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Gunanidhi Mohapatra v. The Chairman, N.A.C, Bhubaneswar And Others Opposite Parties.

Orissa High Court
Mar 2, 1976
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Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the validity of the appointment of Dr. Srikrushna Sahu (opposite party No. 3) as the Second Medical Officer of the Bhubaneswar Notified Area Council (N.A.C.).

Key events (as set out in the opinion):

  • By Resolution No. 29 dated 31-10-1964 the N.A.C. decided to create the post of Second Medical Officer and advertised it on 1-8-1965. Opposite Party No. 3 was temporarily appointed and joined on 31-8-1965.
  • On 23-7-1971 opposite party No. 3 applied for study leave to undergo a condensed M.B.B.S. course. The N.A.C. sought Government instructions (24-7-1971) and resolved to relieve him (31-7-1971). Government directed the N.A.C. to relieve him on 12-8-1971, and he was relieved on 13-8-1971.
  • On 25-2-1972 the N.A.C. cancelled allotment of a residential quarter to opposite party No. 3. The State Government, by letter (Annexure 2), initially intimated that the N.A.C. had no obligation because the post had not been created with Government approval.
  • On 9-12-1972 the N.A.C. terminated the services of opposite party No. 3 retrospectively from 13-8-1971. Opposite party No. 3 appealed under Section 77 of the Orissa Municipal Act; it was rejected by Government on limitation grounds. After a further representation to the Chief Minister, Government directed the N.A.C. to take back opposite party No. 3 and regularise his absence.
  • On 11-6-1975 the N.A.C. passed a Resolution (Annexure 7) accepting Government's direction to reinstate and regularise opposite party No. 3. The petitioner (a Councillor) challenged the legality of that appointment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appointment of opposite party No. 3 as Second Medical Officer was invalid because he lacked the prescribed qualification at the time of his initial appointment (31-8-1965) and was not registered under Section 15 of the Indian Medical Council Act.
  2. Whether the creation of the post of Second Medical Officer required prior sanction of the State Government under Section 73 of the Orissa Municipal Act and, if such sanction was absent at the time of appointment, whether that invalidated the appointment.
  3. Whether Annexure 7 (the N.A.C. Resolution dated 11-6-1975 accepting Government's direction to take back and regularise opposite party No. 3) amounted to a fresh appointment that contravened Article 16 of the Constitution (equality of opportunity), requiring advertisement and selections open to aspirants.
  4. Whether the petitioner (a Councillor) had locus standi to maintain the writ petition seeking reliefs in the nature of quo warranto, mandamus or certiorari in respect of the above matters.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Councillor)

  • Challenged legality of opposite party No. 3's appointment on three grounds:
    • At the time of appointment (31-8-1965) he had not passed the M.B.B.S. examination required for an Assistant Surgeon and was not registered under Section 15 of the Indian Medical Councils Act.
    • No prior sanction of the State Government had been obtained for creation of the post of Second Medical Officer as required under Section 73 of the Orissa Municipal Act.
    • The order of appointment/regularisation in Annexure 7 contravened Article 16 of the Constitution.

Opposite Party No. 3 (Dr. Srikrushna Sahu)

  • Contended there was ex post facto sanction by the State Government for the post during the relevant period.
  • Stated that he held a D.M.S.M. diploma (from Gopabandhu Ayurbeda Institute), which satisfied the advertisement requirement and was recognised by Government as equivalent to M.B.B.S. for service purposes.
  • Asserted he was registered in the State Medical Register on 14-2-1966 and later passed the M.B.B.S. examination while on study leave.
  • Maintained that he was relieved from duty on study leave terms and that his services were not terminated in substance; Government later directed reinstatement and regularisation.

State Government (Opposite Party No. 4)

  • Supported the position that relief to undergo studies did not mean cessation of employment.
  • Explained that an earlier letter (Annexure 2) denying obligation was issued without appreciation of the correct position; on review Government directed N.A.C. to take back and regularise opposite party No. 3.

