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Madhusudan Mahapatra v. State
Factual and Procedural Background
This petition was brought under S. 439 read with Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to expunge certain adverse remarks made by Sri P.N. Sarkar, 1st Class Magistrate, Berhampur, in his judgment in G.K. No. 10 of 1917. The petitioner is a resident of Pitala (P.S. Aska), Ganjam district, and a member of the Orissa Legislative Assembly (a Congress worker).
Factual context: On 8-12-1946 a station diary entry at Aska Police Station recorded that Sibarama Patnaik had been assaulted and wrongfully confined by several persons of Pitala village led by Harihar Panda. Initially treated as non-cognisable, a subsequent report to the Superintendent of Police led the S.I. of Aska to institute a regular F.I.R. on 26-1-1947 and, after investigation, to submit a charge-sheet against Harihar Panda, Biswanath Panda and others. The accused were tried under Ss. 147, 342/149 and 355 IPC before Sri P.N. Sarkar (Magistrate, 1st Class, Berhampur). The petitioner appeared as an eye-witness (P.W.5). The prosecution case involved allegations arising from an alleged indecent act by P.W.2 (Sibarama Patnaik) and subsequent humiliating procession by a mob, from which the petitioner purportedly persuaded the accused to release P.W.2.
Procedural posture: The Magistrate acquitted the accused but made strongly worded remarks about the credibility and conduct of witnesses, including the petitioner. The petitioner objected to a particular passage in the Magistrate’s judgment—specifically the statement that he “has often misused his position as a public man in trying to influence the police and officers in getting a verdict against the accused persons.” The Magistrate was called upon to show cause; he provided an explanation citing extracts from the record. The present petition seeks expunction of that impugned passage.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court has power under Section 661-A (as referred to in the opinion) of the Cr. P.C. (and, by broader argument, under Section 561-A) to expunge defamatory or objectionable passages from the judgment of an inferior court when no appeal or revision has been filed.
- Whether the specific remarks made by the learned Magistrate against the petitioner—in particular that the petitioner “has often misused his position as a public man in trying to influence the police and officers in getting a verdict against the accused persons”—are justified by the evidence on the record and therefore should remain, or are unjustified and must be expunged.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Position
- The petitioner took exception to the italicised passage in the Magistrate’s judgment on the ground that those remarks were not justified by the evidence on record and were defamatory of his character.
Magistrate's Response
- The learned Magistrate was called upon to show cause and furnished an explanation pointing to extracts from the evidence which, in his view, justified the remarks complained of.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| P.J. Rogers v. Shrinivas Gopal, A.I.R. (27) 1910 Bom. 266 (41 Cr. L.J. 855) | Held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to expunge passages from the judgment of an inferior court which has not been brought before it in regular appeal or revision. | The Court noted this authority but declined to follow it; it considered later decisions and legislative amendment (1923) that indicate the High Court's inherent power to expunge objectionable remarks. |
| Bhutnath Khawas v. Dasrathi Das, A.I.R. (28) 1941 Pat. 644 (42 Cr. L.J. 516) | Followed the view that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to expunge unless the record is before it in appeal/revision (as per P.J. Rogers). | The Court recorded this Patna Single Bench decision but, on balance, followed the later and contrary line of authorities recognizing inherent power under Section 561-A. |
| Panchanan v. Upendra Nath, A.I.R. (14) 1927 All. 193 (27 Cr. L.J. 1407) | One of the decisions holding that the 1923 amendment (Section 561-A) makes clear that the High Court can invoke inherent powers to expunge objectionable remarks from judgments when not justified by the evidence. | The Court referred to this line of authority and expressed inclination to follow the reasoning that Section 561-A empowers the High Court to expunge unjustified defamatory passages. |
| Emperor v. Atta Ullah Shah, A.I.R. (23) 1936 Lah. 429 (37 Cr. L.J. 661) | Another decision supporting the view that post-1923 amendment, High Courts have inherent power to expunge such remarks. | Relied upon as part of the body of decisions that justify the High Court's interference to prevent grave injustice arising from unjustified judicial remarks. |
| Lachhman Das v. Jai Gopal, A.I.R. (25) 1938 Lah. 793 (40 Cr. L.J. 214) | Decision cited among those holding that Section 561-A enables High Courts to expunge defamatory or unjustified remarks from subordinate courts' judgments. | Considered persuasive; the Court followed the collective reasoning of such cases in exercising its power to expunge. |
| Ghumanmal v. Emperor, A.I.R. (31) 1944 Sind 133 (46 Cr. L.J. 85) | Explained the inherent power of the highest Court of a province to prevent grave injustice by expunging defamatory passages not justified by the record; such action is within “otherwise to secure the ends of justice” under Section 561-A and includes ancillary power to call for the record. | The Court quoted and relied on this reasoning as central to its conclusion that the High Court possesses the necessary inherent and ancillary powers to expunge unjustified defamatory passages. |
| In re Public Prosecutor, A.I.R. (31) 1944 Mad. 320 (45 Cr. L.J. 763) | Cited as part of the line of authorities holding that the 1923 amendment confirms the High Court's power to expunge unjustified remarks. | Referenced among the decisions whose reasoning the Court accepted in determining that expunction was available despite absence of appeal/revision. |
| Mohd. Fazal Shah v. Muhammad Asghar, A.I.R. (37) 1950 Lah. 66 (61 Cr. L.J. 600) | Another supporting authority indicating that High Courts may expunge inappropriate remarks under the inherent powers affirmed by the 1923 amendment. | Included in the body of precedent the Court found persuasive and followed in exercising the power to expunge the impugned passage. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two primary steps: jurisdictional/authority analysis and application of the evidence to the impugned passage.
