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Chaitan Senapati v. Mani Bewa And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Court-fee Reference (Taxing Judge)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a court-fee reference heard by the Taxing Judge on a reference made by the taxing officer concerning the correct court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal.
The underlying suit (as stated by the taxing officer) was a suit for partition of properties described in schedules of the plaint into three equal shares and for possession of one-third share jointly with defendant No. 4. The shares as between the parties were not disputed, but the controversy concerned which specific properties were to be divided. The appellant (defendant No. 1) contended that items Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of Schedule A (measuring specified acreages) were his separate and exclusive properties not liable to partition. The trial court overruled that contention, and the appellant appealed — giving rise to the present question about the proper court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal.
The taxing officer's reference posed the legal question whether the memorandum of appeal attracts the fixed court-fee under Article 17-A, Sch. II (as amended by Orissa Acts), or an ad valorem court-fee under Article I, Sch. I of the Court-fees Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal arising from this partition suit is the fixed fee provided by Article 17-A, Sch. II of the Court-fees Act (as amended), or an ad valorem fee under Article I, Sch. I of the Act.
- Whether the proper test for determining the fee on the memorandum of appeal is the nature and value of the subject-matter of the suit as pleaded (i.e., the plaint) or the value of the specific subject-matter in dispute in the appeal (for example, a decided issue as to title to certain properties).
- How decisions of the Patna High Court bearing on court-fee practice in partition and title suits affect the determination in this reference, given that Patna practice is binding on the Taxing Judge in matters of procedure.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Diwan Chand v. Dhani Ram, ILR (1941) Lah 234; AIR (28) 1941 Lah 123 | Full Bench view that Article 17(8) (corresponding to Article 17-A of the Orissa Amendment) applies to partition suits and the memorandum of appeal is chargeable with the same (fixed) fee as the plaint when the suit's subject-matter is not capable of valuation. | The Court adopts this Full Bench view as the correct approach and prefers it to contrary authority; the Court explicitly states readiness to follow it. |
| Abdul Rahman v. A.B. Crisp, AIR (17) 1930 Rang 164 | Supports the view that Article 17-A applies where the subject-matter of the suit is not capable of being estimated at a money value. | Placed alongside other authorities as part of the group of decisions supporting application of Article 17-A to partition suits; used to reinforce the adopted view. |
| Parmeshur Din v. Hargobind Prasad, AIR (26) 1939 Oudh 90 | Also cited as supporting the principle that Article 17-A governs where subject-matter is not capable of valuation. | Relied on as another authority in support of applying Article 17-A to partition suits. |
| Jyoti Prosad Singha v. Jogendra Ram Roy, 56 Cal 138 : AIR (15) 1928 Cal 878 | Holds that in appeals against decrees from partition suits, the proper court-fee payable is the fixed court-fee; it does not matter whether appeal concerns allotment of specific portions or only costs. | Used to illustrate that even where appeal concerns costs or specific allotments, the fixed fee has been held proper in partition appeals. |
| Ram Prasad v. Krishnananda, AIR (23) 1938 All 221 | A contrary view (mentioned briefly) that appears to treat the fee differently; the decision contains no discussion of the question. | The Court notes the existence of this contrary decision but prefers and follows the Full Bench view instead, observing Ram Prasad contains no discussion. |
| Gobind Dube v. Parmeshwar Dube, AIR (6) 1919 Pat 403 | Held that if the suit is essentially for partition, the fixed court-fee is payable; if the suit is in substance for money or immovable property (i.e., a title suit), ad valorem fee must be paid. | The Court treats this Patna decision as authority for the position that a plain partition suit attracts the fixed fee; it is cited in support of the Court's approach. |
| Dukhi Singh v. Harihar Shah, AIR (8) 1921 Pat 78 | Statement that in a pure partition suit where plaintiff is in possession, fixed fee applies; if plaintiff seeks recovery of possession (i.e., out of possession), ad valorem fee applies—substance of claim governs fee. | Noted for the principle contrasting partition-in-possession (fixed fee) with claims for possession (ad valorem); used to show Patna authority consistent with substance-over-form. |
