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Messrs Rameswar Prasad v. Sales Tax Officer, Balasore Circle And Another Opp. Parties.

Orissa High Court
Mar 5, 1973
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Judgment Summary — G.K. Misra, C.J. (with S. Acharya, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The facts were not in dispute. The petitioner was assessed to pay sales-tax amounts of Rs. 14,898-14 annas, Rs. 9,941-10 annas and Rs. 13,405-10 annas for the quarters ending 30th June 1953, 31st March 1954 and 30th June 1954 respectively. The competent sales-tax authorities directed the petitioner to deposit those sums into the Government treasury under section 9-B(3) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act as it stood prior to amendment by the Orissa Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1968 (Orissa Act 15 of 68).

The petitioner deposited the sums as directed and then applied for refund, alleging the amounts were not collected as sales tax and the State was not entitled to retain them. The Sales Tax Officer rejected the refund application. The petitioner appealed, and the subsequent Second Appeal failed, in part because the authorities under the Act would not determine the constitutionality of sections 9-B(3) and 14-A. The same facts were the subject matter of S.J.Cs Nos. 12 to 14 of 1964. The petitioner filed writ applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus directing refund of the deposited amounts.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Orissa Legislature had the legislative competency to enact sections 9-B(3) and 14-A of the Orissa Sales Tax Act (i.e., whether those provisions were intra vires the State Legislature).
  2. Whether, if those provisions were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner was entitled to refund of the amounts deposited pursuant to the demand notice.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The sums deposited pursuant to the demand notice were not sales tax and therefore the State was not entitled to retain them.
  • The petitioner sought refund of the deposited amounts and filed writs under Articles 226 and 227 asking for mandamus to compel refund.

Respondent / State Arguments

  • The Sales Tax Officer rejected the petitioner's refund application on the ground that the authorities created under the Act could not determine the constitutionality of sections 9-B(3) and 14-A.
  • The learned standing counsel (for the State) did not dispute that if sections 9-B(3) and 14-A were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would be entitled to a refund.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Quader & Co. v. Sales Tax Officer, Second Circle, Hyderabad (15 S.T.C. 403) The Supreme Court held that a provision (section 11(2) of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950) which required persons who had collected amounts as tax (though those amounts were not exigible as tax) to pay them over to Government was unconstitutional. It rejected the contention that such a provision could be justified as incidental or ancillary to the taxing power under Entry 54, List II of the Seventh Schedule. The court treated section 11(2) as analogous to section 9-B(3) of the Orissa Act and, applying the same reasoning, concluded that section 9-B(3) was not within the competence of the State Legislature and must be declared ultra vires.
Ashoke Marketing Ltd. v. State of Bihar (26 S.T.C. 254) The Supreme Court examined provisions of section 20-A (introduced by amending Act 20 of 1962) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, which corresponded to Orissa's section 9-B(3) and section 14-A. It held sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) (and as a corollary (6) and (8)) prescribing deposit in State treasury of amounts collected but not due as tax to be ultra vires the State Legislature. The present court relied on Ashoke Marketing to reinforce that corresponding provisions in the Orissa Act (sections 9-B(3) and 14-A) were outside legislative competence and therefore invalid.
The Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. The State of Orissa (12 S.T.C. 357) The Revenue relied on this decision; however, the Supreme Court in Ashoke Marketing distinguished Orient Paper Mills on the ground that in that earlier case the taxpayer had challenged the levy under Article 19(1)(f) and had not pressed the contention that the State legislature was incompetent to enact the provision corresponding to section 14-A. Thus Orient Paper Mills did not examine constitutionality of provisions like section 9-B(3). The present court distinguished Orient Paper Mills and held that it cannot be regarded as authority for the proposition that sections 9-B(3) and 14-A are intra vires.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began from undisputed facts: the petitioner had been directed to deposit specified sums into the treasury under section 9-B(3) and had complied, then sought refund claiming the amounts were not sales tax. The court reproduced the text of section 9-B(3) and section 14-A as relevant. Section 9-B(3) was interpreted to mean that any amount realised by a person "by way of tax" which exceeds the amount payable as tax must be deposited in the Government Treasury — that is, a dealer who realises a sum which is not sales tax cannot retain it and must deposit it.

The court observed that the Legislature was aware the State had no title to such sums, and correspondingly section 14-A provided that the person entitled to claim refund is not the dealer but the constituent from whom the dealer had actually realised the amounts.

The decisive issue was legislative competence. The court relied on Supreme Court authority in Abdul Quader and Ashoke Marketing. In Abdul Quader the Supreme Court held that a provision analogous to section 9-B(3) (section 11(2) of the Hyderabad Act) was unconstitutional because the incidental or ancillary powers of a State under the taxing entry (Entry 54, List II) do not extend to permitting legislation that compels payment to Government of amounts which are not exigible as tax. That reasoning led the court to conclude that section 9-B(3) was not within the competence of the Orissa Legislature and therefore ultra vires.

