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Kruttivasa Padhy v. Malati Padhani And Others

Orissa High Court
Oct 30, 1958
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (R.L. Narasimham, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued for partition, mesne profits and consequential reliefs after being forcibly dispossessed of lands she claimed as the widow of Pitambar. Pitambar and his two brothers, Kruttibas (defendant 1) and Appanna (defendant 2), were said by the plaintiff to have partitioned their joint family properties by an award of four arbitrators dated 9-7-1929 (Ext. 6). At that time Pitambar was a minor and his mother, Dommi Dei, acted as his guardian and accepted the award on his behalf. By the award certain schedules of property fell to Pitambar's share, some were allotted otherwise, some were kept joint, and some given to Surekha as dowry.

After the award, Kruttibas remained in separate possession of his share. Pitambar (who later married the plaintiff) and Appanna lived together; Pitambar died in 1936 leaving the plaintiff a childless widow. Appanna managed the plaintiff's share until 26-3-1938 and executed a settlement (Ext. D / Ext. 1) acknowledging payments and delivering possession; later Appanna conveyed some properties (e.g., schedule J for Rs. 700, Ext. 2).

Hostilities arose when the plaintiff refused to adopt Appanna's son Saratha as her husband's son; defendants 1 and 2 dispossessed the plaintiff of properties (forcible dispossession culminating after an acquittal in a criminal case), and the plaintiff filed the suit on 22-3-1947. The trial court entered decree for partition in the plaintiff's favour, rejected the defendants' claims (including that no 1929 partition took place), and disbelieved the alleged adoption of Saratha by the plaintiff. Defendants 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 9 appealed; this opinion is the appellate determination affirming the lower court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Pitambar died while in a state of jointness with his brother Appanna (i.e., was he a coparcener at death) (issue no. 2).
  2. Whether defendant 6 (Saratha) was validly taken in adoption by the plaintiff as a son of her deceased husband Pitambar (issue no. 16).
  3. Whether the alleged 1929 award (Ext. 6) is admissible and genuine and, if signed by parties, whether it became a deed of partition requiring registration (i.e., admissibility/registrability/authenticity of Ext. 6).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Case (Respondent)

  • The joint family properties of Pitambar and his two brothers were partitioned by arbitrators by an award dated 9-7-1929 (Ext. 6), with Pitambar's share identified in schedules A and B.
  • Pitambar's mother Dommi Dei accepted the award on his behalf when he was a minor.
  • Following the award and later settlements (including Ext. D / Ext. 1 and conveyance Ext. 2), the plaintiff regained possession of lands allotted to her husband's share; she was later forcibly dispossessed, prompting the suit.
  • The adoption of Saratha by the plaintiff did not take place (or is not proven), so Saratha is not entitled to Pitambar's share.

Defendants' Case (Appellants)

  • There was no partition in 1929 as alleged; defendant 1 had already partitioned before 1924 during his father’s lifetime and lived separately on his own share.
  • Defendant 1 made subsequent self-acquisitions from his earnings which are not subject to partition in this suit (issue no. 6 was framed on this point but not much pressed).
  • Pitambar and Appanna remained joint until Pitambar’s death; therefore Appanna, as the surviving coparcener, was entitled to their father's properties (other than what had gone to defendant 1).
  • The plaintiff was at best entitled to maintenance as the widow of an undivided coparcener, not to the coparcenary share.
  • The plaintiff purported to adopt Saratha (defendant 6) on 10-11-1943 as Pitambar's son, thereby divesting the plaintiff of the interest to Saratha; defendants asserted this adoption conferred Pitambar's interest on Saratha.
  • Ext. 6 was challenged as (a) not being an original (only a copy) and therefore inadmissible without the original, (b) being in substance a deed of partition (signed by the parties) and thus requiring registration, and (c) possibly not genuine at all.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Teklal Singh v. Sripati Chowdhury, 18 CWN 475 (AIR 1914 Cal 273 (2)) Old decision supporting the view that where an award includes lists of properties and is signed by the parties it may be treated as a deed of partition (and hence registrable). The court noted this is an older authority supporting conversion of an award into a deed by party signatures, but ultimately did not follow this view.
Ralia Ram v. Dunichand, 66 Ind Cas 118 (Lahore) Held that a list of properties awarded by arbitrators formed part of the award and that signatures of the parties did not convert it into a registrable deed of partition. The court cited and treated this and similar authorities as supporting the proposition that signatures did not alter the document's character as an award.
Yemnava v. Revanshiddappa, AIR 1927 Bom 656 Similar view to Ralia Ram: party signatures on an award do not necessarily make it a deed of partition requiring registration. Used as part of the line of authority which the court accepted against the view that signatures converted an award into a registrable deed.
Mangli Pershad v. Babu Ram, AIR 1929 All 365 Adopted the contrary view to the Calcutta decision in 18 Cal WN 475, aligning with the view that an award remains an award despite parties' signatures. Referred to as part of the body of decisions supporting the court's conclusion that Ext. 6 remained an award and was not compulsorily registrable as at the relevant time.
Mt. Jasoda v. Punit Singh, AIR 1934 Pat 48 Patna decision following the Bombay and Allahabad view that signatures on an award do not necessarily convert it into a registrable deed. The court expressly aligned with the Patna view and relied on it in concluding Ext. 6 was an award and admissible.
Kanshi Ram v. Harnam Das, AIR 1940 Lah 73 Observed that where an award is written on behalf of an arbitrator, party signatures alone do not change its original nature. The court cited this later Punjab decision as consistent with the view it accepted and supported its conclusion about Ext. 6.
Indian Registration Act (amendment of 1934) After the 1934 amendment, awards of arbitrators partitioning immovable property became compulsorily registrable. The court noted this statutory change but observed that it post-dated the 1929 award; the discussion concerned the law as it stood in 1929. The court therefore considered Ext. 6 under the pre-1934 legal position and held it admissible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several discrete steps, each constrained by the evidence and the law as described in the opinion.

