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Parfulla Kumar Das v. House Rent Controller, Cuttack And Others Opposite Parties.

Orissa High Court
Jan 24, 1962
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Judgment Summary — R.K. Das, J. (Concurring: Narasimham, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner and his father (opposite party No. 4) were monthly tenants in holding No. 150, Ward No. 13, Cuttack, under landlords Harihar Satpathy and others. The landlords sold the premises to opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 by registered sale deed dated 19-12-1959. After purchase, the new owners called upon the tenants to vacate, to deliver possession and to pay arrears of rent. The tenants failed to comply.

Opposite parties Nos. 2 and 3 filed an application under Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act) before the House Rent Controller (H.R.C. No. 44 of 1960) seeking ejectment on the grounds that they required the house for their occupation and that the tenant was a defaulter in rent. The petitioner raised a preliminary objection before the Controller that eviction proceedings under Section 7 were not maintainable without prior determination of the tenancy by notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Controller overruled this objection.

The tenant appealed (H.R.C. Appeal No. 43/60) to the Additional District Magistrate, Cuttack. The Additional District Magistrate, by order dated 6-1-61, dismissed the appeal holding that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was contemplated within the Orissa Act and that proceedings under Section 7 were maintainable. The petitioner then instituted the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a prior notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is a condition precedent to the institution of eviction proceedings under Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958.
  2. Whether the House Rent Controller has jurisdiction to order eviction under Section 7 of the Orissa Act where no prior determination of the tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act has been given.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented)

  • Mr. R. Das, counsel for the petitioner, contended that the landlord cannot maintain eviction proceedings under Section 7 of the Orissa Act unless the tenancy has first been terminated by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • He argued that the House Rent Control Act's eviction provisions should be construed as supplementary to the Transfer of Property Act provisions dealing with termination of tenancy.
  • He relied on decisions reported in AIR 1960 All 211 and AIR 1953 Sau 119 in support of this contention.

Respondents' / Other Parties' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments beyond the procedural posture and the orders of the Controller and the Additional District Magistrate upholding the maintainability of proceedings under Section 7 without prior Section 106 notice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Parthasarathy v. Krishnamoorty, AIR 1949 Mad 387 Single-Judge holding that Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to order eviction u/s 7 where there had been no prior determination of tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act. The court noted this single-Judge decision but pointed out it was not accepted as correct and was reversed by a Division Bench (see next entry).
Krishnamurthy v. Parthasarathi, AIR 1949 Mad 780 Division Bench holding that Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act had no application to proceedings under Section 7 of the Madras Act; prior determination by notice to quit was not necessary. The court relied on this Division Bench reasoning as supporting the view that transfer-of-property notice requirements need not apply to Statutory rent-control eviction proceedings.
B. Rangaswami Naidu v. Vummidi Bangaru Chetty, AIR 1949 Mad 139 Held that it is not permissible to import concepts from the ordinary law of landlord and tenant or the Transfer of Property Act into proceedings under the Madras Rent Control Act. Used to support the proposition that Transfer of Property Act concepts should not be automatically imported into statutory rent-control eviction proceedings.
Kuppuswami v. Mahadeva, AIR 1950 Mad 746 Relied upon Kai Khushroo v. Bai Jerbai (AIR 1949 FC 124) to hold that Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act had no application to matters arising under the Rent Control Act. Cited to reinforce that certain Transfer of Property provisions do not apply where a Rent Control statute governs eviction.
Kai Khushroo v. Bai Jerbai, AIR 1949 FC 124 Principle that tenancies relating to dwelling houses to which Rent Restriction Acts apply may confer statutory immunity from eviction even after lease expiry; landlord cannot eject except on grounds specified in those Acts. Quoted passage used to show that statutory rent-control regimes can displace ordinary landlord-tenant rules and protect tenants from eviction except on statutory grounds.
Unspecified decision under the Rent Restriction Act (Bombay) — (no citation provided in the opinion) Held that acceptance of rent by landlord after eviction proceedings commenced would not create a new tenancy under Section 118 of the Transfer of Property Act; implying no Section 106 notice needed in that context. The opinion refers to this decision to support the proposition that no Section 106 notice is necessary before instituting eviction under a rent-control regime.
Janld Prasad v. Harish Chandra, AIR 1960 All 211 Dealt with U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act; the court held that a notice under Section 106 could be given before, simultaneously with, or after permission under the U.P. Act — not dependent on the existence of permission. The Orissa court distinguished this case as being under a different statutory scheme (U.P. Act) and held it did not support the petitioner's contention that Section 106 notice was a condition precedent under the Orissa Act.
Keshavlal v. Bai Ajawali, AIR 1953 Sau 119 Under the Bombay (Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control) Act, held that where a lease pre-dated the Transfer of Property Act's application in the State, the Transfer of Property Act provisions would not apply; the suit demonstrating the landlord's intention to determine the lease was sufficient. The court treated observations in this case as fact-specific and noted that its remarks on the applicability of the Transfer of Property Act were casual and of no direct bearing to the Orissa Act question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the statutory scheme and legislative history, starting from earlier local measures (Orissa House Rent Control Order, 1942; Orissa Act V of 1947; Orissa Act XI of 1951) to the present Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act). The opinion emphasizes that the Act of 1958 materially changed the procedure for eviction: under the 1958 Act a landlord need not file a suit in the Civil Court, and eviction relief is obtainable only from the Controller under Section 7.

