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Gangadhar Charan Naga Goswami And Others v. Sm. Saraswati Bewa And Another
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Sambhu died around 1941 leaving his widow Saraswati Bewa (plaintiff) and his son Madhu. Madhu died around 1952 leaving his widow Sukur (defendant No. 4). On 23-12-1952 defendant No. 4 executed two sale deeds: Ext. A (1.27 acres) in favour of defendant No. 1 for Rs. 500 and Ext. B (31 decimals) in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 for Rs. 100. The plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration that these sale deeds were fraudulent, collusive and without legal necessity; she sought recovery of possession and mesne profits (an alternative maintenance claim was later abandoned). The plaintiff also alleged that defendant No. 4 had remarried Kartic Mahanty and thereby incurred civil death in Madhu's family.
Defendants 1–3 contested on the grounds that defendant No. 4 had not remarried and that the alienations were for legal necessity with full consideration and that they were in possession. Defendant No. 4, initially a minor represented by a pleader-guardian, attained majority during the suit and filed a written statement asserting the sales were for legal necessity (to meet funeral expenses and for maintenance), that consideration had passed, that possession had been delivered to the purchasers, and denying remarriage.
The trial court held the sale-deeds (Exts. A and B) were without legal necessity and without consideration and that no title passed to defendants 1–3; it also found defendant No. 4 had remarried Kartic in Baisakha 1953. The appellate court confirmed these findings. Defendants 1–3 appealed to this court by way of a Second Appeal. This court on perusal of lower courts’ judgments found the factual findings were correct and proceeded to consider legal contentions, particularly under Sections 4 and 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The appeal was dismissed and each party was directed to bear their own costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, a female Hindu who had been in possession of property becomes a full owner and thereby acquires unfettered rights to alienate such property so as to defeat the title of a reversioner where the alienation occurred before the commencement of the Act.
- Whether the possession of the vendees (purchasers) in respect of property sold by a female Hindu before the commencement of the Act can be deemed to be the possession of the vendor (the female Hindu) within the meaning of Section 14, thereby converting a limited interest into absolute ownership.
- Whether the particular sales (Exts. A and B) were made for legal necessity and for adequate consideration such that they would be binding on the reversioner.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants (Defendants 1–3) — primary contentions raised on appeal
- Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (1956) vested full ownership in defendant No. 4 (the female vendor) and therefore she had the unfettered right to alienate the property; consequently the plaintiff (reversioner) was not competent to maintain the reversionary suit.
- Even if the alienations were invalid for lack of legal necessity or consideration, the possession of defendants 1–3 should be deemed to be the possession of defendant No. 4 within the meaning of Section 14, making her the full owner of the property despite the sales.
Defendant No. 4 (Sukur) — stance in the lower courts
- Initially represented as a minor, she later filed a written statement after attaining majority, alleging the sales were for legal necessity to meet funeral expenses and for her maintenance, that full consideration had passed, and that possession had been delivered to the purchasers.
- She denied that she had remarried Kartic Mahanty.
Plaintiff (Saraswati Bewa) — core allegations and reliefs
- Alleged that the sale deeds executed by defendant No. 4 in favour of defendants 1–3 were fraudulent, collusive and without legal necessity.
- Sought declaration that defendants 1–3 acquired no right, title or interest; recovery of possession; mesne profits; and alternatively a maintenance charge (the maintenance claim was abandoned at trial).
