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Satrughan Mall v. Revenue Commissioner, Orissa Opposite Party.

Orissa High Court
Apr 6, 1955
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was assessed to agricultural income-tax for the year 1947–1948 on 28-2-1949. He appealed to the Collector of Agricultural Income-tax under Section 25, and that appeal was disposed of on 7-9-1949 with directions to modify the assessment order. The petitioner then filed a revision petition under Section 28 before the Revenue Commissioner. After a remand, the Revenue Commissioner finally disposed of the revision on 9-2-1951, holding that the Collector's appellate order was correct and there was no ground for revision.

The petitioner was informed by a letter from the Superintendent dated 16-2-1951, received 19-2-1951, stating only: “The R.C has been pleased to pass orders on the above mentioned case on 9-2-51. The petition has been rejected.” The reasons for the rejection were not communicated in that letter. The petitioner applied for and obtained a copy of the Revenue Commissioner's order by applying on 21-2-1951 and receiving the copy on 8-3-1951.

The petitioner filed an application under Section 29(2) of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act for the Revenue Commissioner to state a case on 30-4-1951. The Revenue Commissioner held that the application was time-barred and that he had no jurisdiction to condone the delay. This application under sub-section (4) of Section 28 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act challenges that rejection on the ground of time-bar.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Revenue Commissioner's view that the petitioner's application under Section 29(2) was time-barred was correct.
  2. Whether Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act (excluding the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order when computing limitation) applies to applications under the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act, in the absence of an express exclusion in that Act.
  3. Whether Section 44 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act, which excludes time for obtaining a copy only in computing limitation for appeals, operates as an express exclusion of Section 12 of the Limitation Act for applications (i.e., whether it prevents Section 12(2) from applying to applications under Section 29(2)).
  4. Whether the language of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act—expressly limited to appeals, review of judgment and leave to appeal—can be applied to an application under Section 29(2) (an application to the Revenue Commissioner to state a case to the High Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Income-tax Authorities (Mr. Mohapatra)

  • First, that Section 44 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act must be read as having the effect of expressly excluding the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, so Section 12(2) would not apply to proceedings under the Orissa Act.
  • Second, that even if Section 12(2) applied in principle, that sub-section is in terms limited to (i) appeals, (ii) applications for review of judgment, and (iii) applications for leave to appeal, and therefore it cannot be extended to an application under Section 29(2) of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act to state a case for the High Court.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the petitioner's separate legal argumentation beyond the fact of his application and that he sought exclusion of the time spent in obtaining a copy of the revenue order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohanlal v. Commr. Income-tax, B. & O. — AIR 1930 Pat 14 Adopted a liberal construction that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act applies to applications to the income-tax authority to state a case (in context of Section 63(1) of the Income-tax Act as it then stood). The court adopted the reasoning of this decision by analogy to hold that Section 12(2) should apply to an application under Section 29(2) of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act so that time for obtaining a copy of the revisional order is excluded.
Ramanath Reddiar v. Commr. Income-tax — AIR 1928 Rang 152 Held that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act should be given a liberal construction so it applies to an application to state a case under the Income-tax provisions; stressed that without knowledge of reasons in an order an assessee cannot form a question of law. The court relied on this reasoning to conclude that a mere intimation of rejection without reasons does not enable the assessee to decide whether a question of law arises; hence time to obtain the order should be excluded.
Md. Havat Haji Md v. Commr. Income-tax, Punjab & NWFP — AIR 1929 Lah 170 Applied a liberal construction of the Limitation Act provision (Section 12(2)) to applications to the income-tax authority to state a case. The court accepted the approach in this case as supportive of applying Section 12(2) to applications under the Orissa Act by analogy and to justify excluding time spent in obtaining a copy of the order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with the textual provision of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, which states that Sections 4, 9–18 and 22 of the Limitation Act shall apply to periods of limitation prescribed by any special or local law only insofar as they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Because the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act contains no clause expressly excluding those sections of the Limitation Act, the court held that Section 12 of the Limitation Act must apply to the Orissa Act.

Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act provides that, when computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an application for review of judgment, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order of the lower court should be excluded. The Revenue Commissioner contended (1) that Section 44 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act (which excludes the day of the order and time requisite for obtaining a copy only for appeals) amounted to an express exclusion of Section 12, and (2) that Section 12(2) by its terms applies only to appeals/review/leave and not to an application to state a case under Section 29(2).

