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Laxmidhar Panigrahi v. The State Of Orissa And Others Opposite Parties.
Factual and Procedural Background
These two writ applications for certiorari challenge several orders passed under the Orissa Land Reforms Act by the Revenue Officer, the appellate authority and the revisional authority. The petitioner in both writ petitions is the same person; some opposite parties differ between the two matters.
In one matter (O.J.C. 802/1970) opposite party No. 3, and in the other (O.J.C. 803 of 1970) opposite parties 3 and 4, applied to the Revenue Officer (opposite party No. 2 in both petitions) seeking determination of their tenancy interests in lands then under the petitioner and other opposite parties. The petitioner and his relations opposed those claims, alleging mala fides and disputing the tenants' possession.
The Revenue Officer conducted a local inquiry on 25-12-1966, received some evidence from people present at the spot and also made what he described as a "confidential enquiry." On that basis he found the tenancy claims genuine. Appeals and subsequent revisions were unsuccessful: the appellate authority affirmed the Revenue Officer's procedure and findings, and the Additional District Magistrate in revision upheld those orders. The petitioner therefore filed these writ petitions to quash the impugned orders under the Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Revenue Officer, acting under Section 15 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, could lawfully conduct and rely upon a "confidential enquiry" and use materials obtained confidentially in deciding tenancy disputes.
- Whether the procedure adopted by the Revenue Officer and the nature of the evidence collected complied with the requirements of natural justice and the Evidence Act (including the right to cross-examine witnesses), given that the statute and Rules do not prescribe a detailed procedure for such inquiries.
- Whether the impugned orders of the Revenue Officer, the appellate authority and the revisional authority should be quashed for procedural vitiation (failure of natural justice and improper reception of evidence).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- The Revenue Officer was not competent to hold any confidential enquiry; the appropriate section of the Land Reforms Act does not contemplate such secret or confidential inquiries.
- At the local inspection the "usual method recognised in law" of examining witnesses was not followed; the petitioner had no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
- There was no proper recording of evidence as required by law; material relied upon by the Revenue Officer resulted from his secret enquiry of which the petitioner had no knowledge.
- Consequently, the enquiry was inadequate and procedurally defective.
Respondents' / Revenue Authorities' Position (as reflected in the orders and responses)
- The Revenue Officer stated he held a local inquiry (dated 25-12-1966), took evidence from people present at the spot and carried out a confidential enquiry; on that basis he concluded the tenants were in possession and cultivation.
- The appellate authority recorded that, on perusal of lower court records, the Revenue Officer conducted the inquiry "perfectly according to the provisions of law" and affirmed the finding of tenancy and the procedure followed.
- The revisional authority stated that the Revenue Officer had made a local inspection and examined some boundary witnesses and found the opposite party in actual cultivating possession.
- The contesting tenants (the applicants for tenancy) did not appear in this Court despite service of process, and did not contest the affidavits filed by the petitioner in these writs.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op. Bank Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1494 | Support for treating the Revenue Officer and the appellate and revisional authorities under the Act as "Courts in the strict sense" for the purposes of applying judicial-procedure principles. | The court relied on this authority to justify applying the provisions of the Evidence Act and courtroom standards (such as cross-examination) to the proceedings before the statutory officers under the Land Reforms Act. |
| Wiseman v. Porneman, 1971 AC 297 (HL) | Principle that where a statutory tribunal decides final questions affecting parties' rights and the statute is silent, courts will imply the application of principles of natural justice (right to be heard, fair procedure). | The court invoked this authority to support the implication of natural justice requirements into the Act's procedures when the statute and Rules are silent on detailed procedure, thereby disallowing secret enquiries that deny parties a fair opportunity to meet material used against them. |
| Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders, (1970) 2 All ER 713 | Principle that a failure of natural justice at the trial level cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice at an appellate stage; improperly received evidence vitiates the whole proceeding. | The court used this authority to hold that because evidence had not been properly received (confidential enquiry, no cross-examination), the entire proceeding was vitiated and the impugned orders could not stand. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, based strictly on the materials set out in the opinion:
- Procedural facts: The Revenue Officer recorded that he held a local inspection and, additionally, made a "confidential enquiry" and took some evidence from persons present at the spot. The appellate and revisional authorities affirmed the orders of the Revenue Officer (the appellate authority stating the inquiry was conducted "perfectly according to the provisions of law"; the revisional authority stating boundary witnesses were examined).
