means. In paragraph 13 of his order, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner observed:
“……In respect of cash credit, as I have mentioned earlier, the party in whose name cash credit appears is not a credit-worthy party…”
10. This statement seems to be unwarranted because there is no mention of this fact anywhere in paragraphs 1 to 12 of the order of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner which precede the observation. The Income-tax Officer nowhere stated that Mehra was not a credit-worthy party. Admittedly, Mehra had a bank account and it was open to the Income-tax Officer either to require the assessee to establish the credit-worthiness of Mehra or to collect materials all by himself to find out whether Mehra was indeed a person capable of making an accommodation to the tune of Rs. 51,000. There may be cases where if a dispute on such a point arises, the assessee may be required to establish the credit-worthiness of the person with whom he purports to have a deal but in the facts of the case and particularly in the absence of any material to support the view of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, we think the Tribunal was right in holding that a case for imposition of penalty had not been made out. Reference to Anwar Ali's case, [1970] 76 ITR 696 (SC) was unfortunate, but the conclusion reached on taking a sum total view of the matter does not appear to be a view which no prudent Tribunal versed in law would have reached. As has been indicated by the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Limited v. State of Orissa, [1972] 83 ITR 26, penalty is not to be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Where there is no deliberate defiance of law and the conduct is not contumacious or dishonest, it is open to the statutory authority to waive imposition of penalty. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, it is open to the authority competent to impose the penalty to refuse to impose penalty, particularly where the default flows from a bona fide belief that the assessee had not to act in a particular way. It is not disputed that the Tribunal was competent to exercise the same power as the penalty imposing authority and, therefore, when taking into consideration the broad features of a given case, the Tribunal comes to conclude that no penalty is exigible, no question of law can be said to arise. Having given our anxious consideration to the matter, our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is:
On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the assessee was not liable to be visited with penalty in respect of a sum of Rs. 14,050 representing income from house property, a sum of Rs. 51,000 said to be income from undisclosed sources and a sum of Rs. 30,400 said to be capital gains.
11. We direct both parties to bear their own costs.
Mohanti, J.— I agree.
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