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James Bushi v. Collector Of Ganjam And Another Opposite Parties.
Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the District Collector of Ganjam's order dated 2 March 1957 dismissing the petitioner from service.
The petitioner had been employed in the Ganjam Collectorate for about 13–14 years and was serving as Head-Clerk of the Civil Supplies Branch. During 1951–52 he was Head-Clerk at the Sub-Collector's Office, Berhampur. On receipt of information implicating him in corruption, a confidential preliminary investigation was conducted by C.I.D. officers of the Anti-Corruption Department. On 7 October 1955 the Government (Cabinet Department) asked the District Collector to initiate departmental proceedings and suggested that Inspector J.N. Ghosh (Anti-Corruption Department) might marshal evidence at the departmental inquiry.
On 23 October 1955 the District Collector framed four charges and directed a departmental inquiry to be held by the Sub-Collector of Berhampur. Inspector J.N. Ghosh marshalled the prosecution evidence and twenty-seven witnesses were examined. The Sub-Collector reported on 31 August 1956 finding the petitioner guilty on all four charges and recommended dismissal. The petitioner was supplied with the Sub-Collector's report and a show-cause notice (given in compliance with Article 311(2) of the Constitution). The petitioner submitted a lengthy representation. The District Collector reviewed the inquiry record and the representation, concluded the charges were established, and dismissed the petitioner on 2 March 1957.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the denial of permission to the petitioner to engage a lawyer in the departmental inquiry amounted to a breach of the rules of natural justice.
- Whether withholding copies of witnesses' statements made during the confidential C.I.D. investigation deprived the petitioner of a fair opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses.
- Whether refusal by the enquiring officer (Sub-Collector) to permit the petitioner to examine the C.I.D. officer (Sri J.N. Ghosh) or to recall P.W.1 (Mohan Nayak) for further cross-examination materially prejudiced the petitioner and violated principles of natural justice.
- Whether the denial of legal assistance to the petitioner, while the prosecution's case was marshalled by a trained C.I.D. Inspector, could amount to unfair discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. G.K. Misra)
- The petitioner was not permitted to engage a lawyer to defend him, despite the prosecution evidence being marshalled by a C.I.D. Inspector (Sri J.N. Ghosh) trained in evidence collection and prosecution.
- Copies of statements made by prosecution witnesses to the C.I.D. during the preliminary confidential investigation were not supplied, preventing effective cross-examination.
- The enquiring officer refused permission to examine Sri J.N. Ghosh and refused to recall P.W.1 (Mohan Nayak) for further cross-examination; these refusals materially prejudiced the petitioner's defence.
- Relying on Article 14, counsel argued that if a skilled prosecution agent (a C.I.D. Inspector) was effectively conducting the prosecution, fairness required that the petitioner be afforded equivalent legal assistance — otherwise such denial amounted to unfair discrimination.
- Mr. Misra relied on Andhra High Court observations in Dr. K. Subba Rao v. The State of Hyderabad (AIR 1957 Andh-Pra 414) for the proposition that refusal of professional help can, in some circumstances, amount to denial of a reasonable opportunity to defend.
Respondent / State's Arguments
- The Collector (and the enquiring officer) exercised discretion in departmental proceedings in not permitting legal representation; denial of a lawyer is not necessarily a violation of natural justice in such matters.
- Copies of statements given in the confidential C.I.D. investigation were withheld on claim of privilege under Section 124 of the Evidence Act (as advanced by the Advocate General).