On the first point, the court rejected the contention that Section 44 effected an express

On the second point the court acknowledged that Section 12(2) is in terms limited to appeals, applications for review, and leave to appeal, and thus on strict construction would not directly help an application under Section 29(2) of the Orissa Act. However, the court relied on prior High Court decisions interpreting corresponding provisions in the Indian Income-tax Act (the three cited precedents) which had adopted a liberal construction and held that Section 12(2) applied to applications to state a case under the income-tax provisions. The court found the reasons in those cases persuasive and adoptable.

The court explained the practical rationale: where the revisional authority's order is communicated to an assessee without reasons (a mere intimation of rejection), the assessee cannot determine whether a question of law arises until he has seen the reasons. Therefore, the time necessary to obtain a copy of the order should ordinarily be excluded when computing the limitation period for filing an application under Section 29(2).

The court further noted procedural and legislative remedies: it recommended that the State Government consider prescribing a statutory form for applications under Section 29(2) that would require annexing a copy of the order, and suggested that Section 44 of the Orissa Act be amended on the lines of Section 67-A of the Indian Income-tax Act to include revisions and applications under Section 29.

Both Narasimham, J. and Panigrahi, C.J. agreed that Section 12 of the Limitation Act applies in the present circumstances and that the Revenue Commissioner's view on limitation was erroneous. Panigrahi, C.J. additionally analysed the language of Section 29(2) of the Orissa Act, distinguishing between “date of notice of the order” and the “date of the order,” and concluding that because the order was not pronounced in the presence of the assessee (and only a notice of rejection was communicated), the assessee could not form the necessary question of law until he received the order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court set aside the Revenue Commissioner's order of 16-5-1951 and directed that the application under Section 29(2) of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act, filed before the Revenue Commissioner, be treated as having been filed within the period of limitation and be disposed of according to law. The court ordered that a hearing fee of Rs. 150/- be paid to the petitioner.

Direct effect on the parties: The Revenue Commissioner’s determination that the petitioner's application was time-barred was reversed; the application is to be regarded as timely and must be considered on its merits by the Revenue Commissioner.

Implications and observations made by the court: The court applied established High Court precedents interpreting the Limitation Act liberally in the context of applications to state a case and suggested procedural and legislative improvements (a prescribed form for Section 29(2) applications to require enclosing the relevant order, and amendment of Section 44 to extend its protection to revisions and Section 29 applications). The opinion did not purport to create a novel rule of law beyond applying and adopting the reasoning of earlier authorities; it also emphasized the textual requirement that a special or local law must expressly exclude Limitation Act provisions before those provisions will be held inapplicable.

Application allowed.

Show all summary ...

Narasimham, J.:— This is an application under sub-s. (4) of Section 28 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1947 against an order of the Revenue Commissioner, Orissa, rejecting an application under sub-s. (2) of S. 29 of that Act on the ground that it was time-barred.

2. The material facts are as follows: The petitioner was assessed to agricultural income tax for the year 1947-1948 on 28-2-1949. His appeal to the Collector of Agricultural Income-tax under S. 25 of that Act was disposed of on 7-9-1949 with some directions to the Agricultural Income-tax officer to modify the assessment order in the light of the instructions contained in the judgment. The petitioner then filed a revision petition under S. 28 of the Act before the Revenue Commissioner which after a remand was finally disposed of on 9-2-1951 with an order to the effect that the appellate order of the Collector of Agricultural Income-tax was correct and that there was no ground for revision of his order. The Superintendent of the Revenue Commissioner's office communicated the result of the Revenue Commissioner's order to the petitioner by his letter dated 16-2-1951 which was received by the petitioner on 19-2-51. The contents of that letter are as follows:

“The R.C has been pleased to pass orders on the above mentioned case on 9-2-51. The petition has been rejected.”

3. The reasons given by the Revenue Commissioner for rejecting the revision petition were, however, not communicated to the petitioner. Then the petitioner applied for a copy of the order of the Revenue Commissioner on 21-2-1951 and received it on 8-3-1951. The application to the Revenue Commissioner under S. 29(2) of the Act for stating a case was filed on 30-4-1951. If the time taken for obtaining a copy of the Revenue Commissioner's order under S. 28 be excluded, that application would be within the time-limit of sixty days prescribed in S. 29(2). If, however, that period is not excluded the application is clearly time-barred.

4. The Revenue Commissioner took the view that the application was time-barred and that he had no jurisdiction to condone the delay and the main question for consideration now is whether the view taken by the Revenue Commissioner on the question of limitation is correct.

5. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act says clearly that

“for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions of Ss. 4, 9 to 18 and 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not ‘expressly’ excluded by such special or local law”.

