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Mawaji Ramji And Others v. Premji Kumbhabhai Chanda .

Orissa High Court
Oct 5, 1966
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued for recovery of Rs. 6,800 with pendente lite and future interest on the basis of a promissory note (Ex. 1) dated 9-8-1957 for Rs. 5,000, alleged to have been executed by the deceased Ramji Haridas. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were his sons, Defendant No. 3 his widow and Defendant No. 4 his grandson. The plaint alleged that the defendants, as heirs and successors of the deceased, were in possession of properties left by him and had not paid the dues despite repeated demands.

The plaint stated the cause of action arose when a loan was advanced (originally alleged 9-8-1954 in the plaint) and when Ex. 1 was renewed on 9-8-1957. At trial the plaintiff claimed Ex. 1 was executed in his presence at Jatni and that the deceased put the dates thereon.

The written statement contained general averments and raised pleas of limitation and non-joinder of parties, but without specific factual particulars. The execution of the promissory note by the deceased was not denied in terms.

The learned Trial Court made specific findings (set out in the opinion) including that the original loan dated to 9-7-1951, that a handnote of 1954 existed but was time-barred by the time Ex. 1 was executed/renewed on 9-8-1957, that the plaintiff's story of execution at Jatni in the presence of witnesses was not acceptable, but that Ex. 1 had in fact been executed by the deceased and dated 9-8-1957; and that the suit (filed on 9-8-1960) was not barred by limitation. The Trial Court therefore decreed the plaintiff's suit.

The defendants (appellants) appealed. The present opinion is delivered by Misra, J., with Das, J. concurring.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ex. 1 (the promissory note dated 9-8-1957) was executed and dated on 9-8-1957 so as to render the suit, filed on 9-8-1960, not barred by limitation.
  2. Whether the renewal/execution of the promissory note after the limitation period of the earlier note (1954) is valid and enforceable in view of Section 25(3) of the Contract Act.
  3. Whether the omission of the deceased's daughters (co-heirs) as parties is fatal to the suit — i.e., whether non-joinder of those co-heirs requires dismissal because the liability of heirs is joint and indivisible.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent (Plaintiff) — principal assertions recorded in the opinion

  • Plaintiff asserted that Ex. 1 was executed by the deceased in the plaintiff's presence at Jatni and that the deceased himself put the dates “9-8-1957” on the document.
  • Plaintiff relied on Ex. 1 (the promissory note) as the basis for recovery and sought pendente lite and future interest.

Appellants (Defendants) — arguments recorded in the opinion

  • General pleas in the written statement that the suit was barred by limitation and defective for non-joinder of parties, though specifics were not pleaded in detail.
  • Counsel (Mr. Mohanty) contended that the legal presumption under Section 118(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act (that an instrument bearing a date was made on such date) means the dates on Ex. 1 should be presumed to have been put on the date shown unless the defendants prove otherwise, and argued the defendants had not proved otherwise.
  • Counsel (Mr. Misra) urged documentary evidence (Ex. 2.a and 2.b, letters from the deceased) that might show the handnote had been executed earlier or sent later, and further contended non-joinder of the daughters made the suit liable to be dismissed because heirs' liability was joint and indivisible.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1925 Cal 1050 (Full Bench) — Kailash Chandra v. Brojendra Holds that tenants-in-common are each liable for obligations to a creditor (privity of estate) and Section 43 of the Contract Act applies to such situations; a tenant-in-common may be sued for the entire rent due. The court accepted this Full Bench decision as laying down the correct law and applied the same principle to heirs who succeed to the liabilities of a deceased promisor — i.e., heirs become joint promisors and Section 43 applies.
AIR 1955 Raj 11 — Chandra Bhan v. Misrimal Applied the same principle as to heirs succeeding to the liability of a deceased promisor; found no sound reason to exclude heirs from Section 43's application. Used as supporting authority: the opinion noted the facts were similar and cited the judgment as further support for treating heirs as jointly liable and for permitting suit against some heirs though others were not joined, subject to contribution rights.
AIR 1957 Andh Pra 688 — V. Soorayva v. Kateeza Begum Discussed in the opinion; the court observed that the decision did not resolve the precise point and contained indication of difference of opinion in the Calcutta High Court. The court held that this decision could not be accepted as an authoritative precedent on the point (non-decisive) and therefore did not rely on it as binding authority.
AIR 1917 Cal 829 Referred to in prior decisions; the opinion notes it is not longer regarded as good law insofar as it conflicts with later Full Bench analysis. The court indicated that AIR 1917 Cal 829, as relied on in AIR 1957 Andh Pra 688, was no longer to be taken as definitive authority because of later Full Bench treatment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in two main lines: (A) limitation and the authenticity/timing of the dates on Ex. 1; and (B) non-joinder of co-heirs and the applicability of Section 43 of the Contract Act.