The Court set out the key provisions: Section 6 provides that, notwithstanding any agreement or law, no tenant shall be ejected except as provided in Section 7; Section 7 prescribes the process and grounds (e.g., non-payment of rent, bona fides of denial of title, requirement for own occupation) on which the Controller may direct eviction; and Section 13 (referred to in the opinion) deems an order of the Controller under Section 7(1) to be a decree executable by the Civil (Munsif) Court.

Applying these provisions, the Court reasoned that the Act has abrogated alternative modes of eviction for the period it governs; eviction must be in the manner provided by Section 7. Although Section 7(2) does not expressly state the form of the Controller's order, the Court drew a reasonable construction from the context that orders under Section 7(2) come within Section 7(1) consequences (i.e., treated as decree/executable).

The Court then addressed the petitioner's core contention that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (notice to determine tenancy: 15 days for month-to-month tenancies) is a condition precedent to instituting eviction proceedings under Section 7. The Court observed:

  • Section 106 operates "in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary," so its application can be varied or displaced by contract or local law.
  • The Orissa House Rent Control Act, as a local statute governing evictions, can abrogate the general law under the Transfer of Property Act for the purpose of eviction procedure.
  • Reading Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa Act with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, a reasonable construction is that no Section 106 notice is necessary before filing an application for eviction under Section 7 of the Orissa Act.

The Court supported this statutory construction by reference to analogous statutory regimes and case law from Madras and other jurisdictions. It cited Madras decisions (including a Division Bench overruling a single-Judge decision) holding that Transfer of Property provisions (such as Section 111(h)) do not apply to proceedings under a rent-control Act similar to the Orissa Act, and that one should not import ordinary landlord-tenant law into statutory rent-control proceedings.

The Court considered and distinguished authorities relied upon by petitioner:

  • The Allahabad decision (Janld Prasad v. Harish Chandra, AIR 1960 All 211) was distinguished on facts and statutory differences — the U.P. statutory scheme differs from the Orissa Act, and the decision did not support the petitioner's contention.
  • The Saurashtra/Bombay decision (Keshavlal v. Bai Ajawali, AIR 1953 Sau 119) was held to be fact-specific and its casual observations about the Transfer of Property Act were of no direct bearing to the question under the Orissa Act.

The Court also relied on the definition of "tenant" in Section 2(5) of the Orissa Act — which expressly includes persons whose tenancy might have been terminated under other laws — to conclude that Section 7 governs eviction of all such "tenants" and that a prior notice under Section 106 is not necessary as a condition precedent.