- Alleged defendant No. 4 had remarried Kartic Mahanty and was thereby civilly dead in Madhu's family.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sansir Patelin v. Satyabati Naikani, AIR 1958 Orissa 75 | Held that only those provisions inconsistent with the Act stand annulled by Section 4; the concept of a reversioner remains where Section 14 does not vest full ownership (i.e., where the widow had not the property in her possession at commencement). | The court relied on this Division Bench decision to reject the appellants' contention that Section 14 automatically conferred absolute ownership on defendant No. 4 and to confirm that reversionary rights survive in respect of properties alienated before the Act. |
| Venkayamma v. Veerayya, AIR 1957 Andhra Pradesh 280 | Established that Section 14 has no application where the female owner had parted with the property before the Act came into force. | Referenced (through subsequent decisions) to support the conclusion that Sec. 14 does not convert limited interests into absolute ownership where alienation and delivery of possession occurred prior to the Act. |
| Gostha Behari Bera v. Haridas Samantra, AIR 1957 Calcutta 557 | Similar holding: Sec. 14 inapplicable to property alienated by a female owner before commencement of the Act. | Used by the court (and by courts relied upon in earlier decisions) to affirm that alienations prior to the Act do not attract the absolute ownership rule of Section 14. |
| Thailambal Ammal v. Kesavan Nair, AIR 1957 Kerala 88 | Kerala High Court view aligning with the position that Sec. 14 does not apply to property parted with before the Act. | Noted as another High Court decision adopting the same approach, reinforcing the broader consensus cited by the court. |
| Laxmi Debi v. Surendra Kumar, AIR 1957 Orissa 1 | Observed that where a widow alienated property before the Act and the property was not in her possession at commencement, Sec. 14 does not make her a full owner; the decision left open questions not directly decided on alienation facts. | The court referenced the observation to support the proposition that Sec. 14 does not operate to enlarge the widow's rights in respect of properties not in her possession when the Act commenced. |
| Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1958 Patna 581 (Full Bench) | Full Bench held Sec. 14 could not be held to confer absolute ownership on a female who had alienated property before the date of commencement; purchasers who bought with knowledge of limited title are not to be unduly enriched. | The court treated this Full Bench decision as authoritative and as giving a complete answer to the appellants' contention; it was relied upon to hold Sec. 14 inapplicable to property alienated before the Act. |
| G.T.M. Kotturuswami v. S. Veerayya, AIR 1959 SC 577 (Supreme Court) | Considered the nature of possession under Section 14 where adopted son was in permissive possession; Supreme Court regarded the widow as being in constructive possession through the permissive occupant and accepted the Patna Full Bench proposition in principle. | The appellants relied on this case. The court distinguished it: in the present case the purchasers' possession was not permissive but by virtue of sale and delivery; therefore the Supreme Court decision did not support appellants' argument that the purchasers' possession should be treated as the vendor's possession under Sec. 14. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying the statutory provisions central to the dispute: Section 4 (overriding effect of the Hindu Succession Act over inconsistent prior laws) and Section 14 (vesting of full ownership in a female Hindu of property possessed by her on the date of commencement). The court emphasized that Section 4 does not abrogate all previous Hindu law but only those parts inconsistent with the Act; therefore pre-existing doctrines (including the concept of a reversioner) potentially remain where the Act's provisions do not operate.
The court applied the plain terms of Section 14: it confers full ownership only where the property was in the female's possession on the date the Act came into force (17-6-1956). Here, the critical factual finding (accepted by this court on review of lower courts) was that defendant No. 4 had sold the suit lands and delivered possession to the vendees in 1952, i.e., long prior to the Act. Accordingly, the statutory precondition for Sec. 14's operation (possession on commencement) was not met.
The court surveyed authority from several High Courts and Full Bench decisions (Andhra Pradesh, Calcutta, Kerala and Patna) and a Division Bench of this Court (Sansir Patelin). These decisions uniformly held that where a female alienated property prior to the Act and parted with possession, Section 14 does not enlarge her limited interest into absolute ownership and the rights of reversioners under old law remain. The court treated the Patna Full Bench and the Division Bench decisions as decisive and binding on the point.
The court then considered the Supreme Court decision in G.T.M. Kotturuswami v. S. Veerayya, which concerned permissive possession and constructive possession under Section 14. The court distinguished that authority: in Kotturuswami the occupying person’s possession was permissive and thus the widow could be regarded as in constructive possession; in the present case purchasers acquired and retained possession by virtue of sale and delivery, and defendant No. 4 admitted she had parted with interest and possession. The court therefore held that purchasers' possession could not be equated to vendor's possession under Section 14.
The court also noted the lower courts' factual finding that defendant No. 4 remarried in Baisakha 1953 (after the alienations), which led to her incurring civil death in her husband's family—an event occurring subsequent to the sales and therefore not altering the legal analysis about possession at the date of the Act.
Concluding from statutory text, accepted factual findings, and precedential authorities, the court held that the sales were effected by a limited owner without legal necessity and adequate consideration, and thus were not binding on the reversioner. The court accordingly dismissed the appeal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED. The court affirmed the lower courts' conclusions that the sale-deeds (Exts. A and B) executed by defendant No. 4 were without legal necessity and without consideration, and that no title passed to defendants 1–3. The court also accepted the lower courts' finding that defendant No. 4 had remarried in Baisakha 1953.
Implications:
- The immediate effect is that the sale-deeds are not binding on the plaintiff (the reversioner) and the reversionary rights of the plaintiff are preserved as found below.
- The court applied established precedent to conclude that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act does not operate to convert a limited interest into absolute ownership where the female alienated the property and parted with possession prior to the Act’s commencement; thus reversionary rights under prior Hindu law remain enforceable in such cases.
- The opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle; it follows and affirms earlier High Court Full Bench and Division Bench decisions and distinguishes the Supreme Court authority relied upon by the appellants. The court did not announce a new precedent beyond confirming the existing line of authority summarized in the analysis above.
- Costs: Because the respondents did not appear to contest the appeal, the court directed that each party bear his own costs throughout.