1. Jurisdiction to expunge: The Court first considered whether the High Court could expunge remarks from a subordinate court's judgment when no appeal or revision had been filed. It acknowledged an earlier authority (P.J. Rogers and a Patna Single Bench decision following it) which denied such jurisdiction. However, it reviewed a body of later High Court decisions and the effect of the 1923 amendment inserting Section 561-A into the Cr. P.C., which collectively indicated that the High Court's inherent powers include expunging unjustified defamatory passages. The Court accepted and followed the reasoning of those later decisions—particularly the statement in Ghumanmal v. Emperor that expunging such passages is “otherwise to secure the ends of justice” within Section 561-A and that the High Court has ancillary power to call for records to exercise that inherent jurisdiction.
2. Application to the impugned passage: The Court examined whether the Magistrate’s specific remark that the petitioner “has often misused his position as a public man in trying to influence the police and officers in getting a verdict against the accused persons” was justified by the evidence.
The Court accepted that the impugned language was highly defamatory and could injure the petitioner’s reputation (noting his political position). It recognized the legitimate freedom of Magistrates to make candid comments on evidence but emphasized that restrained language is required when commenting on witnesses who lack the full procedural protections of accused persons.
On the facts, the Court found evidence that:
- The petitioner was inimical to the accused and related to them;
- The earliest information came not from the aggrieved person but from Chori Santra (a relative of the petitioner);
- The petitioner forwarded a covering letter and report to the Superintendent of Police which led to further investigation;
- The petitioner admitted sending a letter to the Circle Inspector requesting inquiry;
- The Inspector (P.W.8) deposed that the petitioner was present during police enquiries, put questions to witnesses, urged the Inspector to file charge-sheets and to arrest the accused and not grant bail;
- The petitioner admitted sending a report to the Hon’ble Prime Minister complaining against the S.I. of Aska after investigation.
However, the Court found the particular use of the words “often misused his position as a public man” to be unjustified by the record. The phrase suggested repeated, deliberate abuse—concocting false cases for conviction—which the Magistrate did not establish. The Court noted there was no evidence of a pattern of similar conduct by the petitioner beyond the present case and connected ones, and that the Magistrate did not find the entire prosecution false. As to the allegation of influencing officers or the trying Magistrate, the Court observed that the petitioner had seen the Magistrate several times on other matters while the case was pending; the Magistrate had become embarrassed and suggested transfer, but there was no direct proof that the petitioner had improperly influenced the Magistrate to secure a verdict. A letter to the Prime Minister published in a newspaper was not proved in evidence and therefore should not have been relied upon. For these reasons, the Court concluded that while the petitioner’s conduct displayed imprudence and an extraordinary interest, it did not support the sweeping allegation that he “often misused” his public position.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Petition allowed. The Court ordered expunction of the complained passage from the judgment of the lower Court—specifically the sentence that the petitioner “has often misused his position as a public man in trying to influence the police and officers in getting a verdict against the accused persons.”
Implications:
- Direct effect: The impugned derogatory passage in the Magistrate’s judgment was expunged, vindicating the petitioner against that specific defamatory statement.