  1. Assessment of Ext. 6 (the 9-7-1929 award): The document was a central piece of evidence. The court examined testimony of two arbitrators (P.W.2 and P.W.6), who described the contemporaneous preparation of four quadruplicate documents, one on higher denomination stamp paper (the "main" copy) and three on lower denomination stamp paper, scribed by the same professional scribe and initialled on every page and signed by all arbitrators.
  2. Originals versus copies and secondary evidence: The court accepted the witnesses' account that all four contemporaneously prepared, signed and initialled documents were originals. The court held that Ext. 6—though not the "main" higher-denomination copy retained by Agadhu—was nonetheless an original produced contemporaneously and signed by arbitrators and scribe; therefore it was not subject to exclusion under the rule of secondary evidence. The court observed that the parties' actual signatures accepting the award were found on the main copy, and that in the other copies there was a mention endorsing that fact; this did not render Ext. 6 inadmissible.
  3. Registrability question: The court considered whether party signatures on an award convert its true character into a deed of partition requiring registration. After reviewing conflicting authorities, the court sided with the line of cases from Bombay, Allahabad, Patna and Punjab which held that signatures by the parties did not change the character of an arbitrators' award into a deed of partition. The court noted the statutory amendment in 1934 (which later made awards compulsorily registrable) but emphasised that the 1929 award must be judged under the law then prevailing. On that basis the court held Ext. 6 was not a deed of partition and was not compulsorily registrable at the time.
  4. Credibility and corroboration: The court evaluated witnesses for possible bias (noting some inimical disposition of P.W.6 towards defendant 1) but found P.W.2 to be a respectable, credible witness. The court found no inherent improbability in the account that the arbitrators had been orally requested earlier and had prepared the award the next day. The court also relied on subsequent unchallenged documentary acts by defendants 1 and 2 (post-1929 documents) which showed recognition of the award as genuine and that Pitambar had separated from his brothers pursuant to the award.
  5. Possession and settlement: The court accepted documentary evidence (Ext. 1 / Ext. D / Ext. 2) that defendant 2 had rendered accounts and effected settlement with the plaintiff, that he gave up possession of her share, and that the plaintiff exercised possession thereafter (by leasing to tenants). The court concluded she had regained possession of most lands allotted to Pitambar's share after the 26-3-1938 settlement, though later forcibly dispossessed.
  6. Adoption issue: The court examined the defendants' oral evidence alleging adoption of Saratha by the plaintiff on 10-11-1943. The court found the oral testimony unreliable in the peculiar factual setting, noting absence of contemporaneous documents (no mutation, no rent receipts in the boy's name, and no other documentary markers of adoption). The court held that the lack of documentary corroboration, in light of earlier family transactions and subsequent behaviour, rendered the defendants' case on adoption unbelievable.
  7. Conclusion from evidence: On the combined assessment—authenticity and admissibility of Ext. 6, corroborating later documents, evidence of settlement and possession, and disbelief of the adoption claim—the court agreed with the trial court's findings: (a) Pitambar had been separated by the 1929 award and thus did not die as a joint coparcener with Appanna; and (b) the alleged adoption of Saratha by the plaintiff was not proved.

Holding and Implications

Final ruling: The appeal was dismissed and the judgment and decree of the trial court were affirmed. The appellate court agreed with the lower court on the key factual and legal conclusions.