The Court rejected the petitioner's construction because it would produce an impractical and circular procedure (requiring a prejudicial sequence of Court and Controller applications) contrary to the legislative purpose of the Act to provide a speedier statutory mechanism to prevent unreasonable evictions and to regulate eviction grounds.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The Court held that an eviction application under Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958 is maintainable without a prior notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; the only grounds for eviction are those specified in Section 7 of the Orissa Act, and it is immaterial whether the tenancy was determined under the Transfer of Property Act or not.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The orders of the House Rent Controller and of the Additional District Magistrate (dismissing the appeal) are upheld.
  • The landlord may proceed with the eviction application under Section 7 of the Orissa Act; the Controller's order (if made) is executable as a decree in the Munsif's Court under the Act's provisions.
  • There will be no order as to costs in respect of this petition (the Court expressly directed no costs in the circumstances).

Broader implication stated by the Court: The judgment confirms that the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958 provides the exclusive statutory procedure and grounds for eviction (Section 7), thereby displacing the general landlord-tenant notice/determination regime under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for purposes of eviction under the Orissa Act.

Disposition: Petition dismissed. (Concurring: Narasimham, C.J.)

Show all summary ...

R.K Das, J.:— This, is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuing an appropriate Writ to quash, the proceedings for eviction of the tenant-petitioner under Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958 (Orissa Act, 31 of 1958), herein after called the Act, pending before the House Rent Controller (hereinafter called the controller) in H.R.C No. 44 of 1960.

2. The petitioner and his father (opposite party No. 4) were occupying the suit premises as monthly tenants of holding No. 150 in Ward No. 13 in the town of Cuttack under the landlords Harihar Satpathy and others. The said landlords sold the suit premises to opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 by a registered sale-deed dated 19-12-1959. After the said purchase, opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 became the owners of the suit house and called upon the petitioner and opposite party No. 4 to vacate the suit house, to deliver possession to them and also to pay arrears rent due on them. The tenants having failed to comply with the notice of the new landlords, the latter filed an application under Section 7 of the Act before the Rent Controller of Cuttack for ejectment of the tenants on the ground that they require the house for their own occupation and that the tenant was a defaulter in rent. A prehminary objection was raised by the petitioner-tenant before the Controller that no proceeding for ejectment under Section 7 of the Act was maintainable without prior determination of the tenancy by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. This objection having been overruled by the controller an appeal (H.R.C appeal No. 43/60) was filed before the Additional District Magistrate of Cuttack, where the same contention was raised. The learned Additional District Magistrate by his order dated 6-1-61 dismissed the appeal holding that no sucn notice was contemplated within the scope of the Act and as such a proceeding under Section 7 of the Act was maintainable. It is against this order the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed.

3. It is not disputed that the petitioner was in arrears of rent for a long time. Before going to the question whether such a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is a condition precedent for eviction proceeding, it is necessary to examine some of the provisions of the Act which admittedly cover this case. With a view to give protection to the tenants from illegal eviction by the landlords, the Orissa House Rent Control Order, 1942 was introduced and subsequently the Orissa House Rent Control Act (Orissa Act V of 1947), was introduced though in between 1942 order and 1947 Act Orissa Ordinance No in of 1946 was promulgated to achieve the very same object. Under the provisions of the Orissa Act V of 1947, the landlord was to file a suit for eviction of tenants in the Civil Court and that only after obtaining an exemption order from the Controller appointed under the said Act. To appreciate the position of law, it is necessary to have some of the relevant provisions of Sections 5 and 13 of the Orissa Act V, of 1947. They run as follows:

“5. Continuation of existing tenancies from month to month and bar against increase of rent: Subject to the provisions of this Act and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the agreement or law where a tenant on a tenancy from month to month is, on the date of the commencement of this Act, in possession of any house;

(a) he shall not be liable to be ejected whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except for non-payment of rent or breach of; the conditions of the tenancy,

xxxxxx

Provided further that a landlord may apply to the Controller for exemption from the provisions of clause (a) in respect of any house and if Controller is satisfied:

(i) that the house is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for the occupation of himself or any member of his family joint in mess with him, or for the occupation of any person or persons for whose benefit the house is held by him or,—

xxxxxx”