6. There is no provision in the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act expressly excluding those sections of the Limitation Act. Consequently, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, S. 12 of that Act must be held to apply to the provisions of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act says that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for review of judgment, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the order of the lower Court should be excluded.

7. Mr. Mohapatra, on behalf of the Income-tax authorities, urged two grounds against the application of Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act to the present case. Firstly, he urged that by virtue of Section 44 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act, it must be held that the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act were expressly excluded. Secondly, even if it be held that S. 12(2) applies that sub-section is expressly limited to (i) appeal, (ii) application for review of judgment, & (in) application for leave to appeal & cannot be extended to an application to the Revenue Commissioner to state a case for the decision of the High Court. In my opinion, neither of these two contentions can be accepted. Section 44 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act runs thus:

“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any appeal under this Act, the day on which the order complained of was made and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of such order shall be excluded.”

8. Doubtless, the language of this section is almost identical with that of sub-s. (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act; the only difference being the express restriction of the provisions of Section 44 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act to appeals only. Mr. Mohapatra urged that in view of this express provision in the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act itself it should be held that the Legislature intended to exclude Section 12 of the Limitation Act altogether.

9. Such an inference may follow by implication: but I cannot accept Mr. Mohapatra's contention that Section 44 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act has the effect of “expressly” excluding Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The language of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is clear and unambiguous. Unless there is express exclusion in any special or local law, Section 12 of the Limitation Act would apply to all applications under chat special or local law.

10. It is true that in many instances an inference which follows by necessary implication from a provision of a statute is taken to be equivalent to an inference that arises out of an express provision in the statute. But in view of the language of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act inferences arising out of necessary implication should not be taken into consideration in deciding whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act would apply or not. It is true that this will lead to some overlapping so far as appeals under the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act are concerned, but in respect of other classes of applications under that Act, Section 12 of the Limitation Act would come into operation.

11. The second objection raised by Mr. Mohapatra is more difficult to meet. Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Limitation Act is, in terms, limited to (i) appeal, (ii) application for review of judgment and (iii) application for leave to appeal. On a strict construction, therefore, that sub-section, cannot help the petitioner in respect of an application under Section 29(2) of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act to state a case for the decision of the High Court. But we notice that the corresponding provision in Section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act as it stood prior to the amendments made in 1930 by Act 22 of 1930 had been given a liberal construction by three High Courts (See — ‘Mohanlal v. Commr. Income-tax B. & O.’ AIR 1930 Pat 14 (A); ‘Ramanath Reddiar v. Commr. Income-tax’, AIR 1928 Rang 152 (B), and ‘Md. Havat Haji Md v. Commr. Income-tax, Punjab & NWFP’, AIR 1929 Lah 170 (C).

12. In all those decisions it was held that Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act would apply in respect of an application to the income-tax authority to state a case under Section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act. Doubtless, so far as income-tax law was concerned, the Legislature gave recognition to these decisions by inserting Section 67-A of the by the amending Act 22 of 1930. But the reasons given by the learned Judges for giving such a liberal construction seem to be quite convincing and may be adopted in the present instance also.

13. For instance, in AIR 1928 Rang 152 (B), it was pointed out that unless an assessee knew the reasons given by the Income-tax authority in rejecting his appeal or revision, as the case may be, it would be manifestly impossible for him to make up his mind whether a point of law arose out of the order of the Income-tax authority. Similarly, in the present instance unless the petitioner is aware of the contents of the order of the Revenue Commissioner rejecting his revision petition he will not be in a position to make up his mind whether any question of law arises out of that order so as to justify a reference to the High Court under Section 29(2) of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act.

14. A mere bald communication to him by the office of the Revenue Commissioner to the effect that his revision petition has been rejected would not furnish the necessary material to enable him to make up his mind. Hence, it is absolutely necessary for him to obtain a copy of the order of the Revenue Commissioner and the time requisite for obtaining such a copy should ordinarily be excluded.

15. In AIR 1930 Pat 14 (A), some other reasons have been given by the learned Judges for giving a liberal construction to Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act while applying it to an application under Section 63(1) of the Income-tax Act. I would, with respect, adopt those reasonings in the present instance also.

16. We are not aware if any statutory form has been prescribed by the Government in exercise of their rule-making power dealing with the contents of an application to the Revenue Commissioner under Section 29(2) of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act. The Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, however prescribe a special form (Form R (T)) (see Rule 22A) for an application under S. 66(1), Income-tax Act and the State Government may consider the advisability of prescribing a similar form adding therein a special provision for enclosing a copy of the order of the Revenue Commissioner or of any other Agricultural Income-tax authority against whose decision an application under Section 29(2) of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act was made.

