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Md Mazim v. District Transport Manager Admn Orissa State

Orissa High Court
Oct 17, 1974
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a driver employed by the Orissa State Transport Service, was suspended along with a cleaner on 4-11-1965 due to involvement in an accident and subsequent charge-sheeting under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was convicted on 2-1-1967 and discharged from service the following day. Although the conviction was upheld on appeal, this Court acquitted the petitioner on 28-11-1967. Despite the acquittal, the petitioner was not reinstated immediately and subsequently made a representation on 7th January 1970. On 13-4-1970, the Divisional Manager ordered the petitioner’s fresh appointment as a driver. The petitioner rejoined service on 15-5-1970 and requested that the break in service be condoned and not treated as a fresh recruitment. However, he was retrenched once as a new recruit. On 9-3-1973, the Director of the State Transport Service ordered reinstatement treating the entire period of absence as leave. The petitioner challenged this direction, contending entitlement to full salary and other service benefits for the entire period of absence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the period during which the petitioner was absent from service due to suspension and discharge consequent upon conviction, later acquitted, should be treated as leave or as continuous service with entitlement to salary and other benefits.
  2. Whether the writ application filed by the petitioner is maintainable given the petitioner’s status under the Industrial Disputes Act and the nature of the claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that the direction to treat the entire period of absence as leave was unwarranted.
  • He claimed entitlement to full salary and other service benefits for the period during which he was absent due to suspension and discharge following conviction and subsequent acquittal.

Opposite Parties’ Arguments

  • Alleged that the writ application was liable to be rejected on the ground of acquiescence, as the petitioner accepted several short-term appointments after acquittal.
  • Contended that the petitioner is a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and that the proper forum for relief is the Labour Court or Tribunal under the Act.
  • Argued that the petitioner’s claim was essentially for recovery of salary or damages and that the Civil Court would be more appropriate to deal with the matter.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court found no merit in the objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition, noting that the petitioner held a civil post and maintainability was not affected by his status under the Industrial Disputes Act. The acceptance of short-term appointments post-acquittal did not prejudice the petitioner’s case, especially since the Director accepted that the petitioner must be treated as in continuous service. The central legal question was whether the absence period should be treated as leave or continuous service. The Court emphasized that the petitioner’s absence was not voluntary but due to suspension and discharge following conviction, later overturned by acquittal. Since no disciplinary proceedings were held, and the suspension and discharge were directly linked to the criminal case, the petitioner should have been reinstated immediately upon acquittal. The Court reasoned that treating the absence as leave was unjustified because absence implies voluntary action, which was absent here. Accordingly, the Court quashed the order treating the absence as leave and directed that the petitioner be deemed in continuous service with payment of all legitimate dues for the period of absence, excluding any period for which remuneration was already received.

Holding and Implications

The Court quashed the order treating the period of absence as leave and directed that the petitioner be considered in continuous service during that period with payment of all legitimate dues within three months.

The direct effect of this decision is that the petitioner is entitled to salary and service benefits for the entire period of absence caused by suspension and discharge following conviction, which was later set aside by acquittal. No new precedent was set beyond this individual relief. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner is a driver in the employment of the Orissa State Transport Service, a Government undertaking. He along with one Golak Chandra Naik, the cleaner of the vehicle which the petitioner was driving was suspended from service with effect from 4-11-1965 on the ground that they were involved in an accident case and had been charge-sheeted for offence punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was convicted in the original Court, on 2-1-1967. On the following day, he was discharged from service on that ground. The conviction was upheld in appeal, but this Court by judgment, dated 28-11-1967 acquitted the petitioner of the charges. As the petitioner was not taken back into service by revoking the order of discharge, the petitioner made a representation on 7th of January, 1970. On 13-4-1970, the Divisional Manager (opposite party No. 2) passed the following order:

...The appellant was discharged from service consequent upon his conviction in the Court of law. Since he has been acquitted of the charge by the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa, his appeal is allowed and it is ordered that the appellant may be given a fresh appointment as a driver forthwith.

(Annexure 4) The petitioner joined services with effect from 15-5-1970 and made a representation that the break in service should be condoned and the petitioner should not be treated as a fresh recruit. The petitioner was thereafter once retrenched as he was treated as a new recruit, but ultimately on 9-3-1973 the following order was passed--

After due consideration of the representation of the Mahammad Kazim, ex-Driver, S.T.S. Cuttack Zone, the D(sic)tor S.T.S. Orissa has been pleased to order that Mahammad Kazim should be re instated to his former post of driver in Cuttack Zone treating the entire period of absence as leave due to him.

(Annexure 9) The petitioner challenges this direction and contends that he must be given full salary and other service benefits and the direction to treat the entire period of absence as leave due to him is unwarranted.

2. In the counter-affidavit, it has been alleged that the writ application is liable to be rejected on the ground of acquiescence, inasmuch as the petitioner had accepted several short term appointments after his acquittal. It is next contended that the petitioner is a workman as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act and the proper forum for relief is the Labour Court or the Tribunal under the Act. It is also contended that the petitioner's claim is essentially in the nature of recovery of salary or damages and, therefore, the Civil Court would be more appropriate forum to deal with the matter. It thus transpires that so far as the merit of the matter is concerned, there is indeed nothing in the counter-affidavit.

3. Coming to the objection on the ground of maintainability, we find absolutely no force in it. Admittedly the petitioner is also the holder of a civil post and even though he may be entitled to advantages as a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act. the maintainability of the writ application is not open to challenge on that ground. The acceptance of the short term appointments does not affect the petitioner's case because the Director has now accepted the position that the petitioner must be treated to be in continuous service.

4. The only question that arises for consideration is that whether the period during which the petitioner was absent from service should be treated as leave or he should be deemed to be on duty and be paid the salary and other dues as admissible to him. Admittedly the petitioner was not absent from service on his own volition, but he had been suspended from service during the pendency of the criminal charge and discharged from services upon conviction. Even after acquittal as early as 28-11-1967, more than two years were taken to restore the petitioner to service. There was no disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner and the suspension as also the discharge arose out of his involvement in the criminal case and consequent conviction in the original court. That being so, when there was an order of acquittal, the petitioner must normally have returned to service. When the position is so clear, there is no justification at all in the direction of the Director of the State Transport Services to treat the absence of the petitioner from service as leave due to him. As we have already pointed out, it is indeed no absence of the petitioner. The petitioner was kept away from the service. Absence would certainly postulate a voluntary action of the employee. That certainly was not the situation here.

5. We would accordingly quash the order in Annexure 9 directing the period during which the petitioner was not rendering service to be leave due to him. On the other hand, we direct that a writ of mandamus do issue requiring the opposite parties to treat the petitioner to have been in service during the period and pay him all his legitimate dues for that period within a period of three months from the date of service of the writ. We direct parties to bear their own costs. We make it clear that the period during which he was in service and has received his remuneration must be excluded while calculating his dues.

P.K. Mohanti, J.

6. I agree.