Chairman and Executive Officer of N.A.C. (Opposite Parties 1 and 2)

  • Filed a joint counter supporting opposite party No. 3's case and the actions of the N.A.C. as recorded in its resolutions.

Opposite Party No. 5 (Smt. Binapani Dash)

  • Impleaded herself and supported the petitioner's allegations.
  • Contended that if a selection had been held after proper advertisement, she would have run the best chance of selection for the post.
  • Argued that Government's order directing N.A.C. to take back opposite party No. 3 amounted to a fresh appointment in violation of Article 16.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The King v. Speyer, (1916) 1 KB 595 Historical development and peculiar characteristics of the writ of quo warranto in English law. Used to explain the origins and special nature of quo warranto and the historical shift from Crown-only actions to private informations and court discretion.
Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 Article 226 jurisdiction: the relief asked must be to enforce a legal right and ordinarily that right must be the petitioner's own. Relied upon to show that writ jurisdiction is founded on existence of a legal right and ordinarily requires the petitioner to have a personal legal right.
The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1952 SCR 28 : AIR 1952 SC 12 Existence of a right is the foundation for exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction. Quoted to support the principle that the existence of the legal right is essential to invoke Article 226.
Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 : AIR 1951 SC 41 The legal right enforceable under Article 32 (and analogously Article 226) must ordinarily be the petitioner's own individual right. Invoked to reinforce that ordinarily a petitioner must assert his own legal right to seek relief under writ jurisdiction.
Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 828 Reiteration of the principle relating to locus standi under Article 226. Cited as an authority restating the requirement that the right enforced under Article 226 ordinarily be the petitioner's own.
University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491 Before claiming quo warranto a petitioner must satisfy the Court that the office is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority; inquiry whether appointment was made according to law. Applied to acknowledge that the office of Second Medical Officer is a public office and to frame the inquiry into whether opposite party No. 3 had legal authority to hold it.
Hari Shankar Prasad Gupta v. Sukhdeo Prasad, AIR 1954 All 227 (FB) If holder lacked qualification on date of appointment but acquires necessary qualification during pendency, quo warranto may be refused. Relied upon to support refusal of quo warranto where the incumbent acquired necessary qualification during the relevant period.
P.L. Lakhanpal…Petitioner v. Ajit Nath Ray & Others…, AIR 1975 Delhi 66 (FB) A writ of quo warranto can be futile where intervening events make the relief ineffective (example: changes in eligibility/status during pendency). Used by the Court to illustrate that a quo warranto may be refused when subsequent events render the writ's relief futile.
All India Station Masters' and Assistant Station Masters' Association v. General Manager, Central Railway, AIR 1960 SC 384 Article 16 (equality of opportunity) operates between persons who are either seeking the same employment or have obtained the same employment. Applied to hold that Article 16 challenge cannot be mounted by a person who is not an aspirant to the post being challenged.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by addressing locus standi and the nature of the relief sought before analysing the substantive objections to the appointment.