Implications:

  • The decree for partition and related reliefs in favour of the plaintiff as entered by the trial court stands; the plaintiff's entitlement to the share of her deceased husband (Pitambar) is upheld by this judgment.
  • The alleged adoption of Saratha by the plaintiff was found not proved and thus did not divest the plaintiff of Pitambar's share.
  • The court held (consistent with the Patna/Bombay/Allahabad/Punjab line of authority) that Ext. 6 was an award and not transformed into a deed of partition merely because party signatures appeared in one copy; accordingly Ext. 6 was admissible. The court also noted the 1934 amendment to the Indian Registration Act (which later made awards registrable) but applied the law as it stood in 1929.
  • No broader, novel legal principle was laid down by the court beyond its application of the existing line of authorities favouring the view that party signatures do not, by themselves, convert an arbitrators' award into a registrable deed; the immediate consequence is the affirmation of the trial decree and the dismissal of the appeal with costs.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed." Both R.L. Narasimham, C.J. and G.C. Das, J. concurred.

Show all summary ...

R.L Narasimham, C.J:— This is an appeal by the contesting defendants (Defendants 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 9) against the judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Berhampur, passing a preliminary decree for partition, for estimation of mesne profits, and for other consequential reliefs in favour of the plaintiff. The following is the pedigree showing the relationship of the parties.

2. The plaintiff's case was that the joint family properties of her husband Pitambar and his two brothers, Kruttibas and Appanna, were partitioned by metes and bounds by four arbitrators by an award dated 9-7-1929 (Ext. 6). At that time, her husband was a minor and his mother guardian Dommi Dei accepted the award on his behalf. By virtue of the said award, the properties described in schedules A and B fell to Pitambar's share. The properties described in schedule D were given to Dommi Dei for her maintenance during her lifetime to be divided equally amongst the three sons after her death, and the properties described in schedule L were given away to Surekha as her marriage dowry. The properties described in schedule C were kept joint because the interest of the family in these properties consisted of only a fractional share, the remaining shares belonging to other co-sharers.

3. The other two brothers namely Kruttibas and Appanna were also allowed their respective shares, but subsequendy the properties described in schedules J and K were transferred to either Pitambar or his widow Malati (Plaintiff). After partition, the eldest brother, namely Krutibas (defendant) remained in separate possession of his share, but the other two brothers namely Pitambar and Appanna, lived together mainly because Pitambar was a minor and Appanna managed Ins share of the properties also.

4. Dommi Dei died in due course and Pitambar after marrying the plaintiff died sometime in 1936 within two years of her joining him, leaving her a childless widow. Appanna (defendant 2) however continued to manage her share of the properties until 26-3-1938. He rendered account of his management of her share, and by a document Ext. D dated 26-3-1938 agreed to pay her 45 Bharanams and 14 nowties of paddy, cash of Rs. 741 and 7½ tolas of gold in full settlement of accounts.

5. He also gave up possession of her share, and she exercised possession over the same by leasing out her lands to various tenants. Again on 22-3-1941 he made some payments towards the dues of the plaintiff as acknowledged in his deed of settlement (Ext. 1) and also made the necessary endorsements (Ext. 1-a) on that document. Not content with that, he on 3-4-1941 also conveyed to her the properties described in schedule J for Rs. 700 (Ext. 2) towards discharge of the balance of the debt due.

6. Subsequently, however, troubles arose mainly because the plaintiff was unwilling to adopt his second son Saratha (defendant 6) to her deceased husband. Defendants 1 and 2 then made common cause against her and forcibly dispossessed her from some of her properties. She then brought a criminal case through her tenant Padmanabh Panigrahi against them, but they successfully defended themselves and got acquitted. This acquittal so much emboldened them, that they forcibly dispossessed her of almost all her properties leaving her no other alternative but to bring the present suit under appeal on 22-3-1947.

7. Defendants 1 and 2 who are the main contesting defendants have made common cause and alleged that there was no partition of the joint family properties in 1929 as alleged. According to them defendant 1 alone partitioned during the lifetime of his father prior to 1924 and lived separate with his share of the joint family properties. Subsequendy he made several acquisitions from his own earnings which were not available for partition in the present dispute. They further alleged that the plaintiffs husband Pitamber and defendant 2 remained joint throughout till Pitambar's death and that consequently defendant 2 as the sole surviving coparcener of the joint family, was entided to all the properties of his father excluding those that were given on partition to defendant 1.