(A) Limitation and authenticity/timing of dates on Ex. 1

  • The Trial Court had found that the original loan dated to 9-7-1951, that a handnote of 1954 existed (executed one or two days before 9-7-1954) and had become time-barred by the time Ex. 1 was renewed on 9-8-1957. The present opinion records that this finding was not challenged by Mr. Mohanty.
  • The court invoked Section 25(3) of the Contract Act: an agreement made without consideration but in writing and signed by the person to be charged with payment of a debt which the creditor might have enforced but for limitation is a contract. Applying this, Ex. 1, though executed after the limitation period of the previous promissory note, is nevertheless valid and enforceable.
  • On the evidentiary question whether the two occurrences of the date “9-8-1957” on Ex. 1 were put by the deceased on that date, the court noted the legal presumption in Section 118(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act that "every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date," placing the burden on defendants to prove the contrary.
  • Defendants relied on testimony of D.W.1 (defendant No. 2) and two letters of the deceased (Ex. 2.a dated 6-8-1957 and Ex. 2.b dated 9-8-1957). The court examined D.W.1's cross-examination and found it showed no personal knowledge that the dates had not been put by the deceased; D.W.1 could not say on which date the handnote was executed and had not retained registration receipts or acknowledgments.
  • Ex. 2.a stated the deceased had executed the handnote in accordance with plaintiff's directions and intended to send it with money for interest by registered insured parcel but could not do so due to a postal strike. The court observed that even if Ex. 2.a were true it could support two inferences: (i) the handnote had been executed on or before 6-8-1957 and not dated, or (ii) it had been both executed and dated on or about the date of despatch. The court emphasized one cannot simply presume the content of Ex. 2.a to be true without more.
  • Ex. 2.b (dated 9-8-1957) contained the sentence "After signing that (the handnote) I am sending it to you today," and it was undisputed that Ex. 1 and Ex. 2.b were sent in one registered cover. The court reasoned that the natural reading of Ex. 2.b supported the inference that the handnote had been signed and dated on 9-8-1957 and sent that day.
  • Although the plaintiff's positive story of execution at Jatni before witnesses was held to be untrue by the Trial Court, the court noted that the falsity of that particular positive claim did not automatically establish the truth of the defence (that the dates were not placed on 9-8-1957).
  • Balancing these matters, the court concluded the presumption under Section 118(b) had not been rebutted by satisfactory evidence from the defence. Slight differences in ink were not afforded decisive weight, and the deceased (now dead) was the person with special knowledge. Therefore the Trial Court was correct in holding that Ex. 1 bore the date 9-8-1957 and that the suit was not barred by limitation.

(B) Non-joinder of daughters and application of Section 43 of the Contract Act

  • The court noted that the written statement asserted non-joinder in a general way but did not plead specific facts supporting dismissal for non-joinder.
  • Section 43 of the Contract Act provides that when two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, absent an express agreement to the contrary, compel any one or more of such joint promisors to perform the whole promise; and that each joint promisor may compel contribution from the others.
  • The court reasoned that although Ex. 1 was executed by a single promisor (the deceased), upon his death the rights and liabilities devolved upon heirs who became tenants-in-common as regards those rights and liabilities. The heirs cannot inherit rights without liabilities; by operation of law the heirs become joint promisors with liability limited to the properties inherited.
  • The court rejected the reliance on AIR 1957 Andh Pra 688 (V. Soorayva v. Kateeza Begum) as authority for the proposition that Section 43 does not apply to co-heirs, observing that that decision did not definitively decide the point and contained references to difference of opinion.
  • The court accepted the Full Bench decision in AIR 1925 Cal 1050 (Kailash Chandra v. Brojendra) as correctly stating the law that tenants-in-common (and by parity heirs who succeed to liabilities) can be sued for the entire obligation and that Section 43 applies; it also cited AIR 1955 Raj 11 as consistent authority. On that basis the court held that the plaintiff could, in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, compel performance of the whole promise from the defendants, even though the sisters (daughters) were not parties, subject to the defendants' right to seek contribution from them.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The decree of the learned Subordinate Judge in favour of the plaintiff (for recovery on Ex. 1) is affirmed; the suit is held not to be barred by limitation.
  • Ex. 1 (the promissory note dated 9-8-1957) was held valid and enforceable, including under the principle embodied in Section 25(3) of the Contract Act where applicable to agreements in writing signed to pay a debt which might otherwise have been enforceable but for limitation.
  • Pursuant to Section 118(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the presumption that an instrument bearing a date was made on that date was applied; the defendants failed to rebut that presumption to the court's satisfaction.
  • On the non-joinder point, the court held that Section 43 of the Contract Act applies to heirs who succeed to the liabilities of a deceased promisor: the plaintiff may sue some heirs (as joint promisors) for the whole obligation, and those defendants, if so minded, may claim contribution from absent co-heirs (the daughters). The omission of the daughters did not require dismissal in the circumstances of this case.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle but applies established statute and case law (including the Full Bench decision in AIR 1925 Cal 1050) to the facts before the Court.