  1. Nature of writs and locus standi:
    • The Court distinguished between writs: for mandamus and certiorari the petitioner generally must show a personal legal right or that he is adversely affected; for quo warranto a petitioner may act as informer and need not have a personal interest.
    • The authorities cited (including Calcutta Gas, Madan Gopal Rungta, Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri and Gadde Venkateswara Rao) were applied to establish that Article 226 ordinarily enforces a petitioner's own legal right, with limited exceptions for certain writs like quo warranto.
  2. Application to the present petitioner:
    • The petitioner was a Councillor and not an aspirant for the Second Medical Officer post; he had no personal or prejudicial interest shown such as being an applicant or otherwise directly aggrieved by the appointments recorded in Annexures 5 and 7.
    • Statutory references invoked by petitioner (Section 382 and Section 94(2) of the Orissa Municipal Act) were considered insufficient to confer the necessary locus to maintain mandamus or certiorari petitions under Article 226.
  3. Qualification and sanction issues:
    • The Court examined whether opposite party No. 3 possessed the requisite qualification and whether the absence of prior Government sanction invalidated the appointment.
    • It found that at the time of initial appointment opposite party No. 3 held a D.M.S.M. diploma, which the advertisement allowed as an alternative to M.B.B.S., and Government recognised D.M.S.M. as equivalent for service purposes. He was also registered in the State Medical Register on 14-2-1966 and later passed the M.B.B.S. examination.
    • Even if statutory requirements under Section 73 (Orissa Municipal Act) and Section 15 (Indian Medical Council Act) were not literally complied with initially, the Court noted there was ex post facto sanction by Government for the post for relevant periods and the irregularity, if any, had been cured by the time Annexures 5 and 7 were issued.
    • The Court relied on analogous authorities (e.g., Hari Shankar Prasad Gupta) that refused quo warranto where the incumbent acquired qualifications during the pendency or before decisive orders.
  4. Article 16 challenge and "fresh appointment" argument:
    • The Court considered whether Annexure 7 amounted to a fresh appointment requiring a fresh competitive process under Article 16. It concluded that a challenge under Article 16 cannot be urged by one who was not and is not an aspirant to the post.
    • Relying on All India Station Masters' case, the Court held Article 16's guarantee of equality of opportunity applies between persons seeking the same employment; since neither the petitioner nor opposite party No. 5 were aspirants to that post in the relevant sense, they lacked standing to raise Article 16 objection.
  5. Final evaluation:
    • The Court confined its enquiry to the legality of appointment under Municipal Resolution dated 11-6-1975 (Annexure 7). By that date the post existed and opposite party No. 3 possessed requisite qualifications; moreover Government had accorded sanction/ex post facto regularisation for the period in question.
    • Consequently, the Court found no illegality in the appointment as per Annexure 7 and was not persuaded to interfere.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition dismissed.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The writ petition challenging the legality of opposite party No. 3's appointment was dismissed by the Court.
  • The petitioner was ordered to pay costs and a hearing fee of Rs. 100/- to opposite party No. 3.
  • As decided by the Court, by the date of the challenged municipal resolution (11-6-1975) the post existed, required qualifications for opposite party No. 3 were satisfied (including government recognition/ex post facto sanction and registration), and therefore Annexure 7 was not unlawful.
  • No broader change of law or new precedent is announced by the Court beyond application of existing principles on locus standi, quo warranto, Article 16 standing, and the effect of regularisation/ex post facto sanction as discussed in the cited authorities.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Petition dismissed" (with concurrence by Shankar, C.J.).

Show all summary ...

Mohanti, J.:— In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the validity of the appointment of Dr. Srikrushna Sahu (opposite party No. 3) as the Second Medical Officer of the Bhubaneswar Notified Area Council is under challenge.

2. The relevant facts are these:

3. The Notified Area Council by its Resolution No. 29 dated 31-10-1964 (Annexure A/1) decided to create the post of a Second Medical Officer and advertised the same on 1-8-1965 (Annexure A/3). Opposite Party No. 3 was temporarily appointed to the post and he joined on 31-8-1965. On 23-7-1971 he applied to the Notified Area Council for study leave to undergo the condensed M.B.B.S course (vide Annexure E/3). On 24-7-1971 the N.A.C moved the State Government for necessary instructions regarding the nature and period of leave to be admissible to opposite party No. 3 and for posting of a substitute in his place (vide Annexure H/3). On 31-7-1971 the N.A.C by its Resolution No. 6 decided to relieve the opposite party No. 3 and to settle the nature of leave and the terms and conditions thereof later according to the directions of Government (vide Annexure G/3). On 12-8-1971 Government by their letter in Annexure F/3 directed the N.A.C to relieve opposite party No. 3 to join the training course. On 13-8-1971 opposite party No. 3 was relieved of his duties. On 25-2-1972 the N.A.C issued an order cancelling allotment of a residential quarter in favour of opposite party No. 3. A copy of this order was forwarded to the State Government. Thereupon the State Government by their letter in Annexure 2 intimated that the N.A.C had no obligation for opposite party No. 3 since he was appointed as a Medical Officer without having a post created with the approval of the Government. On 9-12-1972 the N.A.C terminated the services of the opposite party No. 3 with retrospective effect from 13-8-1971, that is, the date on which he was relieved (vide Annexure K/3). Opposite party No. 3 preferred an appeal under Section 77 of the Orissa Municipal Act which was rejected by the State Government on the ground of limitation (vide Annexure 3). But on a subsequent representation to the Chief Minister, Government directed the N.A.C to take back opposite party No. 3 and to regularise the period of his absence from duty (vide Annexure 5). On 11-6-1975 the N.A.C passed a Resolution (Annexure 7) accepting the Government order in Annexure 5. The petitioner challenges the legality of the appointment of the opposite party No. 3 on the following grounds:

(i) At the time of his appointment on 31-8-1965, he had not passed the M.B.B.S examination prescribed for the post of an Assistant Surgeon. He was not registered as a Medical practitioner as required under Section 15 of the Indian Medical Councils Act.

(ii) No prior sanction of the State Government had been obtained for creating the post of Second Medical Officer as required under Section 73 of the Orissa Municipal Act.

(iii) The order of appointment in Annexure 7 is in contravention of Article 16 of the Constitution.

4. Opposite Party No. 3 filed counter contending that there was ex post facto sanction of the State Government for the post during the relevant period; that he passed the condensed course from the Gopabandbu Ayurbeda Institute and held the D.M.S.M diploma as required by the advertisement in Annexure A/3; that the Government of Orissa recognised D.M.S.M as equivalent to M.B.B.S for service; that he was duly registered in the State Medical Register on 14-2-1966; that he was relieved of his duties on 13-8-1971 on study leave terms to join the training course and that in the meantime he has passed the M.B.B.S examination. He also contended that after the State Government directed the N.A.C to take him back, the petitioner brought a proposal to abolish the post of Second Medical Officer but the Council by majority decided to continue the post. The petitioner is bound by the majority decision of the N.A.C and has no locus standi to maintain the writ petition. The State Government (opposite party No. 4) while supporting the above contentions maintained that merely because opposite party No. 3 was relieved to undergo higher studies it does not mean that he ceased to be an employee of the N.A.C The appeal filed by him under Section 77 of the Orissa Municipal Act was dismissed on the ground of limitation, but on a further representation Government reviewed the case and felt that their previous letter dated 14-8-1972 (Annexure 2) had been issued without appreciation of the correct position. Accordingly, Government directed the N.A.C to take back opposite party No. 3 in the post of Second Medical Officer and to regularise the period of his absence.

5. The Chairman and the Executive Officer of the N.A.C (opposite parties 1 and 2) filed a joint counter supporting the case of opposite party No. 3.

6. Smt. Binapani Dash who has been serving as an Honorary Lady Doctor in the N.A.C Hospital was impleaded as opposite party No. 5 on her own application dated 1st December, 1975. She filed a counter supporting the allegations made in the writ petition. Her contention is that if there had been a selection for the post of Second Medical Officer after due advertisement, she ran the best chance of being selected for the post. She further contended that the Government order directing the N.A.C to take back opposite party No. 3 in the post of Second Medical Officer amounts to a fresh appointment and it violates the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.

7. Acute controversy has centered round the question about the petitioner's locus standi to maintain the writ petition. It is contended on behalf of the opposite parties 1 to 4 that the writs sought are those in the nature of quo warranto, mandamus or certiorari and that in the circumstances of the case, none of these writs could lie or could issue at the instance of the petitioner. The argument is that the power of jurisdiction to issue any such writ could be invoked by a petitioner who is prejudicially affected by the order challenged in the writ petition and who seeks protection of a legal right vested in him.