This summary is prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings not contained therein.
1. This is an appeal by defendants 1 to 3 against a decision dated 11-4-1960 of Sri U.N Misra, Subordinate Judge of Ralasore, confirming the judgment of Sri K.P Mohapatra, Munsif of Ralasore. Sambhu died sometime in the year 1941 leaying his widow Saraswati Bewa (plaintiff) and his son Madhu. Madhu died sometime in 1952 leaving his widow Sukuri (defendant No. 4). Sukur sold a part of the suit land under Ext. A on 23-12-52 for a consideration of Rs. 500/- in favour of defendant 1 comprising an area of 1.27 acres. On the same day she also sold under Ext. B.A.O 31 decimals of land to defendants 2 and 3 for a consideration of Rs. 100./-.
2. The plaintiff has filed the present suit for declaration that the sale deeds executed by defendant 4 in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 are fraudulent, collusive and without any legal necessity, and the defendants 1 to 3 have acquired no right, title or interest in the suit-lands. She has further claimed for recovery of possession and also for mesne profits; her alternative claim was a charge for her maintenance at the rate of Rs. 15/- per month, which however was abandoned at the trial stage. She further alleged that defendant 4 having remarried one Kartic Mahanty (P.W 2) was civilly dead in Madhu's family.
3. Defendants 1 to 3 contested the suit on the ground that defendant 4 never remarried Kartic, and the alienations were for legal necessity and full consideration had passed, under them and they are in their possession. Defendant No. 4 was a minor and was represented by a pleader guardian, but in course of the suit she attained majority and filed her written statement contending that the sales were for legal necessity and consideration, that is, to meet the funeral expenses of her husband Madhu and for her own maintenance and she had delivered possession of the suit property to defendants 1 to 3. She however denied her remarriage with Kartic.
4. The trial court held that the sale-deeds. Exts. A and B, were without legal necessity and without consideration, and no title had passed to defendants 1 to 3 thereunder; and defendant No. 4 had remarried to Kartic sometime in Baisakha of 1953, that is, a few months subsequent to the sale-deeds. The appellate Court having confirmed these findings of the trial court, defendants 1 to 3, the alienees have preferred this Second appeal.
5. On perusal of the judgments of the courts below it appears that the findings of fact arrived at by them are correct and cannot be challenged in this appeal. Mr. S.K Roy, learned counsel for the appellants contended that (1) in view of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, (Act XXX of 1956) defendant 4 became the full owner of the suit property and thus had the unfettered right to make any alienations she liked and the plaintiff is no more competent to institute the present reversionary suit; and (2) even if it is held that she has alienated the suit property in favour of defendants 1 to 3 without consideration and legal necessity, in, view of the findings of the courts below that sales were invalid, the possession of defendants 1 to 3 shall be deemed to be the possession of defendant No. 4 within the meaning of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, thus making her the full owner of the property.
6. The contentions of the learned counsel are based upon Sections 4 and 14 of the said Act, and it is necessary at this stage to notice the relevant provisions in the said sections here: Section 4 provides for the over-riding effect of this Act over all other; laws in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act, which apply to Hindus. In so far as they are inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in the Act That section has not abrogated all previous laws on Hindu Law. Section 14 provides that any property possessed by a female Hindu whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Thus, this Act which came into force on 17-6-56 brought revolutionary changes in the Hindu Law of succession having far-reaching effects. If bestowed absolute right of ownership on Hindu women and enlarged their limited right known so long to Hindu Law.
7. Thus, sec. 14 vested full ownership in a female Hindu of property held, by her whether before or after the commencement of the Act, provided the property was in her possession on the date of the Act. In the present case the alienations were made and possession was parted with by defendant 4 long prior to the passing of the Act. Therefore, in accordance with the clear terms of the provisions of Sec. 14, it cannot be contended that the suit property was still in possession of defendant No. 4 when the Act came into force, her own case being that she parted with the property after receiving full consideration under the aforesaid sale-deeds in the year 1952.
8. These very contentions as are now raised, were raised before the Division Bench of this Court and were negatived as would appear from the case reported in Sansir Patelin v. Satyabati Naikani, AIR 1958 Orissa 75, where a reversioner challenged the sale-deed on the ground that it was not for legal necessity; and their Lordships while dealing with the question of applicability of Section 4 of the Hindu Succession Act held that it is only those provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act that stand annulled by virtue of section 4 and the other provisions must be taken to be prevailing. A careful perusal of the several provisions of the Act shows that it was never the intention of the Parliament to abrogate all other previous laws on Hindu Law prevailing before the Act came into force on 17-6-56. The conception of a reversioner therefore still remains in respect of the properties in which the widow does not get the right of a full owner by virtue of the provisions of Section 14 of the Act. Thus, their Lordships held:
“Where a female heir transfers the property inherited by her before the Act came into force without any legal necessity, the does not get any absolute status in respect of it as it cannot be said that the property was in her possession. Further, the provisions of the Act are not meant to enhance the rights of the purchasers who at the time of their purchase knew full well that transaction was not for legal necessity. In such a case the transferee would be ??? to the interest that the female heir had at the time when the transfer took place, namely, the limited interest of the female heir and as the provisions of the Act do not apply to such cases, the old law prevailing among the Hindus regarding the rights of a reversioner must remain intact and must be followed by Courts of Justice.”
