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Raghunath Kar And Others v. Gajendra Kar And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from a reversal by the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack, in Title Appeal No. 191 of 1966. Plaintiffs (appellants) allege that certain suit properties (Schedule A) were joint ancestral properties of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 6 (Jagabandhu Kar), members of a Hindu Mitakshara joint family, of which plaintiff No. 1 was Karta. Plaintiffs assert that defendant No. 6, under undue influence of defendant No. 5 and defendant No. 1, executed two Kabalas (sale deeds) on 28-8-1962 transferring small portions of the land to defendants Nos. 1–5 without consideration; defendant No. 6 later executed cancellation deeds.
The plaintiffs sued for a declaration that they and defendant No. 6 held title to the suit lands and that defendants Nos. 1–5 had no right or interest under the Kabalas. At trial the Court found the properties were joint family properties on 28-8-1962 and that defendant No. 6 lacked authority to sell the undivided joint family property; the trial Court decreed the suit. The appellate Court, after considering evidence, concluded that by the date of sale defendant No. 6 had already severed his joint family status and had a one-fourth share which he lawfully alienated; it reversed the trial Court and held the purchasers (defendants Nos.1–5) acquired good title. The present appeal challenges the appellate Court's finding of severance and its consequences.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, as of the date of the sale deeds (28-8-1962), there was a severance of joint family status between defendant No. 6 and his brothers (the plaintiffs), such that defendant No. 6 could lawfully alienate his share of the family property.
- Whether the sale deeds (Kabalas) executed by defendant No. 6 in favour of defendants Nos. 1–5 were void for want of consideration, undue influence, or incapacity to alienate undivided joint family property.
- Whether the appellate Court erred in construing the pleadings and evidence — specifically, whether the defendants had pleaded a partition by metes and bounds or only an informal/separate arrangement — and thereby improperly decided a new case for defendants not pleaded.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments
- The appellants maintained that the suit lands were joint ancestral family properties and that there was no partition or ascertainment of shares at any time, so defendant No. 6 could not lawfully alienate any part of the undivided property.
- They alleged that the Kabalas were effected by undue influence, collusion and without consideration, and that defendant No. 6 later admitted the Kabalas were executed under undue influence.
- Counsel for the appellants (Mr. Das) contended that the Court below acted illegally by finding severance of joint family status when, according to a specific case pleaded by defendants in their written statement, any alleged partition had been by metes and bounds; he argued the court thereby decided on a case not pleaded and that there was no evidence to support severance.
- Mr. Das argued that law presumes continuance of joint family status among Hindu brothers and that there was no evidence of an unequivocal declaration or communication by defendant No. 6 of an intention to separate.
Respondents' (Defendants') Case and Arguments
- Defendants contended that, long before the sales, defendant No. 6 had separated from his brothers in mess and property (allegedly in April 1959) because of illness and associated dissensions; he lived at Arjunpur with his wife and separately cultivated and enjoyed his share of lands.
- They asserted defendant No. 6 required money for treatment, incurred loans (including advances from defendant No. 5 from her stridhan), and subsequently sold the land for consideration by registered sale deeds dated 28-8-1962; purchasers took possession accordingly.
- Defendants denied undue influence and maintained the sales were for consideration and that cancellations executed later were not genuine or legally effective to defeat their title.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Indranarayan's case ((1971) 2 SCC 438 : AIR 1971 SC 1962) | The case is cited for the principle that severance of joint family status requires evidence of an unequivocal declaration to separate and communication of that intention; absence of such evidence will not support a finding of severance. | The Court distinguished Indranarayan's case on its facts: in Indranarayan there was no evidence of any unequivocal declaration or communication, whereas in the present case the Court found evidence (witness testimony and admissions) showing that defendant No. 6 had expressed and acted upon a firm intention to separate and had been living separately and enjoying his share. The precedent was held to be fact-specific and not supportive of the appellants' contention here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a fact-focused review of the appellate Court's findings. It examined the pleadings (notably paragraph 16 of the written statement by defendants Nos. 1–4) and the evidence adduced at trial and on appeal. Key points in the Court's reasoning include:
- Pleadings analysis: The Court observed that the defendants' written statements did not specifically plead a partition by metes and bounds. Paragraph 16 described separation in April 1959 and that defendant No. 6 thereafter "got his share of the lands cultivated separately according to convenience" and enjoyed their usufructs, but the pleading did not explicitly assert a formal metes-and-bounds partition. Consequently, the appellate Court did not decide a different case than that pleaded.
- Evaluation of evidence: The Court accepted the appellate Court's assessment of the oral evidence: it relied on testimony of D.Ws 2 and 4 (who spoke of the separation and division), corroborative testimony from D.Ws 3 and 5 about cultivation by defendant No. 6's tenants, and admissions by defendant No. 6 (examined as P.W.5) that he suffered ailments, needed money for treatment, lived separately at Arjunpur in his wife's maternal uncle's house, and had lands cultivated separately.
