R.C Patnaik, J.:— This is an application by the brother of detenu Babu @ Pratap Sahoo for a writ of habeas corpus quashing the order of detention dated 1-8-1987 (Annexure-1) passed by the District Magistrate, Cuttack (opposite party No. 3) under the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Nation-al Security Act, 1980.

2. The ground of detention dated 3-8-1987 as per Annexure-2 furnished to the detenu reads as under:

“On 29-7-1987 at about 9.30 P.M while Minaketan Muduli, owner of Mangala Hotel, Badambadi was returning to his house in a Scooter with his servant Rabindra Bhola carrying a Black and White portable T.V (Konark Gitanjali), yourself going on a rickshaw met them near their house at Badambadi. While Minaketan was keeping the Scooter inside the house, you enquired from his servant as to who was the owner of the T.V. When the servant replied that the T.V belongs to Minakatan, you directed him with threats to keep the T.V in your rickshaw. As he did not pay any heed to your direction you theatened him by showing knife, snatched away the T.V and kept it in your rickshaw. When Minaketan enquired as to why you were taking away the T.V you remind-ed him that earlier he had not paid you Rs. 50.00 ‘Dada Chanda’. He (Minaketan) should therefore pay Rs. 1,000.00 and take back the T.V saying so you went away with the T.V in the rickshaw towards Jhanjiri-mangala side hurling the knife. Thereafter Minaketan followed you with his servant and younger brother. Near Jhanjirimangala Labour Colony Gada when he stopped your rickshaw you challenged him and attack-ed him with your knife. When Minaketan tried to save himself, the knife pierced his left thigh causing injury. Again when you tried to strike him with the knife, he went to the other side of the Scooter, as a result the knife hit the Scooter causing two scratches. Though Minaketan raised alarm and called for help, none did venture to come to his rescue including his servant as you chased them hurling the knife with abuses and threats. Due to such action of yours people on the road ran away helter and skelter. People going by rickshaws and scooters on that road also fled away out of fear and flow of vehicular traffic was paralysed., The nearby shop-keepers closed down their shops. The road became isolated when none did come to his rescue. Minaketan ran towards the Bus stand leaving the Scooter to save his life. On the way he met three policemen and narrated them the incident. On hearing this all of them came towards the spot. Seeing the policemen you came forward to attack them with the knife. But the policemen chased you hurling their lathis and blowing whistle you ran towards Jhanjirimangala side throwing away the knife. In the meantime the rickshaw puller had also left the place with his rickshaw leaving the T.V on the road. Due to such action of yours the public peace and tranquility was jeopardised. This incident refers to Madhupatna P.S Case No. 120 dated 29-7-1957 U/s. 394/353.I.P.C

The antisocial and violent activities mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs have adversely affected the even tempo of life of the community and disturbed public peace and order.”

3. The order of detention was approved by the State Government on 11-8-1987 and was confirmed on 19-9-1957 by the State Government. Representation of the detenu bore no fruit. The Advisory Board were of the opinion that there was sufficient cause for his detention. Hence this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Though the attack on the order of detention was multi pronged, we propose to dispose of the writ application on a short ground, namely, if the acts of the detenu alleged to have been committed by him were prejudicial to public order and his detention was warranted with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance thereof. The ground of detention discloses that the District Magistrate was satisfied from the solitary event that took place around 9.30 p.m on 29-7-1987 that he was to be prevented from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order by detaining him under the provisions of National Security Act.

4. In Ram Monohar Lohia v. State of Bihar . A.I.R 1965 S.C 740. Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) elucidated the concept of ‘public order’ by an observation which has by now become classic:—

“One has to imagine three concentric circles. The law and order represents the largest circle within which the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of the State. It is then easy to say that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not the security of the State.”

5. In Sushanta Goswami's case . 1969 1 SCC 273, the Supreme Court observed:—

“The contravention of law always affects public order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to dis-order is not necessarily sufficient for action under the Act but a disturbance which will affect public order can alone justify the detention under that Act.”

6. In Madhu Limaye v. Sub-divisional Magistrate, Monghyr . 1970 3 SCC 746 Hidayatullah, C.J speaking for the Constitution Bench observed:—

“……the expression ‘in the interest of public order’ in the Constitution is capable of taking within itself not only those acts which disturb the security of the State or act within order publique, as described but also certain acts which disturb public tranquillity or are breaches of the peace. It is not necessary to give the expression a narrow meaning because, as has been observed, the expression in the interest of public order is very wide.”

7. In Kanu Biswas v. State Of West Bengal . 1972 3 SCC 831, the Supreme Court held:—

“The question whether a man has only commit-ted a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the act upon the society. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order as laid down in the above case (Arun Ghosh v. State Of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 98 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 1228) is: Does it lend to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquillity of society undisturbed?”

8. In Babul Mitra v. State of West Bengal . 1973 1 SCC 393, the Supreme Court observed:—

“the act by itself is not determinative of its own gravity. In its quality, it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different.”

9. In Kuso Shah v. State of Bihar . 1974 1 SCC 185, it was observed:

“It being well established that stray and unorganised crimes of theft and assaults are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law arc bound in some measure to lead to disorder but everyinfraction of law does not necessarily result in public order. As observed in Pushbar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal ((1969) 2 SCC 528 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 352), the line of demarcation must be drawn between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and relatively minor breaches of peace of purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense, public interest.”