8. According to them, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to nothing but maintenance as the widow of an undivided deceased coparcener. They further alleged that the plaintiff took in adoption Saratha (defendant 6) the second son of defendant 2 on 10-11-1943, as a son to her deceased husband Pitambar, and that consequently, Saratha alone was entided to the interest of Pitambar in the joint family property.

9. Though 22 issues were framed, including a specific issue (issue no. 6) about the self-acquisitions of defendant 1, most of the issues were not pressed and the parties went to trial mainly in respect of the following two important issues:

(i) Whether Pitambar died while in a state of jointness with his brother Appanna (issue no. 2); and

(ii) Whether defendant 6 was validly taken in adoption by the plaintiff, (issue No. 16).

10. The trial court rejected the contention of defendant 1 that he effected a partition with his father during the latter's lifetime and held that the three brothers effected partition by metes and bounds by virtue of the award given by the arbitrators in 1929. He therefore held that Pitambar died in 1936 as a divided brother of defendants 1 and 2 and that consequently his widow (plaintiff) was entitled to succeed to his share. He also disbelieved the story of adoption of defendant 6 by the plaintiff as put forward by the defendants and hence decreed the plaintiff's suit. These questions were also canvassed in this appeal and they are the main questions for decision by us.

11. The most important document in this case is the award of the arbitrators dated 9-7-1929 (Ext. 6) which clearly says that the joint family properties of the three brothers (Pitambar being represented by his mother-guardian Dommi Dei) were partitioned by metes and bounds and separate shares were allotted to each of the three, though some properties were kept joint. If this document be held to be genuine, the plaintiff's case of partition must necessardy succeed. On behalf of the defendants, therefore, themselves the admissibility of the document was challenged on the following grounds:

(i) that it is not an original award but only a copy, and as such, inadmissible due to non-explanation for production of the original.

(ii) that, in any case, it is, in essence, a deed of partition and as it was not registered it is inadmissible.

12. Apart from inadmissibility it was further alleged that no such award was in fact executed and that it is not a genuine document.

13. The four arbitrators mentioned in the award are (1) Karji Karima Sindhu Dhyana Samanto (P.W 6) who is an agnatic cousin of the family, (2) Ballabb Padhy (father of P.W 7) who was the husband of the sister of the mother of defendants 1 and 2, (3) Ganapathi Babartha (P.W 2) father-in-law of Surekha and (4) Agadhu Satapathy, Revenue Inspector of the estate residing in the village. Two of the arbitrators, namely Agadhu and Ballabh are dead, but the other two have appeared as witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff viz., P.Ws 2 and 6 and have spoken about the partition effected by them amongst the three brothers, the drawing up of the award and their signing the same.

14. Their evidence shows that four copies of the award were prepared at the same time, the main copy being scribed on stamp paper of higher denomination and kept with one of the arbitrators, namely Agadhu Satapathy, and the other three copies being scribed on stamp paper of lower denomination and signed by all the arbitrators and one copy given to each one of the three contesting parties. Every page of every one of the documents scribed on stamp paper of lower denomination was initialled by the arbitrators and the last page was signed by all of them.

15. The main copy scribed on stamp paper of higher denomination was however signed by defendants 1 and 2 and by Dommi Dei on behalf of Pitambar and in the other three copies a note was made to the effect that in the main copy the parties themselves had affixed their signatures. Ext. 6 is the copy which was handed over to defendant 2 but which subsequently came into the possession of the plaintiff. I see no reason to disbelieve the evidence of the two arbitrators, P.Ws 2 and 6, regarding the circumstances under which Ext. 6 came into existence.

16. Both of them are common relations of the parties. Doubtless P.W 6 seems to be somewhat inimically disposed towards defendant 1 and had deposed against him in some criminal cases. But P.W 2 seems to be a very respectable gentleman. He is the father-in-law of defendant 9 Surekha who is the sister of defendants 1 and 2. He is an old man aged about 65 years and nothing has been brought out to discredit his testimony. This witness also stated that the parties asked the four arbitrators to settle their disputes, first orally and then after the arbitrators had made careful enquiries and made tentative notes about the respective shares of the parties, they were asked to execute a muchalika consenting to arbitration by these two gentlemen, and that, on the very next day, namely 9-7-1929, the award was written out on stamp paper produced by the parties.

17. Though the actual scribing of the award on the very next day after the written consent of the parties to the appointment of arbitrators may look somewhat suspicious, the evidence of P.W 2 shows that the parties had requested them orally some days prior to that date to settle their dispute. Hence I see no inherent improbability in the evidence of P.W 2.