- Credibility and weight: The Court found D.Ws 2 and 4 to be respectable, impartial local witnesses whose testimony was consistent and remained unshaken on material points. The Court noted that plaintiffs themselves admitted defendant No. 6's illness and the resulting inability to work.
- Legal principle on severance: While acknowledging the general presumption of continuity of joint family status (stronger among brothers), the Court concluded that the evidence established both an intention by defendant No. 6 to separate and acts consistent with that intention (living apart; separate enjoyment of usufructs; tenants cultivating his lands). Thus the factual threshold for severance was met despite absence of formal metes-and-bounds partition.
- Distinguishing precedent: The Court considered Indranarayan's case — where lack of any unequivocal declaration or communication prevented a finding of severance — but held it distinguishable on facts because, unlike Indranarayan, this record contained evidence of both declaration and conduct amounting to separation.
- Consequence for alienation: Given the finding that defendant No. 6 had a separate one-fourth interest by reason of separation, he was competent to alienate his share; therefore the sale deeds Exts. A and A/1 effected transfers of his interest to defendants Nos. 1–5 and conveyed title to them.
- Pleadings/fact framing objection: The Court rejected the appellants' contention that the appellate Court acted illegally by deciding a case not pleaded, holding that the written statement did not aver a formal partition by metes and bounds and that the appellate Court's finding was rooted in the pleaded case and admissible evidence.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: The appeal is dismissed. The Court affirmed the appellate Court's conclusion that by the date of the sale deeds defendant No. 6 had severed his joint family status and therefore could alienate his one-fourth share; as a result defendants Nos. 1–5 acquired valid title under the sale deeds (Exts. A and A/1).
Direct consequences: The trial Court's decree in favour of the plaintiffs was reversed by the appellate Court, and that reversal stands. The purchasers (defendants Nos. 1–5) are held to have good title to the portions purchased. The Court ordered that in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs of the appeal.
Broader implications: The opinion did not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it applied existing principles concerning severance of joint family status and the evidentiary threshold for establishing separation, and distinguished prior authority (Indranarayan) on its facts.
Disposition: Appeal dismissed; no order as to costs.
1. The plaintiffs have preferred this appeal against the reversing decision of the First Addl. Subordinate Judge Cuttack in Title Appeal No. 191 of 1966.
2. According to the plaintiffs, plaintiff Nos. 1 to 3 and pro forma defendant No. 6 are brothers and are members of a Hindu Mitakshara joint family of which plaintiff No. 1 is the Karta. Plaintiff No. 3, one of the sons of plain? tiff No. 1, has been adopted to one Padmanav. Defendant No. 5 is the wife of defendant No. 6, but she has left defendant No. 6 and has remarried one Benudhar Acharya of Arjunpur and is living with him in his house. Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 are members of a Hindu Mitakshara joint family of which defendant No. 1 is the Karta. Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 are the first cousins of the plaintiffs. The suit properties described in schedule A of the plaint are the joint ancestral properties of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 6 and there has been no partition of the properties or ascertainment of their shares in the same at any time. According to the plaintiffs, at the instance of and in collusion with defendant No. 1, defendant No. 5 exercised undue influence on defendant No. 6, who executed a Kabala in favour of defendant No. 5 on 28-8-1962 in respect of Ac. 0.29, 14/16 decimals of land and another Kabala on the same day in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 4 in respect of Ac. 0.19 decimals of land. All these transactions were without any legal necessity, without any consideration and were not acted upon. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 came to know of the execution of the aforesaid Kabalas only after defendant No. 5 left the family and went to live at her father's place. On enquiry defendant No. 6 admitted before plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 that these Kabalas were taken from him on the undue influence of defendant No. 5 and defendant No. 1. Soon thereafter defendant No. 6 executed deeds of cancellation nullifying the effects of the two Kabalas. On the above averments the plaintiffs have instituted this suit for a declaration that the plaintiffs and defendant No. 6 have title to the suit lands and that defendants Nos. 1 to 5 have not acquired any right, title or interest over the said property on the strength of the aforesaid Kabalas executed in their favour. They further aver that the said sale deeds are not binding on the plaintiffs. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and 5 filed separate written statements, but the case averred by them is substantially the same. According to them plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 3 and pro forma defendant No. 6 are no longer members of a joint Hindu family, nor plaintiff No. 1 is the Karta of the said family. According to them the plaintiffs and defendant No. 6 long time back were members of a joint family, and as defendant No. 6 became diseased and could not earn his livelihood, he needed large amount of money for his treatment, whereupon dissensions arose between him and the plaintiffs. Ultimately defendant No. 6 separated from his brothers both in mess and property in April 1959. Defendant No. 6 then left the family house and shifted to Arjunpur where he his wife Khetramani (defendant No. 5) and their children lived in the house of the maternal uncle of defendant No. 5. Defendant No. 5 has not married for the second time. Defendant No. 6, after separation, got his share of lands cultivated separately through his own men and was in enjoyment of the usufructs thereof. Defendant No. 6 was ailing all through and later suffered from dropsy, and on account of his treatment he had to incur loans from several persons including defendant Nos. 5 who advanced money to him from out of her Stridhan funds. Defendant No. 6 had to remain in the hospital for quite some time for treatment and after he was discharged from the hospital he proposed to sell the suit land. Accordingly defendant No. 5 and defendants Nos. 1 to 4 purchased the suit property by registered sale deed on 28-8-1962 for consideration, and the vendees took possession of the property in accordance with the sale deed. According to the defendants, the deeds of cancellation executed by defendant No. 6 are not genuine and the same do not have the legal effect of defeating the title of the defendants.
