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Krupasindhu Panigrahi Accused Petnr. v. Rex

Orissa High Court
Jul 11, 1949
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Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was served with a notice under Section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr PC) requiring him to show cause why he should not be directed to execute a bond for good behaviour under Section 110 of the Cr PC for three years. Two other persons were impleaded and served with similar notices, and an enquiry (M.C. No. 647/47) was commenced by the Sub-divisional Magistrate at Ghumusur.

The Police filed a report dated 24-9-1947 under Section 110(d), (e) & (f) of the Cr PC alleging 84 instances of misbehaviour or offences attributed to one or another of the three persons over a period beginning in 1935 (about twelve years). The police also listed 140 witnesses purportedly to prove those allegations. The Magistrate drew up proceedings accusing the three persons of habitually committing theft, extortion, cheating, mischief and of being so desperate and dangerous as to render their being at large hazardous to the community, and required them to show cause by 11-11-1947 why they should not execute bonds (Rs. 2,000 with two sureties in the petitioner's case; lesser amounts for the others).

Although the Magistrate's order stated that a copy of the police report was enclosed, the petitioner (and the Crown's Advocate General) acknowledged that no copy of the report had in fact been served on the petitioner. The petitioner asked the Deputy Magistrate to hear his case separately (not jointly) and to permit representation by a pleader in lieu of his personal attendance because of illness. The Deputy Magistrate rejected both requests, reasoning that the police report showed the petitioner and the two others to be associates and that Section 540-A Cr PC did not apply because the petitioner was not an "accused" for that purpose.

The petitioner moved in revision to the higher court challenging the Deputy Magistrate's order. Before the higher court, the Additional District Magistrate (who heard the petitioner's application prior to filing revision) had recommended that the Deputy Magistrate's order be quashed and that a separate trial be ordered as a joint inquiry would be prejudicial to those proceeded against.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the joint trial/enquiry under Section 110 of the Cr PC against the petitioner together with two other persons was permissible or whether a separate enquiry against the petitioner should be ordered.
  2. Whether the notice drawn under Section 112 of the Cr PC was legally valid when a copy of the police report (the substance of the information) was not in fact annexed or served on the petitioner.
  3. Whether the Deputy Magistrate was right to refuse the petitioner's prayers (for a separate trial and for exemption from personal attendance or representation through a pleader).
  4. Whether the mode and breadth of the police report (84 instances across 12 years and 140 witnesses) rendered the charges too vague, indefinite or prejudicial to permit a fair enquiry under Section 110.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner applied for separate consideration and not to be tried jointly with the other two persons, on the ground that a joint trial would cause prejudice to him.
  • The petitioner sought waiver of his personal attendance and permission to be represented by a pleader because he was sick and was unable to attend proceedings likely to take a long time.
  • Through Mr. K. Patnaik the petitioner placed before the court a tabular statement distinguishing the acts alleged against the petitioner alone from those allegedly committed jointly with the others; the petitioner contended that many of the serious acts alleged were attributed to the other two accused, not to him.
  • The petitioner contended that the notice under Section 112 was defective because a copy of the police report was not annexed and because the order failed to set out the substance of the information with sufficient particulars (time, place, details) to enable him to meet the charge.
  • The petitioner reserved the right to move for quashing of proceedings later if proper proceedings were drawn up, conceding that immediate quashing at that stage was not being pressed for absolute finality.

Crown / Respondent (as evidenced in record)