- On legal principle: The Court followed a line of High Court authorities (and the reasoning in Ghumanmal v. Emperor) that post-1923 amendment (Section 561-A) the High Court possesses inherent and ancillary power to expunge unjustified defamatory passages from subordinate courts' judgments even in the absence of an appeal or revision. The opinion therefore applies that reasoning to permit expunction in this case.
- Broader precedent: The Court did not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond following and applying the existing authorities it cited; the decision applies those authorities to the facts and expunges the particular impugned language rather than establishing a wider new doctrine in this judgment.
1. This is a petition under S. 439 read with Section 561-A of the Cr PC, for expunging certain remarks made against the character of the petitioner by Sri P.N Sarkar, Magistrate, 1st Class, Berhampur in his judgment in G.K No. 10 of 1917. The petitioner is a resident of village Pitala P.S Aska in Ganjam district. He is also a member of the Orissa Legislative Assembly and belongs to the Congress Party. On 8-12-46 one Chori Santra of village Baisinghpur which is very close to village Pitala lodged a station diary entry at Aska Police Station at about 10 A.M to the effect that one Sibarama Pat naik, the Karanam of village, had been assaulted and wrongfully confined by several persons of Pita's village led by Harihar Panda. The police did not take any immediate action thinking that it was a non-cognisable offence. Sub-Bequently, however, a petition was sent to the Superintendent of Police on the basis of which the S.I of Aska instituted a regular F.I.R on 26-1-47 and after due investigation submitted charge-sheet against Harihar Panda. Biswanath Panda and His other persons who were all tried for offences under Ss. 147, 342/149 and 355, Penal Code in the Court of Sri P.N Sarkar Magistrate, 1st Class, Berhampur, In that case the petitioner figured as one of the eye-witnesses (P.W 5). Chori Santra (P.W 1) and Sibaram Patnaik (P.W 2) also deposed in support of the prosecution case. The substance of the allegations made against the accused persons in that case was that the said Sibaram Patnaik (P.W 2) wrote a love-letter to a female inmate of the house of accused Harihar Panda which, however, fell into the hinds of the accused persons. Thereupon, they were so much enraged against Sibaram Patnaik that they collected in a mob and wanted to kill him. He had himself in the village Pathaghar for some time but subsequently on the assurance given by the petitioner he came out. The accused persons thereupon tied his hinds, put an earthen pot on his bead and led him in a procession in a humiliating way throughout the village. In the end, however, the petitioner succeeded in persuading Harihar Panda and his men to release Sibaram Patnaik.
2. The Learned Magistrate while acquitting the accused persona observed that the prosecution case appeared to be an exaggerated and inflated account of some alteration or misunderstanding between Sibaram Patnaik (P.W 2) and the accused's party. He further observed:
“P.W 2 having done a wrong and indecent act which brought general denunciation from the public must have taken the help or the enemies of the accused in saving his face some how.”
3. He pointed out that all the eye-witnesses were interested persons inimically disposed towards the accused persons and held that the charges were not brought home against them. While discussing the evidence of P.W 5 (the petitioners) who claimed to be an eye-witness to the occurrence, the learned Magistrate made the following comments:
“Besides the aforesaid facts this witness has made a number of admissions which go to show that the witness has evinced extraordinary interest in the case from its inception and during trial. He has often misused his position as a public man in trying to influence the police and officers in getting a verdict against the accused persons.”
4. The passage underlined (here italicised) has been taken exception to and I have been asked to expunge those remarks on the ground that they were not justified from the evidence on record. The learned Magistrate was called upon to show cause why these remarks should not be expunged and he has submitted an explanation pointing out extracts from the evidence from which he thought that those remarks were justified.