4. Subsequently, however, the Orissa House Rent Control Act (Orissa Act XI) of 1951 came Sato force which practically engrafted the very same provisions as embodied in Orissa Act V of 1947 with some slight modifications which are no material for the purpose of this case. The Orissa Act XI of 1951 expired on 3-12-1954 and after a gap of about four years, the present Act (Orissa Act XXXI of 1958) came into force on 1-1-1959 and the provisions of the Act apply to the present case. In the Act, however, some drastic changes have been made, particularly with respect to the procedure for eviction of a tenant. In the Acts of 1947 and 1951, the landlord had to file a regular suit in the Civil Court for eviction of a tenant after obtaining necessary exemption order where necessary from the Controller. As would appeal from the aforesaid provisions of Sections 5 and 13 of the Act of 1947, the landlord is debarred from filing a suit for eviction unless he is armed with an exemption order from the Controller or course no such exemption order was necessary if the case of an eviction sought on the ground of non-payment of rent and where a tenant is a regular defaulter or has violated some of the conditions of the tenancy etc. In the Act of 1958, however, the landlord has not to approach the Civil Court for eviction of a tenant and the said relief can be granted only by the Controller in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Act.

5. At this stage it is necessary to examine some of the relevant provisions of the Act. They run as follows:

“6 Continuance of Tenancy.

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the agreement or law no tenant shall he liable to be ejected except as provided in Section 7.

7. Conditions under which a tenant can be ejected;

(1) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenan shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied:

(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due from him in respect of the house within thirty days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of the tenancy with the landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable or

xxxxxx

(iv) that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim is not bona fide; the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house and if the Controller is not satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application;

xxxxxx

(2) The landlord may, subject to the provisions of this Act, apply to the Controller for an Order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the house, if he requires the house in good faith for the occupation and use of himself, any member of his family or of any person or persons for whose benefit, the house is held by him.

13. Court to deliver possession—The order of the Controller made under sub-section (1) of section 7 directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, shall be deemed to be a decree and executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within whose jurisdiction the house is situate.

6. According to these provisions a tenant can row be ejected only in the manner provided in Section 7 of the Act notwithstanding any agreement or law to the contrary; in other words, if there is any other mode or procedure laid down for the eviction of a, tenant, the same shall remain abrogated for the time being and only the procedure that has been laid down in section 7 of the Act has to be followed. Though there is no express provision as to the nature of the order that the Controller will pass in a case governed by sub-section (2) of section 7, yet a reasonable construction may be drawn from the context and title of those sections that the order passed by the Controller under section 7(2) will be covered u/s. 7(1) of the Act.

7. Section IS of the Act provides that the order passed by the Controller u/s. 7(1) shall be deemed to be a decree and will be executable as such in the court of the Munsif within whose jurisdiction the house is situate. In view of this provision the order of eviction passed by the Controller will therefore, itself be a decree and the landlord has not to file a regular suit in the Civil Court for the same relief, that is, for the eviction of the tenant. Thus to that extent, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is Ousted.

8. Mr. R. Das, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that even under the new provisions of the Act the landlord cannot evict a tenant unless he teminates the tenancy by a notice u/Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, provides as follows:

“In the absence of a contract or local law or, usage to the contrary, a lease of immoveable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immoveable property for any other purpose shall be deem to be a lease from, month to month, terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month oi-the tenancy.”

xxxxxx

9. Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that a lease of immoveable property will be determined on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease or to quit or of the intention to quit the property leased duly given by one party to other, it is on the basis of these two provisions it was contended for the petitioner that unless and until a notice is given u/Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the lease shall not be determined and unless and until it is determined, no proceeding for eviction can be-maintained. It, is however to be seen that the provisions of S. 106 are ??? to any contract or local law or usage to the contrary. So the parties may by contract provide for the determination of the lease without any previous notice or vary the period provided in the Section. Similarly the general law as given in the Transfer of Property Act may also be abrogated by a local law like the House Rent Control Act. Thus reading sections 6 and 7 of the Act and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act together, it may be reasonably construed that no notice contemplated u/Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary before filing an application the eviction under section 7 of the Act. It may be noted in this connection that the procedure laid down for eviction in the Act is more or less similar to that under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, XXV of 1949. In the Madras Act provision has been made for eviction of tenant by the Controller u/s. 7 and u/s. 9 of the said Act the order passed by the Controller u/s. 7 shall be executed in the Civil Court as if it were a decree passed by the Civil Court itself.