- Refusals by the enquiring officer to permit examination of the C.I.D. Inspector or to recall a witness were matters for the enquiring officer's discretion and for appellate review by administrative authorities; such discretionary rulings do not automatically constitute violation of natural justice warranting interference by this Court under Article 226.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dr. K. Subba Rao v. The State of Hyderabad, AIR 1957 Andh-Pra 414 | The Andhra High Court held, in the peculiar facts of that case, that refusal of professional help was unjustified where the enquiry was not conducted fairly and genuine attempts by the officer to establish mala fides were thwarted. | The court distinguished that case from the present facts: unlike in K. Subba Rao, there was no suggestion here that the enquiring officer thwarted the petitioner or showed bias; the present inquiry recorded evidence exhaustively and allowed cross-examination. |
| Lakshminarain v. A.N. Puri, AIR 1954 Cal 335 | The opinion refers to this decision but does not state a specific principle from it in the text. | The court cited the case in the context of considering the petitioner's attainments and whether they were inferior to those of the C.I.D. officer; no detailed exposition of the precedent's rule is provided in the opinion. |
| Harbans Sahai v. Emperor, 13 Ind Cas 77 (Cal) | Quoted by the court for the proposition that if a preliminary (non-confidential) enquiry precedes a departmental inquiry, statements made during that preliminary enquiry should be furnished to permit cross-examination. | The court used this as a contrast to confidential C.I.D. investigations: Harbans Sahai supports disclosure where preliminary enquiries are non-confidential; the court held that confidential C.I.D. investigations stand on a different footing and disclosure is not required. |
| Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor, AIR 1944 Lah 434 | The case held that statements made to specially constituted confidential enquiry agencies were privileged and accused were not entitled to copies of such statements under Section 123 (as applied in that context). | The court relied on Nazir Ahmad to support the proposition that confidential C.I.D. statements are privileged and need not be disclosed in subsequent departmental enquiries. |
| Anton v. Rayner, (1958) 1 WLR 1300 (Court of Appeal, England) | Discussed the Crown's claim of privilege for certain police reports prepared by a Criminal Investigation Department officer; the claim of privilege in that context was upheld. | The court cited Anton v. Rayner to illustrate that claims of privilege for confidential police/CID reports have been recognized in other jurisdictions and to reinforce the view that confidential investigative material may be withheld. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by addressing the petitioner's three principal complaints in turn and applying legal principles only as stated in the opinion:
- Denial of legal representation: The Court noted that in departmental proceedings a delinquent officer is not, as of right, entitled to be represented by a lawyer; permission is within the enquiring officer's discretion. Whether denial of legal assistance breaches natural justice depends on whether the denial caused prejudice, taking into account the nature of the charges and the petitioner's own educational and other attainments.
- On the facts, the petitioner had long service and experience (about fourteen years in the Collectorate and had risen to Head Clerk). The charges were relatively straightforward (acceptance of illegal gratification under a promise to issue licenses). The Sub-Collector's inquiry recorded evidence exhaustively and allowed the petitioner to cross-examine almost all witnesses. Given these facts, the Court held that denial of a lawyer did not, without more, constitute denial of natural justice.
- Article 14 argument: The petitioner argued it was discriminatory to allow the prosecution to be assisted by a trained C.I.D. Inspector while denying him legal assistance. The Court analyzed whether Inspector J.N. Ghosh's role and attainments equated him to a prosecuting Court Sub-Inspector or a practising lawyer. Relying on the unchallenged affidavit of Sri J.N. Ghosh, the Court found he had primarily been engaged in investigation, not court work, and his attainments could not be equated to those of Court Sub-Inspectors or prosecuting inspectors. The Court also emphasized the petitioner's non-illiterate, experienced status. On these facts, the Article 14 complaint failed.
- Disclosure of C.I.D. statements: The Court accepted that while some provisions of the Evidence Act and CrPC are not directly applicable to departmental inquiries, principles of natural justice may require disclosure of prior statements in some contexts (for example, in regular police investigations or non-confidential preliminary enquiries—see S.162 CrPC spirit and Harbans Sahai). However, the Court drew a firm distinction for secret C.I.D. investigations (particularly Anti-Corruption Branch investigations): because of their confidential nature and the need to preserve the effectiveness of such investigations, authorities are entitled to claim privilege for statements given in them. The Advocate General had claimed privilege under Section 124 of the Evidence Act; the Court held that natural justice does not require disclosure of C.I.D. confidential statements recorded in a secret investigation preceding a departmental enquiry.
- Refusal to permit examination of the C.I.D. Inspector and recall of P.W.1: The Court held these matters are primarily within the discretion of the enquiring officer and are subject to administrative appellate review (Board of Revenue or State Government). Sri J.N. Ghosh had no personal knowledge and the enquiring officer's refusal to permit his examination could not be said to violate natural justice. As to Mohan Nayak (P.W.1), although permitting recall might have been better practice, a discretionary refusal does not automatically establish material prejudice; the District Collector, upon reviewing the evidence, held the charges proved. The Court declined to interfere with that administrative conclusion in this extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
- As a result of these assessments, the Court concluded there was no sufficient showing of denial of natural justice that would justify quashing the disciplinary dismissal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is DISMISSED.
Implications:
- The Court affirmed that denial of a lawyer in departmental proceedings does not automatically constitute denial of natural justice; the question depends on prejudice assessed against the nature of charges and the delinquent officer's ability to defend himself.