5. The first question for consideration is whether the High Court has power under Section 661-A of the Cr PC, to expunge these remarks when no appeal or revision has been filed in the High Court against the order of acquittal passed by the trying Magistrate. In P.J Rogers v. Shrinivas Gopal, A.I.R(27) 1910 Bom. 266 : (41 Cr. L.J 855), Beaumont C.J (as he then was) took the view that the High Court has no Jurisdiction to expunge passages from the judgment of an inferior Court which has not been brought before it in regular appeal or revision. This decision has been followed in a later Single Bench decision of the Patna High Court reported in Bhutnath Khawas… v. Dasrathi Das…Opposite Party., A.I.R(28) 1941 Pat. 644 : (42 Cr. L.J 516). On the other hand, several other High Courts have held that whatever might have been the law prior to 1923 the effect of the insertion of Section 561-A of the Cr PC by the amendment of 1923 was to make it clear beyond any doubt that the inherent powers of the Court can be invoked for expunging objectionable remarks from a judgment when they are not justified from the evidence on record, Panchanan v. Upendra Nath, A.I.R(14) 1927 All. 193 : (27 Cr. L.J 1407); Emperor v. Atta Ullah Shah, A.I.R(23) 1936 Lah. 429 : (37 Cr. L.J 661); Lachhman Das v. Jai Gopal, 40 Cr. L.J 214 : (A.I.R(25) 1938 Lah. 793); Ghumanmal v. Empiror, A.I.R(31) 1944 Sind 133 : (46 Cr. L.J 85); In re Public Prosecutor, A.I.R(31) 1944 Mad. 320 : (45 Cr. L.J 763) and Mohd. Fazal Shah v. Muhammad Asghar, 61 Cr. L.J 600 : (A.I.R(37) 1950 Lah. 66), The law on the subject has been fully discussed in those decisions and with respect I am inclined to follow the reasonings given therein. As pointed out in Ghumanmal v. Emperor, A.I.R(31) 1944 Sind 133 : (46 Cr. L.J 88).
“One of the inherent powers of the highest Court of a Province is to prevent grave injustice and injury being caused to a person, who, though not a party, has as a witness been called before the Court upon a summons which he cannot disobey and who has nevertheless been made the subject of defamatory remarks by a Magistrate or Judge, which remarks can in no way be justified from the record and the making of which, therefore, must involve the abuse of the judicial office. To expunge any such passage at the instance of a person aggrieved is ‘otherwise to secure the ends of justice’ within the meaning of Section 561-A of the Cr PC. Once it is considered that the High Court has this power, it must be conceded that it has the necessary ancillary power to call for the record so that its inherent power may be exercised.”
6. The main question therefore for consideration now is whether the remarks made against the character of the petitioner by the learned Magistrate were justified from the evidence on record. That they are of a highly defamatory nature and are likely to damage the petitioner's reputation amongst the public admits of no doubt whatsoever. The petitioner is a member of the Orissa Legislative Assembly and a prominent Congress worker of Ganjam district. If a Court of justice says that the has often misused his position as a public man in trying to influence the police and officers in getting a verdict against the accused persons' such remarks would lower him in public estimation and may prove fatal to his whole political career. Doubtless Magistrates should be free to make bold and fearless comments on the evidence before them while writing their judgments so that they may be able to discharge their duties effectively. But they should use restrained language while commenting on the character and credibility of witnesses, who, unlike the accused persons, do not get adequate opportunities to defend them selves. If the Magistrates overstep the limits and make adverse remarks of a sweeping nature against witnesses unsupported by the evidence on record, the High Court, for the ends of justice has to interfere.
7. The petitioner was admittedly on inimical terms with the accused persons though they were both related. There seems to be no doubt that the petitioner took an active part during police investigation. The earliest information about the occurrence was lodged at Aska Police Station not by the aggrieved party Sibaram Patnaikf (P.W 2) but by one Chori Santra (P.W 1) who is a son of Purohit of the petitioner himself. The police did not take any action on that information and thereupon a report was sent to the Superintendent of Police with a covering letter forwarded by the petitioner himself. It was on the basis of this report that under the orders of S.P further investigation started. The petitioner admitted that he sent a latter to the Circle Inspector of Aska to investigate this case. The Inspector of Police (P.W 8) deposed that during police enquiry the petitioner (P.W 5) was present and that he was putting questions now and then to the witnesses. He tried to persuade P.W 8 to file charge sheet in the present case and in two other connected cases and he went to the length of requesting P.W 8 to arrest the accused persona and not to grant them bail, Apart from these facts, there is also the admission of P.W 5 to the effect that after the completion of the investigation of this case he Bent a report to the Hon'ble Prime Minister complaining against the S. I of Aska. From these proved facts the learned Magistrate was undoubtely justified in saying that the petitioner took extraordinary interest in the case. It is true that as an eyewitness it was his duty to narrate all that he knew about the occurrence to the police during investigation. But his extraordinary action in forwarding a complaint against the local police to the S.P, in putting questions to the witnesses now and then during investigation and in asking the Police Inspector (P.W 8) to arrest the accused persons and not to grant them bail and also trying to persuade him to submit charge-sheet in the case—all tend to support the view that the petitioner was anxious to exploit to the full the advantage derived from a case of this type against his rivals. Doubtless if the occurrence is substantially true there is nothing wrong in a public worker trying to help the police in bringing the offenders to justice; but even for that purpose, the petitioner being a member of the Legislative Assembly need not have taken such an extraordinary interest which, he must have known, would embarrass and overawe the local official. But I am unable to understand why the learned Magistrate observed that the petitioner often misused his position as a public man in trying to influence the police and officers in getting a verdict against the accused persons'. The use of the words ‘often’ and ‘misused,’ seem to indicate that the petitioner was deliberately concocting several false cases against the accused persons with a view to get them convicted. But even the Magistrate does not say in his judgment that entire prosecution case is false. On the contrary he gave the benefit of the doubt to the accused persons though he seems to have recognised that there was some sort of altercation and misunderstanding between P.W 2 and the accused persons due to the former's indecent action. There is no evidence to show that apart from this case and the other connected cases there was any other criminal case against the accused persons in which the petitioner played any part. Thus when the occurrence is not held to be false and when there is no evidence of similar conduct by the petitioner against the accused persons it is not proper to say that the petitioner ‘often misused his position as a public man’ even if it be held that he tried to influence the police to submit charge-sheet in this case.