  • The Deputy Magistrate rejected the petitioner's prayers on the ground that the police report showed the petitioner and the other two persons to be associates and that there would be no prejudice or illegality in a joint trial.
  • The Deputy Magistrate rejected the prayer for exemption from personal attendance on the ground that, the petitioner not being an "accused person" for the purposes of Section 540-A Cr PC, that section did not apply.
  • The Advocate General for the Crown did not deny that no copy of the police report had been served (i.e., it was asserted by the petitioner and not denied by the Advocate General that no copy had been served).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Angnoo Singh v. Emperor, A.I.R(10) 1923 All. 35 (24 Cr. L.J 257) It is oppressive to charge defendants together unless the whole of the evidence against all of them is precisely the same. The court relied on this observation to support the conclusion that joint trial should not be ordered where evidence against individuals is not identical and where joint charging would be oppressive to a defendant like the petitioner.
Jai Rao v. Emperor, A.I.R(10) 1923 Pat. 104 (23 Cr. L.J 100) Joint trial is not permissible unless there is evidence of something in the nature of a conspiracy. The court invoked this principle to emphasize that Section 110 matters ordinarily require separate consideration unless there is evidence linking individuals in the nature of a conspiracy.
Deodhari v. Emperor, A.I.R(12) 1925 Pat. 131 (26 Cr. L.J 733) Evidence to prove a charge under Section 110 should not be vague, general or of a hearsay character. The court relied on this authority to criticize the sprawling, vague police report and to underline that the material placed before the Magistrate was inadequate to justify a joint enquiry.
In re Rathinam Pillai, A.I.R(25) 1938 Mad. 35 (39 Cr. L.J 230) A joint enquiry under Section 117(5) (and by analogy joint proceedings under S.110) is inappropriate when at least one charge is that two persons are so desperate and dangerous that their being at large is hazardous; individual characteristics must be proved separately. The court applied this reasoning to hold that there can be no intimate connection between two persons' individual characteristics that would justify a joint inquisition under S.110, and that applying S.110 to local bosses/faction leaders is an abuse.
Kutti Goundan v. Emperor, 47 M.L.J 689 : A.I.R(12) 1926 Mad. 189 : 26 Cr. L.J 673 A notice under Section 110 must contain something more than a reproduction of the clauses of the section; it should indicate time, place and sufficient particulars of the acts charged. The court cited this authority to find the Magistrate's order and the notice defective for failing to set forth the substance of the information and for not annexing the police report.
In re Krupasindhu Nair, 8 M.L.W 416 : A.I.R(5) 1918 Mad. 219 Similar to Kutti Goundan: a Section 110 notice must give adequate indication of the alleged acts (time/place/details) and cannot be mere reproduction of statutory clauses. The court relied on this authority to conclude that the failure to annex the police report and the brevity/vagueness of the order vitiated the notice served on the petitioner.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a step-by-step analysis rooted in the police report and the statutory requirements:

  1. Content of the police report and misalignment with drawn proceedings: The court observed that the police report, if examined, would permit discrimination between the case against the petitioner and that against the other two persons. The report attributes the most violent acts (setting fire, assaulting, killing/maiming, stealing crops, etc.) mainly to the other two accused, while the petitioner was mainly alleged to have extorted documents and driven persons from their houses. The Magistrate had therefore erred by treating the cases as if all accused were similarly implicated.
  2. Personal attribute issue — "desperate & dangerous": The court emphasized that the characteristic of being a "desperate & dangerous character" is a personal attribute and must be proved separately against each individual charged with it. The Magistrate improperly generalized this attribute across all three persons; moreover, the Magistrate drew up proceedings under S.110(a) although the police report was limited to clauses (d), (e) & (f).
  3. Vagueness, multiplicity and hearsay risk: The court criticized the police report's breadth — 84 instances over 12 years and 140 witnesses — observing that such sprawling allegations will be vague, indefinite and largely hearsay. It would be impossible for a person required to meet the charge to know which allegations are to be proved and by which witnesses. This makes fair analysis and adjudication impracticable and prejudicial.
  4. Risk of prejudice in joint trials: The court explained the practical dangers of joint trials in this context — associative evidence or reputation admissible against one may be used against another, mutual recriminations may lead to conviction by association, and an innocent person may be unfairly prejudiced. The court cited authorities (Angnoo Singh, Jai Rao) to demonstrate that joint charging is permissible only when the evidence is essentially identical or when there is a conspiracy linking the accused.
  5. Inadequacy of the Section 112 notice: The court held that an order under Section 112 must set forth the substance of the information received; merely reproducing statutory language without specifying particulars (time/place/facts) is insufficient. The Magistrate failed to annex the police report and did not provide sufficient particulars, a failure the court described as a "grave irregularity" and one that vitiated the proceedings in respect of the petitioner.
  6. Remedial conclusions and moderation: While the court found the notice bad in law and the joint enquiry improper as to the petitioner, it declined to quash all proceedings against the petitioner at that stage as a final act. Instead the court accepted the Additional District Magistrate's recommendation that the joint enquiry against the petitioner cannot proceed and that the prosecution, if advised, may initiate separate proceedings against the petitioner later. The court ordered that the enquiry be confined to the two principal accused (the persons described by the police as "desperate & dangerous") and that any action against the petitioner under Section 110 should await the outcome of that enquiry.