In Ashoke Marketing, similar provisions in the Bihar Sales Tax Act (section 20-A sub-sections (3), (4), (5), (6) and (8)) were held ultra vires for the same reasons; the court treated those decisions as binding precedent for the present case. The court considered and rejected reliance on The Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. The State of Orissa because that case did not examine the constitutionality of section 9-B(3)-type provisions and therefore could not support the contention that such provisions were intra vires.

Applying these authorities and reasoning, the court concluded that both section 9-B(3) and section 14-A of the Orissa Sales Tax Act were beyond the legislative competence of the State and were therefore ultra vires.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Sections 9-B(3) and 14-A of the Orissa Sales Tax Act are ultra vires the legislative competence of the State and are declared invalid.

Immediate Court Order and Direct Effect: Writ applications allowed. Writs of mandamus were issued directing the opposite parties to refund the amounts deposited by the petitioner in pursuance of the demand notice. There was to be no order as to costs. S. Acharya, J. agreed and the formal result recorded was: "Writ application allowed."

Broader Implications: The opinion itself rests its decision on the cited Supreme Court authorities and does not set out any further discussion of broader doctrine beyond holding the two challenged provisions ultra vires and ordering refund to the petitioner.

Show all summary ...

G.K Misra, C.J:— The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner was assessed to pay sales-tax to the tune of Rs. 14,898-14 annas, Rs. 9941-10 annas and Rs. 13,405-10 annas for quarters ending 30th June, 1953; 31st March, 1954; and 30th June, 1954 respectively. He was directed by the competent sales tax authorities to pay the said sums into Government treasury according to section 9-B (3) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act as it stood prior to its amendment on 20th of July, 1968, by Orissa Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1968 (Orissa Act 15 of 68), as directed in the notice of demand.

2. The petitioner deposited the aforesaid sums in the treasury as directed. He then filed an application for refund of those amounts alleging that they were not collected as sales tax and the State was not entitled to retain the same. This application was rejected by the Sales Tax Officer. The petitioner took recourse to appeal and Second Appeal without any success as the question of constitutionality of section 9-B (3) and section 14-A of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. 1947 (Orissa Act, XIV of 1947) (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) cannot be determined by the authorities created under the Act. The identical facts are the subject matter of S.J.Cs Nos. 12 to 14 of 1964.

3. The applications have been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution for issuing a writ of mandamus directing the opposite parties to make refund of the aforesaid amounts deposited by the petitioner in pursuance of the demand notice.

4. The learned standing counsel does not dispute the legal position that if section 9-B (3) and section 14-A be declared unconstitutional, then the petitioner is entitled to refund of those amounts.

5. section 9-B (3) and section 14-A, so far as relevant, are extracted hereunder:

“9 -B(3) The amount realised by any person by way of tax shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, be deposited by him in a Government Treasury within such period as may be prescribed, if the amount so realised exceeds the amount, if any, payable by him as tax.

S. 14-A. Refund of tax in Special Cases: Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force where any amount is either deposited by any person under subsection (3) of section 9-B or paid as tax by a dealer and where such amount or any part thereof is not payable by such person or dealer, a refund of such a mount or any part thereof can be claimed only by the person from whom such person or dealer has actually realised such amounts whether by way of sales tax or otherwise and the period of limitation provided in the proviso to section 14 shall apply to the aforesaid claims.”

6. It would thus be seen that section 9-B (3) is the provision made in the Act directing that the amount realised by any person by way of tax shall be deposited in a Government Treasury if the amount so realised exceeds the amount payable by him as tax; in other words, it prescribes that if a dealer realises any sum which is not sales-tax, then he cannot retain the same, but must deposit it in the treasury.

7. The Legislature was well aware of the position that the State had no title in the sum so directed to be deposited. Correspondingly, a provision has been made in section 14-A that the person entitled to take refund of that sum is not the dealer who deposited it, but a constituent from whom the same was collected by the dealer even though it was not sales-tax.

8. The question for consideration is whether the Orissa Legislature had the legislative competency to enact both these provisions.

9. The matter directly came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Quader & Co. v. Sales Tax Officer, Second Circle, Hyderabad . 15 S.T.C 403., and Ashoke Marketing Ltd. v. State of Bihar . 26 S.T.C 254..

10. In the first case section 11(2) of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950 (Act XIV of 1950) was held to be unconstitutional. That section ran thus:

“11(2), Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any order of an officer of tribunal or the judgment, decree or order of a Court, every person who has collected or collects on or after 1st May, 1950, any amount by way of tax otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act, shall pay over to the Government, within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed the amount so collected by him, and in default of such payment the said amount shall be recovered from him as if it were arrears of land revenue.”

11. This sub-section (2) is analogous to sub-section (3) of section 9-B of the Act. It was attempted to justify this provision on the ground that though it was not open to the State Legislature to make provision for recovery of an amount which is not a tax under Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, in any law made for that purpose, it was still open to the legislature to provide for paying over of the amounts collected by way of tax by persons even though that really are not exigible as tax as part of incidental and ancillary power to make provision for the levy and collection of such tax.