| Rachhya Raut v. Mt. Chandoo, AIR (10) 1923 Pat 113 | Principle: determine the real nature of the claim — if merely partition, defendants' contest on title does not convert it; if plaintiff seeks declaration of title/possession at the forefront, it is a title suit. | Invoked to support the rule that the essence of the plaint determines fee character (partition vs. title suit). |
| Banku Behari v. Chatur Pandey, AIR (11) 1924 Pat 640 | Holds that court-fees should be assessed on the footing of the plaint; a stamp-officer cannot determine fee by reference to what is later decided by the Court. | Cited as clear authority that in partition suits the fee on appeal follows the fee on the plaint when the plaint treats the subject-matter as incapable of valuation. |
| Nand Kishore v. Achambit Kumar, AIR (24) 1937 Pat 514 | Observed that where a partition suit is in substance a title suit (a partition suit in guise), ad valorem fee may properly be collected; fee determination must look to what plaintiff really sought. | Used to emphasize that where plaint is essentially a title suit the ad valorem fee applies — but this affects both plaint and appeal and depends on substance. |
| Sital Prasad v. Ramdas Sah, AIR (26) 1939 Pat 274 | Related to proper court-fee on the plaint in a partition suit given that case's facts; no direct bearing on fees on memoranda of appeal. | Noted by the Court as having limited relevance to the present question about the memorandum of appeal. |
| Ramautar Sao v. Ram Govind Sao, AIR (29) 1942 Pat 60 | Deals with proper court-fee on plaint in partition suits and emphasizes that the court-fee depends on the real substance (i.e., whether the suit is a title suit in guise of partition). | Cited for the statement of considerations to guide substance-over-form analysis for fee determination on the plaint. |
| Kameshwar Singh v. Raj Bansi Singh, AIR (30) 1943 Pat 433 | Not a court-fee case, but contains a statement that partition merely changes the mode of enjoyment and the subject-matter is not capable of valuation — supporting fixed fee on plaint in partition suits. | Referred to as supportive of the principle that a partition suit (in its ordinary form) attracts the fixed court-fee because the subject-matter is not amenable to valuation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeds in a sequence of legal points anchored to the text of the Court-fees Act and the authorities cited:
- Statutory framing: Article I (Sch. I) is residuary and applies only where no specific Article applies; Article 17 of the Act was replaced/substituted in the Orissa amendments, producing Article 17-A which applies to plaints or memoranda of appeal in suits where it is not possible to estimate the subject-matter at a money value and which are not otherwise provided for in the Act.
- General principle from authorities: In partition suits where the plaintiff merely seeks allotment of his share and separate possession (i.e., conversion of joint possession into separate possession), the subject-matter is the mode of enjoyment and is not capable of estimation in money value; authorities have therefore applied the fixed fee (Article 17-A) to such suits.
- Objection considered: It was argued (as a plausible position) that where a defendant in such a suit claims specific items as his separate property and an issue on title to those items is decided against him, the appeal as to that issue might be regarded as concerning title to specific properties and hence be valuably determinable — suggesting ad valorem fee on the memorandum of appeal. The Court acknowledges this plausibility.
- Precedent-based resolution: The Court notes a line of authorities (including the Full Bench decision in Diwan Chand v. Dhani Ram and several other cases) holding that Article 17-A applies to such situations and that the memorandum of appeal is charged with the same fee as the plaint — i.e., the relevant test is the nature/value of the subject-matter of the suit as pleaded, not the particular issue decided or relied upon in the appeal.
- Examination of Patna practice (binding on the Taxing Judge for procedural matters): The Court reviews several Patna High Court decisions. It finds that while Patna cases emphasize that the substance of the plaint governs (and that purely title-in-disguise suits should attract ad valorem fees), none (from those brought to the Court's attention) establishes that the fee on the memorandum of appeal should be determined by the value of the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal alone. Several Patna decisions support assessing fee on the plaint's substance and treating the memorandum fee as co-extensive with the plaint fee.