- Petitioner’s affidavit allegations: The petitioner swore that usual methods of examining witnesses were not followed, he had no opportunity to cross-examine, evidence was not recorded as contemplated by law, and that the Revenue Officer relied on the results of a secret inquiry of which the petitioner had no knowledge.
- Lack of contrary record: The Advocate-General did not controvert the allegations in the petitioner's further affidavit, and the contesting tenants did not appear to dispute the petitioner's account. The court found no material on the record supporting the revisional authority's claim that boundary witnesses had been examined.
- Characterisation of the forum and applicable law: Relying on precedent, the court treated the Revenue Officer and the appellate and revisional authorities under the Act as courts (or judicial tribunals) for these purposes; proceedings under the Act were judicial proceedings. Consequently, Section 1 of the Indian Evidence Act applies to such proceedings in the absence of a contrary legislative provision.
- Application of Evidence Act and natural justice: Because the Evidence Act applies, oral evidence collected must be subject to cross-examination. Further, even if the Revenue Officer were not a "court" in the strict sense, established authority (Wiseman) supports implying principles of natural justice into a statutory scheme that decides final rights when the statute is silent on procedure. The court emphasised that a statutory authority acting judicially must act fairly and give parties notice of material to be used so they can meet it.
- Finding of procedural defect: The court concluded that the Revenue Officer had collected materials confidentially and used them without disclosing them to the opposing parties; this conduct violated principles of natural justice. The nature of evidence as recorded (or not recorded) was also not in accordance with the Evidence Act. Given the absence of proper, examinable evidence and the secret nature of some inquiries, the court held the enquiry was vitiated.
- Effect of appellate and revisional proceedings: The court relied on Leary to hold that failure of natural justice at the trial/primary stage cannot be cured by subsequent appellate or revisional proceedings; if evidence was not properly received initially the whole proceeding is tainted. The appellate and revisional authorities either failed to deal adequately with the matter or made assertions (e.g., that boundary witnesses had been examined) unsupported by the record.
- Relief as a consequence: Because the foundational enquiry was flawed, the impugned orders could not be sustained and had to be quashed. The court ordered revival of the original applications to be disposed of afresh in accordance with law and gave specific directions about time for disposal and reporting compliance.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
THE WRIT APPLICATIONS ARE ALLOWED; the impugned orders of the Revenue Officer, the appellate authority and the revisional authority are quashed.
Direct consequences and directions stated by the court:
- Both applications originally filed before the Revenue Officer are revived and are to be deemed pending for disposal in accordance with law.
- Opposite party No. 2 (the Revenue Officer) in each case is commanded to dispose of those applications in accordance with law within three months from the date of receipt of the writ and to report compliance to the Deputy Registrar of the Court.
- The writ applications are allowed and, because the contesting opposite parties did not appear, each party is directed to bear their own costs.
Implications regarding precedent and legal principles:
The decision rests on application of established principles of natural justice and on the applicability of the Evidence Act to judicial proceedings under the Land Reforms Act (as supported by cited authorities). The opinion does not purport to set out a new legal principle beyond applying those precedents and statutory provisions to the facts; it resolves these particular applications by quashing the impugned orders and directing fresh disposal in accordance with law.
Judges: R.N. Misra, J. (author of the opinion); B.K. Ray, J. concurred. (Applications allowed.)