10. The question of applicability of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act in a proceeding under the Madras Act came for consideration in a number of decisions of the Madras High Court. In the case of Parthasarathy v. Krishnamoorty, AIR 1949 Mad 387, Subba Rao, J. held that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to order eviction u/s. 7 where there had been no previous determination of a tenancy in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. But this single-Judge decision was not accepted as correct and was reversed in a Division Bench decision of that Court reported in AIR 1949 Mad 780, Krishnamurthy v. Parthasarathi. Their lordships held that the provisions of Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act had no application to a proceeding u/s. 7 of the Madras. Act and prior determination of tenancy by a notice to quit was not necessary.

11. In another case reported in AIR 1949 Mad 139, B. Rangaswami Naidu v. Vummidi Bangaru Chetty. C.J while dealing with a case under the Madras Act held that it was not permissible to import conceptions which belonged to the ordinary law of landlord and tenant obtaining either in England or under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. In another decision of the same High Court reported in AIR 1950 Mad 746, Kuppuswami v. Mahadeva their Lordships relying upon a case reported in AIR 1949 FC 124, Kai Khushroo v. Bai Jerbai, held that Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act had to application to matters arising under the Rent Control Act. In this connection, a passage from the case reported in AIR 1949 FC 124 may be quoted since it has some bearing so far as the present case in concerned. There, B.K Mukherjea, J., held:

“It may be pointed out that in cases of tenancies relating to dwelling houses to which Rent Restriction Acts apply, the tenant may enjoy a statutory immunity from eviction even after the lease has expired. The landlord cannot eject him except on specified grounds mentioned in the Acts themselves.”

12. In dealing with a case under the Rent Restriction Act of Bombay, their Lordships held that acceptance of rent by the landlord after eviction proceedings have been started would not create a new tenancy under the provisions of section 118 of the Transfer of Property Act. This decision, therefore, settled beyond doubt that no notice u/Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary to determine the tenancy before the eviction proceedings are started.

13. Mr. R. Das, however relied upon two decisions reported in AIR 1960 All 211 and AIR 1953 Sau 119 The Allahabad case, Janld Prasad v. Harish Chandra, AIR 1960 All 211, is one under the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (3 of 1947). In the U.P Act, however, there is no provision similar to section 7 of the Act where the Controller has to pass an order for eviction which will be treated as a decree and will be sent for execution to the Civil Court. In the U.P Act, like the Orissa Act of 1947, permission has to be obtained from the District Magistrate for filing a suit for eviction in Civil Court under certain circumstances as provided u/s. 3 of the U.P Act. The Allahabad case is easily distinguishable on facts and moreover there are no similar appropriate provisions in the U.P Art. comparable to the Orissa Act. The Allahabad case also does not support the contention of the petitioner as their Lordships held:

“A notice under Sec. 106 will not be dependent on the existence of permission under Section 3 of the Act 3 of 1947. It can be given before the permission simultaneously on the same date when the permission is sought, and accorded, or after the permission has been granted.”

14. So this decision also does not support the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the termination of the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is a condition precedent to the institution of the eviction proceeding under section 7 of the Act.

15. The next decision reported in AIR 1953 Sau 119, Keshavlal v. Bai Ajawali is a case dealing with the Bombay (Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control) Act LVII of 1947 Under Section 12(2) of the Bombay. Act a notice in the manner provided under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is a condition precedent prior to the institution of a suit for recovery of possession by a landlord against a tenant, of course on the ground of non-payment of standard rent. The facts of this case are somewhat different. The lease, in question, was in Bhavanagar State and was anterior to the application of the Transfer of Property Act in that State. Their Lord ships held that to such a lease the provisions oil Transfer of Property Act will not apply and as such it is not necessary for the landlord to determine the lease nor to give any notice to determine it and the suit itself should be taken as sufficient to prove the landlord's intention to determine the lease. Their Lordships decreed the plaintiffs suit for possession on the ground of non-payment of rent. In that case the main question for consideration was whether the landlord while giving a notice u/s. 12(2) of the Bombay Act can reduce the notice period to 15 days, though one month is provided under the said section. Their Lordships held that the landlord may call upon the tenant to pay rent on any day and since the suit itself was filed after one month it was a sufficient compliance of Sec. 12(2). The observation regarding the applicability of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act can be taken to be casual and has no direct bearing for the decision of that case.