Holding and Implications

REVISION ALLOWED.

The court's dispositive orders and immediate consequences are:

  • The notice under Section 112 of the Cr PC served on the petitioner was held to be bad in law (because it failed to set out the substance of the information and because a copy of the police report was not annexed/served).
  • The interim bond taken from the petitioner was ordered to be discharged.
  • The enquiry under Section 110 of the Cr PC will be confined to the two principal accused described by the police as desperate and dangerous (i.e., the joint enquiry as to those two may proceed), and if the prosecution decides to take action under Section 110 against the petitioner, it must do so by separate proceedings and await the result of the enquiry against those two persons.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is procedural and limited to the parties in this matter — the petitioner's interim bond is discharged, the joint enquiry as it related to him is set aside, and any future enquiry against him under Section 110 must be drawn up separately and may be deferred until after the conclusion of the enquiry against the two principal accused. The opinion does not announce that it sets a new, general precedent beyond applying and reaffirming existing authorities; it relies on earlier decisions to guide the determination that joint proceedings and vague, sprawling police reports are improper under the circumstances.

Disposition

Subject to the modification described above, the revision petition was allowed. (Final line of the record: "Revision allowed.")


Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the contents of the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions have been added beyond those expressly contained in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. The petnr. was served with a notice under Section 112 of the Cr PC, to show cause why he should not be directed to execute a bond to be of good behavior under Section 110 of the Cr PC, for a period of three years. Along with the petnr. two other persons were also impleaded & staved with similar notices & an enquiry M.C No. 647/47 was started against the three persons by the Sub-divisional Mag., Ghumusur. The Police filed a report under Section 110(d), (e) & (f) of the Cr PC against these three persons on 24-9-47, & cited 84 instances of acts of mis-behavior & offences alleged to have been committed or threatened to have been committed by one or the other of the persons named in the report covering a period of over twelve years commencing from 1935. The Police also cited 140 witnesses to be examined to prove the various acts of high-handedness alleged to have been committed at different times by these persons. The Mag. drew up proceedings on the 4th November in the following terms:

“Perused the report of the S.I of Police, Aska & it appears from the Police report that you (1) Krupasindhu Panigrahi (2) Dondia Gowdo, & (3) Baneha Palo of village Horodapadoro, P.S Aska, within the criminal jurisdiction of this Ct., habitually commit theft, extortion, cheating, & mischief & other offences involving a breach of the piece & also are so desperate & dangerous as to render your being at large, without security, hazardous to the community as detailed in the police report (copy enclosed).”

2. You are, therefore, required under Section 110(a), (d), (e) & (f) of the Cr PC to show cause by 11-11-1947 why you Krupasindhu Panigrahi should not be ordered to execute a bond of Rs. 2000 with two sureties for like amount & Dondia Gowdo & Bancha Palo should not be ordered to execute a bond of Rs. 500 etc.… etc.…”