- The Court held that confidential C.I.D. investigations (particularly anti-corruption confidential inquiries) may be treated as privileged and that natural justice does not, in ordinary circumstances, require disclosure of statements made during such investigations to the delinquent officer in subsequent departmental proceedings.
- The Court emphasized the discretionary domain of the enquiring officer regarding examination or recall of witnesses and indicated that appellate administrative authorities are the primary forum to test alleged prejudice arising from such discretionary rulings; the High Court will not lightly intervene under Article 226 where the Collector has reviewed and affirmed the findings.
- Direct practical effect: the petitioner's challenge to his dismissal was rejected and the dismissal stands. The Court made no order as to costs. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel binding precedent beyond the case-specific rulings and distinctions it drew.
Note: The judgment records that Das, J. agreed, and concludes with "Petition dismissed."
R.L Narasimham, C.J:— This is a petition under Article 226 of the_ Constitution against the order of the District Collector of Ganjam dated the 2nd March 1957, dismissing the petitioner from service.
2. The petitioner was serving in Ganjam Collectorate for about 13 years and rose to the rank of Head-Clerk of the Civil Supplies Branch of that Collectorate at Chatrapur. In 1951-1952 the petitioner was working as the Head-clerk of the Civil Supplies, Branch of the Sub-Collector's Office at Berhampur. On receipt of information about corruption while he was working in that capacity, a preliminary confidential investigation was made by some C.I.D Officers of the Anti-Corruption Department and on the basis of that investigation, Government, in the Cabinet Department, addressed a letter to the District Collector of Ganjam on the 7th October 1955 (vide annexure B) requesting him to draw up departmental proceedings against the petitioner for disciplinary action. Government further suggested that a Police Officer of the rank of Inspector, of the Anti-Corruption Department, named Sri J.N Ghosh, might marshal the evidence against the petitioner during such departmental enquiry. On receipt of that letter the District Collector Magistrate of Ganjam on the 23rd October, 1955 framed four charges against the petitioner and directed the departmental enquiry to be held by the Sub-Collector of Berhampur. Before that Officer Sri J.N Ghosh marshalled the evidence of the prosecution and twenty-seven witnesses were examined against the petitioner. The Sub-Collector then submitted a report to the District Collector on the 31st August 1956, holding the petitioner guilty of all the four charges and recommending his dismissal from service.
3. A copy of the Sub-Collector's report was sent by the District Magistrate to the petitioner and he was called upon to show cause why he may not be dismissed from service. This notice was issued obviously in compliance with the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The petitioner then filed a lengthy representation to the District Collector, who after reviewing the entire evidence collected by the Enquiring Officer (Sub-Collector) and considering the representation made, by the petitioner, field that the, charges were established and passed final orders on the 2nd March 1957 dismissing him from service.
4. Mr. G.K Misra on behalf of the petitioner urged that the petitioner did not get an adequate opportunity to defend him self for the following reasons:
(i) The petitioner was not permitted to engage a lawyer to defend him though, as stated above the evidence against him was marshalled by C.I.D Officer of the rank of Inspector, viz., Sri J.N Ghosh, who was trained in the work of collecting evidence and prosecuting criminal cases.
(ii) The petitioner was not supplied with copies of statements made by the prosecution witnesses before the C.I.D during the ??? investigation which preceded the departmental enquiry, and he was thus effectively prevented from cross-examining these witnesses.
(iii) The petitioner's prayer for permission to examine Sri J.N Ghosh was rejected by the enquiring officer, and similarly his prayer for recalling P.W 1 Mohan Nayak for further cross-examination was also rejected. This action of the enquiring offcer materially prejudiced the petitioner in his defence.
5. In departmental proceedings against delinquent public servants they are not entitled, as of right, to be represented by a lawyer; and it is left to the discretion of the officer holding the enquiry to allow or refuse to allow a lawyer to represent the delinquent officer. Hence, the mere denial of such legal help will not necessarily involve failure to observe the rules of natural justice in all cases.
6. In considering the question of prejudice other factors such as the nature of the charges made against the public servant and his own educational and other attainments which have a bearing on the ability to defend himself without legal help, should also be considered. The petitioner had joined Ganjam Collectorate fourteen years before and had risen to the post of Head Clerk of the Civil Supplies branch of that office. The charges were simple in nature relating to the acceptance of illegal gratification from one Mohan Nayak (P.W 1) under promise of issuing a license to him for trading in food-grains and cloth.