9. Their Lordships on coming to the above decision had relied upon the case reported in Venkayamma v. Veerayya, (S) AIR 1957 Andh Pra 280 and Gostha Behari Bera v. Haridas Samantra, (S) AIR 1957 Cal 557, wherein it was held that Sec. 14 has no application to a case where the female owner has parted with her property before the Act. The Kerala High Court also took the same view will appear from the case reported in Thailambal Ammal… v. Kesavan Nair…., AIR 1957 Kerala 88.
10. In this connection an observation by a Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in Laxmi Debi v. Surendra Kumar (S) AIR 1957 Orissa 1, is ???. In that case a reversioner during the lifetime of a widow came with a suit for declaration of his right as reversioner, and their Lordships held that if actually the widows had alienated any of the properties before coming into force of the Act and which were not in their possession at the time of the Act came into force, they do not become full owners in respect of those properties by virtue of Section 14 of the Act but as no such question regarding alienation arose in that appeal, the matter was left open.
11. In a Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court reported in Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1958 Pat 581, the scope and extent of the application of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession. Act came up for consideration. In that case the plaintiff asked for a declaration, that the deed or gift executed by a widow is not binding on the reversioner and is not valid beyond the life-time it the donor. Their Lordships held that a female Hindu cannot be deemed to be a owner of the property of which she made an absolute alienation before the date of commencement of the Act, and Sec. 14 cannot apply to such property and the limited interest of the widow in such property is not enlarged to an absolute interest. The Act was not certainly intended to benefit the alienees or to unduly enrich the alienees who with their eyes open purchased the properties from the limited Owner without justifying necessity before the Act came into force, and at time when the vendors held only limited interest of a Hindu woman.
12. In coming to this decision, their Lordships of the Patna High Court relied upon the aforesaid decisions of Andhra Pradesh and Korala High Courts noticed above, in view of this Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court as also of the Division Bench decision of this Court which is also the view of the various High Courts in India on the subject, it is no longer open to the learned counsel for the appellants to raise this contention. In fact, these decisions give complete answer to the questions raised by him.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in G.T.M Kotturuswami v. S. Veerayya, AIR 1959 SC 577, in support of his contention that the possession of the vendee in a case of this nature shall be deemed to be the possession of the vendor (defendant No. 4). In Supreme Court Case a reversioner challenged an adoption made by the widow and the nature of possession contemplated under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act came up for ??? before their Lordships. In that case the possession of the adopted son was however permissive and the Lordships held that even if it is assumed that the adoption was invalid and the adopted son was in actual possession, his possession was merely permissive and the widow must be regarded as being in constructive possession through the adopted son Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that case noticed the aforesaid decisions of the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Calcutta and Patna and accepted as correct the proposition of law as laid down in the Full Bench decision of the Patna High-Court reported in AIR 1958 Patna 581.
14. In the present case it is not a case of permissive possession of the defendants-appellants. They are in possession on their own right by virtue of the sale-deeds. Defendant 4, as stated earlier, had herself admitted to have parted with her interest and possession in the said property in favour of defendants 1 to 3. In view of this position, the decision of the Supreme Court noticed above cannot be said to support the contention raised on behalf of the appellants. No doubt, the possession under Section 14 of the Act need not necessarily be physical, but may also include the possession of a licensee, mortgagee, lessee etc., from the female owner, but there must be something to Show that she was still in control of the property as owner. Where, however, the property itself has been sold away and the possession delivered to the vendee, the vendor can to no sense be said to be still in control or possession of the property. In view of the findings of the Courts below that defendant 4 had already married sometime in Baisakha of 1953, it cannot be disputed that the had incurred a Civil death in her husband's family, of course after the alienations in question. Therefore in the circumstances, as aforesaid, it must be held that defendant 4, who had only a limited interest, had sold the same without any legal necessity and consideration. Therefore the sales are not binding on the plaintiff. Thus there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. But in view of the fact that the respondents have not appeared to contest this appeal, I will direct that each party with bear his own costs throughout.
GF/J/D.H.Z
15. Appeal dismissed.
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