8. The learned Magistrate further observed that the petitioner tried to influence officers also in getting a verdict against the accused persons. This portion of the remarks seems to be based of the admission made by the petitioner to the effect that while the present case was being tried by a Magistrate of Aska the petitioner as a public worker saw him several time though not in connection with this case. There was also a suggestion to the effect that the trying Magistrate actually went to the house of the petitioner on 18-9-1947. But this suggestion was denied. The Magistrate, however, felt highly embarrassed while these questions were put to the petitioner during his cross-examination. Therefore, in the order-sheet dated 6-9-1947 he himself suggested to the District Magistrate for the transfer of the case from his file. The case was eventually transferred to the file of a Magistrate at Berhampur. The evidence on record only shows that while the present case was going on in the Court of the Magistrate at Aska the petitioner law him several times in connection with some other matter. This conduct of the petitioner has been sought to be justified on the ground that as a public worker, there might have been a necessity for him to see the Magistrate who was also an Executive Officer. But as his action was likely to be misconstrued, the trying Magistrate rightly himself suggested for the transfer of the case from his file. But from these facts it in not fair to infer that the petitioner misused his position as a public man by trying to influence the Magistrate to give a verdict against the accused persons. For such a sweeping statement there must be stronger evidence on record. Apparently the learned Magistrate was, to some extent, influenced by the contents of a letter said to have been written by the petitioner to the Hon'ble Prime Minister of Orissa on 9-4-1947, a copy of which was reproduced in the ‘Observer’ dated 20-4-1947. That letter has not been proved in this case and a copy of the ‘Observer’ has merely been marked as ‘x’ for identification. The petitioner has not admitted the contents of the letter though his answers in cross-examination with reference to that letter are evasive and unsatisfactory. Whatever that may be, so long as that letter has not been proved properly in the case and admitted as evidence it should not have been taken into consideration.
9. I am, therefore, of the opinion that though the Magistrate was justified in observing that the petitioner took an extraordinary interest in the case from its inception and that his evidence should be viewed with suspicion in view of his admitted enmity with the accused persons, he was not justified in saying ‘he has often misused his position as a public man in trying to influence the police and officers in getting a verdict against the accused persons’. It may be that the petitioner's conduct during police investigation was not prudent and his seeing the trying Magistrate at Aska while the present case was pending in his Court was also not proper. As a prominent public worker and a Congress member of the Legislative Assembly the petitioner should have known that any extraordinary interest that he might evince during police investigation of this case and his repeated interviews with the trying Magistrate while the case was pending in his Court are likely to be misconstrued by the public and are also likely to embarrass and sometimes overawe the local officials. It may be that the petitioner had absolutely no intention of interfering with their discretion so far as the investigation or trial of this case was concerned. But in view of his peculiar position, he might have kept himself strictly aloof except to the limited extent of stating to the police and the Magistrates what he knew personally about the occurrence. But mere impropriety of conduct is not sufficient to justify a sweeping remark to the effect that ‘he often misused his position as a public man’. I would, therefore, allow the petition and expunge the passage complained of from the judgment of the lower Court.
V.R.B
10. Petition allowed.
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