8. The question whether the petitioner has any locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Artice 226 of the Constitution is necessarily related to the nature of the relief asked for. For the issue of a writ of mandamus the petitioner has to make out that he has a legal right by virtue of which he is entitled to a particular act being done by the opposite parties or to require that they shall not do a thing which may prejudicially affect his right. For the issue of a writ of certiorari, the petitioner should be a person who is adversely affected by the order sought to be quashed. But in the case of a writ of quo warranto the petitioner is in the nature of an informer. In England the petitioner in such circumstances is not called a petitioner at all but only a relator i.e one who relates facts on the basis of which the Court itself takes Action in the name of the King. The peculiar characteristics of the writ of quo warranto and the history of its development in England would appear from the leading case of The King v. Speyer, (1916) 1 KB 595. Lord Reading C.J pointed out that originally a writ of quo warranto was available only for use by the King against encroachment of Royal prerogative or of the rights, franchise or liberties of the Crown but that later it gave place to the practice of filing informations by the Attorney General on the strength of which the Court enquired into the authority whereby the respondent held any public office. Later still, the King's coroner commenced the practice of exhibiting the information of quo warranto at the instance of even private persons. To prevent malicious information at the instance of private persons, statutes were subsequently passed after which the practice of coroner filing information was stopped. Another statute was passed during the reign of Queen Anne making the issue of a writ of quo warranto subject to the discretion of the Court to grant or refuse the same upon the informations exhibited by private persons.

9. In the case of Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1962 SC 1044 the Supreme Court while dealing with the question of locus standi to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution held as follows:

“……The Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder; but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. In The State Of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1952 SCR 28 : (AIR 1952 SC 12) this Court has ruled that the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 : (AIR 1951 SC 41). It has been held by this Court that the legal right that can be enforced under Article 32 must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief. We do not see any reason why a different principle should apply in the case of a petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. The right that can be enforced under Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified.”

(The underlining is ours.)

10. This view was reiterated in AIR 1966 SC 828, (Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh).

11. In view of the authorities cited, we can take it as well established proposition that if the writ asked for is a writ of quo warranto in respect of a public office the petitioner need have no personal interest. But if the writ asked for is a writ of mandamus or certiorari the petitioner has to establish that he has some personal interest in the matter which the law recognises as sufficient.

12. Now, in the case before us, the petitioner who is a Councillor of the N.A.C questions the legality of the appointment of opposite party No. 3 on the ground that he did not possess the requisite qualifications and that no prior sanction of the Government had been obtained for creation of the post. He has no personal interest in the matter of appointment of apposite party No. 3. He is neither an aspirant for the post nor is he prejudicially affected in any manner by the impugned orders in Annexures 5 and 7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner invited our attention to Section 382 of the Orissa Municipal Act which deals with personal liability of Councillors for any expenditure made from the Municipal Fund contrary to law where such illegal payment has been authorised by him while acting as a Councillor. He also invited our attention to sub-section (2) of Section 94 of the Act which requires any Councillor to call the attention of the Chairman to any waste of Council's property. This interest of the petitioner, in our opinion, is not sufficient to entitle him to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of mandamus or certiorari.

13. The scope and ambit of a writ of quo warranto came up for consideration in the case of University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, AIR 1965 SC 491. The Court indicated that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the Court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not. That the office held by opposite party No. 3 is a public office is not disputed by the opposite parties. It is however contended that he has no legal authority to hold the office. By the time of his initial appointment, opposite party No. 3 was holder of D.M.S.M diploma which had been recognised by Government as equivalent to M.B.B.S degree. The qualification prescribed in the advertisement (Annexure A/3) was either a M.B.B.S degree or a D.M.S.M diploma. Thus the requirement of the advertisement was satisfied. It appears from the letter dated 13-11-1965 (Annexure T/3) from the Chairman of the N.A.C to the Director of Health Services that the post of Medical Officer under the State Government had been offered to opposite party No. 3. It is not disputed that subsequently opposite party No. 3 passed the M.B.B.S examination and was duly registered in the State Medical Register. He was, therefore, qualified to hold the post of a Medical Officer by the time Annexures 5 and 7 were issued. Ex post facto sanction for creation of the post was accorded by Government for the period from 31-8-1965 to 28-2-1971 and the term of the post was extended from time to time. It was last extended upto 29-2-1976 by G.O No. 29600.UD, dated 31-10-1975. Thus it is clear that even if it be assumed that the requirements of Section 73 of the Orissa Municipal Act and Section 15 of the Indian Medical Councils Act were not fulfilled at the time of initial appointment the irregularity if any, was completely cured by the time Annexures 5 and 7 were issued.