18. The award (Ext. 6) is itself an original and not a copy. If the evidence of P.W 2 be believed the award was prepared in quadruplicate and all the four documents were scribed by one Narayan Panda a professional scribe and signed by all the arbitrators—every page having been initialled. Ext. 6 cannot, therefore, be a mere copy subject to the rule of secondary evidence as given in the Evidence Act. The mere fact that the main document was written on stamp paper of higher denomination and was left with one of the arbitrators, namely Agadhu, will not show that the other three documents prepared at the same time and signed by all the arbitrators, are also not originals.

19. So long as all the documents contain the signatures of the scribe and of the arbitrators they are originals. It is true that the parties' signatures are found only in one of the documents signifying the acceptance of the award and in the other three documents there is only a mere mention of this fact. The lower court was therefore right in saying that so far as the acceptance of the award is concerned the endorsement on Ext. 6 (Ext. 6(a)) may be a copy and not the original but that so far the award itself is concerned, Ext. 6 is as good as original as the document that was given to Agadhu. Its admissibility is, in my opinion, beyond question.

20. It is conceded that in the year 1929 an award of an arbitrator partitioning immovable property was not compulsorily registrable. But it was argued that inasmuch as the award was accepted by the parties and signed by them it became, in substance, a deed of partition and as such was compulsorily registrable. This leads to the question as to whether when an award is made by arbitrators, and is signed by the arbitrators and also by the parties, its true character changed and it becomes a deed of partition.

21. Though there are some old decisions supporting such a view: see Teklal Singh v. Sripati Chowdhury 18 CWN 475 : (AIR 1914 Cal 273 (2)) later decisions of the Lahore, Bombay, Allahabad and Patna High Courts are against this view. Thus in a Lahore case reported in Ralia Ram v. Dunichand, 66 Ind Cas 118, it was held that a list of properties awarded by arbitrators to different members of a Hindu joint family on partition formed part of the award and the mere fact that they were signed by the parties themselves did not make it compulsorily registrable. In Yemnava v. Revanshiddappa AIR 1927 Bom 656 a similar view was taken.

22. In Mangli Pershad v. Babu Ram AIR 1929 All 365 the Calcutta view in 18 Cal WN 475 : (AIR 1914 Cal 273 (2)) was dissented from and the contrary view was adopted. In Mt. Jasoda v. Punit Singh AIR 1934 Pat 48 the Bombay and Allahabad view was followed. In 1934 by virtue of the amendment made to the Indian Registration Act even an award became compulsorily registrable and consequently there are not many decisions after that year dealing with this question.

23. The only later decision which learned counsel, after careful research on the subject, could cite was Kanshi Ram v. Harnam Das, AIR 1940 Lah 73 where also it was pointed out that where an award is written on behalf of an arbitrator, the mere fact that the parties signed it will not alter the original nature of that document. I would in agreement with the Patna view mentioned above which is supported by that of Bombay, Allahabad and Punjab, hold that notwithstanding the signatures of the parties the document Ext. 6 was in reality an award of the arbitrators and not a deed of partition and, as the law then stood, it was not compulsorily registrable. Ext. 6 is therefore admissible in evidence.

24. There are subsequent documents of unimpeachable genuineness executed by defendants 1 and 2 which clearly show that they recognised the award to be genuine and admitted that their brother Pitambar had separated from them by virtue of that award. (His Lordship then considered other documentary evidence regarding partition and possession of the plaintiff and continued as under)—I would, therefore, in agreement with the lower court hold that after the settlement of accounts on 26-3-1938 (Ext. 1) between the plaintiff and defendant 1 she regained possession of most of the lands allotted to her husband's share though she was forcibly dispossessed sometime in 1943.

25. (His Lordship after rejecting other objections of the defendants, considered the oral evidence on the issue of alleged adoption by the plaintiff and concluded as follows:) Hence, though a document or deed of adoption is not always necessary to prove the factum of adoption, in the peculiar circumstances of this case and bearing in mind the previous transactions of the family and the difference that had arisen between the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants 1 and 2 on the other, the absence of such a document would render the oral evidence of the defendants on this question unbelievable.

26. There is also no later document to show that the boy Saratha was ever treated as the adopted son of Pitambar. If the adoption was really true, one would expect defendant 2 in the usual course to get the name of the boy mutated describing him as the adopted son of Pitambar and to see that the cist receipts were also issued in his name. This was admittedly not done, and D.W 2 was compelled to admit that there was not a single document to establish the alleged adoption.

27. I would, therefore, in agreement with the learned lower Court, hold that the oral evidence of the defence witnesses about the so-called adoption of Saratha on 10-11-1943, is not believable. The judgment and decree of the lower court are affirmed and the appeal is dismissed with costs.

G.C Das, J.:— I agree.

D.R.R

28. Appeal dismissed.