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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Frontline Software And Services P. Ltd.

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mar 26, 2007
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Court Opinion Summary — M.A.I.T. No. 133 of 2006 (Decided March 26, 2007)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by the Revenue under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 against the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Indore dated May 26, 2006. The assessee, having filed its return for accounting year 1996-97, debited Rs. 6,20,000 in the profit and loss account as "Technical know-how". The amount was paid to NIIT Ltd., New Delhi pursuant to an agreement dated February 10, 1995, in connection with the assessee's venture to start a computer training centre in collaboration with NIIT.

The Assessing Officer treated the payment as capital expenditure under section 35AB of the Act, allowed only 1/6th deduction in the year of account and added the balance (Rs. 6,20,000 less 1/6th) to the total income; penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) were initiated for furnishing inaccurate particulars. The assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who allowed the deduction claimed by the assessee. The Revenue's subsequent appeal to the Tribunal was dismissed. The Revenue then invoked this appeal to the High Court, contending a substantial question of law regarding applicability of the Explanation to section 35AB.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the payment of Rs. 6,20,000 described as "technical know-how" paid to NIIT Ltd. is capital expenditure within the meaning of section 35AB of the Income-tax Act and therefore deductible only as 1/6th in the relevant year with the remainder to be spread over subsequent years under the Explanation to section 35AB?
  2. Whether the Explanation to section 35AB—that defines "know-how" as industrial information or technique likely to assist in manufacture/processing of goods or in the working of mines, oil wells or other sources of mineral deposits—applies to the assessee's payment made for assistance in running a computer training/educational activity?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Revenue) Arguments

  • The payment made to NIIT Ltd. was a fee for technical know-how and should be treated as capital expenditure under section 35AB of the Act and its Explanation; therefore only 1/6th should have been debited in the year of account and the remainder spread.
  • The Explanation to section 35AB should have "full application" if the activities of the assessee are properly scrutinized; the matter raises a substantial question of law.
  • Relied on precedents (notably Southern Switch Gear Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P.) to support the contention that payments for technical collaboration/intellectual property can amount to capital expenditure or be treated as "technical know-how".

Respondent's (Assessee) Position

  • The amount was paid for technical assistance from NIIT in respect of establishing and operating a computer training centre—services and know-how for education/training rather than industrial manufacture or processing of goods.
  • The Explanation to section 35AB applies only where the know-how is likely to assist in manufacture/processing of goods or in working of mines, oil wells or other mineral sources; the assessee's activities are limited to imparting computer training and coaching students and therefore do not fall within that Explanation.
  • The Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal accepted the assessee's position on these factual and legal grounds.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Southern Switch Gear Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, [1998] 232 ITR 359 Held that a collaboration agreement providing technical aid to set up a factory and rights to sell products was capital expenditure (treated as technical know-how relevant to manufacture). The court distinguished this case because in the present matter no finding exists that the assessee ran a factory or used the know-how for manufacturing/processing; therefore Southern Switch Gear was held not to apply to these facts.
Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P., [2004] 271 ITR 401 (SC); (2005) 1 SCC 308 Held that intellectual property (software) may be "goods" for purposes of Sales Tax Act and article 366(12) — thus taxable under sales tax law. The court noted this precedent but observed it concerned sales tax and constitutional definition of "goods"; it did not alter the clear, contextual definition of "technical know-how" in section 35AB for income-tax purposes, and thus it did not change the analysis for the present case.
Sardar Gurmej Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon, AIR 1960 SC 122 Principle: construction of a section must be made of all parts together; phrases are to be construed according to grammar. Relied upon to support the textual reading of the Explanation to section 35AB as a whole and not to isolate parts of the provision; used to justify interpreting "technical know-how" in its statutory context.
Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai, (1991) 3 SCC 410 : AIR 1991 SC 1581 Stated that a section must be read in its entirety as a composite unit without bifurcation or omission. Applied to affirm that the Explanation must be read in full and given its plain meaning; the court emphasized reading the statutory text as enacted.
Balasinor Nagrik Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606 : AIR 1987 SC 849 Reiterated that construction of a section must be made of all parts together and no part can be omitted. Used to support the same textualist approach to the Explanation to section 35AB.
Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. v. State of M.P., (2006) 12 SCC 468 Principle: where words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous and admit only one meaning, that meaning must be given effect irrespective of consequences; courts should not substitute hypothetical constructions. The court relied on this principle to hold that the clear statutory definition of "know-how" must be applied as written; therefore only know-how likely to assist manufacture/processing or mining activities falls within the Explanation.
State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 437; Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271; Sussex Peerage (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 Support for the proposition that clear statutory language should be given its natural and ordinary sense. These authorities were cited as part of the textualist canon adopted by the court; they reinforced the conclusion that the Explanation's plain meaning controls the outcome.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The court began by reproducing and focusing on the Explanation to section 35AB, which defines "know-how" as "any industrial information or technique likely to assist in the manufacture or processing of goods or in the working of a mine, oil well or other sources of mineral deposits (including the searching for, discovery or testing of deposits or the winning of access thereto)."