12. This contention was negatived, Their Lordships observed thus:

“These incidental and ancillary powers have to be exercised in aid of the main topic of legislation, which in the present case, is a tax on sale or purchase of goods. All powers necessary for the levy and collection of the tax concerned and for seeing that the tax is not evaded are comprised within the ambit of the legislative entry as ancillary or incidental. But where the legislation under the relevant entry proceeds on the basis that the amount concerned is not a tax exigible under the law made under that entry, but even so lays down that though it is not exigible under the law, it shall be paid over to Government, merely because some dealers by mistake or otherwise have collected it as tax, it is difficult to see how such a provision can be ancillary or incidental to the collection of tax legitimately due under a law made under the relevant taxing entry. We do not think that the ambit of ancillary or incidental power goes to the extent of permitting the Legislature to provide that though the amount collected may be wrongly - by way of tax is not exigible under the law as made under the relevant taxing entry, it shall still be paid over to Government, as if it were a tax. The legislature cannot under Entry 54 of List II make a provision to the effect that even though a certain amount collected is not a tax on the sale or purchase of goods as laid down by the law it will still be collected as if it was such a tax. This is what section 11(2) has provided. Such a provision cannot in our opinion be treated as coming within the incidental or ancillary power which the legislature has got under the relevant taxing entry to ensure that the tax is levied and collected and that its evasion becomes impossible. We are therefore of opinion that the provision contained in section 11(2) cannot be made under Entry 54 List II and cannot be justified even as an incidental or ancillary provision permitted under that entry,”

13. Their Lordships ultimately held that section 11(2) was not within the competence of the State Legislature under Entry 54 of List II.

14. On the aforesaid reasoning section 9-B(3) of the Act was not within the competence of the Orissa State Legislature and must be declared ultra vires.

15. In the second case a similar question again came up for consideration Ashoke Marketing Ltd. v. State of Bihar. There the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of section 20-A introduced by amending Act 20 of 62 in the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959 (19 of 59) was challenged. Sub-sections (3), (4) and(5) of section 20-A of the Bihar Act correspond to section 9-B (3) of the Act and sub-section (8) thereof corresponds to section 14-A of the Act.

16. Sub-section 3(b) and sub-section (8) of section 20-A of the Bihar Act may be extracted:—

“3(b) On the day specified in the notice under clause (a) or as soon thereafter as may be, the prescribed authority may, after giving the dealer or his authorised representative a reasonable opportunity of being heard and examining such accounts and other evidence as may be produced by or on behalf of the dealer and making such further enquiry as it may deem necessary, order that the dealer shall deposit forthwith into the Government treasury, the amount found to have been so collected by the dealer and not refunded prior to the receipt of the notice aforesaid to the person from whom it had been collected.

(8) The person from whom the dealer has collected the amount deposited in pursuance of an order under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) or deemed, under sub-section (5), to have been so deposited shall be entitled to apply to the prescribed authority in the prescribed manner for refund of the amount to him and the said authority shall allow the refund if it is satisfied that the claim is in order:

xx xxxx”

17. Thus section 20-A of the Bihar Act made provisions corresponding to section 9.B(3) and section 14-A of the Act.

18. On the same reasoning as was given in Abdul Quader & Co. v. Sales Tax Officer, Second Circle, Hyderabad, their Lordships held that sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of section 20-A of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1959, prescribe the procedure for requiring a dealer to deposit in the State treasury amounts collected by a dealer which he is not entitled to collect or liable to pay, are ultra vires the State Legislature, notwithstanding the addition to sub-section (8) which enables the purchaser to claim refund from the State of the amount collected from him within the period of limitation for a similar claim by a suit against the dealer. As a corollary thereto sub-sections (6) and (8) of the section were held to be invalid.

19. In both the aforesaid Supreme Court decisions reliance was placed by the Revenue on an earlier decision in The Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. The State of Orissa . 12 S.T.C 357.. At Ashoke Marketing Ltd. v. State of Bihar, the case in The Orissa Paper Mills Ltd. v. The State of Orissa, was distinguished by their Lordships by saying:

“At the hearing of the petition, the taxpayer challenged the levy on the ground that it infringed his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) and did not press the contention that the State legislature was incompetent to enact section 14-A of the Orissa Sales Tax Act.”

20. Again their Lordships observed:

“That case The Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. The State of Orissa, does not support the plea that the State legislature is competent to legislate for demanding payment or retaining the amounts recovered by a registered dealer but which are not due as sales tax to the State.”

21. In Orient Paper Mill's case, the constitutionality of section 9-B(3) was not examined. That case cannot be regarded as an authority for the proposition that section 9-B(3) and section 14-A are intra vires.

22. On the aforesaid analysis, the Orissa State Legislature had no legislative competence to enact sections 9-B (3) and 14-A of the Act. Both the sections are ultra vires.

23. It follows that the petitioner is entitled to the refund of the amount deposited as directed in the notice of demand which we have already indicated while narrating the facts.

24. In the result, the writ applications are fallowed. Writs of Mandamus be issued directing the opposite parties to refund the amount deposited by the petitioner in pursuance of the direction in the notice of demand.

25. In the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs.

26. S. Acharya, J.:— I agree.

Writ application allowed.