- Conclusion from authorities: On a synthesis of the authorities, the Court adopts the Full Bench view (Diwan Chand) that Article 17-A applies to a memorandum of appeal arising from a partition suit when, on a fair consideration of the plaint, the plaint itself attracts Article 17-A. The decisive factor is the substance of the plaint (and the relief genuinely sought), not the fact that a particular factual or title issue in the suit may have been decided and separately appealed.
- Procedural disposition: The Court finds that the taxing officer did not apply this substance-over-form test in considering the reference. Accordingly, the Court remits the matter to the Taxing Officer for reconsideration and final decision in the light of the adopted view. If, upon reconsideration, the Taxing Officer concludes that the plaint itself should have attracted ad valorem court-fee (i.e., the plaint is in substance a title suit), the Registrar is to consider collecting any deficit court-fee on the plaint as well.
The Court expressly prefers the Full Bench view to the contrary authority where that authority contains no substantive discussion.
Holding and Implications
Core ruling: The Court adopts the Full Bench view that the court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal arising out of a partition suit is the fixed fee under Article 17-A where, upon a fair consideration of the plaint, the plaint itself concerns a subject-matter not capable of being estimated at a money value; in short, the fee payable on the memorandum of appeal follows the fee applicable to the plaint and depends on the substance of the plaint rather than on the value of the subject-matter of a particular issue in the appeal.
Direct effect on the reference: The matter is remitted to the Taxing Officer for reconsideration in the light of the view adopted. The Taxing Officer must determine whether the plaint itself attracted a fixed fee under Article 17-A or an ad valorem fee; if the latter conclusion is reached, the Registrar should consider collecting any deficit court-fee on the plaint.
Broader implications: The Court's decision reiterates and adopts existing authorities favoring a substance-over-form approach to court-fees in partition/title contexts. The opinion does not purport to create a novel legal principle; rather it follows and applies established Full Bench and High Court authorities and remits the factual-application question back to the taxing officer for decision.
D.H
Order accordingly.
1. This is a Court-fee reference coming before me as the Taxing Judge on a reference made by the taxing officer. The question is as to the proper Court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal. The facts giving: rise to this reference may be stated as follows in the wording of the taxing officer:
“Plaintiffs-respondents Nos. 1 to 3 brought a suit for partition of some properties described in Schedules Kha, Ga, Gha and Una of the plaint, into 3 equal shares and for possession of one-third share therein along with defendant No. 4. With respect to the shares of the parties and also with regard to the division of the joint family properties into 3 shares giving to plaintiffs 1 to 3 and defendant 4 one-third share, defendant 1 one-third share, and defendant 2 one-third share, there was absolutely no dispute. The real controversy in the suit centred round the properties to be actually divided. The appellant-defendant 1 contended that items Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of Schedule a properties measuring an area of 3.49 acres, 29.29 acres and 10.40 acres respectively were his separate and exclusive properties and not liable for partition. This contention was overruled by the learned Court below and hence this appeal.”
2. The question which has been raised by the taxing officer on the reference is, whether the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal in these circumstances, is the fixed court-fee under Article 17-A, Sch. II of the Court-fees Act as amended by the Orissa Act, or ad valorem Court-fee payable under Article I, Sch. I of the Court-fees Act. There can be 110 dispute that Article I is in the nature of a residuary Article and will not be applicable where any other Article specifically applies. Article 17 of the Court-fees Act as it originally stood has been substituted by two Articles,. 17 and 17-A by virtue of Orissa Act V of 1939 with, a further surcharge by Section 2 of the Orissa Act XX of 1947. Article 17-A of the Orissa Act, 1939 is the same as Article 17, Sub-article (6) of the main Act and is in the following terms:
17A. Plaint or memorandum of appeal in every suit where it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute and which is not otherwise provided for by this Act. When the plaint is presented to or the memorandum of appeal is against the decree of— (a) a Revenue Court in the district of Ganjam or Koraput (b) any other Revenue Court of a District Judge, Subordinate Judge or Munsif. Ten Rupees Fifteen Rupees if the value for purposes of jurisdiction does not exceed Rs. 4000 one hundred rupees if such value exceeds Rs. 4000.