Bench composition and concurrence: The opinion is written by Misra, J., and Das, J. expressly agreed.

Show all summary ...

Misra, J.:— Plaintiff's suit is for recovery of Rs. 6,800 with pendente lite and future interest on the basis of a promissory note (Ex. 1) dated 9-8-1957 for Rs. 5,000/- executed by deceased Ramji Haridas (hereinafter to be referred to as the deceased) Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the sons Defendant No. 3 is the widow and defendant No. 4 is the son's son of the deceased. In the plaint, a bald case was advanced that the defendants as heirs and successors of the deceased are in possession of vast properties left by him and did not pay up the dues despite repeated lemands. The cause of action was alleged to have arisen on 9-8-1954 when the loan was advanced and on 9-8-1957 when Ex. 1 was renewed. At the evidence stage nlaintiff advanced the story that in his presence at Jatni Ex. 1 was executed and the deceased put the dates thereon.

2. The averments in the written statement are of a general nature. Though pleas were taken that the suit was barred by limitation and was defective for non-joinder of parties, it did not indicate the facts on the basis of which such pleas were advanced. There was no denial of the assertion in para 3 of the plaint that the defendants were in possession of the properties of the deceased as heirs and successors. The execution of the pronote by the deceased was not denied. The learned Trial Court recorded the following findings:—

(a) The original loan was advanced on 9-7-1951. Plaintiff admitted in his evidence that the handnote of 1954 was executed one or two days before 1954. Ex. 1 was renewed on 9-8-1957 and by then the handnote of 1954 was barred by time.

(b) The story advanced by the plaintiff that Ex. 1 was executed in the presence of P.Ws 1 and 2 at Jatni by the deceased who put the dates ‘9-8-1957’ thereon is not acceptable.

(c) From other evidence, it however appears that Ex. 1 was executed by the deceased and he put the dates ‘9-8-1957’. The suit having been filed on 9-8-1960 is not barred by limitation

(d) Admittedly, the daughters of the deceased have not been made parties to the suit. The suit is however, maintainable as defendants are in possession of the estate of the deceased.

3. The learned Subordinate Judge decreed the plaintiff's suit Defendants are the appellants.

4. Plaintiff came forward with an untrue story that Ex. 1 was a renewal of a pronote executed on 9-8-1954 for Rs. 5,000/- paid in cash. The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge is that the original loan to the tune of Rs. 5,000/- was advanced on 9-7-1951 and the handnote of 1954 which is not exhibited in this case was executed one or two days before 9-7-1954 and that Ex. 1 was renewed on 9-8-1957 after the 1954 promissory note had been barred by time. This finding is not assailed by Mr. Mohanty.

5. This does not however, affect the plaintiff's case Under Section 25(3) of the Contract Act an agreement made without consideration but in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith to pay wholly a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits is a contract. Thus, Ex. 1 though renewed after the expiry of the period of limitation of the previous promissory note in 1954; is valid and enforceable in law.

6. It is the common case of the parties that Ex. 1 was executed by the deceased. Dispute centres round the question whether the two dates ‘9-8-1957’ one at the top and the other below the signature of the deceased, were put by him or have been subsequently nut in by the plaintiff to avoid limitation.