3. Although the order recites that a copy of the Police report is enclosed it is asserted by the petnr. & it is not denied by the learned Advocate General appearing for the Crown—that no such copy has been served upon the petnr. The petnr. appeared in due course & applied to the Deputy Mag. to take up his case separately & not to try him jointly with the two others as he apprehended that prejudice would be caused to him. He also played that his personal attendance may be waived & that he may be permitted to appear through a pleader as he was sick & was not able to attend the proceedings which were likely to occupy a long time. The Deputy Mag. dismissed his petn. & rejected both his prayers on the ground that the Police report showed that the petnr. & the two other persons charged with him were his associates & that there would be no prejudice or illegality in a joint trial. He rejected the petnr.'s prayer for exemption from personal attendance on the ground that the petnr. not being an accused person, Section 540-A of the Cr PC did not apply. It is against this order that the petnr. has now come up in revn. to this Ct. The petnr. also moved the Dist. Mag. before filing his revn. petn. in this Ct., & the Addl. Dist. Mag. who heard his appln., has recommended to this Ct. that the order of the Deputy Mag. should be quashed & that a separate trial should be ordered as, in his opinion, a joint enquiry would be prejudicial to the persons proceeded against:

4. The case against the petnr. as it appears from the Police report, is that he is a rich land, holder & money-lender in village Horodopadoro, under the jurisdiction of the Aska Police Station:

“Since about 12 years he started Increasing & adding to his landed properties by making clandestine purchases from one party or other having disputes on lands & also mad; or attempted to make people quit their lands in his favour by putting them in fear of grievous assault & other kinds of mischief such as rendering them homeless, by setting fire, to their houses & by assulting them with the help of a set of ruffians maintained by him solely for the purpose & also by damaging & stealing their crops through the help of the same ruffians…

Accused 2 & 3 & two mochis who were all persons of the most desperate & dangerous character were the principal henchmen of their leader, accused 1.”

5. It is then alleged that accused 2 & 3 committed “numerous instances of zulums such as setting fire to houses, cutting & carrying away crops from land, committing theft of other properties, assaulting persons, killing & maiming of cattle & of persons with whom their leader & employer had any dispute.”

6. The leader (referring to the petnr. before me) also singly committed high-handedness such as extorting documents, rendering persons homeless, by driving them from their houses, etc. It will be seen from the above that the petnr. himself is not accused of any of the acts falling within cls. (a), (d), (e) & (f) of S. 110. These acts are specifically attributed to the other two accused who are sought to be tried jointly with the petnr. So far as the petnr. himself is concerned, the acts of highhandedness charged against him are

“extorting documents, rendering persons homeless, & by driving them from their houses.”

7. If the Mag. who drew up proceedings against them under S. 110 had only cared to go through this Police Report he would have been able to discriminate the case against the petnr. from that of the rest, & he would not have fallen into the error of holding that joint trial is necessary in the interests of justice. Even according to the Police Report, the petnr. is described as “a leader & employer,” & it is not suggested that he employed these persons to commit the offences sought to be proved against them. The specific allegation of being a “desperate & dangerous character” is made only against the other two persons who are roped in along with the petnr. It is well settled that the Characteristic of being a desperate & dangerous character is a personal attribute & should be proved separately against every individual charged with that attribute. The Mag. appears to have gone further than even what the Police seek to prove inasmuch as he has drawn up proceedings under S. 110(a) while the Police restricted their report to cl. (d), (e) & (f) of that section. It is also passing strange that the Deputy Mag. failed to notice that the evidence required to prove 84 instances extending over a period of 12 years is bound to be vague, indefinite & conflicting, & that it would be impossible for any person called upon to meet the charge to decide which of the allegations have been made out & to what extent. The number of witnesses cited is equally formidable & the Police Report does not, give the least inkling as to which of these allegations is going to be proved and by which bunch of witnesses. If the character of a person cannot be proved to be of the description contemplated under S. 110 by half a dozen witnesses, it cannot be established by no witnesses either. If the object of the Police was to overawe the petnr. & his alleged associates this purpose has been served admirably, but I quite fail to see how a Mag. will be able to analyse the evidence which is bound to be of the character merely of hearsay & suspicion & how he will be able to estimate the character of each of the accused persons.