3. It has been held that in partition suits, where the plaintiff claims the allotment of his separate share of the joint property and separate possession thereof, he claims nothing more than the conversion of the joint possession of the whole into a separate possession of the allotted part and that the subject-matter in dispute therefore is only the right to conversion in the mode of enjoyment and that it is not capable of being estimated in money value. It has accordingly been held that to such suits Article 17-A applies. The further question that arises is where in such a suit the defendant claims certain items of property as his separate property and as not liable to partition and where that issue has been decided one way or another and the aggrieved party has to go up in appeal in respect of that issue, whether it is not reasonable to say that the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal is really the title to certain properties and is therefore capable of valuation and consequently ad valorem Court-fee is payable. This certainly looks plausible; but it has been held in a number of cases that Article 17(8) (which corresponds to Article 17-A of the Orissa Amendment Act of 1939) applies to such cases and that the memorandum of appeal is chargeable with the same fee as that on the plaint and does not depend upon the decision of the Court on a particular issue that has been raised in the suit. According to that view, in order to attract the application of Article 17-A what is material, is not the value of the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal, but the subject-matter in dispute in the suit. It has to be noticed that the Article does not say “Memorandum of appeal where it is not possible to estimate at money value the subject-matter in dispute” but “memorandum of appeal ‘in a suit’, where it is not possible to estimate at money value the subject-matter in dispute.” This is the view taken in the Full Bench case in ‘Diwan Chand v. Dhani Ram’, ILR (1941) Lah 234 : AIR (28) 1941 Lah 123. That is also the view taken in ‘Abdul Rahman v. A.B Crisp’, AIR (17) 1930 Rang 164 and ‘Parmeshur Din v. Hargobind Prasad’, AIR (26) 1939 Oudh 90, as also in ‘Jyoti Prosad Singha v. Jogendra Ram Roy’, 56 Cal 138 : AIR (15) 1928 Cal 878. The last mentioned case is a case where the appeal related only to costs, but the Calcutta High Court held that the court-fee payable is the fixed court-fee and it is laid down as follows:
“So far as this Court is concerned, it has always been recognised that in appeals against decrees from partition suits, the proper Court-fee payable is the fixed Court-fee. It does not matter whether the ground of attack is with reference to allotment of specific portion of immovable or moveable property or the ground of attack is the question of costs.”
4. The view taken in these cases therefore gives full effect to the phrase “memorandum of appeal ‘in every suit’ appearing in Article 17-A” and that appears to me to be the correct view. I should be prepared to follow it in preference to the contrary view that appears to have been taken in ‘Ram Prasad v. Krishnananda’, AIR (23) 1938 All 221, where there is no discussion of the question.
5. It is, however, necessary to examine whether there is any course of decisions in the Patna High Court to the contrary since in a matter of I this kind, relating to procedure, the Patna practice is binding on me. The any cases of the Patna High Court as having a bearing on the question which have been brought to my notice by both the appellant's counsel as well as by the learned Advocate-General who has appeared before me for the Government, on issue of notice, are the following: ‘Gobind Dube v. Parmeshwar Dube’, AIR (6) 1919 Pat 403; ‘Dukhi Singh v. Harihar Shah’, AIR (8) 1921 Pat 78; ‘Rachhya Raut v. Mt. Chandoo’, AIR (10) 1923 Pat 113; ‘Banku Behari v. Chatur Pandey’, AIR (11) 1924 Pat 640; ‘Nand Kishore v. Achambit Kumar’, AIR (24) 1937 Pat 514; ‘Sital Prasad v. Ramdas Sah’, AIR (26) 1939 Pat 274; ‘Ramautar Sao v. Ram Govind Sao’, AIR (29) 1942 Pat 60; and ‘Kameshwar Singh v. Raj Bansi Singh’, AIR (30) 1943 Pat 433. I shall now examine these cases.