2. The court examined the factual findings in the assessment order, in the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and in the Tribunal's order. Those factual findings established that the assessee's activities were confined to imparting computer training (coaching students) and that NIIT provided software-related assistance and teacher training. There was no finding by the assessing authority, the appellate authority or the Tribunal that the information received was likely to assist in manufacture or processing of goods, or in activities concerning mines, oil wells or similar mineral operations.

3. Applying established principles of statutory interpretation (as cited in the precedents above), the court held that the Explanation to section 35AB is specific and unambiguous in scope: it applies to know-how that is likely to assist manufacturing/processing or mining-related activities. The court emphasized that when statutory language is plain and admits only one meaning, that meaning must be given effect.

4. The court considered authorities relied upon by the Revenue. Southern Switch Gear was distinguished on facts because it concerned collaboration for setting up a factory and rights to sell products (manufacturing context), which is absent here. Tata Consultancy Services was noted to concern the meaning of "goods" for sales tax and constitutional purposes and therefore did not alter the statutory meaning of "technical know-how" in the income-tax provision under consideration.

5. Concluding from the factual record and the textual analysis, the court determined that the Explanation to section 35AB does not apply to the present payment made for educational/training purposes, and the Tribunal's factual conclusion that the payment was not capital expenditure under section 35AB was upheld.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that no substantial question of law is involved and accordingly the appeal by the Revenue was dismissed as being bereft of merit.

Implications:

  • The decision upholds the Tribunal's conclusion that the sum of Rs. 6,20,000 paid to NIIT Ltd. for technical assistance in relation to running a computer training centre did not fall within the Explanation to section 35AB and therefore was not required to be treated as capital expenditure under that provision.
  • Direct effect on the parties: the assessee's treatment (as accepted by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal) stands; the Revenue's challenge failed.
  • The court did not lay down any new expansive precedent altering the scope of section 35AB; it applied the statutory definition to the facts and affirmed the textual approach to interpretation.

Show all summary ...

M.A.I.T No. 133 of 2006

Decided on March 26, 2007

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.K Gupta, J.:— The present appeal has been preferred by the Revenue under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for brevity “the Act”) assailing the order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Indore (in short “the Tribunal”) on May 26, 2006.

2. The facts in a nutshell are that the assessee by filing the return for the accounting year 1996-97, in the profit and loss account had debited a sum of Rs. 6,20,000 under the head of “Technical know-how”. The aforesaid amount was paid to NIIT Ltd., New Delhi in pursuance of the agreement dated February 10, 1995. According to the Revenue, the sum so paid, being a fee, is in the nature of capital expenditure and the assessee ought to have debited only 1/6th of the above sum in the profit and loss account in terms of section 35AB of the Act and the balance should have been spread into subsequent five years. The assessee had started a computer training centre in collaboration with NIIT Ltd., New Delhi. Pursuant to the agreement dated February 10, 1995, the assessee had to give a technical know-how fee to M/s. NIIT Ltd. The assessee paid the technical know-how fee in terms of the agreement for getting technical assistance from NIIT Ltd. in the field of processes, practices, techniques, procedures relating to site selection and evaluation, architectural plans and drawings, equipment specifications, assistance in selection of marketing and technical staff, support during the launch of operation etc. scheduling and administering education and methods and procedures of examining the standards attained by students, on-going marketing and technical support, special methods of using certain common educational aids, provision of technical reference material relating to the form and content of education and precommencement training of faculty, which is confidential to and owned by the licensor.

3. By virtue of article 2 of the agreement, the licensor is the NIIT Ltd. and the licensee is the present assessee. The Assessing Officer has not permitted to debit the said amount and treated the same as capital expenditure under section 35AB of the Act. Consequently, the said amount of Rs. 6,20,000 was added to the total income and penalty proceedings under section 271(1)(c) of the Act were initiated for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The assessing authority permitted deduction of 1/6th of the above amount in the year for which account was furnished.

4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the appellate authority allowed the said debit as claimed by the assessee. The appellate authority decided the said issue in favour of the assessee on the basis of the assessment of the predecessor M/s. A.K Computers & Services Ltd. of the assessee with regard to the assessment year 1990-91 in terms to the appellate order dated August 4, 1993, a detail of which is given in paragraph 7.1 of the order.