8. Mr. K. Patnaik, appearing for the petnr. has placed before me a tabular statement of the acts alleged against the petnr. alone & those he is supposed to have been responsible for along with the two other accused persons. The specific acts attributed to the peten. are items 1, 12, 16, 18, 45, 47, 52, 63, 69, 70, 79 & 84 of the tabular statement. These acts range over a period of twelve years. (After discussing these items His Lordship proceeded.)

9. In spite of the fact that an enquiry under Section 110 of the Cr PC is bound to be wide in its scope, I cannot understand how a person accused of such elastic, sprawling & pervasive charges as those cited against the petnr. in this case can ever hope to meet them & convince a Ct. that he is not a threat to the community at large. Time & again the Cts. have registered their protest against a free & indiscrimate use of this section. Reported cases show that the Police appeal to this section for bringing down a person whom they otherwise cannot harass. Instead of investigating into particular offences (& bringing the offender to book, recourse is had to the security sections in order to humble local dictators or oppressive money-lenders. The growing tendency of trying to humiliate persons who assume the role of local dictators instead of prosecuting them for substantive offences itself suggests that this loose practice constitutes a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice. The rule of evidence laid down in S. 117(4) makes it all the more difficult to try persons without prejudice to an innocent man. When the prosecution chooses to array a hotchpotch of acts described as “threats & instigations” it is extremely difficult for a Mag. to control or analyse the evidence & to estimate its effect on each of the persons standing trial in proof of so sprawling a charge as “being a dangerous & desperate character.” Evidence of bad reputation is often admissible only on the assumption that the person accused has a bad reputation & that he is an associate of the other persons. The result is that if the other two persons have a local bad reputation or are dangerous & desperate the mere inclusion of the petnr. as an associate of the other two petnrs., makes the entire evidence admissible against the petnr. There generally will be some evidence of wrong-doing by some of the persons but it is extremely difficult for an individual accused to make his own case stand on its own merits as Mags, are only too prone to believe that birds of the same feather look together. It is therefore imperative to ascertain before permitting a joint trial that the birds belong to the same feather. According to the prosecution report, the petnr. is a rich landlord & owner of bus service & is otherwise highly respectable. According to the petnr. the present proceedings have been initiated by the Police at the instance of his political rivals. If therefore he chooses to dissociate himself from the two other accused jointly with him, & tries to throw the blame on the others, the inevitable consequence will follow that the other two will try to throw the entire blame on the petnr. A Ct. faced thus with mutual accusations & recriminations between persons standing their trial, is apt to hold that all the three are responsible for the acts of each one of them. The result will inevitably off that persona jointly tried often convict each other. If, on the other hand, the petnr. chooses to stand alone & is silent, he will be taken to have admitted the accusations made against him or his associates. In either event, the result will be disastrous to the petnr. & there cannot be a fair trial. I am in entire agreement with the observation of Walsh J., in Angnoo Singh v. Emperor, reported in A.I.R(10) 1923 All. 35 : (24 Cr. L.J 257) that it seems very hard—almost oppressive—to any set of defts. to charge them together unless the whole of the evidence against all of them is precisely the same. To the same effect is the case reported in Jai Rao v. Emperor, A.I.R(10) 1923 Pat. 104 : (23 Cr. L.J 100), where it was laid down that a joint trial is not permissible unless there is evidence of something in the nature of a conspiracy. Ordinarily, under Section 110 of the Cr PCJ. every person has to be tried separately for the offences enumerated therein. Mr. Patnaik relied upon Deodhari v. Emperor, in A.I.R(12) 1925 Pat. 131 : (26 Cr. L.J 733) where it was laid down that the evidence to prove a charge under S. 110 should not be vague generally & of a hearsay character & In re Rathinam Pillai, A.I.R(25) 1938 Mad. 35 : (39 Cr. L.J 230) where Newsam J., generally kid down that at joint enquiry under S. 117(5) is out of question when one charge at least is that two persons are so desperate & dangerous as to render their being at large hazardous to the community. There certainly can be no such intimate connection between two individuals in regard to their individual characteristics as to render them liable to joint inquisition. It was further held in that case that to apply S. 110 to local bosses & faction leaders is undoubtedly to abuse it. The section is intended to apply to criminal maniacs & desperados against whom the only weapon to be used is the weapon of public opinion.