3. The trial Court found that by 28-8-1962 the suit properties were joint family properties, the sale deeds executed by defendant No. 6 in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and defendant No. 5 were without consideration, defendant No. 6 had no right to sell the undivided joint family property and he did not convey any title by the aforesaid sale deeds. Mostly on the aforesaid findings the trial Court decreed the suit.
4. The appellate Court on an elaborate consideration of the evidence on record finds that by the time of the execution of the sale deeds Exts. A and A/1 there was no joint family status between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 6 although the properties had not been partitioned between them by metes and bounds. It finds that admittedly Jagabandhu Kar, defendant No. 6, had one-fourth share in the joint family property, and therefore he could alienate his interest in the same to the extent of his share, as by the time of the alienation he had separated from the joint family. On this finding it reversed the finding of the trial Court that the properties were joint by the time of the aforesaid sale. It also finds that there is absolutely no question of any misrepresentation or undue influence played on defendant No. 6 for the execution of the aforesaid sale deeds. While confirming the finding of the trial Court that there was legal necessity for the aforesaid alienations made by defendant No. 6, it also finds that defendant No. 6 executed the sale deeds with full understanding. In conclusion it finds that there was no joint family status between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 6 on the date of the above mentioned sales in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 5 and therefore defendant No. 6 was within his rights to alienate the properties and accordingly defendants Nos. 1 to 5 have acquired good title on the strength of the sale deeds Exts. A and A/1.
5. Mr. Das the learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the Court below acted illegally in arriving at and acting on the incorrect finding and conclusion that there was severance of joint family status between defendant No. 6 and his brothers, the plaintiffs, by the date of the execution of the sale deeds, in view of the specific case in the written statement that there was division of the joint family property by metes and bounds between them. According to Mr. Das in view of the above-mentioned specific averment in the written statement, the Court below acted illegally in making out a new case for the defendants and deciding the case on that basis. He also urged that the aforesaid conclusion about severance of the joint family status was, based on no evidence on record.
6. In the Court below this particular question was agitated by the appellants herein, who were respondents in the Court below. The Court below, on a consideration of the averments in the pleadings and the evidence on record, finds that it is not the case of the defendants that there was a partition between the brothers by metes and bounds. The division, of property alleged by them and the assertion of possession over such property is only by amicable arrangements for the sake of convenience. In paragraph 16 of the written statement filed by defendants Nos. 1 to 4 it is stated that the statements made in that paragraph are the true facts of the case. Therein it is stated that on account of constant illness of defendant No. 6 his inability to earn, and requirement of heavy amounts for his treatment, dissensions arose in the family between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 6 due to which ‘defendant No. 6 separated from his brothers both in mess, movables and property in April, 1959’. After separation and division of property defendant No. 6 left the family house and resided in the house of his wife's maternal uncle in village Arjunpur. Defendant No. 6 after the aforesaid separation got his share of the lands cultivated separately according to convenience, and was in enjoyment of the usufructs thereof. In this paragraph there is nothing specific to the effect that there was a partition of the joint family property between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 6 by metes and bounds. Mr. Das in support of his above submission also drew my attention to para. 7 of the said written statement. The relevant sentence, to which reference was made, is not very clear and explicit, and therefrom it cannot be definitely said that a case of partition by metes and bounds, as urged by Mr. Das is averred by these defendants. In paragraphs 1 to 15 in this written statement, the averments, allegations and the case made out in the plaint have been denied and/or challenged, and in paragraph 16 only the case put forward by these defendants has been stated. Mr. Das has not been able to show anything definite and convincing from the averments in the written statement or from the evidence adduced by the defendants from which it can be said that a case of partition by metes and bounds was pleaded by these defendants. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the defendants 1 to 5 specifically made out a case that there was a partition of the joint family property between defendant No. 6 and the plaintiffs by metes and bounds. I do not therefore find any merit in the above-mentioned contention of Mr. Das.