7. A scrutiny of the evidence recorded by the Sub-Collector of Berhampur would show that there was proper cross-examination of the witnesses. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the rules of natural justice were not duly observed merely because the petitioner was denied an opportunity to engage a lawyer on his behalf.
8. Mr. Misra relied on some observations of the Andhra High Court reported in Dr. K. Subba Rao v. The State of Hyderabad, AIR 1957 Andh-Pra 414. In that case a departmental proceeding was initiated against a medical officer and his prayer for professional help to assist him in his defence was refused. His contention all along was that the proceeding against him was the result of pre-conceived planning and concerted action on the part of the Medical Department. Their Lordships of the Andhra High Court held, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, that his request for professional help was justified, that the officer who conducted the proceeding should have acceded to the same, and that his refusal to do so was tantamount to denying the petitioner an opportunity to defend himself. In that case, there was sufficient material to show that the enquiry itself was not conducted in a fair manner and hence their Lordships were constrained to say:
“We are satisfied that he was not given an opportunity much less a reasonable opportunity to establish his case of mala fide and that every genuine attempt made by him was thwarted by the enquiring officer.”
9. In the present case however it was not even suggested that the Sub-Collector of Berhampur who held the departmental enquiry was thwarting any attempt of the petitioner to defend himself or that the showed any bias against him. The evidence was recorded exhaustively in the presence of the petitioner and he cross-examined almost all of them. On the facts of this case, therefore, I would not go to the length of saying that the denial of legal help to the petitioner was tantamount to denial of, natural justice.
10. Mr. Misra thereupon raised all ingenious argument based on Article 14 of the Constitution. He urged that when the petitioner was denied legal help the authority conducting the case against him should also have been denied the legal help and both parties should have been put on an equal footing, it is admitted that the evidence against the petitioner was marshalled by the C.I.D Inspector, Sri J.N Ghosh, and the Sub-Collector's report shows that for all practical purposes this C.I.D Officer “conducted” the case “for the prosecution”. Mr. Misra urged that an experienced Police Officer of the rank of Sri Ghosh may be expected to be fairly conversant with criminal law and procedure and his attainments may be equated to those of a lawyer practising in Criminal Courts.
11. Hence if the “prosecution” (if I may use that expression) was given the assistance of such an Officer, in fairness to the petitioner he also should have been given facilities for defending himself with the assistance of a lawyer and the denial of such facilities would, in the circumstances of this case, amount to unfair discrimination. It is well known that, in Orissa, Criminal cases in Magistrate's Courts are ordinarily conducted by Police Officers attached to Courts known as Court Sub-Inspectors or Prosecuting Inspectors. This court can also take judicial notice of the fact that these officers have a fairly good knowledge of criminal law and procedure and many of them are in no way inferior in legal attainments to Pleaders or Mukhtars practising in criminal Courts.
12. Hence, if, as a fact, the proceedings against the petitioner had been conducted by a Court Sub-Inspector or by a Prosecuting Inspector there may be some justification for holding that the denial of legal help to the petitioner may amount to unfair discrimination and as such offend Article 14 of the Constitution. But there is no evidence to show that Sri J.N Ghosh was familiar with conducting cases in criminal Courts as is the case with Court-Sub-Inspectors or Prosecuting Inspectors. He was a mere C.I.D Officer of the rank of Inspector of Police whose primary job was to collect evidence by confidential investigation. He has also filed an affidavit before us (which has not been challenged), to show that apart from four month's training as Probationary Sub-Inspector attached to Courts in the early part of his service he was mostly working in police stations or in the C.I.D Special Branch, and that he was never posted to do Court work either as a Court sub-inspector or Prosecuting Inspector.
13. It may be that as a Police officer concerned with investigation he may have some knowledge of penal law including the law of Criminal procedure, but I do riot think that his legal attainments can be equalled to those of a court sub-inspector or Prosecuting Inspector or of a lawyer practising in a criminal Court. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the petitioner is not an illiterate layman, but an experienced member of the ministerial staff of the Collectorate who had worked for years in several branches of that office. I am not prepared to hold, in the absence of further materials, that the petitioner's attainments were in any way inferior to those of Sri f. N. Ghosh so as to justify the view that he was in any way prejudiced in his defence by the mere refusal of the enquiring officer to afford him legal assistance. In this connection I may refer to Lakshminarain v. A.N Puri AIR 1954 Cal 335.