17. We would also suggest that Section 44 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act may be amended on the lines of Section 67-A of the Indian Income-tax Act so as to include within its scope not only appeals but also revisions and applications under Section 29 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act.

18. I would, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (4) of Section 29 of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act set aside the order of the Revenue Commissioner dated 16-5-51 and direct him to treat the application under S. 29(2) of that Act filed before him as having been filed within the period of limitation and dispose of it according to law. Hearing fee of Rs. 150/- should be paid to the petitioner.

Panigrahi, C.J:— I am in entire agreement with the view taken by my learned brother of the applicability of Section 12 of the Limitation Act to the present case. I would also endorse his suggestion that S. 44 may be so amended as to take within its scope applications and revisions under the Act.

19. I would like however to record my view on the true meaning of Section 29(2) of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1947. That sub-section reads as follows:

“29(2). Within sixty days of the date on which he is served with notice of an order under S. 25 or 26 or of an order under S. 28, enhancing an assessment or otherwise prejudicial to him, or of a decision by the Revenue Commissioner under S. 27, the assessee in respect of whom the order or decision was passed may, by application accompanied by a fee of one hundred rupees or such lesser sum as may be prescribed, require the Revenue Commissioner to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order or decision, and the Revenue Commissioner shall, within sixty days of the receipt of such application, draw up a statement of the case and refer it with his own opinion thereon to the High Court:

Provided that a reference shall lie from an order under S. 28 only on a question of law arising out of that order itself, and not on a question of law arising out of a previous order under S. 25 or 26 revised by the order under S. 28:……”

20. There are two other provisions to this sub-section, but they are not relevant to the point at issue. If this sub-section is analysed it will be found that the assessee is entitled to file an application requiring the Revenue Commissioner to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order or decision. The proviso makes it clear that (1) the reference can be made from an order of the Revenue Commissioner only on a question of law and (2) the question of law which may be referred to the High Court must arise out of an order passed by the Revenue Commissioner under S. 28.

21. The other requirement is that the application should be made within sixty days of a particular date. The question is: How is the period of sixty days to be computed? The language of sub-s. (2) of S. 29 warrants the inference that the Legislature has made a distinction between “date of notice of the order” and ‘date of order’. The sub-section says while referring to the orders under S. 25 or 26, that the application should be filed within sixty days of the date on which he was served with a notice of the order. If mere notice of the order was contemplated then there was no need for the words “or of an order under S. 28”. The language of the sub-section would then have been: “within sixty days of the date on which he was served with notice of an order under S. 25 or 26 or 28.”

22. It will also be noticed that the orders under S. 25 or S. 26 relate to the liability of assessment and enhancement, while S. 28 gives the Revenue Commissioner very wide powers to revise the order of the appellate authority under S. 25 or 26. He may make further enquiries or cause enquiries to be made and pass such orders as he thinks fit. These orders are to become final subject to reference to the High Court under S. 29. Such reference can be made only if there is a question of law arising from an order passed under S. 28.

23. The order was not pronounced in the presence of the assessee or of his lawyer. It is, therefore, impossible for the assessee to know what the contents of the order are, so that he may be in a position to formulate the question of law arising out of it. He was served only with a notice that the order was against him, namely, that his application had been refused. This is not sufficient compliance with the language employed in sub-s. (2) of S. 29. If the order had been pronounced in his presence the assessee would immediately have asked for a copy and filed his application within sixty days of the date of the order.

24. He was merely intimated of the result of his application without any indication being given of the contents of the order. It should be noticed that throughout the section a distinction has been maintained between “date of an order” and “date on which he is served with a notice of an order”. The second proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 29 says that

“in the case of a reference from an order under S. 25 or 26 in computing the period of sixty-days from the date on which the assessee was served with the notice of the said order” etc.

The third proviso to the sub-section, which deals with an order under S. 28 says that

“the assessee may, within thirty days from the date on which he receives notice of the order passed by the revisional authority……withdraw his application” etc.

25. Sub-section (3) of S. 29 says that the assessee “may apply, within six months from the date on which he is served with notice of refusal”. Sub-section (4) says that

“the assessee may, within two months from the date on which he is served with notice of the order of the Revenue Commissioner, apply to the High Court.”

26. It is, therefore, not without purpose that sub-s. (2) of S. 29 speaks of “notice of an order under S. 25 or 26 or of an order under S. 28” thus making a distinction between the order itself and the notice of the order. I would, therefore, hold that the Revenue Commissioner was not right in the view he took that the application of the assessee was barred by limitation.

H.G.P

27. Application allowed.