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Balmakunda Singh Rai And Others v. Chitrabhanu Singh Rai And Others Opposite Parties.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (A. Misra, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs (petitioners in revision) filed a suit seeking (a) division of properties described in Schedule A into two equal shares, after a declaration that plaintiffs are entitled to half the suit properties and allotment of that share; and (b) that any portion of the suit properties transferred by defendants without legal necessity be taken into account in the plaintiffs' share. The plaint contains a genealogy showing that plaintiffs and defendants represent different branches of a joint family descended from a common ancestor (Sadananda Singh Ray).
The suit properties originally comprised zamindari and thikadari interests which were asserted to be impartible and hence devolved on one heir, though the plaint alleges the ancestral and joint character of the property was never lost. In an earlier suit by plaintiff No. 1 his partition claim was negatived on the ground of impartibility, but he received maintenance out of the estate. After statutory abolition of zamindari (1952) and thikadari (1954) the impartible character ended and plaintiffs claimed entitlement to partition and allotment of bhogra lands converted into raiyati.
For court-fee and jurisdiction the suit was valued by plaintiffs at Rs. 46,000 and a fixed court-fee of Rs. 150 was paid. Defendants objected to the valuation and court-fee; the Subordinate Judge assessed the entire property at Rs. 3,00,500 and the plaintiffs' claimed share at Rs. 1,50,250, and directed payment of ad valorem court-fee on that amount. The present revision challenges that direction and raises the question which provision of the Court-fees Act governs the suit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Which provision of the Court-fees Act governs the plaintiffs' suit for the purpose of court-fees and jurisdiction — specifically, whether the suit is governed by the amended Section 7(vi)(a) (requiring ad valorem court-fee based on market value of the claimed share) or by Article 17-A of Schedule II (fixed court-fee) of the Court-fees Act as amended in Orissa?
- Whether the plaintiffs' plaint contains an allegation of exclusion from possession (a requirement to attract Section 7(vi)(a)), or whether the plaintiffs allege joint/constructive possession making the subject-matter incapable of being estimated in money value and thus falling under Article 17-A.
- Whether the presence of a prayer for a declaration in the plaint converts the suit into a declaratory suit (potentially attracting different fee provisions such as Section 7(iv)(c)), or whether the declaration is merely incidental to a partition claim.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' (Plaintiffs') Arguments
- The court below erred in directing ad valorem court-fee under Section 7(vi)(a) of the Court-fees Act (as amended in Orissa); the suit is governed by Article 17-A of Schedule II (as amended in Orissa) and only a fixed court-fee is payable.
- To attract Section 7(vi)(a) the plaintiff must allege exclusion from possession; the plaint in this suit does not allege exclusion — instead it alleges that while the property had an impartible character the defendant held it as representing the entire family and that plaintiffs were in joint possession as members of the joint family.
- Even though the prayer includes a declaration, the declaration is ancillary to the partition claim and not a separate declaratory suit; hence the suit should not be treated as a title/possession recovery action attracting ad valorem fees.
Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments
- Mr. Pal (for defendants) accepted that the amended Section 7(vi)(a) applies only where exclusion from possession is alleged, but contended that in fact the properties do not constitute joint family property and plaintiffs were never in possession either actually or constructively.
- He argued that the true substance of the plaint is a claim for declaration of the properties being joint family properties and recovery of possession of a share; if so, the suit would be governed by Section 7(iv)(c) rather than the residuary Article 17-A.
- He relied on plaint language (para 10 and the prayer) to contend that a declaratory relief is sought which might change the classification for court-fees.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1938 Pat 22 (Ramkhelawan Sahu v. Bir Surendra Sahi) | Distinction between a remedy sought (e.g., possession) and a declaration which may be merely a finding of fact necessary to grant that remedy; a declaratory claim unnecessary where it is incidental to the substantive relief. | The court relied on this authority to hold that the declaration in the present plaint is not a declaration properly so-called but only a factual finding necessary to justify partition and allotment; therefore the plaint is not to be treated as a declaratory suit attracting different fee classification. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a structured manner, focusing on the allegations in the plaint and the legal effect of the Orissa amendment to the Court-fees Act:
- The court noted that the Orissa amendment introduced a specific provision (Section 7(vi)(a)) governing suits for partition and separate possession of a share of joint family or joint property, and that under the amended clause such suits are to be valued by the market value of the share claimed and attract ad valorem court-fee.
- The court agreed with petitioners' counsel that to attract Section 7(vi)(a) the plaintiff must allege that he has been excluded from possession of the property of which he claims to be a coparcener or co-owner. The court examined the plaint and found no allegation of exclusion from possession; instead, the plaint alleges that plaintiffs were in joint possession (constructive or actual) with the family while the property retained an impartible character in law.
- The court addressed the respondents' contention that the properties are not joint family properties and plaintiffs were never in possession; it held that such a defence might defeat the plaintiffs' claim at trial but does not permit recharacterising the plaint as one alleging exclusion when it does not. The proper classification depends on the allegations in the plaint and the nature of the suit as framed by plaintiffs, irrespective of the defence that may be raised.