7. Mr. Mohanty does not dispute the finding of the trial court that Ex. 1 was not executed on 9-8-1957 at Jatni in the presence of P.Ws 1 and 2. He, however, argues that the dates ‘9-8-1957’ on Ex. 1 shall be presumed to be on the promissory note on that date unless the contrary is proved and that defendants have failed to establish by satisfactory evidence that those dates were not on the promissory note on the date of execution.

8. This contention requires careful examination.

9. Section 118(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act XXVI of 1881) runs thus—

“118. Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:

(a) ***

(b) That every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date.”

10. Ex. 1 bears three dates at the top, there are two dates 9-8-1957/26-7-1957. At the bottom there is another date ‘9-8-1957’ below the signature of Ramji Haridas. Admittedly, the date ‘26-7-1957’ was not put on the document by Ramji Haridas it was put at Rajenandagaon by the plaintiff when he sent it to the deceased for putting his signature and date. The only question for consideration is whether the two dates ‘9-8-1957’ appearing on the face of Ex. 1 were put on the handnote on 9-8-1957 In view of the presumption u/s 118(b). the onus is on the defendants to establish that it was not put on the handnote on that date. To prove the contrary, defendants have placed reliance on the evidence of defendant No. 2 (D.W 1) and Exs. 2.a dated 6-8-1957 and 2.b dated 9-8-1957 The evidence of D.W 1 throws no light on the question he admits in cross-examination thus’

“I cannot say if I was present with my father on 9-8-1957 In the day Ex. 1 was filled up, it was sent by registered post on looking at Ex. 1 I cannot say on which date my father executed the handnote. I cannot say if there is any other paper to show on which date Ex. 1 was executed or sent to plaintiff after execution. Ex. 1 was sent back by registered post. I could not trace out the registration receipt or acknowledgment.”

11. D.W 1 has thus no personal knowledge and is not in a position to assert that the date ‘9-8-1957’ was not put on the handnote by Ramji Haridas. The fact that the ink of the signature of Ramji Haridas and of these two dates are slightly different is not of much consequence Ramji Haridas is dead. It is difficult to guess as to why the ink slightly differed. He was the only person having special means of knowledge of that fact.

12. Ex. 2.a is a letter addressed by Ramji Haridas to the plaintiff therein, it is stated that Ramji Haridas had executed the handnote in accordance with the direction of the plaintiff and desired to send the handnote and the money towards interest by a registered insured parcel but he could not do it due to strike in postal service and that he would send the handnote within a day or two if the strike ceased. On the basis of this document, Mr. Misra argues that the handnote must have been executed on or before 6-8-1957 and it could not bear the date ‘9-8-1957’. The argument cannot be said to be wholly without force. One cannot however, presume that the statement made by the deceased in Ex. 2.a was true. There are some documents on record to indicate that plaintiff very often complained that the deceased was not true to his promises (see Exs. D and G). If Mr. Misra's contention would be correct, then the handnote would have borne some date on or before 6-8-1957. The handnote (Ex. 1) however bears no such date. Alternatively all that could be inferred from the letter, if it is true, is that Ramji Haridas executed the promissory note on or before 6th August but had kept it undated when he could not despatch it due to postal strike. If that would be the inference, there is nothing wrong for the deceased to put the date ‘9-8-1957’ later when he dispatched it after the cessation of the postal strike. This is however, on the assumption that the contents of Ex. 2.a were true on the other hand, Ex. 2.b written by the deceased to the plaintiff on 9-8-1957 shows that he executed Ex. 1 on 9-8-1957 Ex. 2.b bears the date ‘9-8-1957’ It is not disputed that Ex. 1 was sent with Ex. 2.b in one registered cover. The crucial sentence in Ex. 2.b is to the effect.

“After signing that (the handnote) I am sending it to you today.”

13. Mr. Misra argues that the word ‘today’ refers to or qualifies sending’ In other words, he argues that Ex. 1 was merely despatched on 9-8-1957 though it had been previously executed without any date being put thereon as I have already said even if the recitals of Ex. 2.a are accepted as representing the truth, the inference would be that by then only the handnote was executed, but it is not dated. If that is so nothing prevented the deceased who was a well known business man to have put the dates on the handnote on the date of despatch on 9-8-1957. It is difficult to imagine that the deceased would send a handnote without dating it. Taking Exs. 2.a and 2.b together, the reasonable inference appears to be that the two dates ‘9-8-1957’ on the handnote were put in on that very date Doubtless, plaintiff came with a false story that Ex. 1 was executed in the presence of P.Ws 1 and 2 at Jatni, but the falsity of the positive case advanced by the plaintiff would not prove the truth of the defence version.