“The Revenue preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal preferred by the Revenue and held that the investment of the amount of Rs. 6,20,000 cannot be treated to be a capital expenditure. The reasons which have been given by the Appellate Tribunal are that the Explanation appended to section 35AB shall have no application in the present case as the activities of the assessee do not come within the purview of the Explanation as aforesaid. Under the circumstances, the stand taken by the assessee was accepted that the said amount is paid for educational institution imparting training in computer operation, therefore, it would not fall within the definition of technical know-how “as per the Explanation to section 35AB.”

5. The present appeal has been preferred by the Revenue alleging that in the present appeal a substantial question of law is involved inasmuch as the Explanation attached to section 35AB shall have full application if the activities of the assessee are properly scrutinized and understood.

6. Before considering the arguments canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant, it Would be profitable to refer to the Explanation to section 35AB of the Act. The Explanation reads as under:

“Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘know-how’ means any industrial information or technique likely to assist in the manufacture or processing of goods or in the working of a mine, oil well or other sources of mineral deposits (including the searching for, discovery or testing of deposits or the winning of access thereto).”

7. Keeping in view the aforesaid Explanation, if the activities of the present assessee are taken into account then the assessing authority has not held in his assessment order that the information which is received is likely to assist in the manufacturing or processing of goods or in the working of a mine, oil well or other sources of mineral deposits, etc. The Assessing Officer in his order of assessment has taken into account the activities which are carried out by the assessee. The nature of activities carried out by the assessee is reflected in paragraphs 5 and 5.1 of the order of assessment passed by the Assessing Officer. The said activities have also been considered by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in his order annexure A-2 and in paragraph 7.1 thereof, keeping in view the activities run by the assessee the appellate authority concluded that NIIT provides basic software and also trains their teachers who ultimately are responsible for coaching the students enrolled in their colleges and so section 35AB was not applicable. This aspect of the matter was also considered by the Tribunal and on such consideration of the activities, the Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion that the activities of the assessee are not covered by the Explanation to section 35AB of the Act.

8. The definition of the term “technical know-how” is very specific. According to the said definition, it means industrial information or technique which is likely to assist in the manufacture or processing of goods or in the working of a mine, oil well or other sources of mineral deposits and so on would be covered by the words ‘technical know-how’. In the present case, keeping in view the findings of fact arrived at, the assessee is not carrying out any activity of manufacture or processing of goods. The assessee is also not carrying out any mining activity or other activities which are mentioned in the said Explanation. The assessee is only carrying out the activity of imparting training in computer operation. The information as such is being used for the purposes of coaching the students enrolled in their colleges. There is no scope of ambiguity in the Explanation which defines the words “technical know-how”.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the decision of the apex court in Southern Switch Gear Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, [1998] 232 ITR 359. In the said judgment, the collaboration agreement with the foreign company for grant of technical aid for setting up factory and right to sell products was treated to be a capital expenditure. In the present case, all the authorities; the Assessing Officer, the appellate authority and the Appellate Tribunal have not recorded any finding that the technical know-how, i.e, information which is being received by the assessee is being utilised for the purposes of any assistance in the factory. There is no finding that the assessee is running any factory. There is also not a finding that any manufacturing or processing is being done by the assessee. Therefore, the judgment passed by the apex court in Southern Switch Gear Ltd., [1998] 232 ITR 359 will have no application to the case at hand.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the apex court in Tata Consultancy Services v. State Of A.P, [2004] 271 ITR 401 (SC); (2005) 1 SCC 308 has held that intellectual property is also a goods and is marketable, therefore, intellectual property such as software and medium would be covered under the definition of the words “technical know-how”. The judgment so relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant relates to the case where intellectual property was under consideration for the purposes of the Sales Tax Act and also for the purposes of article 366(12) of the Constitution of India. The apex court held that intellectual property (software) shall also be “goods”. Therefore, for the purposes of sales tax it being goods, sales tax is chargeable. In this context, paragraphs 78, 79 and 80 of Tata Consultancy Services v. State Of A.P, [2004] 271 ITR 401 (SC); (2005) 1 SCC 308 would be relevant. The apex court has held that once the provision in the statute which has a reference shall be taken into account in a case when there is no ambiguity. The definition of the words “technical know-how” by treating it to be an intellectual property as “goods” may be taxable for the purposes of sales tax. The question is whether the same is permissible for the purposes of taxing it under the Income-tax Act. The definition as such is clear. While interpreting, the language used in a taxing statute which has the context has to be interpreted in the manner in which it is provided with reference to a statute until the language as such is not plain or is ambiguous. The courts are open to construe them in their ordinary sense with reference to other clauses of the Act or the rules.