14. Coming to the second point, it is admitted that copies of the statements made by witnesses during the preliminary confidential investigation by the C.I.D were not granted to the ??? during the departmental enquiry, even those witnesses were examined during the latter enquiry. Doubtless their previous ??? before the C.I.D might have been at some help to the petitioner in cross-examining them —village view to ??? if contradictions in any. But in rejecting the petitioner's prayer for grant of copies or those statements the Collector of Gai'jam merely stated annexure ??? that he was not ??? to copies of such statements. The learned Advocate General on behalf of the State claimed privilege for those documents, under Section 124 of the Evidence Act.
15. ??? speaking, neither the provisions of the Evidence Act nor those of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to departmental enquiries, but some of those provisions which are based on rules of natural justice may be held to apply. Thus if a witness is examined against a delinquent officer the latter should be given copies of the previous statements of that witness so as to enable him effectively to cross-examine his witness.
16. If such statements had been recorded in a regular police investigation under Chapter XIV of the Cr PC the delinquent officer should be given copies of these statements even though there was 110 regular criminal case, inasmuch as the spirit of S. 162 of that Code should be followed. Similarly if there was a preliminary enquiry (not of a confidential nature) preceding the holding of a regular departmental enquiry, the delinquent officer should be given copies of statements made by witnesses during that preliminary enquiry as pointed out by the Calcutta High Court in Harbans Sahai v. Emoeror 13 Ind Cas 77 (Cal).
17. But a secret investigation by the C.I.D specially of the Anti-Corruption Brunch, stands on an entirely different footing. The investigation by its nature is very confidential and is meant primarily for the purpose of finding out whether there is really a prima facie case for initiating a regular departmental enquiry ??? the public servant concerned. The authorities are entitled to claim privilege for statements made by witnesses in the course of such secret C.I.D investigation because, if such statements are disclosed it may virtu rby become impossible to collect any information whatsoever.
18. On this question the opinion of the investigating authority should ordinarily be taken as final. Even in a ??? criminal case ??? against an accused on the, basis of a secret C.I.D investigations, he would not be entitled to get copies of statements made by witnesses during. Much investigations inasmuch as these investigations are not made order any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure aril hence S. 123 of that Code, would ??? of no help. Thus in Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor AIR 1944 Lah 434 it was held that ??? given he persons during confide ??? enquiries made by the Specially Enquiry Agency set up by the Punjab Government, were ??? under Section 123 of the Evidence Act and the accused was not entiled to get copies of the same.
19. I may also refer to a very recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Eneland in Anton v. Rayner (1958) 1 WLR 1300, where the law dealing with the claim of pro village by the Crown in respect of certain police reports was hilly discussed and laid dawn. In that case the question for consideration was whether the report made by the officer of the ??? Yard of the Criminal Investigation Department was privileged or not in a subsequent civil suit for malicious prosecution and damages. The claim of privilege was upheld.
20. I am therefore of opinion that rule of natural justice does not require that copies of the statements made by witnesses during an investigation by the C.I.D preceding a departmental enquiry against a delinquent Government servant, should be given to that servant with a view to facilitate the cross-ex mutation of those witnesses.
21. The third point of Mr. Misra deals with the conduct of the enquiring officer. Sub-collector) of ??? in refusing permission to the petitioner to examine Sri J.N Ghosh, the C.I.D Inspector and to recall Mohan Nayak (p. W. 1) for the purpose of further cross-examination. These are matters to be considered primarily by the enquiring officer and by the appellate authority, namely the Board of Revenue or the State Government. Sri J.N Ghosh trad no personal knowledge of the case and if the enquiring officer refused the permit the petitioner to examine the C.I.D Inspector it cannot be said that the rules of natural justice were violated.
22. As regards Mohan Nayak he was undoubtedly the most important witness against the petitioner and was the first to be examined and also to be cross-examined. It might have been better on the part of the enquiring ofticer to have permitted the petitioner to recall and further cross-examine Mohan Nayak at a later stage. But, if, in his discretion, lie refused to grant such permission, the question as to how far such refusal materially prejudiced the petitioner would depend upon a careful review of the facts of the Case. This is primarily the function of the appellate authority and when the District Collector after reviewing the entire evidence held that the charges were proved, I do not think it will be proper for this Court to interfere with Bis order on this ground, in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 For the aforesaid reasons I would dismiss thus petition, but make no order as to costs.
Das, J.:— I agree.
K.S.B
23. Petition dismissed.
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