7. On a perusal of the impugned Judgment I am satisfied that the finding of the Court below, that in fact there was severance of the joint family status between the above-mentioned persons, is based on cogent and convincing appreciation and discussion of the evidence on record. The Court below, in arriving at the aforesaid finding, has taken into consideration the evidence of D.Ws 2, 3 and 4, and certain statements made by P.W 4 in this connection. It has also taken into consideration the evidence of defendant No. 6, who has been examined as P.W 5 for the plaintiffs. Considering the above-mentioned evidence in the perspective of other oral and documentary evidence on record it has arrived at the finding that there was severance of the joint family status between defendant No. 6 and the plaintiffs, and at the time when the sales were effected the joint family status was not in existence between them although the joint family properties had not been partitioned by metes and bounds. Thus the Court's finding to this effect is perfectly correct.
8. Mr. Das also urged that the Court below acted illegally in arriving at the said finding as it did not appreciate the question in the correct legal perspective. He contends that the said finding is illegal inasmuch as there is no evidence on record that defendant No. 6 had expressed his unequivocal and peremptory intention to separate from the joint family. According to Mr. Das law presumes continuance of Joint family status amongst members of a Hindu family and that presumption is stronger still in the case of brothers. He further contends that there is nothing on record to show that defendant No. 6 had at any time either actually separated himself or made any such declaration communicating his intention in the desired manner to separate himself from the family. I do not find any weight in the above-mentioned contention. The Court below has believed the defendant's assertion that defendant No. 6 was constantly suffering from different diseases and was in need of money for his treatment. On that account there was dissension in the family, as a result of which defendant No. 6 remained separate from his brothers and actually went away to village Arjunpur and lived there in the house of the maternal uncle of his wife. The Court also finds that defendant No. 6 was separately possessing some lands out of the joint family property and was separately enjoying the usufructs thereof. In arriving at the above findings the Court has placed reliance on the evidence of D.Ws 2 and 4 who as I find have spoken about the division of the property between defendant No. 6 and the plaintiffs. D.W 2 has stated that the parties separated as defendant No. 6 was not being properly treated by his other brothers. D.W 4 corroborates D.W 2 to the above effect. The Court finds that D.Ws 2 and 4 are respectable persons of the locality and are in no way ill-disposed towards the plaintiffs or any way interested with any of the defendants. Moreover, defendant No. 6, examined as P.W 5 in this case, has himself admitted that he was suffering from various ailments, and diseases and was often in need of money for his treatment. He also states that he remained in village Arjunpur with his wife in the house of the maternal uncle of his wife and from that place he went, to the hospital as his disease became acute. D.Ws 2 and 4 in a very consistent and convincing manner testified to the effect that there was separation between defendant No. 6 and his brothers. D.Ws 3 and 5 state that at different times they were cultivating the lands of defendant No. 6, and their evidence to this effect has not at all been challenged in cross-examination. The plaintiffs have also admitted that defendant No. 6 was suffering from dropsy and consequently he was unable to work and earn money and that large amount of money was needed for his treatment. From the above and other facts and circumstances borne out by the evidence on record, most of which have been discussed and considered by the Court below in the impugned judgment, it is evident that defendant No. 6, prior to the execution of the sale deeds, expressed his firm intention to separate himself from his brothers, and actually remained separate from his brothers by taking out a portion of the moveable and immoveable joint family properties for himself. He went out of the family and separately got his portion of the lands cultivated by tenants and enjoyed the usufructs thereof. These facts clearly establish that there was an unequivocal declaration on the part of defendant No. 6 to remain separate from his brothers and he did remain separate from them both in mess and property. Thus there was severance of the joint family status between defendant No. 6 and his brothers, the plaintiffs.
9. Mr. Das in support of his above contention cited the decision in Indranarayan's case, ((1971) 2 SCC 438 : AIR 1971 SC 1962). Their Lordships on a consideration of the evidence on record find that there was not an iota of evidence in that case to show that the plaintiff had at any time made any unequivocal declaration that he had separated himself from his family, much less there was any evidence that the plaintiff communicated his intention to separate himself from the family either to the Karta or to any of the members of the family.
10. On the aforesaid finding and on the peculiar facts of that case their Lordships held that there was no severance of the joint family status in that case. The decision in that case, having been arrived at mostly on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, does not help and/or support the contention of Mr. Das which is purely based on the facts of this case.
11. On the above considerations I am satisfied that the above-mentioned finding of the Court below is both legally and factually correct and justified. Mr. Das concedes that if the aforesaid status is upheld he cannot question the conclusion arrived at in this case on any other ground.
12. There is therefore no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs of this appeal.
13. Appeal dismissed.
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