- Finding that Section 7(vi)(a) did not apply, the court turned to the appropriate alternative provision. It identified Article 17-A of Schedule II (residuary article) as applicable to cases "where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute and which is not otherwise provided for by the Act." The court observed that in partition suits where plaintiffs allege joint possession, the subject-matter cannot be estimated in money value because the relief sought is essentially a change in the mode of enjoyment rather than recovery of possession.
- The court considered the respondents' further argument that the suit's substance was for declaration and recovery of possession such that Section 7(iv)(c) would apply. It examined Paragraph 10 and the prayers of the plaint and concluded that there is no prayer to set aside alienations and that the declaration, if present in the prayer, is incidental — a finding of fact necessary to grant partition rather than a standalone declaratory remedy.
- To support this analysis, the court relied on the Patna decision (AIR 1938 Pat 22) to draw the distinction between a primary remedy and a mere factual declaration. Applying the test from that case, the court noted that if partition and allotment are granted, plaintiffs could not justifiably complain on appeal that they were denied the declaration; hence the declaration is not a substantive independent relief.
- Accordingly, the court concluded that the suit is governed by Schedule II, Article 17-A (fixed court-fee) and that the court-fee already paid (fixed fee of Rs. 150) was proper. It also observed that the differing valuations (plaintiffs' Rs. 46,000 vs. court's Rs. 3,00,500) are immaterial because the fixed court-fee under Article 17-A is the same regardless of the assessed monetary value; jurisdiction remains with the same court in either assessment.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision is allowed; the order of the court below directing ad valorem court-fee is set aside, and the court holds that the suit has been properly valued and that the proper (fixed) court-fee has been paid.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The plaintiffs are not required to pay ad valorem court-fee based on the market value of the share assessed by the Subordinate Judge (Rs. 1,50,250); the suit falls under Schedule II, Article 17-A (fixed court-fee) as amended in Orissa.
- The order directing payment of ad valorem court-fee is set aside; the plaintiffs' previously-paid fixed fee is held to be proper.
- The revision was allowed without costs (the court expressly allowed revision "in the circumstances without costs").
Broader implications: The opinion explains the method of classifying partition suits for court-fee purposes — stressing that classification depends on the allegations in the plaint (not on the defendant's proposed defence) and that partition suits where joint possession is alleged generally fall under Article 17-A as not amenable to valuation in money. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts before it.
Disposition in the court below: The impugned order of the Subordinate Judge directing ad valorem fee is set aside; revision allowed. (B.K. Patra, J. agreed.)
A. Misra, J.:— Plaintiffs are the petitioners. The only point for consideration in this revision relates to the appropriate provision of the Court-fees Act which will govern the plaintiffs suit for purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction.
2. The suit was filed with the following prayers; (a) Properties described in Sch. A at the foot of the plaint be divided into two equal shares after declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to half share out of the suit properties and the same be allotted to the plaintiffs; and (b) portion of the suit properties, if any, transferred by defendants without legal necessity be allotted to their share. A genealogy of the family is given in the plaint showing that plaintiffs represent one branch and defendants another branch of the joint family descended from the common ancestor Sadananda Singh Ray. The suit properties, it is alleged appertained to the zamindari and thikadari interest belonging to the joint family, but the said interest being impartible in character, it devolved only on one heir, though the ancestral and joint character of the property was never lost.
3. In a previous suit filed by plaintiff No. 1, though his claim for partition was negatived on the ground that the zamindari was impartible, maintenance at the rate of Rs. 125/- a month out of the estate was decreed in his favour as a member of the joint family. After abolition of the zamindari in 1952 and thikadari Interest in 1954, the character of impartiality came to an end, and as such, plaintiffs became entitled to partition and allotment of their share of bhogra lands which were converted into raiyati. The suit is valued at Rs. 46,000/- for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction, but a fixed court-fee of Rs. 150/- has been paid. On objections raised by defendants regarding the correctness of the valuation given and the court-fee paid, the learned Subordinate Judge assessed the value of the entire properties at Rs. 3,00,500/- and the share claimed by plaintiffs at Rs. 1,50,250/-. Accordingly he directed the plaintiffs to pay ad valorem court-fee on the said amount.
4. Learned counsel for petitioners contends that the court below has erred in directing the plaintiffs to pay ad valorem court-fee on the market value of the share claimed holding that the suit is governed by Section 7(vi)(a) of the Court-fees Act as amended in Orissa, According to him, a suit of the present nature will be governed by Article 17-A of Sch. II of the Court-fees Act as amended in Orissa and only a fixed court-fee is payable.
5. Section 7(iv)(b) of the parent Act governed suits to enforce a right to share any property on the ground that it is joint family property. Under the Orissa amendment of the Court-fees Act, a specific provision has been made for partition suits in Section 7(vi)(a). The result of the amendment is that in Orissa, a suit for partition and separate possession of a share of joint family property or of joint property or to enforce such rights when plaintiff alleges that he has been excluded from possession of the property falls to be governed by the amended clause.