R.N Misra, J.:— Both these writ applications are petitions for certiorari Several orders passed by the Revenue Officer, the appellate authority and the revisional authority under the Orissa Land Reforms Act are impugned in these writ petitions. The petitioner in both the writ petitions is the same person but some of the opposite parties are different.;
2. Opposite party No. 3 In O.J.C 802/1970 and opposite parties 3 and 4 in O.J.C 803 of 1970 separately applied to the Revenue Officer (opposite party No. 2 In both the writ petitions) for determination of their respective tenancy interests in the lands in question under the petitioner and the other opposite parties — Padma Dibya and Baidei Dei. The petitioner and his relations opposed the claim by saying that the applications before the Revenue Officer were made mala fide by persons who had no connection with the lands in question. Their possession as tenants was seriously disputed. The Revenue Officer held a local enquiry on 25-12-1966. It is stated that he received some evidence from the people who were present at the spot and made some confidential enquiry. On the basis of such materials he found the claim of tenancy to be genuine in both the casts.
3. Appeals were carried against the aforesaid order in both the cases, and as the appeals proved unsuccessful, revisions were also carried to the Additional District Magistrate of Puri. He upheld the orders of the original authority as affirmed in appeal. These writ applications are, therefore, filed for quashing of the several orders by the authorities under the Orissa Land Reforms Act.
4. The contesting tenants have not appeared in this Court in spite of service of process. Mr. Jagadeb Ray for the petitioner claims that it was not competent for the Revenue Officer to hold any confidential enquiry. In fact the appropriate section under the Land Reforms Act does not conceive of any such confidential enquiry. As regards the evidence the Revenue Officer had stated:—
“I held the snot enquiry on 25-12-3966 and in course of my enquiry I came to the conclusion that the lands owned by Lokanath Panisrahl in mauza Sarua are not entirely being cultivated by his legal heirs but some portion of the lands has been given to others on bhag basis. On taking evidence from the doodle who were present at the spot and on my confidential enquiry I came to understand that the petitioner Sauri Muduli is in Personal cultivation of the land and in the suit year also. I believe, there is coma truth in it.”
5. In regard to this aspect of the matter, the appellate authority stated:—
“On a perusal of the records of Six lower Court it appears that the petitioner Sauri Muduli under the provisions of the O.L.R Act moved the Revere Officer for determination of the non-resumable lands in respect of his tenancy over the plot No. 878, area C.O 415 and pending disposal of that case the petitioner filed one application before the Ret venue Officer for protecting his tenancy etc. under Section 15(1)(b) of the O.L.R Act.
6. The Revenue Officer after receipt of the application started a case under Section 15(7) of the O.L.R Act, 1965, declared the petitioner as tenant over the suit land and disposed of the dispute.
………So far as the procedure of this enquiry is concerned, the Revenue Officer appears to have conducted the enquiry perfectly according to the provisions of law and I do not find anything wrong there.”
7. The order of revision shows the treatment of the aspect of the matter thus:
“………on 25-12-1967 the Revenue Officer had made a local inspection and also examined some boundary witnesses and has come to the finding that the opposite party Sauri Muduli was in actual cultivating possession of the suit land.”.
8. Apart from what had been stated in the writ petitions, an affidavit in each of the cases has been filed by the petitioner to say:—
“That during the inspection also the usual method recognised in law was not at all followed in examining any witness and the petitioner had no occasion to cross-examine anybody and it was a gathering and almost every body was shouting across each other.
That the petitioner humbly stated that there was no recording of evidence as contemplated in law and anything referred to by the learned Revenue Officer are to outcome of his secret inquiry about which the petitioner has no knowledge.”
9. These allegations in the further affidavit are not controverted before us by learned Advocate General appearing for the opposite parties 1 and 2. The other opposite parties do not appear at all.
10. We are satisfied that there is no material on record to support the conclusion of the revisional authority that boundary witnesses were examined. The Revenue Officer did not say so. On the allegations raised before us we are satisfied that there has been no adequate enquiry as contemplated in law. On the other hand some secret enquiry had been made by the Revenue Officer. He was admittedly acting as a judicial authority while disposing of application under Section 15 of the Act. He could not have collected materials confidentially and without disclosing the same to the opposite parties before him the Revenue Officer could not have utilised them for coming to his conclusion regarding the fate of the lis. The action of the Revenue Officer is clearly violative of the principles of natural justice.