6. In ‘Gobind Dube v. Parmeshwar Dube’, AIR (6) 1919 Pat 403, it was held that where the suit was in a sense a suit to obtain a decree for money or a decree for immovable property an ad valorem Court-fee must be paid, but that if it was a plain suit for partition, the fixed Court-fee is payable. On the facts of that case, the learned Judge was of the opinion that the suit was one for partition and that therefore, the memorandum of appeal before him was chargeable only with the fixed Court-fee.
7. ‘Dukhi Singh v. Harihar Shah’, AIR (8) 1921 Pat 78 is a case in which the question arose not about the court-fee payable, but as to the competency of the appeal, depending upon the valuation of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction. In the course, however, of that decision, their Lordships stated as follows:
“It is settled by authority that in a suit for partition, pure and simple, where the plaintiff is in possession of his share of the property and simply wants to alter the mode of his enjoyment by claiming to hold his share in the property separately from the other joint holders, the court-fee payable will be Rs. 10/- only under Sch. II, Article 17, Cl. 6 of the Court-fees Act. It has also been settled that where the plaintiff is out of possession of his share in the joint property, he is required to pay ad valorem Court-fee under Section 7 of the Cl. 4 of the Court-fees Act, inasmuch as it is not a suit for mere partition, but for a consequential relief in the shape of recovery of possession of his share in the property. In such a case, the plaintiff has to pay Court-fee upon the valuation of his share in the property.”
8. In ‘Rachhya Raut v. Mt. Chandoo’, AIR (10) 1923 Pat 113, their Lordships laid down with reference to a partition suit that:
“one must look to see what is the real nature of the Claim. If it is merely a suit claiming a partition and nothing else, then it makes no difference that the defendants by their written statement raise a question disputing the title or possession of the plaintiffs. But if in the very forefront of their claim they ask the Court for declaration of their title and possession, they are Claiming under the guise of a partition suit a declaration of their title which is the proper subject-matter of a title suit.”
9. It is not very clear from the report whether the question involved in this case was with reference to the Court-fee payable on the plaint or on the memorancum of appeal.
10. In ‘Banku Behari v. Chatur Panaey’, AIR (11) 1924 Pat 640, the question as to the correctness of the Court-fee paid both on plaint as well as on the memoranaum of appeal the Courts below was raised. The stamp-reporter appears to have been of the opinion that ad valorem Court-fee was payable since the Courts below had found that Sch. If properties were acquired in the names of various defendants. Their Lordships were not prepared to accept the view of the stamp-reporter and said as follows:
“It is the case of the plaintiffs in the plaint that the family is joint and it is well settled that where the family is joint, the possession of one is the possession of ail. I know of no authority which entities the stamp-reporter to determine the question of Court-fees by reference to what is afterwards decided by the Court. If the plaintiffs' case is untrue, it must fail. But I know of no authority which entitles the Court to compel the plaintiff to pay court-fees not on the footing of the plaint, but on the footing of what is afterwards decided by the Court.”
11. This appears to be a clear authority for the position that in a partition suit the Court-fee payable on the appeal is to be the same as that on the plaint where the plaint is treated as involving a dispute relating to the subject-matter of the suit incapable of valuation.