16. It may however, be noted that the definition of the word “tenant” in the Orissa Act is sufficient to repel the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In fact the word “tenant” under the Act includes also a person whose tenancy might have been terminated by a notice under the Transfer of Property Act. It is clear, therefore, that no notice u/Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary of can be taken as a condition precedent before the institution of an eviction proceeding under Section 7 of the Act. The orders passed by the Controller is correct and there is no reason to Set aside the same.

17. In the result, therefore, the petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

18. Narasimham, C.J:— I agree.

19. The main contention of Mr. R. Das for the petitioner is that notwithstanding the wide definition of the expression “tenant” in Section 2(5) of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958, that expression should be given a narrow interpretation in Section 7 of that Act and that the right of the landlord to seek the eviction of his tenant by applying to the House Rent Controller under Sec. 7 would accrue only after the tenancy has been determined under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. According to him the provisions of the House Rent Control Act dealing with eviction of tenants should be construed as supplementary to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with the circumstances under which a tenancy may be terminated.

20. This argument not only runs counter to the well known rules of statutory construction, but is also against the main objective of the Legislature in enacting the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958.

21. In Section 2(5) of that Act the expression ‘tenant’ has been defined so as to include not only a tenant as Ordinarily understood, but also a tenant whose tenancy has been detenriined under the provisions of any other law, and also a tenant against whom a decree for eviction had been passed by a Civil Court but who has not been actually evicted. Section 6 of the Act says that

“notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any agreement or law, no tenant shall be ejected except as provided in section 7.”

22. Section 7 of the Act describes, the procedure for the eviction of a tenant by application to the Rent Controller and also lays down the grounds on which a tenant could be evicted. ??? sections 6 and 7 together, and applying the interpretations of the word “tenant” as given in; the definition clause (Section 2(5)) the reasonable inference is that the only grounds on which a tenant (as defined in the Act) can be evicted are those specified in Sec. 7. This must apply to all classes of tenants, whether their tenancy was determined under the provisions of the Transfer of Property I Act or not. There is nothing in the subject or context, either of Sec. 6 or of section 7 of the Act, to limit the word “tenant” occurring in them to those tenants on whom a valid notice to ??? had been served.

23. As pointed out by my learned brother, the Legislature made a radical departure while enacting the Orissa House Rent Control Act 1958. In the previous. Orissa House Rent Control Act of 1950, the power of the Civil Court to evict a tenant on the termination of his tenancy under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act was not taken away; and the only restriction on this power was the duty cast on the landlord to obtain the permission of the House Rent Conti oiler before seeking eviction. In the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1958, however, the Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain suits for eviction of a tenant was completely taken away and this power was conferred on the House Rent Controller by Sec. 7. The only right of the Civil Court was to execute the order of eviction passed by the House Rent Controller as if it were a decree (see Sec. 13). There is no provision in Sec. 7 for the House Rent Controller first to examine whether the tenancy had been validly determined in ??? the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.

24. The vexed question as to whether the notice to quit was validly issued or not cannot ordinarily be decided by the House Rent ??? and can be properly adjudicated only by the Civil Court. If Mr. Das's contention is to be accepted, then the landlord must first apply to the Civil Court and obtain a declaration that the tenancy has been validly terminated under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and must then apply to the House Rent Controller under Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, for his eviction, and then again apply to the Civil Court, under Section 13 of the Act, for executing the order of the Controller. Such a construction of Sec. 7 is not warranted by the language used therein, and will moreover defeat the provisions of the Act which was passed primarily with a view to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants and to provide a speedier method for their eviction, on specified grounds. Hence it must be held that the only grounds on which a tenant can be evicted are those specified in Section 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act 1958, and it is immaterial whether the tenancy was determined under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or not.

EF/M/K.S.R

25. Petition dismissed.

Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act