14. To sum up the presumption of law that Ex. 1 bears a date which was made on that date has not been rebutted by any satisfactory evidence for the defence that it was executed earlier or that a handnote had been sent without any date being affixed thereto. The learned Trial Court was right in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation.

15. Mr. Misra next contended that on the admitted position that the daughters of the deceased were not made parties, the suit is liable to be dismissed as the liability of the heirs of the deceased was joint and indivisible and the daughters were necessary parties to the suit.

16. It is to be noted that though in the written statement there was a general plea of nonjoinder no specific facts were averred. Reliance is placed by Mr. Misra on AIR 1957 Andh Pra 688, V. Soorayva v. Kateeza Begum. This decision cannot be accepted as authority in support of the contention that Section 43 of the Contract Act has no application to coheirs. Their Lordships said:—

“It might be observed that there is some difference of opinion in the Calcutta High Court itself on this point and were it necessary to do so we would have to examine the case law at some length.”

17. This decision did not therefore decide the point and cannot serve as an authority.

18. Section 43 of the Contract Act so far as relevant runs thus:—

“43 When two or more persons made a joint promise the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any one or more of such joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise. Each of two or more joint promisors may compel every other joint promisor to contribute equally with himself to the performance of the promise unless a contrary intention appears from the contract.”

19. This section in terms applies to a case of joint promise by two or more persons Ex. 1 was executed by the deceased alone and there were no joint promisors After the death of the deceased his rights and liabilities were inherited by number of heirs, some of whom are parties to the suit. The heirs constitute tenants-in-common in respect of those rights and liabilities. They cannot inherit the rights without inheriting the liabilities Rights and liabilities go together. The responsibility of the heirs in discharging the liability is not personal but is limited to the properties inherited. Though under Ex. 1 there was a single promisor after the inheritance of the liabilities the heirs become joint promisors under Ex. 1 by virtue of inheritance When succession opens Sec. 43 applies with full force. There is no logic in confining the applicability of Sec. 43 only to the stage of actual execution of the contract AIR 1917 Cal 829 referred to in AIR 1957 Andh Pra 688 is no longer good law on account of difference of opinion in the Calcutta High Court, the matter was examined in AIR 1925 Cal 1050 (FB) Kailash Chandra v. Brojendra. The short facts in that case were that plaintiff was entitled to Re. /4/ share of taluq under which there was a tenure which formerly belonged to one Gour Sundar Singh and which by successive devolutions and assignments had come into possession of about twenty persons Plaintiff had sued for his share of the rent against some of the persons who were in possession during the period in suit along with others who had not been made parties. It was contended before their Lordships that the suit was not maintainable as the other defendants had not been made parties. This was negatived. The majority held that a tenant-in-common is entitled to possession of every part of the estate and there is privity of estate between him and the landlord. The law imposed a liability for payment of rent by reason of privity of estate and any one of such tenants may be sued for the entire rent due to the landlord. This conclusion was reached both u/s 43 of the Contract Act which applied to express as well as implied promises and under the general law based on privity of estate. The principle enunciated in the Full Bench decision has not been subsequently departed from I am inclined to accept this decision as laying down the correct law. The identical principle applies to the case of a recovery of loan by a creditor from the heirs who by operation of law become joint promisors after the death of the single promisor. The same view has been taken in AIR 1955 Raj 11 by a learned single Judge (Chandra Bhan v. Misrimal) The facts in that case are similar to the facts of this case his Lordship put the matter pithily thus:—

“There appears to me to be no sound reason why the principle of this section (Sec. 43) should be held to be inapplicable to the case of heirs also who have jointly succeeded to the liability of their deceased ancestor.”

20. On the application of Section 43 of the Contract Act I am clearly of the opinion that in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary it is open to the plaintiff to compel performance of the whole of the promise by the defendants though the sisters are not parties to the suit. It need hardly be stated that under the very section it would be open to the defendants to compel the sisters for contribution.

21. Thus both the contentions fail. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

22. Das, J.:— I agree.

FK/RSK/D.V.C

23. Appeal dismissed.