11. The apex court in Sardar Gurmej Singh v. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon , AIR 1960 SC 122, with regard to interpretation of statutes and construction of the section has held that construction of a section is to be made of all the parts together and not of one part only by itself, and phrases are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. The apex court in paragraph 9 (page 124) has held as under:

“It is an elementary rule that construction of a section is to be made of all the parts together and not of one part only by itself, and that phrases are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. So construed the meaning of the clause is fairly clear. The genus is the ‘revenue officer’, and the ‘including’ and ‘excluding’ clauses connected by the conjunction ‘but’ show that the village accountants are included in the group of revenue officers, but the other village officers are excluded therefrom. If X includes A but excludes B, it may simply mean that X takes in A but ejects B. It is not necessary in this case to consider whether the inclusive definition enlarges the meaning of the words ‘revenue officers’, or makes them explicit and clear, viz., that the enumerated officers are within the fold of ‘revenue officers’; for, in either construction the village accountants would be revenue officers. But we cannot, accept the argument that what is excluded was not part of that from which it is excluded, and that lambardars were not revenue officers and yet had to be excluded by way of abundant caution. If so, it follows that the village officers, who included lambardars, were excluded from the group of revenue officers, with the result that they are freed from the disqualification imposed by the provisions of the said clause.”

12. The apex court in Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai, (1991) 3 SCC 410 : AIR 1991 SC 1581, while dealing with the principles with regard to the interpretation of statutes held in paragraph 6 that while interpreting the statute the section has to be read in its entirety as one composite unit without bifurcating it or ignoring any part of it. On the basis of the same, it is clear that a plain reading of the section and its interpretation has to be taken out with regard to the applicability and also to understand the expression of the Legislature used while enacting the law. The apex court in Balasinor Nagrik Co-op. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606 : AIR 1987 SC 849, in paragraph 4 (page 851) held as under:

“It is an elementary rule that construction of a section is to be made of all parts together. It is not permissible to omit any part of it. For, the principle that the statute must be read as a whole is equally applicable to different parts of the same section.”

13. The apex court in Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. v. State of M.P, (2006) 12 SCC 468; [2007] ILR (MP Series) 170 considering the earlier judgments passed by the apex court has observed that the plain or unambiguous and clear meaning of the statute which gives only one meaning has to be given effect to irrespective of its consequences. The apex court in paragraphs 26, 27, 28 and 29 observed as under:

“26. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e, they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. (See : State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh, (2005) 10 SCC 437; Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta., (2005) 2 SCC 271).

27. In Sussex Prerage case, [1844] 11 Cl & Fin 85; 8 ER 1034, 1057 at page 143. Tindal C.J observed as follows:

“if the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do in such case best declare the intention of the lawgiver.

28. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.

29. As observed in Nathi Devi's case, (2005) 2 SCC 271 if the words used are capable of on construction, only, then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly be not given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act.”

14. On the basis of the aforesaid decisions rendered by the apex court, we are required to see whether the definition “technical know-how” is applicable in the manner as argued by learned counsel for the appellant then the legislative intent which is reflected in the Explanation attached to section 35AB shall become meaningless. It is so, because the Legislature has intended for the purposes of covering the said amount towards the income and the revenue expenditure. The intention of the Legislature would be clear if the Explanation as such is read. The utilization of the technical know-how would only be relevant with reference to the context if the said technical know-how is relevant to assist the assessee with regard to manufacturing or processing of goods or in the working of a mine, oil well or other sources of mineral deposits (including the searching for, discovery or testing of deposits or the winning of access thereto). Having regard to the nature of the Explanation to section 35AB the chargeable income or allowing a debit or not or to make the payment to be treated as a capital expenditure has to be understood with reference to the context of the legislative intent. It is not the legislative intent that the use of the words “technical know-how” for the purposes other than not covered by the Explanation would also be treated as the capital expenditure on which tax is leviable. The “technical know-how” by itself would not be enough until such technical know-how is likely to assist for the manufacturing or processing of goods. In the present case, the assessee admittedly has not been found to have indulged into the activities of manufacturing or processing of goods which could be said that such technical know-how is likely to assist the assessee with regard to the activities including any mine and other activities referred to in the said Explanation. The assessee is utilising the said technical know-how for imparting training in the computer operation for coaching the students which is neither manufacture nor processing of goods. The activity as such is also not an activity of a mine, oil well or other sources of mineral deposits (including the searching for, discovery or testing of deposits or the winning of access thereto).

15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that no substantial question of law is involved in the present appeal and accordingly the appeal is dismissed being bereft of merit.