12. ‘Nand Kishore v. Achambit Kumar’, AIR (24) 1937 Pat 514, is a case where in an appeal memorandum arising out of a partition suit ad valorem Court-fee was collected. But this is so because on the facts of that case, the suit was held to be a title suit in the guise of a partition suit. His Lordship observes as follows:
“It has not ordinarily been the practice in the Patna High Court, from the time of its foundation, to depend exclusively on the averments of the plaintiff for the ascertainment of what should be the proper Court-fee payable, to permit a plaintiff to escape liability by a vague and indefinite statement of facts in the plaint or to penalise him because he may possibly ask for a declaration which may be unnecessary. The proper court-fee payable is to be determined on appreciation of what the plaintiff-appellant really sought, not requiring payment of ad valorem Court-fee merely because a suit for partition was defended by a claim of adverse possession, but astute to see that plaintiff should not avoid liability to pay Court-fee under S. 7(iv)(c) or S. 7(v) of the Act merely by omitting to assert a prayer for possession in what was essentially a title suit in the guise of a partition suit.”
13. This decision which has been relied on as an authority for the practice of collecting Court-fee in appeals arising from every partition suit on ad valorem basis does not appear to me to support any such position. It shows only that where the suit itself is in substance a title suit and not a partition suit, the Court-fee payable is ad valorem. But it is obvious that it would be so both for the plaint and the memorandum of appeal and not for the memorandum of appeal alone. It depends on what may be determined to be the essence of the plaint and the relief sought for. It has nothing to do with the decision of the issues in the suit.
14. ‘Sital Prasad v. Ramdas Sah’, AIR (26) 1939 Pat 274, relates only to the proper Court-fee payable on the plaint in a partition suit having regard to the facts of that particular case and has no bearing on what fee is payable on a memorandum of appeal arising out of a partition suit.
15. ‘Ramautar Sao v. Ram Gobind Sao*’, AIR (29) 1942 Pat 60, is also a case relating to the proper Court-fee payable on a plaint in a partition suit and emphasizes the principle uniformly adopted in the Patna High Court that the court-fee payable in partition suits depends not on the ostensible form, but on the real substance and on the question whether the suit is in essence a title suit under the guise of a partition suit. This decision contains a valuable statement of the considerations which should guide the determination of that question.
16. ‘Kameshwar Singh v. Rajbansi Singh’, AIR (30) 1943 Pat 433, is not a case relating to Court-fees, but is useful only for a statement in the judgment that in a suit for partition, the plaint is chargeable with a fixed Court-fee on the ground that partition merely changes the form of enjoyment and therefore the subject-matter is not capable of valuation.
17. It will thus be seen on a review of these decisions that there is no case of the Patna High Court, so far as it has been brought to my notice laying down that irrespective of what is the proper court-fee payable in a plaint, in a partition suit, the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal depends on the value of the subject-matter in dispute in the appeal arising from the decision of an issue in the suit. On the other hand, the cases in ‘Gobind Dube v. Parmeshwar Dube’, AIR (6) 1919 Pat 403, and ‘Banku Behari v. Chatur Pandey’, AIR (11) 1924 Pat 640, are clear authority to the contrary. The only point that is insisted upon in all these cases is that the court-fee must depend not on the form, but on the substance. It is however assumed throughout in all these cases that the court-fee on the appeal is the same as that payable on the plaint. I would therefore respectfully adopt the view of the Full Bench in ‘Diwan Chand v. Dhani Ram’, ILR (1941) Lah 234, that the court-fee payable on a memorandum of appeal arising from a partition suit is a fixed court-fee as provided in Article 17-A if from a fair consideration of the plaint the court-fee payable on the plaint itself is under the said article; but that the court-fee payable both on the plaint as well as on the memorandum of appeal would depend on the substance and not on the form. In the present case, the court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal, therefore, would depend upon what would have been the correct court-fee payable on the plaint itself having regard to its substance and in the light of the principles elucidated in the decisions quoted above. The learned Taxing Officer has not examined the question in this light. The matter will, therefore, be remitted back for reconsideration and final decision by the Taxing Officer in the light of the above view. If he comes to the conclusion that the court-fee payable on the plaint itself in this case was ad valorem and not a fixed Court-fee, he will, in his capacity as the Registrar, consider the question of collecting the deficit Court-fee on the plaint also.
D.H
18. Order accordingly.
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