6. Such a suit has to be valued according to the market value of the share in respect of which the suit is instituted and ad valorem court-fee has to be paid on such valuation. It is contended by learned counsel for petitioners and we agree with him that to attract the application of the amended provision Section 7(vi)(a), plaintiff must allege to have been excluded from possession of the property of which he claims to be a coparcener or co-owner. Nowhere in the plaint, there is any allegation of plaintiffs having been excluded from possession of the suit properties. On the other hand, their specific case is that so long the property carried with it its imparticle character, defendant No. 1 held it as representing the entire family. In other words, plaintiffs allege that in the eye of law, they were in joint possession of the properties as members of the joint family.
7. Mr. Pal, learned counsel appearing for opposite parties, while not disputing that the amended provision Section 7(vi)(a) will be attracted only where there is an allegation of exclusion from possession, contends that in fact the properties do not constitute joint family properties and plaintiffs were never in possession either actually or constructively. It is not disputed that determination of the question as to which provision of the Court-fees Act will govern a particular case will depend on the allegations contained in the plaint and the nature of suit as framed by the plaintiffs irrespective of the defence that may be put forth. If as contended by Mr. Pal, the properties are not joint family properties, such a defence will be available to him and the suit may fail if the properties are not found to be joint family properties. This, however, will not justify construing the plaint as one where plaintiffs allege to have been excluded from possession. Therefore, the court below has erred in holding that the suit as framed is one governed by the amended Section 7(vi)(a) of the Court-fees Act.
8. If the suit is not governed by the amended Section 7(vi)(a), the next point for consideration is the appropriate provision which will govern it. No specific provision has been made in regard to suits for partition where plaintiffs claim to be in actual or constructive possession of the properties. Learned counsel for petitioners contends that such suits will be governed by the residuary Article 17-A of the second Schedule which deals with cases where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute and which is not otherwise provided for by the Act. It is well settled that in partition suits where plaintiff alleges to be in joint possession, it is not possible to estimate the subject-matter at a money value, because in such cases, what is sought is in substance, a change in the mode of enjoyment and not recovery of possession of the property which plaintiff claims to be already in possession with his co-sharers. This view is not seriously disputed by Mr. Pal, but he contends that taking the substance of the plaintiff's claim in the present suit. It is really one for declaration of the properties being joint family properties and recovery of possession of a share. In such a case, it is argued that even if on the allegations the suit is held not to be governed by Section 7(vi)(a) as amended, it will be governed by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act.
9. In this connection, he refers to para 10 of the plaint and the prayer of plaintiffs which includes a declaration that plaintiffs are entitled to half a share. Para 10 of the plaint does not lend support to the contention advanced, inasmuch as, it is stated therein that certain alienation made by defendants without legal necessity are liable to be taken into account in their half share of the suit properties. Thus, there is no prayer or relief claimed to set aside any of the alienations. So far as prayer (a) is concerned, it is couched in language which may appear as if plaintiffs want a declaration of their right to half share and partition and allotment of the same as a consequential relief. It is argued for petitioners that merely because the prayer makes reference to such a declaration, it cannot be construed as a suit for declaration of a title with consequential relief. Even if in the prayer portion there is a claim for declaration, the plaint should be examined to see whether it is a declaration properly so-called and whether such a declaration is necessary to entitle the plaintiffs to get the relief.
10. Reliance is placed in support of this contention on a decision reported in AIR 1938 Pat 22 (FB), (Ramkhelawan Sahu v. Bir Surendra Sahi). That was a suit for recovery of possession, though a claim for declaration of right to the property was also made in the plaint. It was held that the claim for declaration was unnecessary and amounted to nothing more than a finding of fact on the basis of which the relief claimed by the plaintiff can be granted. In the present case, a consideration of the entire plaint shows that the specific case of plaintiffs is that the properties are joint family properties and they are in joint possession of the same. On the basis of these allegations, they claim partition and allotment of half a share. This being the frame of the suit, the inclusion of a claim for a declaration in the prayer cannot amount to a declaration properly so-called, but refers only to a finding of fact on the basis of which plaintiffs claim division and allotment of half a share to them. In the aforementioned Patna case, it was observed:
“The distinction between the remedy sought and the finding of fact necessary to justify the granting of that remedy may be simply tested by considering whether the plaintiff obtaining an order for possession but having been refused a formal declaration in the decree could come to the appellate court with a complaint that he had not received the whole remedy for which he had asked.”
11. Applying this test, if partition and allotment of their share are allowed to the plaintiffs, they cannot go to the appellate court complaining that they have not received the whole of the remedy which they had asked by not being given the declaration claimed.
12. Thus, as the suit is foamed, it cannot be construed as one for declaration with consequential relief. Necessarily, the only other provision of the Court-fees Act which will govern the present suit is Sch. II, Article 17-A where-under fixed court-fee is payable. It is immaterial in this case whether the jurisdictional value of the property is Rs. 46,000/- as alleged in the plaint or Rs. 3,00,500/- as assessed by the court below, because the court-fee is the same. In either case, the same court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
13. In the result, we allow the revision, but in the circumstances without costs, set aside the order of the court below and hold that the suit has been properly valued and proper court-fee paid.
14. B.K Patra, J.:— I agree.
15. Revision allowed.
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