14. In AIR 1954 All 227 (FB), (Hari Shankar Prasad Gupta v. Sukhdeo Prasad) the writ of quo warranto was refused as the holder of the office though not qualified on the date of his appointment thereto acquired the necessary qualification during the pendency of the writ petition. In AIR 1975 Delhi 66 (FB), (P.L Lakhanpal…Petitioner v. Ajit Nath Ray & Others…S) the petitioner prayed for a writ of quo warranto against the present Chief Justice of India on the ground that his Lordship's appointment was in violation of the provisions of Article 124 (2) of the Constitution as the mandatory consultation was not made and as the rule of seniority which inheres in that Article was not followed. After the appointment was made, Justices J.M Shelat, K.S Hegde and A.N Grover who were senior to the present Chief Justice resigned their office as Judges of the Supreme Court and by the time the writ petition was filed. Justice A.N Ray became the seniormost puisne Judge. In the circumstances, the Full Bench held that the issue of a writ of quo warranto would be futile because as a result of the resignations of the Judges who were senior to him. Justice A.N Ray became the seniormost puisne Judge and he was not only eligible for reappointment as Chief Justice of India but was entitled to be so reappointed and hence a writ of quo warranto ousting his Lordship from the office of the Chief Justice of India would be futile and such a writ could not be issued. We are in respectful agreement with the views expressed in these decisions.

15. The alleged invalidity of the appointment of opposite party No. 3 in the year 1965 is not the subject-matter of this writ petition. We are only concerned with the legality of his appointment under Municipal Resolution dated 11-6-1975 (Annexure 7). As mentioned earlier, the post of Second Medical Officer did exist on that date and the opposite party No. 3 had the requisite qualification for the same. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was any illegality in the appointment of opposite party No. 3 as per Annexure 7.

16. The next contention is that the order in Annexure 7 amounts to a fresh appointment and the Notified Area Council was bound to observe the principles of Article 16 of the Constitution and advertise an invitation for applications thereto, which has not been done in the present case and, therefore, the appointment of opposite Party No. 3 is illegal. In our opinion, a challenge to a particular appointment as contravening Article 16 of the Constitution cannot be urged by one who was not and is not an aspirant to the post. Referring to Article 16, in AIR 1960 SC 384, (All India Station Masters' and Assistant Station Masters' Association v. General Manager, Central Railway), the Court said:

“Equality of opportunity in matters of employment can be predicated only as between persons, who are either seeking the same employment, or have obtained the same employment.”

17. Opposite party No. 5 has been appointed as an Honorary Lady Assistant Surgeon under the Notified Area Council. She was never an applicant for the post of the Second Medical Officer held by opposite party No. 3. She is over-aged and in her letter dated 21-7-1972 (Annexure Z/3) she offered to serve as a Lady Assistant Surgeon in the N.A.C without any remuneration towards her service. She has therefore no locus standi to challenge the appointment of opposite party No. 3. Admittedly, applications from eligible persons were invited when opposite party No. 3 was appointed to the post on 31-8-1965 and he was selected on merit. No doubt, his services were terminated on 9-12-1972 as per Annexure K/3 but subsequently the order of termination was cancelled by the N.A.C - vide Resolutions in Annexures L/3 and M/3. In Annexure 7 the N.A.C accepted the Government decision in Annexure 5 for taking back opposite party No. 3 and for regularising the period of his absence.

18. In these circumstances, the contention that there was fresh appointment of opposite party No. 3 in violation of the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution is not acceptable.

19. Considering all the circumstances of the case, we are not satisfied that this is a fit case for interference with the appointment of opposite party No. 3. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs and hearing fee of Rs. 100/- (one hundred) payable to opposite party No. 3.

20. Shankar, C.J:— I agree.

21. Petition dismissed.