10. I have, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that the reference made by the Addl, Dist. Mag. that the joint enquiry against the petnr. along with the other two persons, cannot proceed, & that the police, if so advised, may initiate separate proceedings against the petnr., alone, should be accepted.

11. Mr. Patnaik also complained that the order drawn up by the Mag. is all-too brief, vague & indefinite & does not give any clue to the petnr. as to the acts charged against him. An order under S. 112 is not a formal order but is intended to give sufficient notice to the individual against whom the order is made, of the accusation made against him. The section in specific terms says that the order shall set forth the substance of the information received. The Mag. who drew up the proceedings has entirely ignored that requirements of this section in so far as he has failed to set out the substance of the information before him. The failure to annex a copy of the Police report is itself a grave irregularity which, in the circumstances of this case, must be held to have vitiated the proceedings. The order does not comply with the provisions of the Code & is bad in law. For a similar case, reference may be made to Kutti Goundan v. Emperor, 47 M.L.J 689 : (A.I.R(12) 1926 Mad. 189 : 26 Cr. L.J 673) and In re Krupasindhu Nailc, 8 M.L.W 416 : (A.I.R(5) 1918 Mad. 219), wherein Kemaraswami J., observed that a notice under Section 110 of the Cr PC must contain something more than a re-production of the clauses of that section. There should be sufficient indication of the time & place of the acts charged & sufficient detail which should enable the accused to know the facts that he has to meet. It should be remembered that the petnr. is put on his trial on information received behind his back, extending over a period of 12 years or more. Had the proceedings started on a private complaint he would have been entitled to copy thereof, but in the case of a police report, such as the one placed before me, the petnr. gets no clue as to the dates when the persons in respect of whom, & the nature of the acts which one alleged to have been committed by him. I have no doubt in my mind that the-notice served on the petnr. is bad in law & is of no effect. But whether that would justify the quashing of the proceedings altogether at this stage is a matter on which I am not prepared to hazard an opinion. There is no legal proceeding against the petnr. according to the view I have taken & the question of quashing the proceedings does not arise. Mr. Patnaik has therefore, very adroitly conceded that if & when proper proceedings are drawn up against the petnr. he will take the earliest opportunity of raising this question again & wanted to-reserve liberty to move this Ct. for quashing of proceedings later. I think that this is the only-reasonable course to adopt at present. I should, however, like to observe that the Dist. Mag., or the Head of the Police who is responsible for the initiation of these proceedings should very seriously consider the propriety of clubbing together acts, real or imaginary, extending over such a long period & trying to prove them at great expense & waste of time. It is-preposterous to suggest that a case cannot be-proved except by examining as many as 140 witnesses. I shudder to think how long this, enquiry will occupy if all the witnesses are to be examined, having regard to the leisurely way in which the Prosecuting Officers conduct even petty cases in the Cts. below. It will be the duty of the officers in charge of the prosecution to shift the evidence & reduce the number of witnesses to the minimum possible in the interests of fairness of trial & in order to save-avoidable waste of time & money. The enquiry will now be confined to the case against Dandi Gowdo & Bancha Palo alone & if the prosecution ultimately decides to take action under Section 110 of the Cr PC, against the petnr. also, they must await the result of the enquiry against, Dandia Gowdo & Bancha Palo. It may perhaps be that as a result of the enquiry against these-two persons the prosoeution may find that the evidence againt the petnr. is too exiguous, to sustain an order under S. 110. That however, is a matter for the prosecutor to decide. So fat-as this revn. petn. is concerned the order will be that the notice under Section 112 of the Cr PC served on the petnr. is bad in law & the interim bond taken from him should be discharged; that any enquiry under S. 110 against him should be separately undertaken & should await the result of the enquiry against the two principal accused, who, according to the Police, are desperate & dangerous characters. Subject to this modification this revn. is allowed.

D.B.R

12. Revision allowed.