11. Section 15(2) of the Art. provides that on receipt of an application of the type as in this case the Revenue Officer may dispose of the same after making such enquiry as he deems fit. Counsel for the petitioner contends, and learned Advocate-General agrees, that the Rules under the Act do not specify any procedure and in fact Rule 16 which is the only Ryle with reference to Section 15 of the Act merely deals with the manner of filing of the application.
12. Section 61 of the Act declares that orders passed under the statute, subject to any order passed in appeal or revision, as the case may be, are final and are not to be called into question in any Court of law. Section 67 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Undoubtedly civil rights of parties are dealt with under the Act and the jurisdiction of the common law Court is ousted.
13. The Revenue Officer and the appellate and revisional authorities under the Act are. Courts in the strict sense of the term (See Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op. Bank Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1494). The proceeding under the Act is a judicial proceeding in any view of the matter and therefore, in terms of Section 1 of the Evidence Act, the provisions of that Act apply to the proceedings before the statutory officers under the Act in the absence of legislative provision questing the application of the Evidence Act to the proceedings under the Land Reforms Act statutory authorities thereunder in dealing with judicial proceedings cannot overlook the provisions of the Evidence Act. If the Evidence Act is to be applied, all the oral, evidence collected has to be subjected to cross-examination.
14. Even if the Revenue Officer is not a ‘Court’ in the strict sense of the term, as Lord Guest pointed out in Wiseman v. Porneman, 1971 AC 297 (HL)—
“It is reasonably clear on the authorities that where a statutory tribunal has been set up to decide final questions affecting parties' rights and duties, if the statute is silent upon the question, the Courts will imply into the statutory provision a rule that the principles of natural justice should be applied. This implication will, be made upon the basis that Parliament is not to be presumed to take away parties' rights without giving them an opportunity of being heard in their interest……………”
15. Reasonable opportunity will certainly imply that the statutory authority would act fairly, put the parties to notice of all material that may be available to be used so that reasonable opportunity would be available to the parties to meet such evidence. In the aforesaid decision Lord Reid pointed, out:—
“……… Natural justice requires that the procedure before any tribunal which is acting judicially shall be fair in all the circumstances, and I would be sorry to see this fundamental general principle degenerate into a series of hard-and-fast rules. For a long time the Courts have, without objection from Parliament, supplemented procedure laid down in legislation where they have found that to be necessary for this purpose. But before this unusual kind of power is exercised it must be clear that the statutory procedure is insufficient to achieve justice and that to require additional steps would not frustrate the apparent purpose of the legislation.”
16. Learned Advocate General has not supported the procedure of the Revenue Officer. He is at one with Mr. Jagadeb Rav that confidential enquiries are not permitted-at all because that would be negation of fairplay and would be contrary to the well settled judicial procedure of this country.
17. It is difficult at this stage to assess on the basis of the record in what manner and to what extent the confidential enquiries led to the final result of the proceeding. Besides, the nature of evidence collected in this case also is not in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act as indicated above. The enquiry, therefore, was vitiated. As was pointed out in Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders, (1970) 2 All ER 713, a failure of natural justice in a trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate forum and where the evidence has not been properly received, the entire proceeding becomes vitiated because the foundation is not in accordance with law.
18. As we have already said, the appellate authority did not deal with the matter and in the order of revision it has been stated that evidence of boundary witnesses had been recorded. There is no material on record to show that any boundary witness was ever examined. On the other hand, the petitioner has disputed that there was any enquiry of the type referred to in the revisional order.
19. We are, in the circumstances, satisfied that the impugned orders cannot be sustained and have got to be quashed. Both the applications filed before the Revenue Officer shall revive and shall be deemed to be pending for disposal in accordance with law.
20. The opposite party No. 2 in each of the cases is commanded to dispose of those applications in accordance with law within three months from the date of receipt of the writ by him and report compliance to the Deputy Registrar of this Court.
21. The writ applications are allowed. In view of the fact that the contesting opposite parties have not entered appearance, we direct parties to bear their own costs.
22. B.K Ray, J.:— I agree.
23. Applications allowed.
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