10. In Ram Ranjan Chatterjee v. State Of West Bengal . 1975 4 SCC 143 the same view was reiterated with the following words:

“If the contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distin-guished from a wide spectrum of public it would raise a problem of law and order only”

11. A solitary act which ordinarily would be a case of disturbance of law and order might in a different situation and circumstances cause different reactions and disturb public tranquillity, the even tempo of life of the community. When communal tension is high, an indiscreet act of no significance is likely to disturb or dislocate the even tempo of the life of the community. An order of detention made in such a situation has to take note of the potentiality of the act objected to—see State Of U.P v. Hari Shankar Tewari . . 1987 2 SCC 490.

12. Against the backdrop of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the catena of cases referred to above, the act of the detenu has to be judged. The detenu, it is alleged, had earlier demanded Rs. 50/- as ‘Dada Chanda’ from Minaketan and on 29-7-1987 in the evening forcibly removed a black & white T.V set from the possession of his servant by show of force and carried the same in rickshaw threatening Minaketan and his servant with a knife and attacked Minaketan on his left thigh. The alleged act of removal of the T.V set and the threats and assault were confined to Minaketan and not to members of public at large. The reach and effect of the act was not so extensive as to affect considerable members of the society. The alleged act was an act infringing law and order but did not disturb public tranquillity. It had not the potentiality to create any terror or panic in the minds of the public of the locality at large nor did it affect in any manner the even tempo of life of the community—see Subhash Bhandari v. District Magistrate, Lucknow . 1987 4 SCC 685.

13. In Ramveer Jatav v. State of U.P . 1986 4 SCC 762, the detenu along with his companion jointly committed murder of one Atmaram by firing at him in broad daylight with the object of getting the land vacated by him. The Supreme Court observed that “it cannot be laid down as a bald proposition that one ground can never be sufficient for founding the satisfaction of the detaining authority for detaining a person. There are cases where one ground may be regarded as sufficient if the activity alleged is of such a nature that the detaining authority could reasonably infer that the detenu must be habitually engaged in such activity or there may be other circumstances set out in the grounds of detention from which the detaining authority could reasonably be satisfied even on the basis of one ground unless the detenu is detained, he might indulge in such activity in future”. It was held that the only ground was that the petitioner along with others jointly committed murder of Atmaram in broad day-light. There was no other circumstances from which an inference could be drawn that the petitioner was likely to do such act in future, if left free.

14. In Fazal Ghosi v. State of U.P . 1987 3 SCC 502, the detenu addressed the people returning from the Mosque at Faizabad in Ayodhya after Ram Janam Bhumi temple was opened, in language inciting them to beat the police and police Constabulary. As a consequence the crowd started pelting stones and discharged fire arras on the Government officials and police personnel. The Supreme Court observed:

“There is no doubt that preventive detention is not intended as a punitive measure, as a curtailment of liberty by way of punishment for an offence already committed. Section 3 of the Act clearly indicates that the power to detain thereunder can be exercised only with a view to preventing a person from acting in a manner which may prejudice any of the considerations set forth in the Section. In the present case, we are unable to discover any material to show that the detenus would act in the future to the prejudice of the maintenance of public order. Even if it is accepted that they did address the assembly of persons and incited them to lawlessness there is no material to warrant the interference that they would repeat the misconduct or do anything else which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The District Magistrate, it is true, has stated that the detention of the detenus was effected because he was satisfied that it was necessary to prevent them from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of public order, but there is no reference to any material in support of that satisfaction. We are aware that the satisfaction of the District Magistrate is subjective in nature, but even subjective satisfaction must be based upon some pertinent material. We are concerned here not with the sufficiency of that material but with the existence of any relevant material at all.”

15. The ground furnished to the detenu was a solitary event relating to Minaketan. and his servant. There was no material before the District Magistrate that the detenu was habitually engaged in such activity or unless prevented by detention he would indulge in similar act in the community at large in future. This is not a case of solitary act like dacoity in running train or a bus or the act as in Subal Chandra Ghosh v. State of West Bengal . 1972 4 SCC N 9 or in Narayan Debnath v. State Of West Bengal . 1975 4 SCC 508 The materials did not disclose that the detenu had a tendency to disturb the even tempo of life in the com-munity. We are of the view that the solitary act complained of could not form the basis of satisfaction of the detaining authority that unless detained the detenu would indulge in such act in future or that the act shall disturb public order. We, therefore, quash the order of detention as per Annexure-1 and direct that the detenu Babu @ Pratap Sahoo be set at liberty forthwith. We close our judgment with the following observa-tions from Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan . A.I.R 1964 S.C 334 which are opposite and should guide the detaining authority while acting under the provisions of the Act:

“The first stage in the process is to examine the material adduced against a person to show either from his conduct or his antecedent history that he has been acting in a prejudicial manner. If the said material appears satisfactory to the authority, then the authority has to consider whether it is likely that the said person would act in a prejudicial manner in future if he is not prevented from doing so by an order of detention. If this question is answer-ed against the petitioner, then the detention order can be properly made”

V. Gopalaswamy, J.:— I agree.

16. Application allowed.